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NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS, 1998 - 1999
Miscellaneous Deduction Limitatiou - Revocable Trusts. In O'Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d
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302 (6th cir. 1993), revg. 98 T.C. 227 (1992), the court held that expenses necessary for trust administration were not
subject to the 2% limit on miscellaneous itemized deductions under section 67. The trust considered in O'Neill was
not a grantor trust. Are the considerations the same?
The issue arose in Susan L. Bayv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-411, and the Court answered no:
We turn our attention first to the status ofthe trust for Federal income tax purposes.
In petitioner's brief, as a general criticism of respondent's position, and with
reference to the trust restrictions on the distribution of corpus, petitioner states:
[respondent] fails to note that in the instant case although the form of * * * [the
trust] is that ofa grantor's trust, in substance it is similar to an irrevocable trust or
mutual fund." According to petitioner, we should consider the trust as other than
a grantor trust. Petitioner's reliance upon section 67(e) and O'Neill v.
Commissioner, supra, is consistent with treating the trust as other than a grantor
trust. However, such treatment is inconsistent with the stipulation of facts, in
which petitioner agreed not only that the trust "is a grantor trust," but further, in
apparent reliance upon section 671, that "each item ofincome and expense [ofthe
trust] is reported individually by the grantor." Considering the trust as other than
a grantor trust is also inconsistent with the manner in which petitioner reported the
items of income and deductions attributable to the trust on her 1993 and 1994
Federal income tax returns. Furthermore, the restrictions on the distribution of
trust corpus, do not, as petitioner suggests, remove the trust from the provisions of
section 671. See Sec. 677. The trust is a grantor trust, and the positions of the
parties will be considered accordingly.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, section 67(e) does not and cannot apply to
grantor trusts. Because the items ofincome and deductions are passed through to
the grantor, the adjusted gross income ofa grantor trust, in effect, is not a viable
notion either conceptually under the relevant statutory scheme, or for reporting
purposes. Pursuant to section 671, petitioner, as a grantor ofthe trust, is required
to include in the computation of her taxable income, the items of income,
deductions and credits ofthe trust that are attributable to her proportionate share
ofthe trust. See sec. 1.671-4, Income Tax Regs. This, in fact, is what she did on
her 1993 and 1994 Federal income tax returns. These items are treated as though
received or paid by her, instead ofby the trust. Sec. 1.671-2(c), Income Tax Regs.
Because the deductions here under consideration constitute "Miscellaneous
Itemized Deductions" within the meaning of section 67(b), the provisions of
section 67(a) are applicable.
2. Taxable Income Upon Termination of Life Insurance Policies. In Stephen L. Atwood, et ux. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-61, the tax court held that the taxpayers received taxable income when insurance
A-I
companies terminated life insurance policies where the taxpayers hadborrowed amounts inexcess ofthe premiums they
had paid. The taxpayers had borrowed the maximum available against the policies and then had not paid the interest.
The companies terminated the policies and sent the taxpayers Forms 1099.
..
3. Separate Share Rules Relating to Estates. REG-114841-98 (January 6, 1999) contains proposed
regulations dealing with the application of the separate share rules to estates. In general, they provide the basic
definition ofseparate shares as applied to estates but specifically do not deal with revocable trusts that elect to be treated
as part ofthe decedent's estate under section 646 (other than stating that such a revocable trust is created as a separate
share in the estate). The proposed regulations also deal specifically with the elective share ofa surviving spouse in an
estate.
The general separate share rule, and examples, is as follows:
Section 1.663(c)-4 Applicability of separate share rule to estates.
(a) General rule. The applicability ofthe separate share rule to estates provided by
section 663(c) will generally depend upon whether the governing instrument and
applicable local law create separate economic interests in one beneficiary or class
of beneficiaries of the decedent's estate such that the economic interests of the
beneficiaryor class ofbeneficiaries are not affectedby economic interests accruing
to another beneficiary or class of beneficiaries. A separate share should be
allocated only the share ofthe estate's income and deductions that the beneficiary
(or beneficiaries) of such separate share is (or are) entitled to (if any) under the
terms of the governing instrument or local law. The separate share rule does not
affect rules under section 663(a) concerning specific gifts and bequests.
(b) Examples of separate shares. Separate shares include --
(1) A surviving spouse's elective share;
(2) A revocable trust that elects to be part of the decedent's estate under
section 645;
(3) The residuary estate, or some portion of the residuary estate, if the
requirements ofparagraph (a) of this section are met; and
(4) A gift or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific property
that is paid or credited in more than three installments, if the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section are met.
(c) Shares with multiplebeneficiaries andbeneficiaries ofmultiple shares. A share
may be considered as separate even though more than one beneficiary has an
interest in it. For example, two beneficiaries may have equal, disproportionate, or
indeterminate interests in one share which is economically separate and
independent from another share in which one or more beneficiaries have an
A-2
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interest. Moreover, the same person maybe a beneficiary ofmore than one separate
share.
The explanation of the provision discusses the issue ofa spousal elective share as follows:
Most non-community property states have some form of elective share statute
which replaces common law dower and curtesy (the common law protection for
surviving spouses). Generally, an elective share statute gives the surviving spouse
the right to claim a share ofthe deceased spouse's estate ifthe surviving spouse is
disinherited or dissatisfied with what the spouse would have received under the
will or otherwise. In most states the elective share consists of a fraction, ranging
from one-fourth to one-halfofthe decedent's estate. Elective share statutes vary as
to when the share vests and whether the share includes a portion of the estate
income, as well as whetherthe shareparticipates in theappreciation ordepreciation
of the estate's assets.
Rev. Rul. 64-101 (1964-1 C.B. 77) addresses the Florida statutory dower interest
which, at the time of the revenue ruling, entitled the widow to the dower interest
and mesne profits thereon. The ruling holds that the value ofassets transferred to
the widow as dower is not a distribution to a beneficiary subject to sections 661(a)
and 662(a) of the Code. Instead, the transfer of assets is governed by section 102.
Rev. Rul. 71-167 (1971-1 C.B. 163) modifies Rev. Rul. 64-101 by holding that the
amount distributed to the widow representing mesne profits is subject to sections
661(a) and 662(a) of the Code. Therefore, an amount corresponding to the
allowable deduction to the estate under section 661(a) is includable in the gross
income of the widow under section 662(a).
Recently, two cases, Deutsch v. Commissioner, TCM 1997- 470, and Brigham v.
United States, 983 F. Supp. 46, (D. Mass. 1997), have addressed how to treat
payments to the surviving spouse in satisfaction of the spouse's elective share
amount. InDeutsch, the surviving spouse elected to take against the decedent's will
as provided by the Florida elective share statute. Under the statute, the surviving
spouse was entitled to 30 percent ofthe net estate based upon date ofdeath values,
but was not entitled to any income of the estate, and did not participate in
appreciation or depreciation of the estate assets. The Tax Court, noting Rev. Rul.
64-101, held that payments to the surviving spouse in satisfaction of her elective
share amount were not subject to sections 661(a) and 662(a). Rather, the payments
were governed by section 102.
In Brigham, the surviving spouse elected to take against the decedent's will as
provided by the New Hampshire elective share statute. Under the statute, the
surviving spouse was entitled to one-third of the personalty and one-third of the
real estate. The court held that the payments made to the surviving spouse in
satisfaction of her elective share amount were subject to sections 661(a) and
662(a). Thus, the court held that all of the estate's distributable net income was
taxable to the surviving spouse because she was the only beneficiary to receive a
distribution for theyear in question and her distribution exceeded the amount ofthe
estate's distributable net income.
In light of the uncertainty concerning the proper treatment of payments in
satisfaction of a surviving spouse's elective share, and also given that Rev. Ruls.
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64-101 and 71-167 are outdated because dower has been replacedbyelective share
statutes in most states, the Internal Revenue SetVice and Treasury have concluded
that regulatory guidance is needed to provide uniform treatment.
These proposed regulations provide that the surviving spouse's elective share
constitutes a separate share of the estate for the sole purpose of determining the
amount of distributable net income in application of sections 661(a) and 662(a).
Therefore, only the income that is (1) allocable to the sutViving spouse's separate
share for a taxable year, and (2) distributed to the sutViving spouse in satisfaction
ofthe elective share will be treated as a distribution subject to sections 661(a) and
662(a). This approach results in the sutViving spouse being taxed on the estate's
income earned during administration only to the extent of the sutViving spouse's
right to share in the estate's income under state law. Comments are requested on
whether there are situations in which an elective share or dower interest would not
be a separate share under the separate economic interest test set forth in the
proposed regulations.
..
B. CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170,642,664,501,509,2055,2522, and
4940-4947
1. Gain on Stock Taxable to Donor When Gift is Not Made Soon Enough. The tax court opinion
in Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) has been upheld by the Ninth Circuit. This is an important
case that mustbe considered whenadvising clients about funding charitable gifts including charitable remainder trusts.
On July 18, 1988 American Health Companies, Inc. ("AHC") entered into a merger agreement with COl
Holding, Inc. through its wholly owned subsidiary DC Acquisition Corp. The plan was for DC Acquisition to purchase
the majority of the AHC stock through a tender offer and then have DC Acquisition merge into AHC leaving AHC as
a wholly owned subsidiary of CDI. The tender offer, and merger, were conditioned on the acquisition by DC
Acquisition ofat least 85% ofthe outstanding shares ofAHC by August 30, 1988, but that condition was waivable at
the sole discretion of DC Acquisition, and was in fact extended to September 9, 1988. On September 12, 1988 DC
Acquisition announced its acceptance ofall tendered or guaranteed AHC shares and on October 14,1988 the merger
was effectuated.
Between August 9, 1988 and August 26, 1988 the Fergusons "transferred" AHC shares to certain charitable
organizations. The date was a matter of dispute before the court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court factual
findings that there was no completed delivery to the charities until September 9, 1988. The specific facts are worth
quoting in detail:
The evidence shows that Brett Floyd was not acting on behalf ofthe Charities (as
their agent, as the trustee of a voluntary trust created for their benefit, or in any
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other capacity) until the time that the Merrill Lynch clearance process had been
completed, the AHC stock had been transferred on the books of Merrill Lynch
from the Fergusons' account to the Charities' account, and the Fergusons had
authorized the transfer, finally and effectively. Even ifBrett Floyd had ceased to
be acting under the control ofthe Fergusons at any time, not until Merrill Lynch's
legal department had completed its two-week clearance process, would he even
have been capable ofacting at the Charities' behest with respect to any disposition
of the AHC stock, which still remained in the Fergusons' personal accounts.
Moreover, in the memorandum disposition cited by the Fergusons as support for
their contentions, the Tax Court there held that, under Montana law, a voluntary
trust would not be formed without some sign, some overt act, which demonstrated
that, after receiving stock onbehalfofa named beneficiary, the recipient bank had
accepted its position as trustee for the benefit of the named beneficiaries. See
Richardson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) P 84,595 (T.C. Nov. 9, 1984). In that
case, the contribution thus was not completed for tax purposes until the recipient
bank had tendered the received shares on behalfofthe named beneficiaries. See id.
Likewise, in the present case, although controlled as to the formation ofa voluntary
trust by Idaho law (which does not address this issue), logic and common sense
dictate that the Fergusons' gift could notbe completed until Merrill Lynch, through
its legal department and Brett Floyd, finally had decided that it was willing to
transfer the shares according to the Fergusons' wishes and to tender the shares on
behalf of the Charities.
Furthermore, contrary to the Fergusons' assertion, BrettFloyd's testimony as to the
existence ofthe original letters ofexecution and as to the intended purpose ofthose
letters, if they indeed existed, was not uncontroverted. The total absence of any
trace ofthe originalletters and the "substantial documentary evidence" that the Tax
Court relied upon in its decision, easily could have supported a finding that Brett
Floyd was not a credible supporting witness. This documentary evidence included:
(1) the donation-in-kind records completed and dated "9-9-88" by Brett Floyd
himself; (2) the donation-in-kind receipts submitted and dated September 9, 1988,
by the Church; (3) the sole existence of "final versions" (as opposed to "new
copies") of the signed letters of authorization; and (4) the disclosure documents
dated September 9, 1988, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
and completed by Billy G. DuPree, Jr., AHC's very own vice president of legal
affairs and secretary. Thus, the evidence in the record clearly supports the Tax
Court's implicit finding thatthere were no original letters ofauthorizationthatwere
intended tobe anything other than rough drafts, mere working copies, whichinfact
were thrown away once they had been replaced by [mal versions.
Therefore, in the absence ofBrett Floyd's role as anything other than an agent of
the Fergusons or Merrill Lynch, there could have been no contribution until the
delivery ofthe AHC stockto the Charities' account hadbeen completed. And in the
absence of any earlier letters of authorization that were intended to be final and
effective, there was no completed delivery to the Charities, no transfer that was
legally binding and irrevocable, until the date that the Fergusons' letters of
authorization were finally and effectively executed -- September 9, 1988.
The next issue before the court was whether a contribution on September 9, 1988 was too late to avoid the
assignment of income doctrine. The tax court had found that by August 31, 1988 over 50% ofthe AHC stock had been
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tendered and, thus, that it was "quite unlikely" that any ofthe relevant parties would back out ofthe tender offer for the
merger or that the requisite number of shares could not be tendered by the close of the tender offer window. In
particular, the court stated:
Third, the Fergusons and at least one commentator, see Note, Taxpayers Liable for
Gain in Stock Donated to Charity During a Tender Offer: Ferguson v.
Commissioner, 51 Tax Law. 441 (1998), contend that the Tax Court's analysis of
the likelihood that as of August 31, 1988, the merger would proceed, was
fundamentally flawed because it failed to take into account the bilateral nature of
a merger. More specifically, they claim that as of August 31, 1988, even though
more than 50% ofthe ARC shareholders had expressed their tacit approval ofthe
pending merger by tendering their shares, there was still a significant possibility
that DC Acquisition's own shareholders might not approve ofthe merger -- a threat
until 90% ownership hadbeen obtainedbyDC Acquisition, thereby eliminatingthe
need for anyformal shareholdervote. However, further analysis shows that it is the
Fergusons' andthe one commentator's analyses that are fundamentally flawed. Both
make it sound as if there was much uncertainty as to how the many shareholders
of DC Acquisition would vote. Both seem to have completely forgotten that DC
Acquisition's sole shareholder was COl, and that COl's board ofdirectors (along
with DC Acquisition's single director -- another corporate insider) therefore
effectively could approve the merger without turning to any outside shareholders.
And for the reasons discussed above, it was most unlikely as ofAugust 31, 1988,
that COl's board ofdirectors was not fully committed to approving the merger once
the tender offer had been completed. Thus, the Tax Court's analysis was sound.
***
On a final note, the Fergusons raise two policy considerations, but these
considerations do not support their contentions. First, the Fergusons rightly point
out that there is a distinction between tax evasion (i.e., choosing an impermissible
path) and tax avoidance (i.e., choosing the least costly permissible path) and that
so long as they are acting in accordance with the existing tax laws, the motives for
their actions should not dictate the consequences oftheir actions. However, simply
because the Fergusons have the right to choose the least costly path (from a tax
perspective) upon which to walk, they do not have the right to be free from taxation
if they decide to walk the line between what is and what is not permissible, and
happen to stray across it, as they have here. Second, the Fergusons note that the
logic ofthe Tax Court's decision implies that their ARC stock already might have
ripened by some date even earlier than August 31, 1988. In essence, they note that
there is no clear line demarcating the first date upon which a taxpayer's appreciated
stock has ripened into a fixed right to receive cash pursuant to a pending merger.
However, from the perspective oftaxpayers, walking the line between tax evasion
and tax avoidance seems to be a patently dangerous business. Anytax lawyer worth
his fees would not have recommended that a donor make a gift ofappreciated stock
this close to an ongoing tender offer and a pending merger, especially when they
were negotiated and planned by the donor. See, e.g., Gain on Tendered Stock
Taxable Despite Charitable Donation, 26 Tax'nfor Law. 114 (1997). Therefore, we
will not go out ofour way to make this dangerous business any easier for taxpayers
who knowingly assume its risks. Moreover, from the perspective ofjudging such
cases, tllere is no special reason that we should curtail the application of this
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doctrine simply because it requires "engaging in an exercise in line drawing, a
difficult task which nevertheless is part ofthe daily grist ofjudicial life." Badger
Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) P 856 (T.C. Oct. 8, 1997)
(Tannenwald, 1.) (discussing generally the determination of the character of a
transferred interest).
[Emphasis added.]
2. Interpretation of Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act. Section 707(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code provides that in determining whether to give Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief the bankruptcy court
may not consider whether a debtor had made, or continues to make, charitable contributions to religious or charitable
organizations. Before the bankruptcy court in In re: James A. Shmihula, et ux., 83 AFfR2d ~ 99-889 was the effect
of section 548(a)(I) ofthe Bankruptcy Code which allows bankruptcy court to recover any transfer ofassets on the eve
of bankruptcy if the transfer was made to delay or hinder a creditor, with section 707(b). Here, the bankruptcy
petitionersbeganmaking charitablecontributions after thebankruptcypetitionwas filed. The courtdenied reliefstating:
While these Debtors emphasize that they did not commence charitable giving with
the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and that they have in fact
continued giving tovarious charities throughout the pendency ofthis litigation, the
effect of their actions cannot be overlooked. What these Debtors are doing,
regardless of their stated intent, is to rewrite the law in accordance with their
personal wishes, to the detriment of creditors who, under section 707(b), have a
vested interest in their disposable income. Based upon the clear language of the
statute in question and the reported history, it is the ruling of this Court that the
issue of timing, i.e., JUST WHEN a debtor commences charitable giving, is very
relevant to the 707(b) inquiry. Where the debtor's charitable giving instinct arises
shortly pre-petition, and surely where it arises post-petition, as here, it is
unthinkable that the Court would not have the authority to examine such
circumstances.
3. Charitable Split-DollarLife Insurance. Notice 99-36, 1999-26IRB 1, warns taxpayers and exempt
organizations not to engage in charitable split-dollar life insurance transactions. The Service has concluded that tax
exempt organizations may be challenged on private inurement for private benefit grounds, and individuals will be
challenged on their income tax deductions.
The Service's position is that the transaction should be described as one in which the taxpayer obtains an
insurance policy, pays premiums with respect to that policy, and transfers some ofthe rights under that policy to the trust
and the remaining rights to charity. The taxpayer is treated as dividing the rights ofany insurance policy between the
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trust and the charity, and thns transferring a partial interest rather than an entire interest, and without being within any
of the partial interest exceptions under section 170.
4. Transfer of EE Income Tax Bonds to Charity. In PLR 9845026 the decedent's residuary estate
wasbequeathed to various charities. The estate included EE savings bonds as to which no §454(a) election to recognize
as income the annual increase in redemption value was made. The IRS ruled that transfer of the bonds to the charity
would enable the income tax on the incremental increase to be avoided.
5. Division of Charitable Remainder Trust. PLRs 9851006 and 9851007 deal with the division of
a charitable remainder trust created by hnsband and wife for their joint benefit. Husband and wife subsequently were
divorced and desired to divide the trust in equal shares.
6. Disclaimer Followed by Reformation to Create Charitable Remainder Trust. PLR 9852034
discusses an interesting way to change a defective charitable trust. A decedent created a trust the income and principal
of which was to be paid by the trustee for the decedent's sister's "proper care, comfort, health, and support." At the
sister's death, the trust was to be distributed to a charity. The sister disclaimed her interest as a discretionarybeneficiary
of trust principal and the trustee then petitioned to reform the trust under section 2055(e)(3) to transform the sister's
income interest into a unitrust interest. The IRS allowed the transaction even though as a unitrust interest the sister did,
implicitly, have an interest inprincipal, presumablyan interest which hadbeendisclaimed. The ruling does not discuss
this peculiarity.
...
J
7. Generosity In Allowing Reformation for Scrivener's Error. PLR 199923013 allowed the
proposed reformation of a charitable remainder unitrust where the drafting attorney provided a sworn affidavit that
various disqualifYing provisions were the result ofdrafting errors. The drafting errors were substantial: among other
things, the trust gave the grantor a power ofacquisition described in section675(4)(C), allowed the trustee to pay death
taxes from the trust assets, and allowed the trustee to terminate the trust ifafter the death ofboth of the grantors was
not economically feasible to continue the trusts existence.
8. Special Needs Arrangement. PLR 199903001 deals with an interesting planning situation. At a
grantor's death, one-halfofthe grantor's residence was to be distributed outright to a charity with the other halfbeing
distributed to a special needs trust that provided a life estate to the grantor's child, with remainder to the charity. The
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remaining assets in the grantor's estate would, for the mostpart, pass into a charitable remainder annuitytrust that would
pay the annuity to the special needs trust during the child's lifetime.
The grantor requested the trustee of the special needs trust and the charity enter into a use agreement with
respect to the residence that would allow the child, during the child's lifetime, to have complete use of the first floor,
back yard, and pool located in the back yard as well as access to the second floor for any reasonable purpose. The
charity would have complete use ofthe second floor and access to the first floor for any reasonable purpose. The issue
was whether the use agreement would disqualify the gift of the residence to charity for the charitable deduction in
section 2055.
The ruling concluded that the transfer of the half interest in the residence would be deductible because the
interest passed outright to charity and there would be no binding obligation on the charity. Because the child had a
general power of appointment over the assets of the special needs trust, the ruling also concluded that the annuity
interest could be paid to the special needs trust.
9. Retirement Plan Payable to Charitable Remainder Unitrust. PLR 199901023 describes the tax
results of a retirement plan payable to a charitable remainder unitrust in a lump sum immediately following the
participant's death. Section 691(a)(I)(B) provides that income in respect ofa decedent that is not payable to an estate
on account of the decedent's death is taxable to the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the
right to receive the IRD. The retirement plan proceeds are IRD and thus, the ruling concludes, are IRD to the charitable
remainder trust. Because the charitable remainder trust is tax-exempt, the IRD will notbe taxable to the trust. However,
the ruling concludes that the ordinary income character of the IRD will be retained under section 691(a)(3) which
generally provides that the right to receive an item of income in respect of a decedent shall be treated in the hands of
the person who acquired such rights by reason of the death of the decedent as if it had been acquired by such person
in the transaction from which the right to receive the income was originally derived. Thus, the IRD would be "first tier"
income to be distributed to the unitrust beneficiary.
The ruling also concluded the effect of the 691(c) deduction and concluded that the trust would be entitled to
the deduction rather than thebeneficiary. The deduction would reduce, therefore, the amount offirst tier income. When
the amount of the section 691(c) deduction is calculated, the hypothetical estate tax calculation (the calculation that
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excludes the IRD items) will also exclude the charitable deduction resulting from the contribution of the qualified
retirement plan amounts to the trust to avoid a "double deduction."
10. htsurance Policy in Charitable Remainder Trust. PLR 199915045 approved the transfer ofalife
insurance policy to a charitable remainder unitrust. A husband would create the trust for thebenefit ofhis stepdaughter,
purchase an insurance policy on his wife's life, and transfer the policy to the trust. The trust would be a net income with
makeup unitrust described in section 664(d)(3).
The first issue for the Service was whether the trust would be a grantor trust because of the trustee's powers
to pay premiums on the life ofthe wife of the grantor under section 677(a)(3). A trust that is a grantor trust may not
be a charitable remainder trust. Section 677(a)(3) provides that a grantor is treated as the owner ofany portion ofthe
trust whose income, without the approval or consent ofany adverse party, is, or in the discretion ofthe grantor, a non-
adverse party, or both, maybe, applied to the payment ofpremiums on insurance policies on the life ofthe grantor and
the grantor's spouse, except with respect to policies irrevocably payable for a purpose specified in section 170(c). The
trust provided that the insurance proceeds would be allocated to trust principal and not income. Thus, because the trust
was a net income unitrust, the SelVice concluded that the insurance proceeds would neverbe payable to a non-charitable
beneficiary and thus that the insurance policies would be irrevocably payable for a charitable purpose.
The ruling also concludedthatthehusband wouldbe entitled to an income tax charitable contribution deduction
for the present fair market value ofthe remainder interest in the insurance policy, and for a similar gift tax charitable
deduction, and that the trust would not be included in the grantor's estate. Neither the grantor nor the grantor's spouse
j
J
was trustee of the trust.
11. S Corporation Stock in a Charitable Lead Trust. PLR 199908002 discusses a plan in which S
j
corporation stock is transferred to two charitable lead trusts. One of the trusts would be exempt from the generation
skipping tax and the other would notbe. The trust wouldbe a grantor trust, the taxpayerproposes, because the grantor's
brother would have a power under section 675(4)(C) to reacquire trust property by substituting property ofequivalent
value, exercisable in a non-fiduciary capacity. After the grantor's death, the trust would be eligible to elect as an
electing small business trust under section 1361(e)(1). The ruling notes whether the exercise ofthe section 675(4)(C)
power is in a non-fiduciary capacity is a facts and circumstances test which is not eligible for the court ruling. The
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Service's ruling positionon who may have section675(4)(C) power continues tobebroader than, arguably, the statute ••
which uses the term reacquire .- or the regulations which refers only to the grantor.
The beneficiary of the charitable lead trust payments was a private foundation and the grantor was to be
excluded from having any control over the lead trust payments so that the lead trust would not be included in the
grantor's estate under section 2036.r 12. Failed Charitable Trust. In Lynn E. Zabel v. United States, 995 F.Supp. 1036 (D. Neb. 1998) the
fill court disallowed any charitable deduction for one trust that paid 50% ofthe income to charity and 50% to individuals.
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The opinion states:
The plaintiff, through his able trial counsel, argues that it makes little sense to
reject the charitable deduction for 50 percent of the trust. He argues that, as a
practical matter, no harm canbefall the charities, though the trust does not employ
one of the three devices specified in section 2055(e)(2)(A). He stresses that,
although there is only one trust, the trustee maintains separate accounts. The
charities will not be harmed, he states, because the income and principal interests
in 50 percent of the trust have effectively (but not legally /71) merged and belong
to the charities.
I reject this argument because even if it were true, it is irrelevant. As Judge
Wisdom has said in a similar case, "We consider the pertinent statutory language
unambiguous. There is no justification for a judicial divination of an unstated
congressional intent to make an exception for the bequest in this case. " Estate of
Johnson v. United States, 941 F.2d 1318, 1319-21 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
trust to support the testator's sisters, to maintain graves offamily members, and to
pay for religious education in certain Catholic parishes did not qualify for a
deductionunder section 2055(e)(2)becausethe trustwas not a charitable remainder
annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust, or a pooled income fund).
[Footnote omitted.]
13. Specificity of Charitable Beneficiaries. At issue in Estate ofKenneth E. Starkey v. United States,
83 AFTR2d' 99-843 (U.S. S.D. IN 1999) was whether the following disposition of residue created a charitable trust:
All ofthe rest, residue and remainder ofmyproperty, I give andbequeathto Norma
Jeanne Starkey, Cynthia StarkeyRobinson, Christopher Kenneth Starkey, Theresa
Carole Starkey, and Carrie Jeanne Starkey, whom I nominate and appoint as
Trustees, to be held by said Trustees, in trust for the uses and purposes herein set
forth.
Half of the income from the trust is to go to Lawndale Community Church in
Chicago, Illinois provided that Wayne Gordon is still the pastor of it at the time of
my death and that church will receive this until the time that he is no longer pastor.
The Trustees are to manage the property of the Trust for the benefit of this
beneficiary, missionaries preaching the Gospel of Christ, and Milligan College.
A-ll
Subject to the provisions . . . relative to the termination of this trust and the
provisions for distribution, the Trustees may distribute to a beneficiary or apply for
such beneficiary's sole benefit, so much of the net income and corpus of the trust
at any time and from time to time as the Trustees deem advisable. Any income
which is not distributed may be accumulated as income or added to the trust.
The court held that it did not. The Will had been draftedby the decedent's son who was not an estate planning
attorney. After death, the estate filed for section 50I(c)(3) status for the trust and the application was rejected by the
IRS. The estate attempted to "reform" the trust in Indiana Probate Court. The United States was not a party to the
action. The court declined to give effect to the reformationbecause, the court determined, that the court did not receive
"the type offull and fair presentation of the issues that is the hallmark of adversarial proceedings."
The court also determined that the post mortem reformation would not relate back to the date ofdeath citing
the case of Van Den Wvrnelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.), Cert. Denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968) in
which the 7th Circuit stated that "not even judicial reformation can operate to change the federal tax consequences of
a completed transaction."
-
-
14. No Income Tax Deduction Available to an Estate for a Charitable Bequest. In Crestar Bank, et
al. v. IRS, et aI., 83 AFTRld ~ 99-839 (U.Va. 1999) the District Court determined that an estate was not entitled to an
income tax deduction for a charitable bequest. The decedent died in 1989 bequeathing halfofcertain closely-held stock
to a charitable trust. The estate claimed an estate tax deduction under section 2055 for the bequest. Some years later,
the estate claimed an income tax deduction for thevalue ofthe bequest, approximately $1 million, under section 642(c).
The court found that the stock was not part ofthe estate's gross income and thus no income tax deduction would be
j
allowed.
15. Disclaimerto a Charitable Fund. This topic hasbeen discussed inpreviousyears. Another example
j
was presented in PLR 199903019 in which the IRS confirmed that a child could disclaim and have the assets pass to
a charitable trust so long as the child did not retain any control over distributions from the disclaimed portion. In the
ruling, the disclaimed property was to be retained in a separate fund and managed and distributed by a separate
subcommittee of the charitable trust.
16. Private Inurement. Inan important case to the tax-exempt community, the 7th Circuit has held that
there was no private inurement in the relationship of a fund raiser to the charity where about 90% ofthe contributions
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received by the charity during the period the fund raiser was employed were paid to the fund raiser for fund raising
costs. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 83 AFfR2d ~ 99-416 (7th Cir. 1999). In a very direct opinion,
Judge Posner stated that the private inurement prohibition was designed "to prevent the siphoning ofcharitable receiptsr to insiders of the charity, not to empower the IRS to monitor the terms of arm's length contracts made by charitable
organizations with the firms that supply them with essential inputs." The Tax Court had not considered the private
a claim favorably.
benefit claim made by the IRS so the court did not either, although the opinion suggests that the court might view such
r,
r
17. Tax on Investment Income; Retirement Plan Benefits. Section 4940 imposes a tax on the net
r investment income ofa private foundation. Suppose retirement plan distributions are paid to a private foundation. Are
r,
those distributions net investment income? PLR 9838028 says no. The ruling construed section 4940(c) narrowly:
Section 4940(c)(2) of the Code defines a private foundation's "net investment
income," in pertinent part, to be its "income from interest, dividends, rents, and
royalties."
".,
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Section 4940(c)(2) of the Code states, in pertinent part that "there shall be taken
into account only gains and losses from the sale or other disposition of property
used for the production of interest, dividends, rents, and royalties."
The statutory language of section 4940 of the Code indicates that this tax is a
limited excise tax that applies only to the specific types of income listed in that
section. Amounts from retirement accounts are deferred compensation income.
Neither section 4940(c) ofthe Code nor section 1.512(b)-I(a) ofthe regulations on
unrelated business income tax lists deferred compensation as an item that is
included in the gross investment income of a foundation.
a charitable remainder trust have been issued. T.D. 8791.r
18. Charitable Remainder Trust Final Regulations. Final regulations dealing with certain aspects of
r (I) FlipUnitrusts. A charitable remainderunitrustmaychange from a net income unitrust (withor without makeup) and a fixed percentage unitrust, upon a date or event outside the control ofthe trustee or any other
person. Examples given include marriage, divorce, death or birth ofa child, or the sale ofan umnarketable asset. The
r
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conversion is effective for the tax year following the tax year in which the conversion event occurs. Upon conversion
any makeup amount, under section 664(d)(3)(b), will be forfeited.
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An unmarketable asset is an asset other than cash or cash equivalents, or other assets that can readilybe sold
for cash or cash equivalents. Examples include realproperty, closely-held stock, anunregistered stock exemptionwhich
would allow a public sale.
The existing charitable remainder trust may be reformed if proceedings are begun by June 8, 1999, or, as
extended, completed by June 30, 2000.
-
so long as the character ofthe amount in the recipient's hands is income under section 664(b)(1), (2), or (3) or the trust
18, 1997, an annuity or unitrust amount maybe paid in a reasonable time after the close of the year for which it is due
(2) Time ofPavmentofUnitrust orAnnuityAmount. Applicable for taxyears endingafterApril
-
distributes other property that it owned as ofthe close ofthe taxable year to pay the annuity or unitrust amount and the
trustee elects to treat any income generated by the distribution as occurring on the last day ofthe tax year for which the
amount is due. Such an election is made on a Form 5227, trust Information Return.
For a trust created before December 10, 1998, the annuity or unitrust amount maybe paid within a reasonable
time up to the close ofthe taxyear for which is due ifthe original percentage used to calculate the annuity, or the annual
unitrust percentage, is 15% or less.
A "reasonable time" will normallybe up until the time required to file the trust information return, Form 5227.
(3) AppraisingUnmarketable Assets. Ifa charitable remainderunitrust hasunmarketable assets
and the only trustee is the grantor, a non-charitable beneficiary, or a related insubordinate partyto the grantor, grantor's
spouse, or non-charitable beneficiary (as defined in section 672(c», the trustee must value those assets using a current
qualified appraisalfrom a qualified appraiser, as both are defined in Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13. A co-trustee who is an
independent trustee may value the trust in marketable assets.
The rules for valuing unmarketable assets are effective for trusts created on or after December 10, 1998.
(4) Application ofSection 2702 to NIMCRUTs. The abuse that the regulations are attempting
to prevent may be illustrated as follows. Suppose a parent creates a NIMCRUT for herself for five years with
subsequent payments to child for life. The trust is to pay the lesser of net income or 5% each year. If the trust is
invested during the parents' term to produce 1% it will generate a 4% arrearage annually. After the child becomes the
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beneficiary the trust could be reinvested to produce a greater than 5% return, with the arrearage being paid to the child.
The valuation of the parent's retaiued interest would have been overstated, and the gift to the child understated.
The regulations provide that unitrust interest in a NIMCRUT that are retained by the donor or any applicable
family member will be valued at zero when a non-charitable beneficiary of the trust is someone other than the donor,
the donor's spouse who is a U.S. citizen, or both.
(5) Allocation ofPre-contribution Gain to Trust Income and Makeup Amount as liability. The
regulations prohibit allocation of pre-contribution gain to trust income for a NIMCRUT. However, the governing
instrument may, ifallowable under applicable state law, allow the trustee to allocate post-contribution capital gains to
r trust income. The makeup amount in a NIMCRUT does not need to be taken into consideration as a liability when
valuing the assets ofthe NIMCRUT. PLR 199907013 continues the Service's ruling position that a trust provision may
C. SECTION 408 - mAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS
law and that it pertains only to post-contribution appreciation.
allow the trustee to allocate capital gain to income so long as the trust provision is not directly adverse to applicable stater
r
I
r 1. Section 2057(b)(U Trust Not a Designated Beneficiary. In PLR 9820021 the Service held that a
r
r
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QTIP trust with charitable remainderman was not a designated beneficiary within the meaning of section 40 I. The
ruling states:
Trust M elected to receive installment payments in accordance with the terms of
Plan X. Under these terms, Plan X must distribute an amount not less than all of
the income of the plan prior to the end of the year in which Individual A would
have attained age 70 1/2, and on or after that date, the greater ofthe income or the
required minimum distribution amount under section 401(a)(9). The election
provides that Trust M may receive a larger amount upon request.
Trust M does not provide that Individual B must receive all amounts that are
distributed from Plan X to Trust M. Although Individual B is entitled to income,
and principal subject to a standard, Trust M does not require Individual B to
receive any minimum distribution amount under section 40 I (a)(9) that has been
distributed to Trust M, ifgreater than annual income. Further, any larger amounts
requested by Trust M from Plan X that are allowed by Trust M'S election are not
required to be distributed to Individual B. Thus, Plan X may distribute to Trust M
an amount greater than Individual B is entitled to receive under Trust M during
Individual B's lifetime.
Because additional amounts that are distributed from Plan X could remain in Trust
M during Individual B's lifetime, three organizations (not individuals), University
Q, School R and Reservation S, are entitled to benefits while Individual B is alive
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unless the trustee of Trust M considers the amounts necessary for Individual B's
health and medical needs, even though access to these amounts may be delayed
until after Individual B's death. Absent the occurrence of this contingency, the
death ofIndividual B affects the timing rather than the availability oftheir benefits.
Thus, the entitlement of University Q, School R and Reservation S is not
contingent on the death of Individual B. As a result, these beneficiaries are
designatedbeneficiaries for purposes ofapplyingthe rules in section 1.401(a)(9)-1,
Q & A E-5 and Individual B is not treated as the sole beneficiary. Pursuant to
section 1.40l(a)(9)-1 Q & A D-2A(b) ofthe proposed regulations Individual A is
treated as having no designated beneficiary for purposes ofsection 401(a)(9) ofthe
Code, since persons other than individuals are designated as beneficiaries of
Individual A's account.
D. SECTIONS 671-678 -- GRANTOR TRUST RULES
1. Grantor Trusts; Trust Created by Guardian for Incompetent. PLR 9831005 determined that the
creation of a revocable trust by co-guardians on behalfofan incompetent would be a grantor trust. The creation was
pursuant to court order. The trust was revocable by the co-guardians and the ruling also determined that the transfers
to the trust would not be a completed gift.
The Service also ruled that the incompetent's brother did not have a general power of appointment:
In this case, there will always be at least two trustees, the family trustee and the
independent trustee who is not a beneficiary. During the period of Taxpayer's
incapacity, the independent trustee will have sole discretion to expend income and
principal for Taxpayer's benefit, to revest funds in the guardianship estate for the
purpose of making gifts to members of Taxpayer's family, and make annual
donations to Charities. Although the family trustee will have the exclusive right,
power, and authority to remove any other trustee then serving at any time "for
cause," an independent trustee may not be removed for the reason that the
independent trustee disagrees with the family trustee on the making of a
distribution to a beneficiary. In addition, an individual or corporate successor
trustee must not be related to or subordinate to the family trustee within the
meaning of section 672(c).
Accordingly, based onthe information submittedand the representations made, we
conclude: (1) Brother 1, in this role as family trustee ofthe trust and/or co-guardian
ofTaxpayer's estate, will not be treated as having a general power ofappointment
over the trust assets; and (2) the family trustee will not be treated as having a
general power ofappointment over the trust assets byvirtue ofthe special removal
powers.
Several issues were not ruled upon:
In particular, we express or imply no opinion concerning the estate, gift, or
generation-skipping transfer tax consequences of: (1) the independent trustee's
authority, to the extent authorized by the court of competent jurisdiction, to
withdraw funds and/or assets from the trust, and to revest those funds and/or assets
in the guardianship estate to enable the co-guardians to make gifts, or (2) the co-
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guardians authority to make gifts from funds and/or assets revested in the
guardianship estate by the independent trustee.
SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 -- VALUATIONF.r 1. Lottery Payments in Gross Estate. TAM 199909001 discusses the valuation of lottery paymentsr under section 7520. The lottery tickets had been purchased by a decedent and her sister in law as partners in a limited
r
partnership. In valuing the decedent's partnership interest the estate discounted the lottery payments using a discount
rate based on AAA bonds taking into consideration applicable income taxes. The estate also took a discount for a
r
r
minority interest and lack of marketability.
The TAM concludes that the estate improperly used the bond yield rather than the section 7520 rate. The
Service also concluded that another discount for lack ofmarketability or for income taxes was available in valuing the
payments, although the ruling does not address whether a discount for lack ofmarketability or minority interest should
r be taken at the partnership level.
In Estate ofThomas 1. Shacklefordv. United States, 82 AFfR2d 98-5538 (E.D. Cal. 1998), the court held that
r
r
r
r
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lottery payments were included in a decedent's gross estate under section 2039. The court also held that the value could
not be determined as if the payments were a commercial annuity. Must the IRS tables be used:
Plaintiffs contend that the question of whether the tables "produce such an
unrealistic and unreasonable result that they should not be used," is a factual
question. The government contends that it is a legal question whether the result is
so unreasonable that departure from the tables is warranted. Although
determination of a realistic value of the interest is a factual question, the court
agrees with the government that whether the value calculated by the tables is
sufficiently unrealistic that departure is warranted is a legal question.
r
r
Neither the case law nor the interim regulations establish clear guidelines for
determining when the value calculated by the tables is sufficiently unrealistic that
departure is warranted. In O'Reilly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that departure
from the tables was warranted where the history ofpayments from the annuity was
one fIftieth of the amount that the tables assumed the interest to be worth. In
contrast, the taxpayer did not satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the tables
were sufficiently unrealistic in Estate of Christ v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973), where the tables used a rat~ 00.5% and
the actual gross yield during the relevant period was 5.48%.
r'
r
r
Applying these principles in the case at bar, the court concludes that ifplaintiffs
succeed in demonstrating that as a factual matter $2.4 million is the realistic value
ofplaintiffs' interest in the lottery payments, this difference is sufficient to establish
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that departure from the tables valuing plaintiffs' interest at more than $4 million
is warranted. Accordingly, because disputed factual issues preclude the court from
determining that it is appropriate to value plaintiffs' interest by reference to the
annuity tables, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
[Footnotes Omitted]
Shares Subject to Buy-Sell Agreement. The Second Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in Estate
ofFrederick Carl Gloecknerv. Commissioner, 82 AF1R2d Par. 98-5172 No. 97-4007. The decedent owned most of
a company and arranged for the company to redeem his shares at his death. The result was that an employee, Joseph
Simone, would own the only outstanding shares.
The redemption price was set at $440 per share at the time the agreement was entered into based on an
independent appraisal. The issue was framed by the court as follows:
The IRS has refined the use ofthese restrictive agreements through its regulations.
Not all restrictive agreements are controlling with respect to estate tax valuation.
"The effect, if any, that is given to the option or contract price in determining the
value of the securities for estate tax purposes depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case." Treas. Reg. section 20.2031- 2(h). While the regulation calls
for a case-by-case evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, essentially four
requirements have evolved for a redemption price to be considered binding for
estate tax purposes.
First, the price of the stock must be fixed or determinable by a formula within the
agreement. See Estate ofLauderv. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1643, 1656
(1992). Second, the estate must be obligated to sell the stock at this fixed price
upon the shareholder's death. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 1962) (holding that because purchase restrictions expired upon the
shareholder's death, forcing remaining partners to purchase those shares at full
value, then full fair market value at the time ofdeath was controlling for estate tax
purposes). Third, in the event the decedent shareholder chose to sell his shares
during his lifetime, he must have been obligated to sell them at the price fixed by
the agreement, and not at any price he otherwise might have chosen. See Treas.
Reg. section20.2031-2(h); Estate ofCarpenterv. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH)
1274, 1278 (1992); Estate of Wei! v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1267, 1273-74
(1954). Fourth, the agreement must "represent[] a bona fide business arrangement
and not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of his bounty
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." Treas.
Reg. section 20.2031-2(h).
The Commissioner does not dispute that the restrictive agreement affecting
Gloeckner's shares meets the first three requirements. That is, it concedes the stock
price at issue was fixed within the redemption agreement and binding upon both
the estate at decedent's death and Gloeckner during his lifetime. Thus, the crux of
the Commissioner's argument is that Gloeckner drafted the agreement as a
testamentary device to transfer the stockto the natural objects ofhisbounty without
full consideration, and therefore Treas. Reg. section 20.2031-2(h) mandates that
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the price fixed within the agreementbe disregarded incomputing what estate taxes
are owed.
On the record, the court concluded that Simone was not a natural object ofthe decedent's bounty and thus that
the redemption agreement was not a testamentary devise:
None of the evidence in the case at hand supports such an inference that Simone
-- to whom decedent's shares were passed -- enjoyed an especially close
relationship with decedent. The tax court characterized the relationship between
Simone and Gloeckner simply as a "close personal" one. Although Gloeckner
made two loans to Simone in different years totaling $175,000 and named his
"friend" Simone a minor beneficiary in his will, we have no other information
about decedent's feelings toward this associate beyond this small glimpse. What
IS in the record is Simone's uncontradicted testimony that the two of them
maintained a "business relationship." The tax court does not suggest that Simone
held a place in decedent's life similar to that held by his kin. Nor did the
Commissioner introduce evidence to support such a theory, even though it advised
the trial court it would do so. As a consequence, Gloeckner's relationship with
Simone strikes us as "a little more than kind," but certainly "less than kin."
3. Valuation of Voting Stock of Closely-Held Corporation. The case of the Estate of Richard R.
Simplot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. No. 13 (1999), is very important. In 1993 Richard Simplot died owning 18 of the
76.445 shares ofthe Class A voting stock, and 3,942.48 of the 141,288.584 shares ofthe Class B non-voting stocks of
lR. Simplot Co., a closely-held corporation best known for being the primary supplier ofpotatoes to McDonalds but
also operating in a variety of other businesses. At issue was the value of the decedent's stock.
After determining the underlying value ofthe company as a whole, the court calculated the per share value of
the Class A and Class B shares. The court then applied to the Class A shares a 3% premium ofthe value of the whole
company. Finally the court applied a 35% discount for the Class A shares, and a 40% discount for the Class B shares,
based on the lack ofmarketability. That result was a value for a Class A share of$215,539.01 and the value ofa Class
B share of $3,417.05.
The rationale for the 3% premium for the voting stock was not entirely clear. An important consideration was
the ratio ofthe number of Class A shares to the number of Class B shares, which was approximately 1 to 1,848. The
opinion states:
We recognize that on the valuation date the hypothetical buyer of decedent's 18
shares ofclass A voting stock would not have the ability to control the Company's
management and would be subject to the philosophy of the other three class A
shareholders, all of whom were related and had family interests to protect. And
obviously, an investor would pay more for a block of stock that represents control
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than for a block of stock that is only a minority interest in the Company. On the
other hand, here, no one individual had a controlling block ofvoting stock.
We also recognize that Don, Gay, and Scott [the other voting Shareholders] would
want to maximize their children's interest in the Company and that if a sale or
liquidation of J.R. Simplot Co. occurred or if the Company merged with or into
another, the benefits derived therefrom would probably be distributed not by class
ofstock, but rather on an equal per- share basis, regardless ofclass. In other words,
after having paid for voting privileges, ifon or after June 24,1993, the Company
were merged, sold, or liquidated, the hypothetical buyer would suffer a loss ifthe
proceeds of the sale, merger, or liquidation were to be distributed among all
shareholders ofJ.R. Simplot Co. on a pro rata share basis, rather than on a class
basis.
On the other hand, we agree with Mr. Matthews [one of the IRS experts] that
although on the valuation date decedent's class A voting shares constituted a
minority interest in J.R. Simplot Co., it was foreseeable that one day (but NOT ON
the valuation date) the voting characteristics associated with them could have
"swing vote" potential if the hypothetical buyer combined his 18 class A voting
shares with Scott's 22.445 shares or joined with Don and Gay (combined having
36 class A voting shares) to form a control group.
Considering and weighing all ofthese factors, we adopt Mr. Matthews'lower range
figure of 3 percent of J.R. Simplot CO.'s equity valueas the fair premium for the
voting privileges (NOT voting control) associated with the class A stock of J.R.
Simplot Co. We have adopted Mr. Matthews' 3-percent premium for voting
privileges because we give the greatest weight to the fact that Don, Gay, and Scott
would be inclined to vote in a manner that would maximize their children's
interests. Thus, we believe the collective premium for the voting privileges of the
76.445 shares ofclass A stock ofJ.R. Simplot Co. as ofthe valuation date is $24.9
million (3 percent x $830 million), or $325,724.38 per share.
The court appeared uncomfortable with its decision:
A few final words before leaving the valuation issues. We recognize the disparate
ratio of our determined value before consideration of a liquidity discount of the
class A voting stock ($331,595.70 per share) to that ofthe class B nonvoting stock
($5,695.09 per share), that is a ratio ofapproximately 58 to 1. This disparity is the
consequence of the unique capital structure of J.R. Simplot Co. and the skewed
ratio of the number of class A voting shares to the class B nonvoting shares, that
is, approximately 1 to 1,848.
The decision is unprecedented and canbe criticized. Inthe real world would a buyer pay more unless acquiring
control? The benefit ofbeing a director, for instance, seems ephemeral as an economic matter.
If the Simplot rationale were followed with respect to transfers of general partnership interests, significant
taxable gifts could result. To illustrate, suppose a family limited partnership were formed with 100 general partnership
units and 9,900 limited partnership units and owned $10 million in marketable securities. If a 3% premium were
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attributed to the general partnership units then the value of the 100 general partnership units would increase from
$100,000 to $400,000.
r
r
r
r
r
r
4. General Partnership Interest. The value ofa 25% assignee interest in a Texas general partnership
that automatically dissolved upon the decedent's death was entitled to a 5.4% discount for selling expenses in Patricia
M. Adams, et at. v. United States, 83 AFrR2d ~ 99-691 (U.S. N.D. Tx. 1999). The decedent created a general
partnership with her siblings which had a net asset value ofapproximately $33 million at her death which consisted of
ranch land, marketable securities, and mineral interests. At the decedent's death, the partnership dissolved according
to Texas law because the partnership agreement did not provide for it to continue and, also by operation ofTexas law,
the decedent's heirs became assignees of her interest. Texas law allows the remaining partners to either wind up the
partnership or continue it as a new partnership.
The court concluded that a hypothetical buyer would choose to receive 25% of the partnership's net assets
rather than continuing as an assignee because ofthe limited rights an assignee has. The estate argued that a hypothetical
buyer would not pay full value for the interest. The court disagreed noting that the existing partners had a strict fiduciary
r duty to the assignee while liquidating and valuing the assets to determine the assignee's share. Thus the court did not
I
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r
r
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apply a lack of marketability or minority interest discount.
The court also rejected a "portfolio discount" even though the partnership had a mix ofassets because, again,
the purchaser would receive actual assets not a partnership interest. The estate also argued that a hypothetical buyer
would pay less for an interest that has uncertain rights and obligations or carry the high potential for litigation but the
court did not find any such potential because it found that estate law was very clear.
The court did conclude that a discount for the cost ofselling the assets was appropriate and found the discount
to be 5.4%.
5. Aggregation ofStock. The holding in Estate ofBonnerv. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
was followed in a case appealable to the Ninth Circuit by the Tax Court in Estate of Harriett R. Mellinger v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. No.4 (1999). The decedent and her husband originally owned, as community property, 4.9
million shares ofFrederick's ofHollywood, Inc. Frederick died first and left his community property interest of 2.46
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million shares in a QTIP trust for the benefit ofHarriett. The remaining 2.46 million shares were owned by Harriett
in her own revocable trust.
Together the two blocks of stock represented 55.7% of the stock. The estate valued these shares as separate
27.8% interests using a discount of about 30%.
The courtvalued the interests separatelybut applied a 25% discount. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the decedent should be treated as the owner ofthe QTIP property for valuation purposes under section 2044. The court
noted that neither decedent had any power of disposition over the assets of the QTIP trust.
Estate ofEthel S. Nowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-15, came to the same conclusion as Mellinger
with respect to a partnership interest. ChiefJudge Ma1y Ann Cohen wrote the opinion in both Nowell and Mellinger.
Also at issue in Nowell was whether the interest in the partnerships passing at the death ofthe decedent should
bevalued as an assignee interest or as partnership interest. The Tax Court determined that the interest shouldbevalued
as an assignee interestbecause the estate tax is levied on the property interests that were transferred at decedent's death
as determined by applicable state law.
The partnership was created under the Arizona limited partnership act which provided that a limited partner
could not transfer the partner's interest without the consent of the general partner unless the partnership agreement
provided otherwise. Here, the partnership agreement did not provide otherwise. The court noted that whether general
partners will consent is a subjective factor that would not be taken into consideration under the objective standard of
the hypothetical buyer, hypothetical seller analysis, citing Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982),
Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982), and Kolom v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 235 (1978), affd. 644
F.2d 1282 (9th. Cir. 1981).
The opinion did not state whether the previous practice of the partnership had been to admit assignees as
limited partners.
6. Valuation of Construction Company Using Discounted Cash Flow Method. The Tax Court
adopted the discounted cash-flow method to determine the value of a construction business in May T. Rakow v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo, 1999-177, finding that a 31% minority discount was appropriate. The taxpayer argued that
future cash flows were too uncertain in the construction business to be a basis for valuation because ofthe risk inherent
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in the business -- such as poor estimates, delays, litigation over accidents, defects, non-performance, and cyclical
r demands -- but the court rejected that argument because this particular construction company did not suffer
disproportionately from any of those risks. On the other hand, the court rejected the use of an asset base valuation
r
r
r
approach because the construction company was not a holding or an investment company.
The gift involved 1,780 shares of common stock out ofa total of $6,340. The taxpayer's original value was
$354.89 per share, and the IRS assessed value was $606.65 per share. The court determined the value to be $413.59
per share.
7. Importance ofReliable Experts. The case ofEstate ofAlice FriedlanderKaufinanv. Commissioner,
r T.C. Memo. 1999-119, illustrates the importance ofhaving a competent and credible appraiser. At issue was the value
ofalmost 20% ofthe stockin a closely-held company, Seminole Manufacturing Co., a maker ofuniforms. The taxpayer
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contended that the value ofthe shares was $29.77 based on sales two months after the valuation date oftwo blocks, one
of 4.7% and another of3.25%, sold to other family members. The court found that those sales were not truly at arm's
length because the sellers were not reasonably informed about the facts relating to the stocks' value before they sold.
The estate had engaged an expert as had the IRS. However, the IRS' expert's report used the wrong valuation
date and made other mistakes and thus was held irrelevant other than as a rebuttal to the taxpayer's expert.
The court found that the taxpayer's expert was unpersuasive, and the taxpayer's expert testimony was
unsupported by the record, so that the court gave no weight to the taxpayer's expert and accepted the IRS determination
of the stock which was $56.50 per share. The case contains a lengthy discussion of the inadequacy of the taxpayer's
expert, ranging from confusion about the expert's assumptions, to mistakes in the interpretation ofvaluation methods.
The case should be reviewed by any expert preparing valuation opinions.
On the other hand, in William 1. Desmond v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-76, the court largely accepted
the estate's expert in valuing Deft, Inc. The court looked at two methods to determine value, what is described as the
income method, the discounted cash-flow method, and the market method, comparing the stock to public companies.
The chart shows the calculations of the court, following the taxpayer's expert:r
)
r
r
Unadjusted Value $8,109,000
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$10,410,000
'----------------------------------------------
Less Marketability Discount:
Nonenvironmental
Environmental
Add Control Premium
Fair Market Value of
100 percent Interest
x Decedent's
Interest
x Weight Given
i.-
J...
20% (1,621,800) 20% (2,082,000)
10% ( 810,900) 0%
25% 2,027,250 0%
7,703,550 8,328,000
81.93% 6,311,519 81.93% 6,823,130
50% 3,155,759 50% 3,411,565
Fair Market Value of
Decedent's Interest 3,155,759 + 3,411,565 = 6,567,324
As the chart shows, there was a significant environmental liability potential in the company because it was a
manufacturer ofpaints, and that went into the lack ofmarketability discount whenvalue was determined using the cash-
flow method. In addition, because the decedent owned a majority ofthe stock the decedent could liquidate the company,
which was an S corporation, at anytime. Thus the court found that a control premium shouldbe added in the discounted
cash flow method. A control premium had already been added in the market method when reaching the $10,410,000
value.
With respect to calculating the amount of the lack of marketability discount, the court stated:
The following factors favor a high lack ofmarketability discount: (1) There was no
public market for Deft's stock; (2) Deft's profit margins were below the industry
average; (3) all stock in Deft was subject to a restrictive share agreement which
provided that a shareholder could transfer his or her stockto a nonshareholder only
after the shareholder offeredthe shares to the remaining shareholders; (4) giventhe
size and low profitability ofDeft, a public offering ofthe stock was unlikely in the
future; (5) the size of the interest is so large that it may be hard to find potential
buyers in the future who could finance such a purchase; and (6) where not already
considered, Deft has large potential environmental liabilities.
Only one factor favors a low lack ofmarketability discount: Deft had an historical
favorable distribution policy (it distributed most of the company's earnings to its
shareholders through higher-than-market compensation in the past).
We conclude that a 30-percent lack ofmarketability discount is appropriate for the
Deft stock. Ofthis 30-percent discount, 10 percent is attributable to Deft's potential
environmental liabilities. We shall apply the 30-percent lack of marketability
discount to the unadjusted value we determined under the income method. We
however shall apply only a 20-percent lack of marketability discount to the
unadjusted value we determined under the market method because as discussed
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supra, the environmental liabilities have already been included in the unadjusted
value under that method.
Discount for Built-in Capital Gains. Last year we saw the Davis case, which, for the first time,r allowed a reduction in fair market value for built-in capital gains based on the theory that a hypothetical willing buyer
would take into consideration and realize capital gains when valuing assets after the repeal of the General Utilitiesr doctrine. How the reduction for built-in gains needs to be calculated is only beginning to be worked out. In Davis the
court considered the reduction as part of a lack of marketability discount.
The Second Circuit held that built-in capital gains must be considered when valuing a C corporation, even if
the corporation has no plan to liquidate. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1998). The IRS has
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acquiesced in the decision. 1999-4 IRB 4. The only asset ofthe corporation was a rental building. The opinion states:
We disagree with the Commissioner's reasoning that the critical point in this case
is that there was no indication a liquidation was imminent or that "a hypothetical
willing buyer would desire to purchase the stock with the view toward liquidating
the corporation or selling the assets, such that the potential tax liability would be
of material and significant concern." Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1046, 1048-49 (1997). The issue is not what a hypothetical willing buyer
plans to do with the property, but what considerations affect the fair market value
of the property he considers buying. While prior to the TRA any buyer of a
corporation's stock could avoid potential built-in capital gains tax, there is simply
no evidence to dispute the fact that a hypothetical willing buyer today would likely
pay less for the shares ofa corporation because ofthe buyer's inability to eliminate
the contingent tax liability. SeeJohn Gilbert, After the Repeal ofGeneral Utilities:
Business Valuations and Contingent Income Taxes on Appreciated Assets, Mont.
Law, Nov. 1995, at 5 (citing a 1994 study that analyzed the impact of contingent
tax liability on a buyer ofa private, closely-held corporation and concluded a large
majority ofbuyers would discount the stock and negotiate a lower purchase price
due to the existence of a contingent tax liability on the corporation's appreciated
property).
* * *
Further, we believe, contrary to the opinion of the Tax Court, since the General
Utilities doctrine has been revokedby statute, a tax liabilityuponliquidation or sale
for built-in capital gains is not too speculative in this case. Courts previously have
allowed discounts for built-in capital gains if, among other factors, payment oftax
on a capital gain is likely. See, e.g., Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29,
34-36 (D. Haw. 1964) (finding expert testimony showed built-in capital gains tax
would necessarily adversely affect value of stock at issue to willing buyer, and in
allowing discount, contrasted the facts with Estate of Cruikshank, 9 T.C. 162, a
case relied on by appellee); see generally Clark v. United States, No. 1309, 1309,
1975 WL 610, at *4,5 (E.D.N.C. May 16, 1975) (stating a well-informed willing
buyer of stock in corporation would consider that underlying assets ofcorporation
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included inactive investment portfolio that, upon liquidation, would incur
substantial capital gains tax liability).
Although the Tax Court in this case held that "the primary reason for disallowing
a discount for capital gains taxes in this situation is that the tax liability itself is
deemed tobe speculative," Eisenberg, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1048, we disagree. We
believe that an adjustment for potential capital gains tax liabilities should be taken
into account in valuing the stock at issue in the closely held C corporation even
though no liquidation or sale of the Corporation or its assets was planned at the
time ofthe gift of the stock. We therefore remand this matter to the Tax Court to
ascertain the gift tax to be paid by the taxpayer consistent with this opinion.
The only guidance givenbythe court for the way in which the potential capital gains tax shouldbe considered
is provided by footnote 16:
Where there is a relatively sizable number of potential buyers who can avoid or
defer the tax, the fair market value of the shares might well approach the pre-tax
market value ofthe real estate. Potential buyers who could avoid or defer the tax
would compete topurchase the shares, albeit ina marketthatwould include similar
real estate that was not owned by a corporation. However, where the number of
potentialbuyers who canavoid or defer the tax is small, the fair marketvalue ofthe
shares might be only slightly above the value ofthe real estate net oftaxes. In any
event, all of these circumstances should be determined as a question ofvaluation
for tax purposes.
More recently, in Estate ofHelen BoltonJamesonv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-43, the court calculated
the discount as the net present value of the capital gains tax liability as the court estimated it would be incurred. The
company at issue was a timber company. The estate valued the stock on the basis of income not assets but the court
disagreed and accepted the IRS's expert opinion as valuing the assets as a holding company was more appropriate.
As a holding company, the court found that the company would recognize itsbuilt-ingain as it cuts timber over
time based on four variables: (1) the rate at which the timber grows, (2) the effects of inflation, (3) capital gains tax
rates, and (4) the discount rate. The court selected variables within the range offigures offered by the various experts
and assumed annual timber growth of 10%,4% inflation, 34% in capital gains tax rate, and 20% discount rate. The
court assumed 9 years of timber sales on a sustainable yield basis.
The estate ownedvirtually all ofthe company stock and the court rejected a 10%lackofmarketabilitydiscount
in favor ofa 3% lack of marketability discount primarily because no expert testimony was offered by the taxpayer on
that subject. The court found that approximately 3% of the company's total assets were completely unmarketable.
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The court also rejected the estate's argument that having a small-- 2 or 3percent minority shareholder -- should
r give rise to a nuisance discount.
I
The IRS had claimed a value of$77.00 per share, the estate $50.94 per share, and the court $71.00 per share.
r 9. Blockage Discount. In general, blockage discounts have been decreasing over many years because
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of the increased volume. The appropriate blockage discount to apply to 2.2% ofthe common stock of Applied Power,
Inc. was before the Tax Court in Estate of Dorothy B. Foote v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-37. The taxpayer's
expert argued for a 22.5% discount and the IRS' expert for a 2.3% discount.
The court accepted the IRS' expert's opinion. The IRS' expert determined that there were 8 days in 1993, after
the date ofdeath, where more than 50,000 shares ofApplied Power stock were traded and that the largest decrease on
one ofthose trading days was 2.5% stock all for one ofthe largest trading volume days there was an increase in value
of 1.5%. In contrast, the taxpayer's expert had concluded the stock could best be disposed ofin 7,000 shares per day
increments over a period of 40 days.
Ofparticular interest was the court's discussion of post-death events:
We are mindful that as a general rule only facts known at the valuation date are
considered in determining the property's value. However, subsequent market
activities may provide helpful comparable sales. See Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193,218 n.15 (1990). Here, we believe the three sales by
the Trust within 3-1/2 months of decedent's death to be relevant and reasonably
proximate to the valuation date. This 3-l/2-month period was, in our opinion, a
reasonable period of time following the valuation date.
Petitioner failed to show that the market price of the stock on the valuation date
was an inaccurate reflection of the true value of the Trust's block of stock. The
relative size of the block of stock at issue in relation to the amount of Applied
Power stock outstanding, plus the monthly andyearly tradingvolumes for the stock
of Applied Power, plus the fact that the entire block of stock was sold within an
acceptable period of time after the valuation date (and on 3 trading days) suggest
that only a minimal blockage discount is warranted. Inour opinion, the depressing
effect on the market of the Trust's sale of its stock is not commensurate with the
22.5- percent blockage discount estimate of Mr. Kleeman [taxpayer's expert].
held corporation involved in real estate development was approximately book value. Estate of Lynn M. Rodgers v.
for market absorption discounts, to conclude that the fair market value ofthe decedent's one-third interest in a closely-,.
1
10. Real Estate Corporation. Thetax court reliedprimarilyona discounted cashflow analysis, allowing
r
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-129.
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11. Actuarial Factors. Section7520 provides that thevalue ofan annuity, life interest, interest for a tenn i-
of years, and remainder and reversionary interests, for transfers after April 30, 1989, are to be detennined using a
discount rate, rounded to the nearest 2!lOths ofone percent, equal to 120% ofthe applicable federal mid-tenn rate in
effect under section 1274(d)(1) for the month in which the transfer occurs. Section 7520(c)(3) directed the Secretary
of the Treasury to issue tables not later than December 31, 1989, using the then most recent mortality experience and
to revise the table with respect to mortality experience not less frequently than every 10 years. T.D. 8819, REG-l03851-
99 contains the new tables for the most recent mortality experience available and is effective as of May 1, 1999. The
new mortality tables are referred to as Life Table 90CM. The mortality tables indicate that for the most part individuals
are living longer, except in the very oldest ages where life expectancies have actually declined since the 1980 tables.
Life expectancies are attached to these materials as an Appendix to Appendix B.
G. SECTION 2032 - ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A -- SPECIAL USE
VALUATION
....
1. Protective Election of Alternate Valuation. A protective election under section 2032 was allowed
by TAM 9846002. The estate wanted to use the alternate valuation date only ifthe surviving spouse agreed to an
elective share, which she did after the estate tax return was filed. In Estate of Mapes v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 511
(l992), the Tax Court allowed a protective election that was conditional on section 2032A treatment not being allowed
by the IRS.
There are other situations inwhicha protective electioncouldbe desirable. Forexample, suppose certainassets
that have decreased in value may be includable in the gross estate (e.g. because of what could be a power of
appointment), but the value of the other assets in the estate has increased.
2. Minority Interest. A minority interest discount may be taken for assets that then qualify for special
use valuation. The IRS has acquiesced in Estate ofClaraK. Hooverv. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 1044 (lOth Cir. 1995).
i-
The assets there were a minority interest in a partnership for which a 30% discount was claimed.
3. Use of Comparables. In Estate ofLewis S. Thompson, IIIv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-325
I...
Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 14929-96, the Tax Court held that taxpayer's expert did not meet the regulatory requirements for a
valid section 2032A election:
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Section20.2032A-4(b)(2),EstateTaxRegs.,describesthedocumentationrequired
from the executor in order to value property under section 2032A(e)(7)(A). The
regulation states that "The executor must identify to the Internal Revenue Service
actual comparable property for all specially valued property and cash rentals from
that property" for each ofthe 5 calendar years preceding the year ofthe decedent's
death. Sec. 20.2032A-4(b)(2)(i) and (iv), Estate Tax Regs.
The determination ofwhether property is comparable is a factual one and is made
according to "generally accepted real property valuation rules". Sec.
20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs. Factors to be considered in such a determination
include, but are not limited to, whether the property is situated in the same locality
as the specially valued property; whether the property is segmented or unified;
whether the property is subject to flooding; and, in the case of timberlands, the
comparability of the timber to the timber located on the property to be specially
valued. Sec. 20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs.
Frazer [taxpayer's expert) utilized 8 timberland properties as comparables in his
report. The report identified the lessor and lessee, the location ofthe property, the
initial year ofthe lease, and the cash consideration paid for each ofthe 8 properties
used as comparables. The report also listed the "Adjusted Net Lease Income/Acre"
for the 8 properties and the "Average" thereof ($15). The report indicated no
adjustments to any ofthe 8 properties used as comparables based on the factors set
forth in section 20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the report is completely unreliable as
to whether any ofthe 8 properties were indeed comparable to the subject property.
The putative comparables ranged in size from 44 acres to 34,365 acres, yet no
adjustment to any of them was made for size even though the substantially
disparate sizes of the properties would appear to have some significance in terms
ofeconomies of scale. Frazer also did not make any adjustments for location, land
quality, or timber type/maturity in his report. Moreover, no description of the
properties was contained in the report, from which Frazer appears implausibly to
be inferring that they were sufficiently similar so as to warrant none of the above
adjustments.
We are also not convinced that the special usevaluationofthe subject property was
based on actual cash rents of the putative comparables as is called for under the
regulations. Section 20.2032A-4(b)(2)(iii), Estate Tax Regs., provides that
"appraisals or other statements regarding rentalvalue as well as area-wide averages
of rentals * * * may not be used under section 2032A(e)(7) because they are not
true measures of the ACTUAL CASH RENTAL VALUE OF COMPARABLE
PROPERTY in the same locality as the specially valued property." (Emphasis
added.)
Although in effect for the 5 years preceding decedent's death in 1992, the 8
timberland leases were entered into over the 27- year period from 1957 through
1984. For those leases whichdid not containrent escalationclauses, Frazerclaimed
to have applied the "ProducerPrice Index" (PPI) to the consideration statedtherein
in an effort to calculate the market rental value of those properties for the 5-year
period preceding decedent's death. The result was termed the"Adjusted Net Lease
Income/Acre" in his report.
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4. Grant ofDevelopment Easement is a Disposition. InEstate ofJames C. Gibbs, Sr. v. United States,
-
82 AFTR2d ~ 98-5557 (3rd Cir. 1998) the court held that granting a development easement to the state ofNew Jersey
was a disposition ofqualifiedfarm propertythat triggered recapture ofestate taxunder section 2032A(c)(1). The court's
rationale was that the heir benefitted from the property's "highest and best use" through the grant of the easement.
Stated differently, the courtviewed the land as a bundle oftwo rights -- the land's agricultural use, plus non-agricultural
development rights. In order to obtain special use valuation the estate had to warrant that only agricultural use would
be made during the 10-year recapture. By granting the easement the owner benefitted from the development value of
the land.
H. SECTIONS 2035-2038 -- RETAINED INTERESTS
1. Requirement that Trustees Pay Grantor's Income Taxes. PLR 199922062 dealt with an
interesting issue. A grantor intended to create a foreign trust that would be a grantor trust for income tax purposes. The
trust would require the trustee to pay, on behalf of the grantor, to the IRS or to a state revenue authority, income or
principal to satisfy the grantor's income tax liability attributable to the trust. The issue presented in the ruling was
whether such requirement constituted a retained interest under section 2036. The Service concluded that such direction
would not be a retained interest; however, ifthe trustee were required to make distributions to reimburse to grantor for
any tax liabilities not attributable to the trust the grantor would have retained section 2036 power.
The ruling did not state whythe payments would notbe made to the grantor directly, but presumably the ruling
would have been the same had the payments been so made. The payment provision itselfwas a direction to the trustee
to distribute an amountby which the personal income tax liability ofthe grantor exceeded what the grantor's personal
income tax liability would be if he were not the owner of any portion of the trust.
2. Ability of Creditors to Reach Trust Assets. TAM 199917001 considered a decedent who created
an inter vivos trust under California law for the decedent's own benefit. The trust provided that the income and
principal could be paid to or for the benefit ofthe decedent as determined by the trustees in their absolute uncontrolled
discretion but only upon the spouse's written consent. Upon the decedent's death the trust was for the benefit of the
decedent's spouse.
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The TAM relied on Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293, which held that where under applicable state law ther trust is a discretionary trust and the entire trust corpus may be subject to the claims of the grantor's creditors, the trust
corpus would be included in the grantor's gross estate under section 2038 because the grantor has retained the power,
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in effect, to terminate the trust by giving it to the grantor's creditors. The TAM also relied on Outwinv. Commissioner,
76 T.C. 153 (1981) which had the same analysis under Massachusetts law, and section 156(2) ofthe Restatement (2d)
of Trusts.
The IRS determined that the California Probate Code had adopted the Restatement rule cited above and that
various California decisions had noted that it was against public policy to allow a person to "tie up" property in such
a way that the person can enjoy the preventatives creditors from reaching it.
The estate made much ofthe "spousalveto" relying on Germanv. Commissioner, 7 Cl.Ct. 641 (1985), decided
under Maryland law. There the decedent's children were trustees and had discretionary authority to distribute trust
assets to the decedent provided the remainderman, also the decedent's children, consented. The ruling noted that there
was Maryland lawto the effect that a discretionary trust where the remainder passes to persons other than the decedent's
estate on termination could not be reached by creditors. The IRS found that California law was not consistent with
Maryland law. Another factor in the ruling may have been that the decedent was trustee ofa trust for the spouse as well
and thus the spouses had reciprocal vetoes.
Presumably, the decision is limited to applicable state law. The issue, then, with respect to a trust created under
Delaware or Alaska law, is whether the creditors of a grantor in some other state may reach the assets in such trust.
PLR 9837007 deals with a transfer to a trust created under Alaska or Delaware law where the donor continues
as a beneficiary. The trust was described as follows:
According to the facts submitted, Donor, a resident of State, proposes to create an
irrevocable trust (frust) for thebenefit ofherselfand her descendants. Trustee will
be appointed as the only trustee. Trustee is to pay, during the Donor's lifetime, any
part or all ofthe income and/or principal in such amounts and at such times, as the
Trustee, in its sole and absolute discretion determines, among one or more of the
class consisting ofthe Donor and the Donor's living descendants. Any income that
is not distributed is to be added to the corpus ofthe trust. Upon the Donor's death,
the corpus is to be divided into separate trusts for each then living child ofDonor,
and a separate trust for each child who died leaving issue. The Trustee is to
distribute the income and principal, in its discretion, among the beneficiaries. If
no descendant of Donor is living at the time of Donor's death, the income and
principal ofthe Trust is to be distributed to one or more organizations described in
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sections l70(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a) ofthe Internal Revenue Code, as the trustee
may determine.
Under Articles SIXTH and NINTH of the Trust, Donor, her descendants, or any
person related or subordinate to these persons (within the meaning of section
672(c) ofthe Code) are precluded from serving as trustee. Donor will not have the
power to remove or replace the trustee or to appoint a successor trustee. It is
represented that Donor is not a shareholder, director, officer, or employee of
Trustee. If Trustee should cease to serve as trustee, Donor's authorized
representative will name a successor trustee.
It is represented that there is no agreement, express or implied, between the Donor
and the Trustee as to how Trustee will exercise its sole and absolute discretion to
pay income and principal among the beneficiaries.
The donor had no known or anticipated debts, other than a home mortgage and was not obligated to pay child
support. The trust contained a spendthrift clause. The applicable state statute was described:
State Statute provides that a person who in writing transfers property in trust may
provide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either voluntarily
or involuntarily transferred before the payment or delivery of the interest to the
beneficiarybythe trustee. Ifa trust contains this transfer restriction, the restriction
prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who subsequently
becomes a creditor, or any other person from satisfying a claim out of the
beneficiary's interest in the trust unless:
1. the transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors or other persons;
2. the trust provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part ofthe trust
without the consent ofa person who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust
and the interest would be adversely affected by the exercise of the power held by
the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of the trust;
3. the trust requires that all or a part ofthe trust's income or principal, orboth, must
be distributed to the settlor; or
4. at the time ofthe transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days ofmaking
a payment due under a child support order.
The ruling states that the donor made a completed gift when funding the trust. The Service specifically
declined to rule on the inclusion or exclusion of the trust assets from the donor's estate.
3. Retention ofPowers By Grantor. Section2042 includes ina decedent's estate all life insurance over
which the decedent has an incident ofownership in any capacity, including as trustee. Thus, we are trained not to have
the grantor/insured of an irrevocable life insurance trust be the trustee of that trust. That training is often applied to
other gift trusts, perhaps unnecessarily.
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PLR 199903025 considered with the creation ofan irrevocable trustby grantor and spouse, one for each child.
Grantor and spouse were co-trustees of each trust along with the child for whom the trust has been established. The
trustees had discretionary authority to distribute income and principal to or for the benefit ofthe child and the child's
descendants for an ascertainable standard.
The ruling states that powers limited by an ascertainable standard will not cause inclusion ofthe trust assets
in the grantor's estate under sections 2036 or 2038.
A separate issue was whether gifts by the spouse of shares of a closely-held corporation would be included
under section 2036(b) and the ruling concluded that the spouse could give up her ability to vote the stock and thus avoid
inclusion under that provision. The ruling states:
Spouse transferred shares of Corporation to each ofthe trusts established for her
four children and Spouse was designated as a co-trustee of each of the trusts.
Corporation is a controlled corporation within the meaning of section 2036(b)
because Spouse as trustee, with other members of her family, retained and
continued to hold the right to vote stock that is at least 20 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock. Spouse's retained right, as a
fiduciary, to vote the stock constitutes the right to vote stock for purposes of
section 2036(b).
Spouse proposes to relinquish her power to vote the stock in Corporation by
judicially modifYing each of the trusts in a manner that will prohibit her from
participating, as trustee, in the right to vote each Trust's shares in Corporation.
Spouse, has represented that she has not and will not enter into either an expressed
or implied agreement with the other trustees that would enable her to direct or
influence the manner in which the other trustees vote the stock. IfSpouse retains
the power to vote the shares in Corporation, the value of the shares would be
includable in her gross estate under section 2036.
Based on the facts submitted and the representations made and assuming the State
District Court approves the amendment of each trust in the manner described, we
conclude that, ifSpouse's death does not occur within three years of the effective
date ofthe amendment to each ofthe four trusts, then the stock in Corporation that
is held by the four trusts will not be included in Spouse's gross estate under section
2035(a) or section 2036(b).
Is it possible for the Internal Revenue Service to review a standard such as "health, education, maintenance,
and support" under the facts and circumstances to determine whether it is truly ascertainable? The answer would seemr to be yes. Thus, in many instances it may still be desirable to have an institution or other person serve as trustee rather
than the grantor.
r
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4. Gifts by Attorney-in-Fact. The IRS has been aggressive in including gifts made by an attorney-in-
fact in a decedent's estate, typically on the grounds that the gifts were voidable by the decedent because they were not
authorized by the instrument creating the attorney-in-fact relationship for applicable state law. In Estate ofMarie S. -
Hubberdv. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. 1998-428, the estate stipulated that gifts oflimited partnership interest to trusts
for nieces and a nephew were voidable under Texas law. However, the estate argued that until the transfers were
actually voided they were effective and thus the gifts should be effective. The contention was rejected by the IRS and
by the Tax Court. The opinion states:
Petitioner's focus onthe transferees legal title to the disputed property is misplaced.
To the contrary, the question posed under section 2033 is whether the decedent, at
the time ofher death, possessed a beneficial interest in the property. Ifthe transfers
in question constituted voidable transfers, we are satisfied that the decedent
possessed a beneficial interest in the property; i.e., the right to avoid the transfers
and regain legal title to the property, within the meaning of section 2033.
-
The court further held that section 2038 applied.
The rejected the estate's analogy to voidable charitable transfers and distinguished Longue Vue Found. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 150 (1988) and Estate ofVarrick v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 318 (1948) which had allowed the
charitable deduction for voidable charitable transfers holding that those cases created a very narrow rule that a voidable
6. Inclusion of Death-Bed Checks. Checks drawn and given to donees shortlybefore a donor's death,
decedent's estate went to his private foundation which consented to the gifts; the consent was not an act ofself-dealing.
charitable transfer is a contingency that is not so remote as to be negligible under section 2055.
allowing guardians to make gifts were not includable in a decedent's estate under section 2038 in PLR 9839018. The -
-
-
Gifts Under Court Order. Gifts made by guardians pursuant to court order under a state statute5.
oftenby an attorney-in-fact, continue to cause problems for taxpayers. In Estate ofNewmanv. Commissioner, III T.C.
No.3 (1998), the checks were drawn and delivered on September 23 and 24 and cashed on October 2. The decedent -
died on September 28. The IRS argued no completed gift because the decedent could have stopped payment on the
checks. The opinion described applicable state law this way:
Prior to the time that a draweebank accepts a check, a customer mayorderthebank
to stop payment by telephone, which would be effective for a period of 24 hours.
D.C. Code Ann. sec. 28:4-303(1) and (2) (1981). After that time, a written stop
payment order made by the customer would be effective for 6 months. D.C. Code
Ann. sec. 28:4-403(2) (1981). Although testimony was presented which portrays
-
-
-
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decedent as "bedridden" prior to her death, there is no evidence that she had
absolutely no access to a telephone. Further, because Mark [the attorney-in-fact]
was also a customer on the account in question, he could have ordered CFB to stop
payment at decedent's request.
Petitioner does not direct us to, nor have we found, any State that recognizes
delivery ofa check to be a completed gift ofthe underlying funds. See 38A C.l. S.,
Gifts, sec. 56 (1996) ("The gift ofthe donor's own check is but the promise ofa gift
and does not amount to a completed gift until payment or acceptance by the
drawee. "). Furthermore, mere possession of a power to revoke, not the ability to
exercise it, is controlling. Estate of Alperstein v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 351,
353-354 (1978), affd. 613 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, we find that
decedent possessed the power to revoke the checks until accepted or paid by CFB.
Because CFB did not accept or pay the checks until after decedent's death, they
were not completed gifts under the law of the District of Columbia. (footnote
omitted)
The court rejected the estate's argument that the relation-back doctrine, applicable to charitable gifts, should
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming our decision in Estate of
Metzger [100 T.C. 204 (1993)], recognized the important distinction between the
facts ofthat case and those in McCarthyv. United States [806 F.2d 129 (7th Cir.
1986)], supra, and Estate of Gagliardi v. Commissioner, [89 T.C. 1207 (1987)]
supra, stating:
We do not dispute the wisdom of declining to extend the relation-back
doctrine in the circumstances presented inMcCarthyand Gagliardi, when
the donor died while the checks were still outstanding. Clearly there is a
veryreal danger offostering estate tax avoidance in cases in which checks
are not cashed until after the donor dies. However, that is not the
situation in this case. [Estate of Metzger v. Commissioner, 38 F.3d at
122.]
Unlike decedent here, the donor in Estate of Metzger v. Commissioner,
supra, was alive at the time the checks were presented and paid by the
drawee. The facts in the case before us are more analogous to those
presented in McCarthy v. United States, supra, and Estate ofGagliardi v.
Commissioner, supra. Therefore, we hold that the relation-back doctrine
does not apply to checks representing noncharitable gifts which were
accepted and paid by the drawee after decedent's death.
Accordingly, the checks in issue were not completed gifts during decedent's
lifetime, and the value of the underlying funds is includable in decedent's gross
estate. Because our holding resolves the sole issue before us, we need not address
the merits of respondent's other arguments.
SECTION 2040 -- JOINT INTERESTS
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1. No Discount for Joint Interests. Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 297 (1998), was
followed in Estate of Albert Fratim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-308 Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 18921-96, to the effect
that no fractional interest discount was allowed for property held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Section
2040 was determined to be an inclusion statute not a valuation statute.
2. Contribution ofConsideration. EstateofMaxL. VanTinev. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-344
Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 20054-96, held the following:
Decedent conveyedjoint tenancies to three parcels ofreal property to his daughter
several years before he died. The sole issue for decision is whether decedent's
daughter contributed consideration equal to at least one-half of the total
consideration that decedent and his spouse paid for the three parcels of real
property. If so, one-half of the value of the three properties is excluded from
decedent's estate under section 2040. Ann Van Tine performed valuable services
for her father's construction business from 1955 to the 1970's, butthe record does
not show how much consideration decedent and his wife paid to buy and improve
the three parcels. As a result, we have no basis to decide what part ofthe parcels'
value that is attributable to Ann Van Tine's services. Thus, on this record, we hold
for respondent.
J. SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 - GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
1. Trust for Incompetent. PLR 9831005 - see D-1.
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r 1. Trust Reformation. In PLR 9847025 the IRS ruled that the refonnation of a life insurance trust to
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prevent the insureds from serving as trustee was effective for tax purposes. The reformation was with court approval
and occurred prior to the death of either insured.
2. Change in Trust Document. In PLR 9832039 an irrevocable insurance trust was created in which
husband and wife had the unrestricted right to remove the trustee and appoint another trustee, other than themselves.
One spouse died and the issue was whether this right was an incident of ownership. The ruling states:
Section 20.2042-1(c)(4) provides that a decedent is considered to have an "incident
ofownership" in an insurance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of
the policy, the decedent, (either alone or in conjunction with another person or
persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership
in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even
though the decedent has no beneficial interest in the trust. Moreover, assuming the
decedent created the trust, such a power may result in the inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036 or section 2038 of other property
transferred to the trust if, for example, the decedent has the power to surrender the
policy and if the income otherwise used to pay premiums on the policy would
become currently payable to a beneficiary of the trust in the event that the policy
were surrendered.
***
Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325, held that when a grantor retains the right to
remove and replace the corporate trustee with another trustee, the grantor is treated
as having the powers of the trustee. Accordingly, if the Trustee's powers are
sufficiently broad, the trust property will be included in the grantor's gross estate
under section 2036 and 2038. Rev. Rul. 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458, modified Rev.
Rul. 79-353 so that it did not apply to a transfer or an addition to a trust made
before October 29, 1979, if the trust was irrevocable on October 28, 1979.
Rev. RuI. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191, revokes Rev. RuI. 79-353 and Rev. Rul. 81-51.
Rev. Rul. 95-58 concludes that an individual is not treated as possessing the
trustee's powers when the individual can remove and replace a trustee and appoint
an individual or corporate successor trustee that is not related or subordinate to the
individual (within the meaning of section 672(c)).
Here the decedent's estate went to court to reform the trust because the words "for cause" had been
inadvertently omitted from the trustee removal section. The court agreed and reformed the trust retroactive to its
creation. The IRS acquiesced inthe reformation. The ruling is significantbecause the IRS views post-deathreformation
with suspicion.
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insurance. The new table is as follows:
29790, contains revised uniform premium tables used to calculate the cost of employer provided group-term life
3. Revised Uniform Premium Table for Group-Term Life Insurance. T.D. 8821,64 F.R. 29788-
TABLE I. - UNIFORM PREMIUMS FOR $1,000 OF
GROUP-TERM LIFE INSURANCE PROTECTION
-
5-year age bracket
Under 25
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64
65 to 69
70 and above
Cost per $1,000 ofprotection
for one month
$0.05
.06
.08
.09
.10
.15
.23
.43
.66
1.27
2.06
The effective date was July 1, 1999, with several exceptions.
I
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situation. A trust had been created for the benefit of taxpayer and taxpayer's brother, the assets of which consisted
4. Division of Life Insurance Policies Not a Transfer for Value. PLR 9852041 dealt with an unusual f
\.....
primarily of the policies. The trust was terminated by order of the state court and the trust assets were distributed
equally between taxpayer and taxpayer's brother so that they became joint owners of each of the policies. For
administrative convenience, the brothers proposed to have the insurance companies issue two separate policies, one
owned by each, to replace each ofthe policies currently ownedjointly. Each ofthe new policies would insure the same
life as one of the old policies and would have one-half of the death benefit, cash value, and indebtedness of the policy
it replaced. An administrative fee would be paid to the insurance companies equally by each brother.
At issue was whether the acquisition ofthe separate policies would be a transfer for value. The IRS analogized
the transaction to a division ofjoint property and concluded that the deemed transferable portion ofthe brother's joint
interest in the new policies to the taxpayer would not affect a significant change in the beneficial ownership of the
policies and thus would not be a transfer for value under section 101.
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SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
r
r
L.
1. Deduction for Income Taxes. In Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-82, the
r
r
r
court determined that where a decedent took an estate tax deduction for income taxes which were owed, and subsequent
developments produced an income tax refund, the estate tax deduction must also be reduced. In April 1990, Donn
McMorris died and a few months later Evelyn McMorris received a partial distribution of certain closely-held stock
from his estate which was redeemed in September, 1990. Evelyn McMorris died in March, 1991 and a deduction was
taken on her estate tax return for a significant income tax. A significant part ofthe income was gain resulting from the
redemption ofstockbecause it was redeemed at considerably more than the value placed on it in Donn McMorris' estate.
r Subsequently, the Donn McMorris estate and the IRS reached a settlement which increased the value ofthe stock in his
r
r
r
r
Iii
estate, which in tum increased the basis ofEvelyn McMorris in the stock and eliminated the income. Whereupon, she
filed a claim for an income tax refund.
The issue was whether the original estate tax deduction in the Evelyn McMorris estate shouldbe adjusted. The
court determined that it should be because:
a claim that is valid and enforceable at the date ofa decedent's death must remain
enforceable in order for the estate to deduct the claim. Technical claims that
disappear in the light of subsequent circumstances should not be allowed. Thus,
postdeathevents mustbe taken into considerationin determining the enforceability
of a claim that a creditor fails to make and preserve within the time allowed by
local law.
The court distinguished Estate ofSachsv. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 769 (1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.
1988), which dealt with a post-death, retroactive, change in the tax laws.
r 2. Deduction for Interest. Section2053(c)(1)(B) provides that for decedents dying after December 31,
r
r
1997, no deduction is allowable for any interest payable under section 6601 on any unpaid portion ofthe federal estate
tax for the period during which an extension oftime for payment is in effect under section 6166. What ifan estate does
not elect section 6166 but merely arranges for a loan to pay the estate tax? Is that interest deductible?
Revenue Ruling 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193, states that if a loan is reasonably and necessarily incurred inr administering the estate (e.g., to avoid a forced sale of estate assets) then the interest is deductible as an expense of
administration under section 2053(a)(2). However, ifthe amount ofinterest the estate might pay is uncertain, because,
r
r
r
for example, the estate's obligation to make payments could be accelerated either through pre-payment or through
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default, the ruling concludes that the interest is deductible by the estate only after it accrues and any future estimated
accrual is not deductible. This presents a significant problem with loans that last for longer than the applicable statute
of limitations.
PLR 199903038 considered an estate in which the estate proposed to borrow, with appropriate court approval
as required by applicable state law, from a bank. The loan would provide for an annual payment ofboth interest and
principal over a specified term ofyears not to exceed seven at a fixed rate ofinterest. The note would also provide that
neither principal nor interest could be prepaid and that in the event ofdefault the entire interest that would have been
paid under the full term ofthe note would be accelerated. Stated differently, the loan was designed to set forth a strictly
ascertainable amount ofinterest that would be paid. The IRS has determined that the interest was deductible prior to
payment relying on Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, which dealt with a similar situation
except that the lender was the decedent's closely-held corporation.
The IRS noted that whether the expense was necessarily incurred was a factual determination. As such it was
not part of the ruling.
Suppose an estate includes only limited partnership interests. The Executor requests that the general partner
distribute funds to the estate for payment oftax. The partnership declines to do so but is willing to make a loan to the
estate. Ifthat loan is structured properly the interest should be deductible. Such would be desirable because ofa spread
between income tax rates and estate tax rates.
3. Claim for Refund Based on Retroactive Tax Change. Section 2032A(c)(7)(E) was added in 1988,
effective for leases entered into after December 31, 1976, and provides that a decedent's surviving spouse will not be
treated as failing to use the qualified real property in a qualified use solely because the spouse rents the property to a
member of the spouse's family on a net cash basis. TAM 9843001 considered a taxpayer who pays recapture tax in
1991 because the taxpayer was a spouse who entered into the activity which was subsequently protected by section
2032A (c)(7)(E). At issue was whether the taxpayer could claim a refund for the recapture tax. The IRS concluded that
the new provision did not constitute a waiver of the period oflimitations relying on United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S.
528 (1963), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a change in the income tax treatment of royalty payments
received for the transfer of patent rights would not give rise to a claim for refund otherwise barred by the applicable
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statute of limitations. The taxpayer was allowed a claim for refund with respect to interest because a claim was filed
within two years of the time interest was paid on the tax.
M. SECTIONS 2056 AND 2056A - MARITAL DEDUCTION
r 1. Reformation to Create ODOT. PLR 9848007 discusses the requirements for reforming a QTlP to
r
r
create a QDOT. A reformation pursuant to a power granted in the governing instrument must be completed by the date
for filing the federal estate tax return (with extension). A reformation pursuant to court order must be begun by that
date. See also PLR 199904023.
2. Relief to Unelect Not Available. In PLR 9848041 the Service denied section 9100 reliefto an estater that elected QTlP for both the marital trust and the credit shelter trust and tried to "unelect" with respect to the latter.
Section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) provides that a QTIP election is irrevocable once made. Section 9100 relief is limited to
r making late elections.
r 3. ContingentOTIP. Final Regulations under section 2056(b)(7) allowing a contingentQTIPtrusthave
fA
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been issued. T.D. 8779 (August 19, 1998).
Section 20.2056(b)-(7) Election with respect to life estate for surviving spouse.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(3) Contingent income interests. (i) An income interest for a term ofyears, or a life
estate subject to termination upon the occurrence of a specified event (e.g.,
remarriage), is not a qualifying income interest for life. However, a qualifying
income interest for life that is contingentupon the executor's electionunder section
2056(b)(7)(B)(v) will not fail to be a qualifying income interest for life because of
such contingency or because the portion of the property for which the election is
not made passes to or for the benefit of persons other than the surviving spouse.
This paragraph (d)(3)(i) applies with respect to estates of decedents whose estate
tax returns are due after February 18, 1997. This paragraph (d)(3)(i) also applies
to estates ofdecedents whose estate tax returns were due on or before February 18,
1997, that meet the requirements ofparagraph (d)(3)(ii) of this section.
(ii) Estates of decedents whose estate tax returns were due on or before February
18, 1997, that did not make the electionunder section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) because the
surviving spouse's income interest in the property was contingent upon the election
orbecause the nonelected portion ofthe property was to pass to a beneficiary other
than the surviving spouse are granted an extension of time to make the QTIP
election if the following requirements are satisfied:
(A) The period oflimitations on filing a claim for credit or refund under section
6511(a) has not expired.
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(B) A claim for credit or refund is filed on Form 843 with a revised Recapitulation
and Schedule M, Form 706 (or 706NA) that signifies the QTIP election. Reference
to this section should be made on the Form 843.
(C) The following statement is included with the Form 843: "The undersigned
certifies that the property with respect to which the QTIP election is being made
will be included in the gross estate of the surviving spouse as provided in section
2044 of the Internal Revenue Code, in determining the federal estate tax liability
on the spouse's death." The statement must be signed, under penalties ofperjury,
bythe surviving spouse, the survivingspouse's legal representative (ifthe surviving
spouse is legally incompetent), or the surviving spouse's executor (ifthe surviving
spouse is deceased).
*****
(h) * * *
Example 6. Spouse's qualifying income interest for life contingent on executor's
election. D's will established a trust providing that S is entitled to receive the
income, payable at least annually, from that portion of the trust that the executor
elects to treat as qualified terminable interest property. The portion of the trust
which the executor does not elect to treat as qualified terminable interest property
passes as ofD's date ofdeath to a trust for the benefit of C, D's child. Under these
facts, the executor is not considered to have a power to appoint anypart ofthe trust
property to any person other than S during S's life.
4. Invalid Election. The Federal Circuit has affirmed the Tax Court in Estate of Rinaldi v. United
States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5526 (1998).
1....
J
....
5. Coordination With Tax Payment Clause. The Eighth Circuit has reversed the District Court in
Patterson, et at v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-2476 (8th Cir. 1999). The estate poured into a revocable trust. The
decedent's Will directed the executor to pay from the residue all death taxes but also provided that ifthere were a trust
in existence at the decedent's death, any part of the death taxes could be paid from the trust assets in the trustee's
discretion. The trust provided that 10% ofthe trust assets, unreduced by any death taxes, were to be set aside in a QTIP
trust.
The IRS claimed that 10% ofthe probate assets which the estate had qualified for the marital deduction were
not in fact eligible for the marital deduction because they would not have existed if the trustee had not paid the estate
taxes. Stated differently, the IRS contention was that the wording of the tax payment clauses was not sufficient to
protect the marital deduction with respect to the estate assets. The Ninth Circuit rejected that position, holding, in
essence, that ifthe assets actuallypass to the QTIP trust that is sufficient, relying on Estate ofSpencerv. Commissioner,
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43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995); Estate ofRobertson v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate of Clayton v.
r Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992).
The case underscores the importance ofcoordinated tax clauses when a Will and a revocable trust are involved.
r 6. Distribution of Delayed Income is Not a Disposition. PLR 199915052 confirms that a spouse has
stock or publicly-traded stock.
spouse to compensate for underpayments ofincome from prioryears. The facts arose out ofan exchange ofclosely-held
entire property in the QTIP trust -- where the state's Principal and Income Act requires a lump sum payment to the
not disposed of the spouse's qualifying income interest for purposes of section 2519 -- and thus made any gift of the
Importance of Lifetime QTIP Election. PLR 199903040 determined that where a QTIP election7.r
r
r
was not made for a lifetime QTIP, in fact it did not qualify.
IRS allowed the estate to correct the mistake because it determined that the governing instrument was clear.
marital deduction as ifthe QTIP election would be made for property that was in fact not supposed to be QTIP'ed. The
r
r
,..
8.
9.
Miscalculation of QTIP. PLR 199902014 is a ruling in which the estate incorrectly calculated a
Termination of QTIP Trust as a Gift. PLR 199908033 is very important. At issue were the tax
r
r
r
consequences of terminating a QTIP trust and distributing the trust assets to the spouse. This could be done under
applicable state law with the consent ofthe spouse, the trustee, and the remainder beneficiaries who were the children
of the decedent and the spouse.
The ruling determined that the children, through consenting to the termination ofthe trust, made a giftjust as
ifthe children transferred the remainder interest in the QTIP to a third party other than the spouse. The ruling states
that the "fact that the receipt ofthe remainder interestby Spouse will not increase thevalue ofSpouse's potential taxable
r estate is not pertinent to the determination of the federal tax consequences to Taxpayer with respect to Taxpayer's
proposed transfer."r
r
r
The taxpayer argued that this result was inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 98-8, 1998-7 LR.B. 24, which held
that where a surviving spouse purchased from the trust remainderman a remainder interest in the QTIP for an amount
equal to the actuarialvalue ofthe remainder interest, the spouse made a gift. Here the taxpayer's position was that under
Rev. Rul. 98-8 a remainder interest is, essentially, accorded a value of zero when received by the spouse because it is
r A-43
r
already included in the spouse's estate for transfer tax purposes. Thus, the taxpayer argued, the transfer should not be
subject to gift tax. The IRS said that Rev. Rut. 98-8 di,g not state that the remainder interest ofa QTIP should be valued
at zero but whether that Revenue Ruling focused on what constituted adequate consideration for transfer tax purposes
and concluded that the receipt ofthe remainder interest by the spouse does not constitute adequate consideration. Most
commentators believe the IRS positions are inconsistent.
The issues in the PLR arise in another context. Suppose a QTIP trust invested in a family limited partnership
and received both a general interest and a limited interest. There should be no gift because the QTIP could liquidate
the partnership immediately after the investment. Suppose that sometime later the QTIP trust distributed or sold the
general partnership interest to the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse's estate, to this point, has not changed, one
could argue, because the surviving spouse has the ability to liquidate the partnership as general partner. However, under
a Bonner analysis, the QTIP assets and the spouse's individual assets are not aggregated. In addition, the dimunition
-
of the QTIP assets, without protest by the children, could be viewed as a gift by the children.
10. QTIP Regulations: Effect ofEstate Expenses. Proposed regulations on the effect ofadministration
,
;..
expenses on the marital deduction have been issued. REG-1l4663-97 (December 15, 1998). The regulation
distinguishes between estate transmission expenses which will reduce the marital deduction, and estate management
expenses which will not reduce the marital deduction. For drafting purposes, the marital deduction/exemption
equivalent formula clause should be revised to take into consideration estate management expenses that are not taken
as income tax deductions. The regulations provide as follows:
SECTION 20.2056(B)-4 MARITAL DEDUCTION;
VALUATION OF INTEREST PASSING TO SURVIVING SPOUSE
*****
(e) EFFECT OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES -- (1) ESTATE
TRANSMISSION EXPENSES. Forpurposes ofdetermining the marital deduction,
thevalue ofany deductible property interest which passed from the decedent to the
surviving spouse shall be reduced by the amount of estate transmission expenses
incurred during the administration of the decedent's estate and paid from the
principal of the property interest or the income produced by the property interest.
For purposes of this subsection, the term estate transmission expenses means all
estate administrationexpenses that arenot estate management expenses (as defined
in paragraph (e)(2) ofthis section). Estate transmission expenses include expenses
incurred in the collection of the decedent's assets, the payment of the decedent's
debts and death taxes, and the distribution ofthe decedent's property to those who
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are entitledto receive it. Examples ofthese expenses include executorcommissions
and attorney fees (except to the extent specifically related to investment,
preservation, and maintenance of the assets), probate fees, expenses incurred in
construction proceedings and defending against will contests, and appraisal fees.
(2) ESTATE MANAGEMENT EXPENSES -- (i) IN GENERAL. For purposes of
determining the marital deduction, the value of any deductible property interest
which passed from the decedent to the surviving spouse shall notbe reduced by the
amount ofestate management expenses incurred in connection with the property
interest during the administration of the decedent's estate and paid from the
principal of the property interest or the income produced by the property interest.
For marital deductionpurposes, thevalue ofany deductible property interestwhich
passed from the decedent to the surviving spouse shall be reduced by the amount
of any estate management expenses incurred in connection with property that
passed to a beneficiary other than the surviving spouse ifa beneficiary other than
the surviving spouse is entitled to the income from the property and the expenses
are charged to the deductible property interest which passed to the surviving
spouse. For purposes of this subsection, the term estate management expenses
means expenses incurred in connection with the investment ofthe estate assets and
with their preservation and maintenance during the period of administration.
Examples of these expenses include investment advisory fees, stock brokerage
commissions, custodial fees, and interest.
(ii) SPECIAL RULE WHERE ESTATE MANAGEMENT EXPENSES ARE
DEDUCTED ON THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX RETURN. For purposes of
determining the marital deduction, the value of the deductible property interest
which passed from the decedent to the surviving spouse is not increased as a result
of the decrease in the federal estate tax liability attributable to any estate
management expenses that are deducted as expenses of administration under
section 2053 on the federal estate tax return.
The effective date is for decedents dying after the date the regulations become final. The regulations have come
under considerable criticism either for being too complicated, or too uncertain, and, in general, for not dealing with
charitable matters.
r N. SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
r
r
r
r
,.,
r
1. Power ofModification Prevents Completed Gift. In 1989 Kathryn O. Neal released her contingent
reversion in a grantor retained income trust because ofadvice given her under then section 2036(c). She paid gift tax.
Subsequently section 2036(c) was retroactively repealed and the taxpayer wanted her gift tax back. In Neal v. United
States, 82 AF.T.R.2d 98-5429, (W.D. Pa. 1998), the court determined that the release had not been a gift because of
the right under applicable state law (pennsylvania) of Mrs. Neal to revoke the release. The opinion states:
A gift upon a trust with the power reserved in the donor to revoke it is not taxable
as a "gift" because the transfer remains incomplete. Sanford's Estate v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39 (1930). Moreover, powers of
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revocation reserved to the settlor by operation ofstate law may also render the gift
incomplete and non-taxable. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Allen, 108
F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 309 U.S. 680 (1940), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit applied the rule in Sanford's Estate to a giftby a minor which
remained revocable under Pennsylvania law for a reasonable time after the minor
attained the age of twenty-one.
***
In the instant case, plaintiff did not specifically reserve a power to revoke or
modify her releases of reversionary interests in the GRIT. However, that power
was reserved to her by operation of Pennsylvania law, and she has lawfully
exercised that powerby rescinding her releases on the grounds ofa clear unilateral
mistake of law. The government concedes that "in some very limited
circumstances, an irrevocable transfer may be legally reformed into a revocable
transfer .... and that such revocation abrogated the federal gift tax which accrued
as a result of the transfer" in Berger v. United States, 487 F.Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa.
1980). United States' Memorandum ofLaw in Support of Summary Judgment, at
7. The government also recognizes Allen held "incomplete transfers that can be
rescinded are not completed taxable gifts for Federal gift tax purposes." Id. The
government asserts, however, thatplaintiffcannotprove sheproperlyrescinded her
releases ofreversionary interests inthe GRIT inaccordance withPennsylvanialaw.
Nevertheless, the government states "if Mrs. Neal could prove that she properly
rescinded her releases in accordance with Pennsylvania law, her gifts would be
incomplete and non-taxable." Id. at 8. The Court finds that Mrs. Neal HAS --
proven, to the satisfaction ofthe Orphan's Court and ofthis Court, that she properly
rescinded her releases in accordance with Pennsylvania law -- and her "gifts"
WERE -- incomplete, and non-taxable.
The court rejected the government's argument that Pennsylvania law allowed revocations only ifthe mistake
were about present law, not future law:
By its nunc pro tunc repeal of section 2036(c), Congress ELIMINATED the tax
liability plaintiffsought to avoid in 1989 by her releases, and EXPLICITLY made
said elimination retroactive. That clear expression of Congressional intent must
mean SOMETHING. After all, the Internal Revenue Code is "not a promise," and
the government does not have a "vested right in the Internal Revenue Code." Just
as Congress may IMPOSE tax liability retroactively AT ITS PLEASURE,
Congress may WITHDRAW tax liability AT ITS PLEASURE, [Louisiana v.
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883)], and it has done just that. The
sampling of retroactivity cases set forth above demonstrates that the government
does not hesitate to apply retroactive legislation to collect increased tax liability
upon transactions and events preceding their actual enactment dates, yet itbalks in
this case at respecting the intent of Congress which explicitly repealed section
2036(c) retroactively.
Importantly, it is not merely upon the repeal of section 2036(c) that plaintiffseeks
a refund, but upon her mistake oflaw in believing section 2036(c) was valid and
enforceable and her obtaining a Pennsylvania Orphan's Court ruling, after notice
to the IRS and active opposition by one of the beneficiaries to the GRIT,
recognizing her rescission for llnilateral mistake pursuant to Pennsylvania law
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which demonstrates, clearly and convincingly, that her "gift" was incomplete in
1989.
Gift Tax Disclosure Proposed Regulations. REG. 106177-98 sets forth proposed regulations
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relating to the gift tax statute oflimitations. The proposed regulations add a new paragraph (f) to section 301.6501(c)-I.
Ifa gift is not adequately disclosed on a timely filed gift tax return, then gift tax may be assessed at any time.
Adequate disclosure is described by (f)(2) as follows:
Adequate disclosure of transfers of property reported as gifts. A transfer will be
adequately disclosed on the return only if it is reported in a manner adequate to
apprise the Internal Revenue Service of the nature ofthe gift and the basis for the
value so reported. Transfers reported on the gift tax return as transfers ofproperty
by gift will be considered adequately disclosed under this paragraph (f) only ifthe
return provides a complete and accurate description ofthe transaction including--
(i) A description ofthe transferred property and any consideration received by the
transferor;
(ii) The identity of, and relationship between, the transferor and the transferee;
(iii) A detailed description ofthe method used to determine the fair market value
ofproperty transferred, including any relevant financial data and a description of
any discounts, such as discounts for blockage, minority or fractional interests, and
lack ofmarketability, claimed invaluing the property. In the case ofthe transfer of
an interest inan entity (e.g., a corporationorpartnership) that is not actively traded,
a description ofany discount claimed in valuing the entity or any assets owned by
such entity, including a statement regarding the fair marketvalue of100 percent of
the entity (determined without regard to any discounts in valuing the entity or any
assets owned bythe entity), the pro rata portion ofthe entity subject to the transfer,
and the fair market value ofthe transferred interest as reported on the return. Ifthe
entity that is the subject of the transfer owns an interest in another non-actively
traded entity (either directly or through ownership of an entity), the information
required inthis paragraph (f)(2)(iii) mustbe provided for each entity and the assets
owned by each entity;
(iv) Ifthe property is transferred in trust, the trust's tax identification number and
a brief description of the terms of the trust;
(v) Anyrestrictions onthe transferredpropertythatwere considered indetermining
the fair market value of the property; and
(vi) A statement ofthe relevant facts affecting the gift tax treatment ofthe transfer
that reasonably may be expected to apprise the Internal Revenue Service of the
nature ofanypotential controversy concerningthe gifttaxtreatment ofthe transfer,
or in lieu ofthis statement, a concise description ofthe legal issue presented by the
facts. In addition, a statement describing any position taken that is contrary to any
temporary or final Treasury regulations or revenue rulings.
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Ifa completed gift is mistakenly reported as incomplete, the statute of limitations does not run. The proposed
regulations state that if an incomplete gift is reported as a completed gift the statute does run.
A quality appraisal would normally satisfy the requirements of (f)(2)(iii). However, a recital offacts in an
appraisal may not satisfy (f)(2)(vi). The provision requiring disclosure ifa position taken contrary to a revenue ruling
will require additional diligence from return preparers.
3. No Annual Exclusion for Gifts to Corporation. The U. S. District Court for the Northern District
ofIndiana concluded in Estate of Stinson v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6944 (N.D. Ind. 1998), that a donor's
forgiveness of corporate debt did not qualify as an annual exclusion gift to the corporation's shareholders because the
gifts were not present interests. The court stated that "it is the shareholder's inability to use, possess, or enjoy any of
the corporation's assets, including the gift, withoutjoint actions by the directors that renders their interest in the gift to
the corporation's 'future interests.''' Revenue Ruling 71-443, 1971-2 C.B. 337, sets forth the same position relying on
Chaninv. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 840, 393 F.2d 972 (1968)(a gift from one closely held corporation made to another
closely held corporation would be a future interest gift to the shareholders of the recipient corporation).
4. Use of Section 483 Interest Rate. The U. S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
has followed Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991), and Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d
986 (10th Cir. 1995), and rejected Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988) and held that the safe harbor
interest rate ofsection483 does not apply in determining the presentvalue ofinstallment payments for gift taxpurposes.
Lundguistv. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d ~ 99-1471 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
5. Gift of Discretionary Life Interest. PLR 199908060 dealt with a widow's gift ofher discretionary
life interest in her husband's pension plan. The beneficiary designation provided as follows:
So long as my wife, Taxpayer B, herein referred to as "my wife", shall live, I direct
that the Trustee of this Plan shall continue to hold all death benefits due to me or
my designated beneficiary, and if my wife's own income, when consumed, is not
sufficient to provide for her support, maintenance, care and health during her life
in a reasonable standard ofliving (not to exceed that which we maintain at the time
of my death), then the Trustee ofthis Plan shall periodically distribute to my wife
as much of my death benefits under this Plan as shall be necessary to provide for
her support, maintenance, care and health in such standard of living. Upon the
death ofmy wife any and all amounts which she or her estate might have in any
thenremainingundistributedbenefits due to me or my designatedbeneficiaryunder
this Plan shall terminate, and all such then remaining undistributed benefits shall
thereafter be payable equally to my two SOIlS, Taxpayer C and Taxpayer D.
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The ruling concludes that the spouse's discretionary life interest has value and that the invasion power of a
trustee is limited by definite and ascertainable fixed standards. A representation was made that the taxpayer would not
need any distributions of income or principal because of her separate income and assets.
when a decedent and her children formed a family partnership where the decedent did not have control after the
partnership was formed. See complete discussion under Section Q.
r
r
r
6.
7.
Gift Created on Formation of Family Partnership. TAM 9842003 found that a gift was made
Transfer of Partnership Interests and the Annual Exclusion. PLR 199905010 dealt with the
transfer of limited partnership interests and qualification for the annual exclusion under section 2503 (b). Ther partnership was formed, and the interests transferred in order to facilitate the sale of a life insurance policy from a
corporation to the recipients of the partnership interest. In pertinent part, the ruling states:
In TAM 9751003 the fiduciatyduties ofthe generalpartners hadbeen overriddenbythe partnership agreement.
r
I
r
r
r 8.
the management powers possessed by A and B, as the general partners, authorize
A and B, in determining Partnership distributions, to withhold only amounts that
the general partners reasonably deem necessary or appropriate for the proper
operation ofthe Partnership business or its winding up in liquidation. The general
partners from this exercise such powers in a fiduciary capacity and are held to a
high standard of conduct toward the limited partners.
Exchange ofVotingfor Non-Voting Shares. The Tax Court determined that the exchange ofvoting
for non-voting shares in a closely-held corporation was a gift to the other shareholders (the sons of the donor). Estate
r of Bosca v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1990-251. The court also held that the gift should be valued as two blocks of
stock because two sons were the indirect donees:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
The final issue is whether the voting common stock that the decedent transferred
to HBC should be valued as a single block of 50 percent of the stock of the
corporation or as two blocks of 25 percent. As mentioned above, ifthe decedent's
voting stock is valued as a single block, then the parties have stipulated that each
share of stock was worth $11,827 immediately before the recapitalization. In that
event, the difference between what the decedent transferred to HBC and what he
received in return is $2,412, and the decedent's gifts to his sons will be valued in
the aggregate amount of$970,830. On the other hand, ifthe stock is valued as two
25-percent blocks, then the parties have stipulated that each share of stock was
worth $9,671 immediatelybefore the recapitalization. In that event, the difference
between what the decedent transferred to HBC and what he received is $256 and
the gifts will be valued in the aggregate amount of$103,040. In passing, we note
respondent does not take the position that, for purposes ofvaluing decedent's stock,
we must take into account the voting stock transferred to the corporation by Ms.
Baker.
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Generally, the gift tax applies to a transfer of property by way of gift. Secs.
25.2501-1(a)(I), 25.2511-1(a), Gift Tax Regs. As mentioned above, the value of
the property at the date of the gift is considered the amount of the gift. Sec.
2512(a). Thus, for purposes of computing the gift tax, each separate gift must be
valued separately. [Citations omitted.] For example, we have rejected attempts by
taxpayers to aggregate separate gifts of stock made on the same day in order to
claim a blockage discount, and we have held that each separate gift mustbe valued
separately. See, e.g., Rushton v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 272 (1973); Phipps v.
Commissioner, supra. Similarly, we have rejected an attemptby the Commissioner
to aggregate separate gifts ofstock made onthe same dayby a majority stockholder
to members ofhis family in order to value the gifts as "control stock". See Estate
ofHeppenstall v. Commissioner, a Memorandum Opinion ofthis Court dated Jan.
31,1949.
***
As mentioned above, a transfer ofproperty to a corporation for less than adequate
and full consideration generally represents gifts by the donor to the individual
shareholders ofthe corporation to the extent oftheir proportionate interests in the
corporation. Kincaid v. United States, supra at 1224, 1226; Heringer v.
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956); CTUW Georgia Ketteman
Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. at 96-97; sec. 25.2511-1(h) (1), Gift Tax
Regs. Applying the principle that separate gifts must be valued separately, it
follows that each such gift to a stockholder of a corporation must be valued
separately. Cf. Estate of Hitchon v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 96 (1965).
In these cases, the decedent through his participation in the recapitalization
indirectly made gifts to his two sons. In valuing the gifts, respondent takes the
position that the stock transferred by the decedent to the corporation should be
treated as a single block of stock and should be valued accordingly. Thus,
respondent has aggregated the decedent's stock for purposes ofvaluing the gifts he
made to his sons. In ourview, this approachviolates the principle that separate gifts
should be valued separately. We agree that the decedent surrendered stock in the
recapitalization that represented 50 percent ofthe voting stock ofthe corporation.
However, the decedent did not convey 50 percent of the voting stock of the
corporation to either of the donees or to both of them jointly. See Estate of
Heppenstall v. Commissioner, supra. Respondent has committed errorbyvaluing
the decedent's stock as ifhe had. Cf. Estate ofBright v. United States, 658 F.2d
999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1981)
SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMERS
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P. SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
1. Change ofTrust Situs By Reason of Change of Corporate Trustee. It is often desirable to change J
trustees and an issue arises when a trustee in a state different from the state in which the trust has been administered is
made. Does the change in trust situs, and potentially applicable state law, affect the trust's generation-skipping tax
exemption?
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PLR 199922044 suggests not. There the trust provided that the situs ofthe trust would be deemed to be at the
principal office ofthe corporate trustee and the trust was to be governed by the laws of the state ofthe situs and to be
administered in accordance with the laws of the state of the situs. The ruling concluded that the primary beneficiary
ofthe trust had the power to replace the corporate trustee according to the governing instrument and thus that the change
r
r
r
I
in situs and applicable law occurred pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument. Thus "the proposed
modifications do not confer additional powers or beneficial interest upon any current or new trustee or upon any ofthe
trust beneficiaries. Moreover, these modifications will not create any additional generation-skipping transfers or
increase the amount of any generation-skipping transfers."
Where concern has arisen, it maybe possible to arrange for the initial governing law to continue to govern the
trust even after the trustee has changed.
r 2. Adopted Beneficiaries. PLR 199907015 considers whether the adoption of a grandchild by the
r
r
grandchild's aunt following the death ofthe grandchild's parents would make the grandchild a skip person with regard
to a transfer in trust from the grandparents. The Service determined that because the transfers occurred after the
grandchild's parent died, section 2651 treats the grandchild as if he were a member of the generation that is one
generation below the generation of the grandparents. The adoption of the grandchild by his aunt will not affect ther relationship between the grandparents and the grandchild and thus would not cause the grandchild to become a skip
In PLR 199915038 a trust was construed by the court having jurisdiction over the trust to include adopted
children. The Service held that the court order was not a modification that would affect the trust's grandfathered status
person.
for generation skipping tax purposes.
Partition of a Trust into Subtrusts. PLR 199912034 approves the division ofan irrevocable trust3.
r
r
r
r
into two subtrusts for the benefit ofeach ofthe grantor's children and their heirs. Each subtrust will have substantive
terms identical to the original trust and the parties beneficial interest would not change. The division would not cause
r
r
the existing trust, or the subtrust, or any ofthe beneficiaries, to realize a gain or loss from the disposition ofproperty.
The Service's ruling position is that if the rights of beneficiaries are actually cut off by the creation of a
subtrust, that division will cause recognition of gain or loss.
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PLR 199922030 is to the same effect. See also PLR 9830017.
4. Substantial Compliance When Allocating GST Exemption on a Form 709. PLR 199909034
allowed a taxpayer to substantially comply with allocation ofa GST exemption. The facts and holding are as follows:
In this case, it appears that Taxpayer did not literally comply with the instructions
on Form 709. Taxpayer reported the 1987 gifts to the Trust on Schedule A, Part 2
(Gifts Subject to Both Gift and GST Tax) and completed portions of Schedule C.
However, Taxpayer did not attach to the 1987 return a Notice ofAllocation ofGST
exemption. However, literal compliance with the procedural instructions to make
an election is not always required. Elections may be held to be effective where the
taxpayer complied with the essential requirements ofa regulation even though the
taxpayer failed to comply with certain procedural directions therein. See
Hewlett-Packard Company v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 736, 748 (1977), acq. in
result, 1979-1 C.B. 1. The allocation will be deemed valid ifthere are enough facts
and circumstances to indicate that the Taxpayer intended to allocate part of his
exemption to the Trust.
Webelieve that there is sufficient informationprovided on Taxpayer's 1987 gift tax
return to conclude that Taxpayer intended to allocate part of his exemption to the
Trust established under the Trust Agreement. Taxpayer reported the 1987 transfer
on Schedule C of the Form 709. On Schedule C, Part 3 (GST Exemption
Reconciliation), line 4 (Exemption Claimed on This Return) Taxpayer entered z,
for the 1987 transfer. On Schedule C, Part 4, line 1 (GST Exemption Allocated),
Taxpayer entered the same amount. In addition, Taxpayer attached a statement to
his 1987 return whichprovided the trust identification number and thevalue ofthe
property transferred to the trust. We note that Taxpayer did not complete the GST
portions ofthe form correctly, in view of the fact that the transfer was not a direct
skip. However, based on the information provided on the return, we conclude that
Taxpayer substantially complied with the requirements for making an allocation of
GST exemption for the transfer reported on the 1987 gift tax return. Taxpayer is,
therefore, deemed to have allocated the exemption as described above for the 1987
transfer to the Trust.
In PLR 199922045 spouses created identical GRITs having an irrevocable trust as the remainder beneficiary.
The spouses each filed timely gift tax returns allocating generation skipping tax exemption to the GRITs but not to the
irrevocable trust. Because the spouses had allocated their GST exemptions to property subject to an estate inclusion
(ETIP) prior to the promulgation ofTreas. Reg. §26.2631-1(c)(l) the Service concluded that the allocations were void.
Thus, the spouses were allowed to reallocate their exemption on amended gift tax returns.
Q. SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
!
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J
j
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1. Application to Family Limited Partnerships. TAM 9842003 deals with the creation of limited
partnerships. Mother contributed 99% of the assets and received a 99% limited partnership interest; each of two
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children contributed 0.5% and received a one-halfgeneral partnership interest. The partnership was formed six weeks
before Mother died, primarily with marketable securities. Mother's estate claimed a 60% discount.
The IRS advanced the following arguments:
We believe the instant case is similar to Estate of Murphy, in that the sole or
primarypurpose for the transactionwas the reduction offederal transfer taxes. The
only discernible purpose for the transfers to the partnership was to depress the
value of the Decedent's assets as these assets passed through Decedent's gross
estate, into the controlofher children, via thepartnership. The arrangementmerely
operated to convey the assets to the same individuals who would have received the
assets inanyeventunderthe testamentaryinstruments. "Nothing ofsubstance" was
intended to change as a result ofthe transactions and, indeed, the transactions did
nothing to affect Decedent's or her children's interests in the underlying assets
"except to reduce federal transfer taxes." The control exercised by Decedent and
her children over the assets did not change at all as a result of the transactions.
r
r
r
r
r
1.
2.
Estate ofMurphyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-472.
Section 2703.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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Under section 2703(a)(2), thevalue of"property" transferred is determinedwithout
regard to any restriction relating to the "property". In the instant case, we believe
the "property" subject to Decedent's transfers was the underlying partnership
property. Any reduction invalue ofthe underlying assets causedbythe partnership
agreement is disregarded under section 2703(a)(2) in determining the value ofthe
transfers. The steps ofthe transaction (the creation and funding ofthe partnership
within six weeks ofDecedent's death, and the transfer ofthe partnership interests
throughthe trust) shouldbe collapsedandviewed as a single integrated transaction;
the transfer at her death of the underlying trust assets subject to the partnership
agreement. See, Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1996-149,
(donor's gifts ofminority stock interests to shareholders followed by a redemption
of donor's remaining shares treated as single transfer of a controlling interest);
Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, supra, (decedent's inter vivos transfer of a
minority interest followed bya testamentarytransfer ofhis remaining shares treated
as a single transfer of a controlling interest); Griffin v. United States, No.
A96-CA-760 SS (W.D. Texas June 2, 1998), (transfer of 1/2 of donor's stock to
donor's spouse followed by a transfer by spouse and donor of all their stock to a
trust for the benefit oftheir child treated as one gift by donor of the entire block).
In Griffin, the court distinguished a Tax Court decision, Estate of Frank v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-132, where the court declined to integrate the
steps of the transaction. Thus, the partnership assets are properly viewed as the
subject matter of the transfers.
Further, we do not believe the transaction qualifies for the section 2703(b)
exception to the application of section 2703(a).
* * *
It is inconceivable that Decedent would have accepted, ifdealing at arm's length,
a partnership interest purportedly worth only a fraction of the value of the assets
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she transferred. This is especially the case given the Decedent's age and health,
because it was impossible for her to ever recoup this immediate loss. Further, it is
inconceivable that Decedent (or her representative) would transfer such a large
portion ofher liquid assets to a partnership, in exchange for a limited interest that
terminated her control over the assets and their income stream, ifthe otherpartners
had not been family members. See Estate of Trenchard v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-121, where, based on the facts presented in that case, the court found
"incredible" the executrix' assertion that the decedent's transfer of property to a
family corporation in exchange for stock was in the ordinary course ofbusiness.
We believe it is clear that the primary, ifnot the sole, purpose of the partnership
was to artificially depress the value of Decedent's assets for a brief period as the
assets passed through Decedent's estate to her children.
Applied within the context ofsection 2703(a)(2), which focuses on restrictions on
the rightto sell oruse property, webelieve that a "device" under section 2703(b)(2)
is reasonably viewed as including any restriction that has the effect of artificially
reducing the value of the transferred interest for transfer tax purposes without
ultimately reducing the value of the interest in the hands of the transferee-family
member. We believe the partnership arrangement, under the circumstances
presented, satisfies this description.
In the instant case, based on the facts presented, even assuming the transactional
steps are not collapsed and the partnership interest is recognized as the subject
matter of the transfer, section 2703(a)(2) would still apply.
Thus, the IRS ignored all restrictions on rights ofthe limited partner.
-
!,...
3. Section 2704(b) - Existence of Applicable Restrictions
In the instant case, the estate argues tbat any restrictions in the partnership
agreement are not "applicable restrictions" because they are no more restrictive
than state law. We do not agree. Under the terms ofthe partnership agreement, the
Decedent could not withdraw from the partnership and liquidate her interest.
However, under New York law, absent a prohibition in the partnership agreement,
the Decedent could have withdrawn and liquidated on six months notice. The
prohibitiononDecedent's rightto liquidate her interestcontained inthepartnership
agreement is more restrictive than New York law, and thus, is an applicable
restriction under section 2704(b)(2)(A).
The estate argues that section 2704(b) only applies to a restriction on the ability of
the PARTNERSHlP as a whole to liquidate, and does not apply to a restriction on
a limited partner's ability to liquidate the partner's interest. The regulations do not
support such a conclusion. Section 25.2704-2(b) defines an applicable restriction
as a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity "in whole or in part". Section
25.2704-2(d), Example 5, considers a situation where a donor transfers common
stock in a corporation and retains preferred stock that carries a put right that is not
exercisable for 4 years. The example concludes that the restriction on the right to
put the preferred stock to the corporationand liquidate that interest is an applicable
restriction for purposes of a section 2704(b) (i.e., a limitation on the ability to
liquidate the entity "in part") that is disregarded in valuing the retained preferred
stock for purposes of section 2701.
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Thus, under the regulations, section 2704 applies to restrictions on a limited
partner's ability to liquidate the partner's interest. See, section 2704(b)(4),
authorizing regulations prescribing restrictions that may be disregarded in
determining the value of a transferred interest in a partnership or corporation.
Indeed, it would seemincongruous to interpret the statute asprecluding a discount
for a family controlled restriction limiting the ability to liquidate the entire
partnership, while permitting a discount for a family controlled restriction limiting
the ability to liquidate the partnership interest transferred.
Theprovisions ofthepartnershipagreementprohibiting Decedentfrom liquidating
her interest constitute an applicable restriction under section 2704(b) and should
be disregarded invaluing the Decedent's partnership interest for estate and gift tax
purposes.
4. Section 2512 - Gift on Formation
The estate contends that the formation ofand transfers to the partnership did not
result in any gifts by the Decedent. The Decedent held a partnership interest
representing a proportionate interest in the value ofthe property transferred to the
partnership. Thus, any difference between the value oftheproperty transferred and
the partnership interest results as a consequence ofthe partnership form; the value
of the other partners' interests were not enhanced. Rather, the net worth of each
partner decreased as a result oftheir respective transfers to the partnership. In the
absence ofany increase in a partner's net worth, there was no donee and therefore,
no basis for asserting that a gift was made. The estate further argues that any
attempt by the Service to tax the decrease in wealth experienced by the Decedent
would be an impermissible direct "wealth tax" on property, rather than an indirect
excise tax on the transfer ofproperty.
Initially, we disagree that the parties heldproportionate interests in the partnership.
Rather, in the instant case, the Decedent supplied 99 percent of the value of the
partnership assets in exchange for a 99 percentLIMlTED partnership interest, and
Child A and Child B supplied the remaining I percent of the value of the
partnership assets in exchange for a 1percent GENERAL partnership interest. By
taking back a LIMITED partnership interest, the Decedent relinquished control
over partnership assets. According to the estate, this lack of control, in part,
resulted in a 40 percent reduction in the value ofDecedent's interest. On the other
hand, the general partnership interests of Child A and Child B enable them to
effectivelycontrol the entirepartnership, notjust the $10,050 that eachcontributed.
This control element should necessarily enhance thevalue oftheir interests. Thus,
in this case, theparties (the Decedent, compared with Child A and Child B) did not
eachreceivepartnership interests that were proportionate invalue to the assets each
contributed.
Further, we don't agree that the difference in value between the assets transferred
and the partnership interest received, should be characterized, in this case, as
"disappearing" as a natural consequence ofthe partnership form. Rather, the entire
transaction (Le., the creation of the partnership, the subsequent death of the
Decedent, and the passage ofthe partnership interests to the family members) must
be viewed as an integrated donative plan. The Decedent intentionally transferred
assets inexchange for a partnership interest worth significantly less than the assets
transferred, enablingthe otherpartners, in conjunctionwith otherfamily members,
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to ultimately realize the full value of the underlying assets on the death of the
Decedent, when the Decedent's retained partnership interest passed to her
beneficiaries. Thus, there was no "disappearance" of value when Decedent
transferred assets to the partnership. Rather, the difference in value between the
Decedent's assets and Decedent's partnership interest was transferred by the
Decedent to the other partners and to the testamentary beneficiaries ofDecedent's
partnership interest, to be ultimately realized in the future.
In any event, under the regulations, it is neither necessary to demonstrate that any
person's net worth increased as a result of the transfers by Decedent, nor is it
necessary to identify the donee or donees at the time ofthe transfer. Rather, once
it is determined that the Decedent's transfer was not in the ordinary course of
business, section 2512 statutorily mandates that the unequal exchange results in a
gift. See section 25.2511-2(a).
2. Spousal Annuity Interest. The Service's position is that an annuity interest that is paid to the
annuitant's estate is not a qualified interestnor is anannuity interest thatbecomespayable to the annuitant's spouse after
the annuitant's death. The result is that the chance that the annuitant might die before the term of the annuity ends
always reduces the value of the annuity with the result that a GRAT produces a taxable gift.
In TAM 9848004 spouses each created GRATs to pay the annuity to the grantor for sevenyears or prior death;
ifdeath occurred within seven years the remaining annuity payments would be payable to the grantor's spouse (whose
rights the grantor could revoke). The TAM states:
However, in the present case, with respect to each trust, the Spouse's right to
receive annuitypayments is contingentonthe grantor's deathprior to the expiration
of the seven-year term. This is the same interest considered in section 25.2702-
3(e), Example 5 and Example 6. As discussed above, these examples illustrate that
the right to receive annuity payments contingent on the grantor's death prior to the
expiration of the grantor's retained term interest, is not a qualified interest.
Accordingly, as is the case in Example 5 and Example 6, the spouse's interest in
each trust is not a qualified interest for purposes of section 2702(b).
Furthermore, the spouse's interest does not satisfy the requirements of section
25.2702-3(d)(3). That is, under section 25.2702-3(d)(3), the term of the annuity
interest must be for the life ofthe term holder, for a specified terms ofyears, or for
the shorter (but not the longer) ofthose periods. In the instant case, the spouse's
annuity is not payable for the life ofthe spouse, a specified term ofyears, or for the
shorter of those periods. Rather, the annuity is payable, ifat all, for a unspecified
period dependent on whether the grantor dies during the term ofthe trust and the
term of the trust remaining at that time.
The taxpayers also argued, unsuccessfully, that the Service's position should not be applied to them:
Section 301.7805-1(b) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the
Commissioner may prescribe the extent, ifany, to which any ruling relating to the
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internal revenue laws, issued by or pursuant to authorization from the
Commissioner, shall be applied without retroactive effect.
Taxpayers contend that in structuring the transaction they relied on private letter
rulings issued by the Service and Example 7 of section 25.2702-2(d). Further,
taxpayers argue they would have used an alternative estate plan had they known
that the plan they did utilize did not produce the desired tax results.
The taxpayers [sic] reliance on the letter rulings is not a sufficient basis for relief.
Section 6110(j)(3) provides that the letter rulings are not to be used or cited as
precedent. Further, as discussed above, the regulation does not support the
taxpayers' position. The spousal interest described in section 25.2702-2(d),
Example 7, is different from the spousal interest in the taxpayers' trust. As
discussed above, other examples in the regulations indicate the spousal interest
used by the taxpayers is not a qualified interest.
The fact that the taxpayers would have structured the transaction differently had
they been aware that their transaction did not produce a favorable tax result is not
a basis for section 7805(b) relief, in the absence of appropriate and justifiable
reliance on published Service guidance.
Accordingly, the conclusion of this Technical Advice Memorandum applies
retroactively to the taxpayers' transaction.
Two docketed cases in the Tax Court deal with various aspects of GRAT calculations. Walton v.
Commissioner, Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 3824-99, deals with the issue of whether an annuity payable to the decedent's estate
is a qualified interest, and Cook, et fiX. v. Commissioner, Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 257-99, deals with both the valuation issues
on a corporation with significant dollars involved (the IRS argues the value of$622 million; the taxpayer argues a value
of $290 million) and the issue of whether a spousal interest revocable by the grantor has value.
3. Use of Notes in GRATs. The IRS has confirmed its regulatory position that notes may not be used
to make annuity payments from a GRAT. REG-108287-98. The explanation states:
Accordingly, theseproposed regulations amend the regulationsunder section 2702
to provide that issuance ofa note, other debt instrument, option or similar financial
arrangement does not constitute payment for purposes of section 2702. A retained
interest that canbe satisfied with suchinstruments is not a qualified annuity interest
or a qualified unitrust interest. In examining all ofthese transactions, the Service
will apply the step transaction doctrine where more than one step is used to achieve
similar results. In addition, a retained interest is not a qualified interest under
section 2702, unless the trust instrument expressly prohibits the use ofnotes, other
debt instruments, options or similar financial arrangements that effectively delay
receipt by the grantor of the annual payment necessary to satisfy the annuity or
unitrust interest amount. Under these provisions, in order to satisfy the annuity or
unitrustpayment obligationunder section 2702(b), the annuityorunitrustpayment
must be made with either cash or other assets held by the trust.
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The proposed regulations provide a transition rule for trusts created before
September 20, 1999. Ifa trust createdbefore September20, 1999, does not prohibit
a trustee from issuing a note, other debt instrument, option or other similar
financial arrangement in satisfactionofthe annuity orunitrustpaymentobligation,
the interest willbe treated as a qualified interest under section 2702(b) ifnotes, etc.
are not used after September 20, 1999, to satisty the obligation and any note or
notes or other debt instruments issued on or prior to September20, 1999, to satisty
the annual payment obligation are paid in full by December 31, 1999, and any
option or similar financial arrangement is terminated byDecember 31, 1999, such
that the grantor actually receives cash or other trust assets in satisfaction of the
payment obligation. For purposes of this section, an option will be considered
terminated if the grantor is paid the greater of the required annuity or unitrust
payment plus interest computed under section 7520 ofthe Code, or the fair market
value of the option.
4. Definition of Personal Residence. The Internal Revenue Service continues to be generous in its
definition ofpersonal residence. In PLR 199916030 the Service determined that property consisting ofa main house
and a leased caretaker residence would be a personal residence even though the caretaker residence is leased to an
unrelated third party. In PLR 199906014 a vacation home that included a rental apartment was allowed to be placed
in a qualified personal residence trust. The ruling determined that under the facts the rental of the apartment was
incidental to the use of the property as a residence.
J
J
5. Creation of 50% Ownership. PLR 199908032 approved the creation oftwo QPRTs, one each by
a husband and wife, for a vacation home. The vacation home was held as community property and the spouses wanted
to put each of their respective halves of the community property into separate QPRTs.
This would work as well for tenants-in-common property and could enable the spouses to achieve a discount.
6. Joint OPRT. PLR 9829002 dealt with a Qualified Personal Residence Trust (a QPRT) funded with
a residence by both spouses. Ifone of them died during the QPRT term, half the residence would be distributed to the
deceased spouse's estate. After the QPRT term the residence would be rented by the spouses. The Service granted the
following ruling requests:
1. During the Trust term, the taxpayers, or the survivor, will be considered
the owner of the income and corpus of the Trust for federal income tax purposes
and will be entitled to deductions for mortgage interest, taxes, and other deductions
applicable to the residential real estateduring the Trustterm, whetherthe taxpayers
make the payments directly or the Trust makes the payments;
2. The provisions of the Trust satisty the requirements of section
25.2702-5(c) of the Gift Tax Regulations, and therefore the transfer of the
taxpayers' right, title, and interest in the residential real estate qualifies for the
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exception to the valuation rules ofInternal Revenue Code section 2702(a)(1) and
(2) contained in section 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii);
3. The transfer of the residence by the taxpayers is a completed gift for gift
tax purposes.
4. The taxpayers' right to rent the property at its fair market value, and the
taxpayers' exercise ofsuch right, after the trust term has expired, will not cause the
property to be included in either taxpayer's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1);
5. At the death ofthe first grantor prior to the expiration ofthe Trust term,
any amount ofthe Trust property includible in the estate of such grantor passes to
the surviving grantor and will qualifyfor the marital deduction in determining any
estate tax due by the estate of the deceased grantor.
With respect to the section 2036 issue the ruling states:
In Estate ofMcNichol v Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. den.
361 U.S. 829 (1960), the court held that "enjoyment" as used in the predecessor
statute to section 2036 is not a term of art, but is synonymous with substantial
present economic benefit. In McNichol, the decedent purportedly conveyed
income producing real estate to his children nine years before his death. Pursuant
to an oral understanding with his children, the decedent continued to receive the
rents from the properties until his death. The court held that the properties were
includible in his gross estate under the predecessor to section 2036.
InEstateofBarlowv. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 666 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1, the
decedent and his spouse transferred a farmto their childrenand contemporaneously
leased the property from the children at fair market value rent. The decedent and
his spouse were legally obligated as tenants to pay this rent and the children were
entitled, as landlords, to terminate the lease and oust the decedent and his spouse
from the property ifthe rent was not paid. Although the decedent paid the rent for
the first two years, the family agreed that, because ofcertain medical problems, the
decedent need not continue to pay the rent, and the decedent did not pay the rent
until his death four years later. The court found that the decedent was obligated to
pay fair marketvalue rent from the date ofthe transfer and there was no express or
implied agreement at the date ofthe transfer that the decedent could avoid this rent
obligation. The court held that the property was not includible in the decedent's
gross estate under section 2036.
Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189, holds that a donor's continued occupancy of
a transferred residence rent free until his death is as much an economic benefit as
if he had rented the property and obtained the income therefrom.
In the present case, Husband and Wife propose to transfer their personal residence
to the Trust. After the Trust term expires, Husband and Wife have the option to
rent the real property covered by the Trust at fair market rental value. Based upon
the information submitted and representations made, we conclude thatbecause the
property will be leased at fair market value, Husband and Wife will not receive an
economic benefit from the property and their retained economic enjoyment of the
property will cease when they begin paying the rental.
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We conclude that Husband and Wife's right to rent the property at fair market
value, and their exercise of such right, after the Trust term has expired, will not
cause the property to be included in either of their gross estates under section
2036(a)(1), assuming there is no implied agreement or understanding that the
parties can remain in the residence even if they do not pay rent.
By using one trust the ability to leverage the gift by claiming a discount for the transfer of a one-half interest
to each of two trusts was lost.
7. Creation of QPRT by Joint Purchase. PLR 9841017 dealt with the creation ofa QPRT without
gift tax cost to the parents. A QPRT was created and parents and child contributed to the trust. The child had an
independent source of funds. The terms of the trust were that of a standard QPRT. The ruling concludes that the
contribution to the trust ofthe value ofthe child's remainder interest was sufficient for there to be no gift by the parents.
In all other respects, the QPRT operated normally.
J
8. Availability of Section 121. PLR 199912026 confirms that new section 121 will be treated the same
as old section 121 with respect to a QPRT so long as the QPRT is a grantor trust for income tax purposes.
9. Disposition of Personal Residence After QPRT Term Ends. In PLR 199916030 the Service
approved a rental agreement whichwould allow the grantor to lease the residence after the expirationofthe trust, paying
fair market value rent. The ruling states that the rental arrangement would not cause the property to be included in the
grantor's estate under section 2036. In PLR 199906014 the residence passed into a trust for the benefit ofthe grantor's
spouse after the end ofthe QPRT term. The Service relied on Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189, to determine that co-
occupancy by the grantor with the grantor's spouse does not of itself support an inference of an agreement or
understanding as to retain possession or enjoymentbythe donor. Thus, unless the grantor had animplied understanding
with the spouse, outside ofwhat would normally arise through the spousal relationship, sections 2036 and 2038 would
not apply.
10. Meaning of Family Member for Purposes of Section 2703. TAM 9841005 states that for purposes
of section 2703 family members include the descendants ofa decedent's deceased spouse. The ruling does not discuss
whether such would be the result on all circumstances. For example, what ifthe decedent had remarried prior to death?
..
R. SECTION 6166 -- EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX
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1. Estate Tax Refund Limited to Installments Paid in the Last Two Years. Revenue Procedure 81-
27, 1981-2 C.B. 548, sets forth a procedure in which a supplemental Form 706 is filed by an estate to claim interest and
r
other expenses incurred in the administration ofthe estate during the time in which the estate had made a section 6166
election. The reason for the procedure is that section 6511 (b)(2)(B) limits refunds to amounts paid within two years
until the two years after the final installment was paid under section 6166 to file a claim.
9828002 is a harsh ruling, acknowledged to be so by the IRS, which denies an estate a refund where the estate waited
of the date the refund claim was filed if the claim is not filed within the three year period of section 6511(a). PLR
s. TAX ADMINISTRATION
Calculation of Fraud Penalty. Estate ofTrompeterv. Commissioner, III T.C. No.2 (1998), dealt1.
r
r
,.
i
,.. with the calculation of the fraud penalty under section 6663(a). The issue, and holding of the majority, was stated as
follows:
r
r
[1] The dispute herein involves the Rule 155 computation mandated by the
Court's Memorandum Opinion filed as Estate ofTrompeterv. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-35. The issue before the Court is one of first impression; namely,
whether an estate's underpayment for purposes of computing the fraud penalty is
determined based solely on expenses which are included on the Federal estate tax
return, or based on all deductible expenses including deficiency interest and
professional fees which arise after the filing of the return.
r
,.
1
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[2] We hold that the underpayment is determined by taking into account all
expenses. Unless otherwise stated, section references are to the applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Ru1e references are to the Tax Court
Ru1es of Practice and Procedure. Estate references are to the Estate of Emanuel
Trompeter. Mr. Trompeter (the decedent) resided in Thousand Oaks, California,
when he died on March 18, 1992. The estate's coexecutors, Robin Carol Trompeter
Gonzalez and Janet Ilene Trompeter Polachek, resided in Florida and California,
respectively, when the petition was filed.
[3] In Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, supra, we held that the estate
was subject to the fraud penalty under section 6663(a). The estate computes the
amount of this penalty based on an underpayment that takes into account all
deductible expenses, including expenses for trustee's fees, attorney's fees, and
deficiency interest that were incurred after the filing of the estate tax return.
Respondent challenges the estate's ability to compute its underpayment by
deducting the latter expenses. Respondent asserts that the estate must compute its
underpayment based solely on the expenses which were reported on its estate tax
return.
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The Court was heavily divided -- there were three concurring opinions and a dissent.
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[4] We agree with petitioner.
r
2. No Collection Against Tenancy by the Entirety Property. The case ofUnited States v. Simpson,
J
j
et. ux., 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5306 (N.D. Fla. 1998), is interesting. Husband owed taxes and the government attempted to
collect on real estate owned with wife as tenants by the entireties. The court held that it could not. Wife had
subsequently been given title to the property to her children retaining a life estate. The court held:
In the instant case, there simply was no opportunity for Plaintiff to reach the
individual interest of Defendant Wilford Simpson. As a tenant by the entireties
under the laws of Florida, his interest was unreachable by any creditor. United
States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Avenue, 894 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, because the property was then conveyed to only Janet Simpson in fee
simple, Wilford Simpson had absolutely no interest at the time the tenancy by the
entireties was destroyed:
No persons except husband and wife have a present interest in an estate
by the entireties when such estate is unencumbered by any lien existing
prior to the creation of such estate and is unencumbered by any lien
createdjointlyby the husband and wife after the estate by entireties came
into being. It is not subject to execution for the debt of the husband. It
is not subject to partition; it is not subject to devise by will; neither it is
subject to the laws of descent and distribution. It is, therefore, an estate
over which the husband and wife have absolute disposition and as to
which each, in the fiction ofthe law, holds the entire estate as one person.
Therefore, there appears to be no plausible reason why the law should not
recognize as valid any formal agreement executed according to law
whereby one spouse would be divested ofhis or her interest in such estate
and the other be invested with the unqualified fee-simple title.
Hunt v. Covington, 200 So. 76 (Fla. 1941).
Plaintiff now argues that the subsequent transfers to Janet Simpson, then to her
children, and ultimately to the Mills Family Preservation Trust were fraudulent, as
those grantees were effectively nominees ofWilford Simpson, and that it is entitled
to foreclose its liens against the property (doc. 31, memorandum at 8-14).
However, a large component of this argument becomes moot when considered in
light of the safeguards afforded property held by tenants by the entireties. If,
arguendo, the transfer to Janet Simpson was not fraudulent, then clearly she holds
the property in fee simple and is free to dispose of it as she wishes. On the other
hand, ifthat conveyance was fraudulent, Janet Simpson would not have fee simple
title to the property, but rather the property would stillbe heldby Wilford and Janet
Simpson as tenants by the entireties. In either case, the subsequent transfers to the
children and trustbecome irrelevant, as they too are either entirelyvalid or entirely
void depending on the validity of the initial transfer to Janet.
Furthermore, it is also unnecessary to address whether the conveyance from
Wilford and Janet Simpson to only Janet was fraudulent. As discussed
immediately above, if the conveyance to Janet was fraudulent, the property
remained a tenancy by the entireties and was unreachable by creditors of only
Wilford Simpson. If the conveyance was valid, then Janet Simpson held the
property in fee simple and Wilford had no interest at all. While there is a
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to the spouse outright. Upon petition, the court interpreted the bequest to mean:
The ruling suggests that the IRS may be "lenient" in determinations relating to the change from unified credit
ofa Will. The Will left an amount equal to the unified credit to a trust for the surviving spouse and the remaining assets
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possibility that by divorce or some other reason the tenancy by the entireties could
be destroyed, thus creating a tenancy in common and making the validity of
subsequent conveyances of utmost importance, that day has not yet arrived. As
such, the Court declines to make those determinations today.
The facts ofthis case mandate an unusual result. Frequently, a debtor will attempt
to convey his own property to a third party or into a tenancy by the entireties as an
attempt to hinder or obstruct his creditors. Without discerning the motives behind
their decision, the Court notes that Defendants did exactly the opposite, destroying
the tenancy by the entireties in favor ofa fee simple held by Janet Simpson alone.
While this conveyance, ifvalid, would have placed the property beyond the reach
ofWilford's individual creditors, the tenancybythe entireties already afforded that
protection. Nonetheless, because it is undisputed that Wilford and Janet Simpson
acquired the 27.77 acre parcel as tenants by the entireties without intention to
defraud or avoid creditors, the Plaintiff is simply unable to enforce a lien against
Mr. Simpson's interests in the property as it is held today, regardless ofsubsequent
conveyances. Therefore, summaryjudgment in favor ofDefendants is warranted.
Florida Interpretation ofWill. PLR9834027 gives effect to a Florida probate court's interpretation
... a bequest ofa sum equal to "the largest amount permitted to pass at Decedent's
death that will not result in the imposition ofa Federal Estate Tax with respect to
his estate, after allowing for transfers made during his lifetime and any credits and
deductions permitted to enable his estate to take full advantage of the maximum
value of assets sheltered by the unified credit provision of the Internal Revenue
Code."
r
r
r
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to applicable credit amount.
4. Reversal of Tax Court, Equitable Recoupment. The Sixth Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in
Estate ofMuellerv. Commissioner, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5169, and held:
This is a case in which a taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
disagree over the effect ofan audit adjustment to the taxpayer's estate tax return.
Specifically at issue are 8,924 shares of stock that the taxpayer undervalued when
it filled the estate tax return, as a result of which the taxpayer underreported the
taxable value of the shares and, consequently, underpaid its estate taxes. In
addition, the government's determination that the stock was worth more than
taxpayer claimed also had the effect ofcreating an overpayment in capital gains tax
paid by the taxpayer in a previous year on the stock's sale. Just as the higher stock
valuation resulted in a higher taxable amount, it also resulted in a higher basis in
the stock and, therefore, a smaller amount of capital gains upon the sale of the
stock. The problem for taxpayer is that the statute of limitations now bars any
claim for a refund of the overpaid capital gains tax.
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The question on appeal is whether the taxpayer is entitled to assert the defense of
equitable recoupment in order to use the time-barred overpayment ofcapital gains
taxes as a set-off against the timely charged deficiency in estate taxes. Before we
can reach this question, however, we much first decide whether the Tax Court had
the jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Because we find
that the Tax court lackedjurisdiction to consider a claimfor equitable recoupment,
we affirm the dismissal ofthe taxpayer's suit witllout reaching the merits of the
equitable recoupment claim.
Attachment of Federal Tax Lien to Disclaimed Property. Maya beneficiary who owes federal
J
J
taxes avoid the attachment ofa federal tax lien to inherited propertyby disclaiming? The answer appears to depend on
the character of the right to inherited property under applicable state law.
TheEighth Circuit construed Arkansas lawinDrye Family 1995 Trustv. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5190
(8th. Cir. 1998):
By extension, we hold that the state law consequences of Drye's right to his
mother's estate, namely, the legal fiction that is created through Drye's disclaimer
under Ark. Stat. Ann. section 28-2-101 et seq., is "ofno concern to the operation
ofthe federal tax law. II Cf. Bess, 357 U.S. at 57 ("Such state laws 'are not laws for
the United States . . . unless they have been made such by Congress itself. "')
(quoting Finkv. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 276 (1882)(concerningbankmptcyliens»;
Leggett, 120 F.3d at 596 (liThe view that the disclaimer is a legal fiction ...
supports the holding that property right existed before the disclaimer. ");
Terwilliger's Catering Plus, 911 F.2d at 1171-72 ("Although it is true iliat the state
has the right to decide what property interests it wishes to create, it cannot thwart
the operation of the Tax Code by classifying the interests it has created as
something other than property rights. ") Under this view, we conclude that the
preexisting federal tax liens attached to Drye's state law right to his intestate share
which vested on or about the time of his mother's death. See, e.g., Keenan v.
PeeVY, 590 S.W.2d 259,269-70 (Ark. 1979)(holding that the title to real property
vests immediately upon death ofowner ifheirs take through intestate succession,
subject to appropriate provisions for administration under the probate code and
subject to widow's dower and homestead rights, if any); Dean v. Brown, 227
S.W.2d 623, 628 (1950)(decidingunderprior lawthat thepersonaltyofanintestate
became vested in the personal representative when appointed and remained so
vested until distribution upon proper order ofthe probate court); see also Ark. Stat.
Ann. section 28-9-203(c) ("Real estate passes immediately to the heirs upon the
death of the intestate . . . . However, personalty will pass to the personal
representative, if any, for distribution to the heirs ....").
The opinion discusses cases construing the law of other states:
The Second, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits addressed similar arguments in determining
the effect of a state law disclaimer on preexisting federal tax liens and reached
differing results. In Leggett, the most recent case, the Fifth Circuit determined that
a disclaimer under Texas law nullifies any interest iliat the disclaimant has in the
property, thereby defeating the attachment offederal tax liens. 120 F.3d at 596.
As in the instant case, the IRS had made assessments against a taA-payer and
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acquired a lien against all ofher property and rights to property pursuant to section
6321 whenher aunt died testate, leaving the taxpayera one-twentiethinterestinher
estate. Id. at 593. The taxpayer subsequently disclaimed her entire interest in the
estate pursuant to Texas's disclaimer statute and sought a declaration that the IRS
had no lien against the estate's property in view ofthe disclaimer. Id. The district
court ruled in favor ofthe IRS on the ground that Texas law creates only a right to
accept or reject inheritance; that is, the taxpayer merely had a right of decision
which does not constitute a property right under state law. Id. at 596. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, applying Texas law to determine whether the state-law right
constituted "propertyor rights to property" under section 6321. Id. at 594 (" [S]tate
law determines whether a taxpayerhas a property interest to which a federal lien
may attach. . . . Therefore, we must decide whether, under Texas law, [the
taxpayer] ever had a property interest in [the subject] estate.") (citations omitted).
Reading the Texas Probate Code's vesting and disclaimer provisions together, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "a bequest or gift is nothing more than an offer which
can be accepted [by taking possession, exercising dominion, or taking no action
within the settime] orrejected [by timely filing a disclaimer]. " Id. at 595-96 (citing
Texas authority). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit distinguished its holding from a
contrary holding in United States v. Comparato, 22 F.3d 455 (2d Cir.
1994)(Comparato), onthe ground that NewYorklawis substantiallydifferentfrom
Texas law and from Arizona law, which was applied in Mapes v. United States, 15
F.3d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1994)(Mapes). Leggett, 120 F.3d at 596-97.
In Mapes, the taxpayer's mother died, leaving him half of her estate. 15 F.3d at
139. In order to prevent preexisting federal tax liens from attaching to his interest
in the estate, the taxpayer renounced his interest in favor ofhis children pursuant
to Arizona's Probate Code. Id. at 140. The district court's [sic] ruled in favor of
the government and against the taxpayer's children in their wrongful levy action.
Id. at 141. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "state law, not federal law"
determined "whether [the taxpayer] had any interest in property, lienable or not."
Id. at 140. From this premise, the court concluded that the taxpayer did not have
an interest under state law because the effect of the taxpayer's proper and timely
renunciation was to prevent him from acquiring any interest to which a federal tax
lien could have attached. Id. at 140-41. The court further held that the taxpayer's
renunciation was not compromised by his temporary use of part of the estate (a
vehicle, constituting one percent ofthe value of the estate) in order to prevent its
loss or theft. Id. at 141.
As noted above, the Second Circuit reached a contrary result in Comparato.
Comparato involvedthe estate ofa quadriplegic who died intestate in 1984, leaving
his parents, the Comparatos, as his statutory distributees. 22 F.3d at 456. In 1989
Anthony Comparato, the decedent's father, petitioned the Surrogate's Court to
approve the settlementofamalpractice actionthat decedent had commencedbefore
his death and a derivative wrongful death claim, and to distribute the proceeds
equally between himselfand his wife as the decedent's heirs. Id. In August 1989,
before the Surrogate Court disposed of the petition, the IRS served notice oflevy
on the decedent's estate in the amount of the Comparatos' tax liability. Id. The
Comparatos executed separate, untimely renunciations oftheir respective interests
in their son's estate on April 10, 1991, which the Surrogate Court permitted them
to file on September 23, 1991. Id. In 1992 the government commenced an action
in the district court to reduce to judgment the assessments against the Comparatos.
Id. The district court held tllat the Comparatos acquired property interests in the
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proceeds of the malpractice claims on the date of their son's death and that the
preexisting federal tax liens attached to the interests prior to the Comparatos'
renunciation. Id. at 458. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, under New
Yorklaw, the Comparatos' interestsvestedupontheir son's death, thereby obviating
any analysis of the retroactive effect of the renunciation. Id. at 457-58. "[O]nce
state law provided [the Comparatos] with a vested interest in the proceeds of the
malpractice actions, federal law controlled whether their interests were exempt
from levy by the United States." Id. at 458 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461
U.S. 677,683 (1983». Applying federal law, the court further determined that the
express terms of the Code precluded any determination that the Comparatos'
interests were exempt from levy by operation ofa state law. Id. (citing 26 U. S.C.
section 6334).
Liability of Heirs for Unpaid Income and Self-Employment Taxes. PLR 9851036 considered the
J
J
J
J
J
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situation in which a decedent owned propertyjointly with three ofhis children and owned the life insurance policy that
was payable to a fourth child, all ofwhich passed to the children outside ofthe decedent's probate estate. The decedent
had not filed federal income tax returns or paid federal income tax or self-employment tax for approximately 40 years
and no taxassessments were made against the decedentprior to his death and the decedent's probate estate lacked assets
to pay the tax. The IRS determined that the heirs were not subject to transferee liability. The IRS did not explain how
J
J
the taxpayer successfully avoided income tax for 40 years!
7. Section 7491 - Burden of Proof. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform of 1998 J
added a new section to the Internal Revenue Code, section7491. The new section provides that with respect to a factual
issue, the burden ofproofwill shift to the IRS from the taxpayer ifthe taxpayer introduces a "credible evidence." The
Conference Report to the Act states that "credible evidence" is the "quality of evidence which, after critical analysis,
the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue of no contrary evidence were submitted."
Thus, an expert opinion on which a court would rely should be credible evidence. The new provision applies with
respect to transfers after July 22, 1998, subject to certain net worth limitations. Neither individuals nor estates are
subject to the limitations.
J
j
J
J
T. KENTUCKY DEVELOPMENTS
1; On the Brink of a New Millennium: Kentucky Supreme Court holds no cause of action for
J
breach of promise to marry. Never let it be said that Kentucky is not on the leading edge. In Gilbert v. Barkes, Ky.,
97 S.W.2d 772 (1999) the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that there was no longer any common law cause of
action for a breach of promise to marry. The court did state, however, that in certain circumstances a fiancee could
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recover under other theories, such as breach ofcontract or intentional infliction ofemotional distress, however, under
the particular facts of the case, neither would be allowed. There was no proof of any direct economic loss and no
wedding date was ever actually set. The decision was a close one with three Justices dissenting, stating "having
successfully purged the common law ofthe tort ofalienation ofaffection in Hoye v. Hoye, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 422 (1992),
the majority of this Court now consigns to oblivion yet another ancient tort, the breach ofpromise to marry."
2. Undue Influence and Lack of Testamentary Capacity. The Kentucky Supreme Court dealt with
the challenge of the validity of the Will on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity in Bye v.
Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998). On March 23,1989, Mrs. McQuady died leaving all of her assets to Mr.
r McQuady. In May 1989,Mr. McQuady hired Ms. Bye as his housekeeper. He was unable to see at this time. On July
17, 1989, Mr. McQuady, accompanied by Ms. Bye, executed a new Will revoking bequests to family members, and
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leaving $100 to his church, and the remainder to Ms. Bye.
On May 18, 1990, the family members who had been the beneficiaries ofthe earlier Will petitioned and were
appointed limited conservators and limited guardian. On September21, 1990, Mr. McQuadywas diagnosed as suffering
from Alzheimer's disease. Subsequently, a petition was filed seeking to allow Mr. McQuady to marry Ms. Bye and on
May 17, 1991,a hearing was held onthat matter. In the hearing, Mr. McQuady testified that he had signed the petition
in error, that he did not want to marry Ms. Bye, and that he was afraid of Ms. Bye. The court denied the petition to
marry and Ms. Bye's services as housekeeper were terminated.
On October 29, 1991, a new Will was executed by Mr. McQuady which reenacted the 1988 Will. One ofthe
beneficiaries drove Mr. McQuady to and from the law office but did not participate in any discussion or activities .
regarding the Will and Mr. McQuady had private discussions with his lawyer. When the Will was executed, only the
r lawyer, Mr. McQuady, and a witness were present. On August 7, 1992, Mr. McQuady died and Ms. Bye sued
challenging the validity of the 1991 Will on the grounds ofundue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.
r
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The courtnoted that there is strongpresumptioninfavor ofa testatorpossessing adequate testamentary capacity
and held that although "a ruling of total or partial disability certainly is evidence ofa lack of testamentary capacity, it
is certainly not dispositive of the issue." The court cited cases in which deaf, blind, paralyzed, and epileptic testators
were determined to have capacity, as well as those who believed in witchcraft, spiritualism, and atheism. The court
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found, therefore, that Mr. McQuady would be presumed to have been experiencing a "lucid interval" during the
execution of the Will.
With respect to undue influence, the court listed as badges ofundue influence: "a physically weak and mentally
impaired testator, a will which is unnatural in its provisions, a recently developed and comparatively short period of
close relationship between the testator and principal beneficiary, participation by the principal
beneficiary in the preparation of the will, possession of the will by the principal beneficiary after it was reduced to
writing, effortsby the principalbeneficiary to restrict contactsbetweenthe testator and the natural objects ofhisbounty,
and absolute control of testator's business affairs." The court found that on these facts the only existing badges of
undue influence were that the testator was physically and mentally weak and that one ofthe beneficiaries had complete
control over the testator's business affairs as guardian.
The court specifically distinguished between contracts between a guardian and a ward which do create a
presumption against the transaction which must be rebutted by the guardian with clear and convincing evidence, and
a bequest in a will.
The court also noted that merely driving the testator to and from the lawyer's office was not "active
J
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participation" in the execution of a Will and, thus, did not give rise to a presumption ofundue influence.
3. Conflict of Interest By Trustee of Multiple Trusts. The Kentucky Court ofAppeals has rendered J
an interesting opinion in Wiggins v. PNC Bank, Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 988 S.W.2d 498 (1999). PNC Bank was trustee
of two trusts having as the lifetime beneficiary Verna Schlegel Moesser. One trust was an inter vivos trust which was
for her sole benefit with the remainder being distributed to her estate at her death. Another trust had been created by
Ms. Moesser's mother and, under the facts, was passed to Ms. Moesser's mother's descendants after her death. PNC
Bankmade encroachments frombothtrusts for Ms. Moesser'sbenefitwhile she was incompetentandin a nursinghome.
After Ms. Moesser died, the beneficiaries ofMs. Moesser's mother's trust (the Schlegel trust) contended that
PNC Bank had a conflict of interest and should have obtained prior court approval before distributing assets from the
Schlegel trust pursuant to KRS 386.820(2). That statute provides:
If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of
another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be exercised
only by court authorization (except as provided in KRS 386.810, subsections
(3)(a), (d), (f), (r), and (x» upon petition of the trustee. Under this section,
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personal profit or advantage to an affiliated or subsidiary company or association
is personal profit to any corporate trustee.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed that a conflict existed and that KRS 386.820(2) applied. Thus, the
statute limited PNC's discretion and it should have obtained prior court approval. The court remanded the case for a
determination of damages.
The dissent makes the point that the "majority seems to say that merely becuase PNC had two trusts from
which it could invade principal to support Verna, a 'conflict ofinterest' was automatically created when PNC exercised
its discretion as to which funds would be used for her support." The majority opinion does not say why there was a
conflict of interest, only that PNC was faced with the choice ofwhether to disadvantage the remainder beneficiaries of
the Schlegel trust or the remainder beneficiaries of the Moesser trust.
PresumablyifPNC Bankhad acted inaccordance withthe authority ofan attorney-in-fact or the revocable trust
had been an agency account the issue would not have arisen. The result seems anomalous in that respect. Regardless,r corporate fiduciaries, in particular, can be expected to face this issue on an on-going basis.
4. Prenuptial Planning;. The settled law in Kentucky is that gifts before marriage are ineffective to
r
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defeat an intended spouse's dowerinterest. In Martinv. Martin, Ky., 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940), the court stated a general
rule that pre-marital gifts of real estate were ineffective to defeat dower but that gifts ofpersonalty were effective and
then determined that there should be no difference between kinds ofproperty. The court held that pre-marital gifts of
all types were ineffective.
The result is the same for post-marital transfers. See Anderson v. Anderson, Ky. App., 5835 S.W.2d 504
(1979), and Harris v. Rock, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 10 (1990).
whether such policy is appropriate.
The cases are consistent with a public policy that protects spouses from disinheritance. It is not entirely clearr
r U. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Tax Apportionment. Apportionment of estate tax presents on-going issues. One of those was
r addressed in Estate of Miller v. Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 1998-416: apportionment inside the residue. The
decedent's Will provided for all taxes to be paid from the residue. The residue was to be divided, one-half for the
r
r
r
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decedent's surviving spouse and the other halfto a trust that did not qualify for the marital deduction. The applicable
apportionment statute, Texas, was summarized by the court:
Generally, in the absence of specific directions in the will regarding the
apportionment ofestate tax, the State's apportionment statute mandates that estate
tax be apportioned among estate beneficiaries according to the taxable value of
their respective interests in the estate. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. sec. 322A(b)(1).
Apportionment, pursuantto the statute, takes into considerationbequests qualifying
for the marital deduction, and no estate tax is apportioned to the surviving spouse
with respect to such bequests. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. sec. 322A(c) and (d). The
Texas statute, however, allows the decedent to opt out of the general scheme by
specifically providing for an alternative plan of apportionment. Tex. Prob. Code
Ann. sec. 322A(b)(2).
The court relied on Estate ofFinev. Commissioner, 90 T. C. 1068 (1988), aird without published opinion, 885
F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1989), and Estate ofBrunettiv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-517, and held that the Will "opted
out" of the statute.
A contrary result was reached in Edward McKeon v. United Stated, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5114 (9th Cir.),
construing the California apportionment statute.
In Estate ofFagan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-46, the decedent's will provided in pertinent part as
follows:
1.01 CLAIMS AGAINST MY ESTATE. I direct my Executor, hereinafter named,
to payout of the general funds of my estate the cost of the administration of my
estate, all my legal debts, expenses of last illness, and funeral expenses.
1.02 PAYMENT OF TAXES. I direct my Executor to payout of my residuary
estate, otherwise passing under Article III hereof, and as soon as practical, all
inheritance, estate, transfer, and succession taxes payable by reason of my death
(including interest and penalties thereonin the discretion ofmy Executor) assessed
on my property or interest included in my gross estate for tax purposes. I direct that
my Executor shall not require that any part of such taxes by [sic1recovered from,
paid by, or apportioned among the recipients of, or those interested in, such
property.
* * * * *
ARTICLE III
DISPOSITION OF RESIDUARY ESTATE
All the rest, residue and remainder ofmy property, real and personal, tangible and
intangible, wheresoever situate and howsoever held, including any property over
which I may have a power of appointment, herein referred to as my residuary
estate, I give, devise, and bequeath to First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, as
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Trustee under that certain Trust Agreement dated the 17th day of June, 1988,
wherein I am the Grantor and First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company is Trustee, to
be held and administered as a part of the trust hereby [sic] created.
The trust provided that the trust assets wouldbe divided into three shares, the last ofwhich was equal to three-
r fifths ofthe estate and was to be distributed amongvarious charitable organizations. The trust agreement provided that
that share should "not be reduced by any taxes chargeable against the Grantor's gross estate."
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At issue before the court was whether the charitable share was calculated as a percentage of the entire estate,
unreduced by federal estate taxes, or after the payment offederal estate taxes. The court determined that the language
ofthe Will waived any general apportionment statutes under applicable state law (North Carolina) as well as section
2206 (apportionment to life insurance). The court found that the clause in the trust was insufficient to overcome the
waiver ofapportionment inthe Will statingthat the "apportionmentclause inthe trustagreement deals withan allocation
of the tax burden on property that the beneficiaries of the trust are entitled to receive from the trust, not what the trust
is entitled to receive from the grantor-decedent's estate."
In TAM 199915001 the decedent had a Will that provided for the payment ofall estate taxes from the residue
ofthe estate without apportionment. The decedent's estate plan also included a revocable trust and an irrevocable life
insurance trust, the insurance proceeds payable to which were included in the decedent's gross estate. The TAMr concludes that the general tax clause waived apportionment under section 2206 and thus the insurance trust would not
be required to reimburse the probate estate but that reimbursement under section 2207B was not waived and thus taxes
An issue not addressed was whether the revocable trust is also included under section 2038 or instead under
section 2038. Section 2207B applies only to section 2036.
would be apportioned against the revocable trust because it was included in the decedent's estate under section 2036.r
r
r 2. Resulting Trust Argument Rejected. In Estate ofHorstmeier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-
r
r
r
r
r
145, the court held that 100% ofthe residence titled in the name of the decedent would be included in the decedent's
estate and rejected the estate's contention that a resulting trust in favor of the decedent's life partner was valid. The
estate claimed that the decedent's life partner had beneficial interest in half of the propertybased on an understanding
and agreement with the decedent that the decedent purchase the residence and would, in effect, transfer the residence
over time to the life partner in exchange for services. The tax court found insufficient evidence of a resulting trust.
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A somewhat different conclusion was reached in the Kentucky case ofRakhmanv. Zusstone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d
241 (1997), in which Zusstone bought the residence and Rakhman contended that the residence was a gift to her on the
occasion ofthebirth oftheir second child. The parties began living together, unmarried, in 1979, their second child was
born in 1985, and the home was used as their residence until their separation in 1992. Any evidence that the residence
was a gift was in testimony ofRakhman, although the court did find other instances in which Zusstone bought property
and had it "held" in someone else's name.
The Kentucky Supreme Court found first that Rakhman was the natural object ofZusstone's affection stating
"one with whom the donor has shared a home for nearly twelve years, who has been represented to the public as the
donor's spouse, who has adopted the use of the donor's surname, and who has borne the donor two children and has
shared the demands andjoys ofparenting with the donor, would come within a practical definition of the phrase." In
1985 when the property was purchased, Zusstone transferred funds into a bank account over which Rakhman had sole
control, she wrote and signed the check in payment for the house, and the deed was placed in her name alone. Thus,
there was presumption that the gift was made to her.
3. Effectiveness of Off-Shore Trusts. Ofinterest to those doing off-shore trusts for creditor protection
planning is Federal Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC, _ F.3d-, 99 Cal. Daily Op. SelV. 4689, (9th Cir.
1999), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the U. S. District Court's findings of contempt against the Andersons for
failing to return the list ofproceeds from an off-shore trust. The Andersons claimed that they were unable to comply
with thejudicial order -- an impossibility defense --but the Ninth Circuit rejected that contention noting that the District
Court found that in fact the Andersons were indirectly in control ofthe trust. That finding was buttressed, apparently,
by the fact that the Andersons acted, or could act, as the "trust protector."
The court did not squarely address the issue of whether an impossibility defense would have been sufficient
had the Andersons not acted as trust protector. The court seemed sympathetic to the notion that an impossibility defense
is not appropriate where the parties asserting the defense have in fact created the impossibility. To state it differently,
where the parties themselves created a trust which was designed not to honor court orders, was a self-created
impossibility. In that regard, the court stated:
Given that these offshore trusts operate by means of frustrating domestic courts'
jurisdiction, we are unsure that we would find that the Andersons' inability to
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comply with the district court's order is a defense to a civil contempt charge. We
leave for another day the resolution ofthis more difficult questionbecause we find
that the Andersons have not satisfied their burden ofprovingthat compliance with
the district court's repatriation order was impossible. It is well established that a
partypetitioningfor an adjudication that anotherparty is incivil contempt does not
have the burden ofshowing that the other party has the capacity to comply with the
court's order. See NLRB v. Trans Ocean Export Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d 612,616
(9th Cir. 1973). Instead, the party asserting the impossibility defense must show
"categorically and in detail" why he is unable to comply. Id.; See also Rylander,
460 U.S. at 757 ("It is settled, however, that in raising this defense, the defendant
has a burden ofproduction.").
In the assetprotectiontrust context, moreover, the burden onthe party asserting an
impossibility defense will be particularly high because of the likelihood that any
attempted compliance with the court's orders will be merely a charade rather than
a good faith effort to comply. Foreign trusts are often designed to assist the settlor
in avoiding being held in contempt of a domestic court while only feigning
compliance with the court's orders:
Finally, the settlor should be aware that, although his trust will probably
prove unassailable by domestic creditors, he may face minor hassles
while defending his trust in court. In particular, if a creditor attacks an
offshore trust in United States court, the settlor may face contempt of
court orders during the proceedings.... [T]here is a possibility that the
court will ... order the settlor to collect his assets from the trust and turn
them over to the court. Ifthe settlor does not comply with these orders, a
court may hold him in contempt. However, there are ways around such a
conflict. ... [T]he settlor could comply with the court order and 'order'
his trustee to turn over the funds, knowing full well that the trustee will
not comply with his request. Thereby, the settlor would technically
comply with the court's orders, escape contempt of court charges, and
still rest assured that his assets will remain protected.
James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection
Scheme, 102 Com. L. 1. 138, 158 (1997). With foreign laws designed to frustrate
the operation of domestic courts and foreign trustees acting in concert with
domestic persons to thwart the United States courts, the domestic courts will have
tobe especiallycharyofaccepting a defendant's assertions that repatriationorother
compliance with a court's order concerning a foreign trust is impossible.
Consequently, the burden on the defendant of proving impossibility as a defense
to a contempt charge will be especially high.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES FOR TRUST AND ESTATE LAWYERS
(A Review oflssues Addressed by Kentucky Bar Association Formal Ethics Opinion E-401)
Sheldon G. Gilman
I. Introduction to Issues
B. Confidentiality and Privilege. If the fiduciary reveals to the lawyer or the lawyer
discovers in the course of the representation that the fiduciary has made a mistake, or
acted in a dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal manner, mayor must the lawyer reveal this
information to the beneficiaries, or the other fiduciaries, or a court that supervises estate
administration, or does the duty of confidentiality or the concept of privilege preclude
such revelation or discovery?
C. Conflicts of Interest. To whom must the lawyer be loyal if multiple co-
fiduciaries Of a predecessor and a successor fiduciary disagree, or the fiduciaries and the
beneficiaries disagree, or a fiduciary is a creditor of the entity or one of several
beneficiaries whose interests conflict with other fiduciaries or beneficiaries, and does the
lawyer have a conflict of interest in the context of such representations? What is the
potential for conflict among several constituents: the spouse as against the children (the
income beneficiary as against the remainder beneficiaries and one co-fiduciary against
another co-fiduciary), and the children as against the one child who is active in the
business.
3. Does the lawyer represent the estate/trust as an entity?
Does the lawyer represent the beneficiaries?
Review of Fundamental Issue: "Who does the lawyer represent?"
1. Does the lawyer represent the fiduciary? If the lawyer represents the
fiduciary, then does the lawyer represent the fiduciary in a fiduciary capacity or
an individual (corporate) capacity?
4. Does the lawyer representthe beneficiaries and the fiduciary?
2.
A.
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D. Competence and Loyalty to the Beneficiaries. Must the lawyer protect the
. beneficiaries' interests as individuals or only indirectly as beneficiaries of the fiduciary
entity that the lawyer serves, and must the lawyer seek protective rpeasures if, for .
example, a beneficiary is being overreached by a third party or by a fiduciary, or appears
to require the appointment ofa guardian or conservator to protect the beneficiary?
,..
f
r
E. Review ofQuestions Presented By KBA E-401.
1. Question 1: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a
decedent's estate or trust expand or limit the lawyer's obligation to the fiduciary
under the Rules of Professional Conduct?
r A-77
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2. Question 2: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a
decedent's trust or estate impose on the la\vyer obligations to the beneficiaries of
the decedent's trust or estate that the lawyer would not have toward third
parties?
3. Question 3: Is the lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidences
under Rule 1.6 altered by the fact that the client is a fiduciary?
4. Question 4: May the lawyer for the fiduciary also represent the
beneficiaries of the decedent's trust or estate?
Review of Professional Rules
A. Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.
I. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(a) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(b) Each client consents after consultation.
2. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(a) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(b) The client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
.J
J
J
B. ~omments To Rule 1.7. Other Conflict Situations
[10] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be
difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there. is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and intimacy ofthe lawyer's relationship with
the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the
likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client
from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often one of proximity and
degree.
[11] For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a
negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but
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common representation is pennissible where the clients are generally aligned in
interest even though there is some difference of interest among them.
[12] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate
administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client
may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the
client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust.
including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the
parties involved.
C. Requirement of"Consent and Consultation." The Rules of Professional Conduct
define "consult" or "consultation" as denoting "communication of infonnation
reasonably sufficient to pennit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question." A lawyer is obligated to disclose to the client the existence of the conflict,
that multiple representation is sought, then disclose the implications thereof, including
its risks and advantages. In this regard pages 114 through 118 of the American Bar
Association's text, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct Third Edition,
(1996) contains numerous citations, and commentary on this issue of client
"consultation," and is recommended reading for a further understanding of the
requirements for and the meaning of "consultation." All communications between a
lawyer and multiple clients regarding questions of conflict should be in writing, and the
client's consent should be evidenced in writing.
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D. Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation.
I. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide "by a
client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
2. A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
eco~omic, social, or moral views or activities.
3. A' lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation.
4. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client
and may counselor assist a client to make a good faith effort to detennine the
validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.
S. When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not
pennitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer
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shall infonn the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's
conduct.
Comment to Rule 1.2.
[8] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special
obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.
Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Infonnation.
I. A lawyer shall not reveal infonnation relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).
2. A lawyer may reveal such infonnation to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(a) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
hann;or
(b) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(c) To comply with other law or a court order.
J
,J
G. Comments to Rule 1.6.
[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law.
One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation
ofthe law in the proper exercise oftheir rights.
[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of
facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people
. to seek early legal assistance.
[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine
what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to
be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences
must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that
almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the
lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The
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client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer
even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of
law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in
the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional
ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
Disclosure Adverse to Client
[9] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming
privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends
serious harm to another person. However, to the extent a lawyer is required or
permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from
revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful
course of action. The public is better protected if full and open communication
by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
[10] Several situations must be distinguished.
[11] First, the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is
criminal or fraudulent. See Rule L2(d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under
Rule 3.3(aX4) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special
instance of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in
criminal or fraudulent conduct.
[12] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct
by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has
not violated Rule 1.2(d), because to "counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent
cond.uct requires knowing that the conduct is ofthat character.
[14] The lawyer's exercise ofdiscretion requires consideration ofsuch factors
as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who
might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in' the transaction
and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the .
lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a
disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer
reasonably believes is necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take
preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1) does not violate this Rule.
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III.
Witbdrawal
[15] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering
a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated
in Rule 1.16(a)(I).
[16] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6.
Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.l6(d) prevents the lawyer from
giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and upon withdrawal the lawyer may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
Review of State Cboices
A. Representation of Fiduciary. Florida Law.
[C]ounsel for the personal representative of an estate owes fiduciary duties not only to
the personal representative but also to the beneficiaries of the estate.... This does not
mean, however, that counsel and the beneficiaries occupy an attorney-client relationship.
They do not. "In Florida, the personal representative is the client rather than the estate or
the beneficiaries." Rule 4-1.7, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (comment). It follows
that counsel does not generate a conflict of interest in representing the personal
representative in a matter simply because one or more of the beneficiaries takes a
position adverse to that of the personal representative. A contrary position would raise
havoc with the orderly administration of decedents' estates, not to mention the additional
attorney's fees that would be generated. I
B. Representation of Estate or Trust. In Delaware, North Carolina, New York and
Washington it appears that the lawyer for the fiduciary represents the fiduciary entity
and not just the fiduciary.2
C. Recommendation for Action. In "Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities:
Who is the Client?," 62 Fordham Law Review 1319 (1994), Jeffrey N. Pennell reviews
the complexity ofthe problem, and makes the following comments:
Fo~lowing the approach in Florida, other states should be encouraged to
establish, by express amendment to their Rules or by a Comment
explaining them, who the attorney represents in the absence of a
representation agreement to the contrary. In establishing this rule jt is
necessary and appropriate to distinguish between an attorney's duties to
non-clients (such as beneficiaries under most of the alternative visions
J
I
J
J
,/II"
J
I In re Estate ofGOry. S70 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990) (emphasis added) (order disqualifying personal
representative's lawyers in dispute over personal representative's compensation reversed).
% Riggs National Bank v. Zimmmer. 3S5 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 512 (1979),
Jenkins v. Wheeler. 69 N.C. App. 140, review denied, 311 N.C. 758 (1984); In re Vetter. 711 P.2d 284, 289 (Wash.
1985);
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VI.
of the entity representation situation) and to restrict the impetus to
expand the concept of "derivative" duties by adopting a rule that
provides protection to beneficiaries without creating untenable or
undefinable obligations of the attorney. Among the available options,
regarding the beneficiaries as the attorney's client should be rejected
because the beneficiaries do not engage the attorney, the beneficiaries
almost always have conflicting interests (because some are current and
others are future interest holders), and in some cases the attorney may
not know the wishes or even the identity of the various beneficiaries.
Casting the attorney in the role of a watchdog over the fiduciary to
protect the interests of beneficiaries also is untenable and subverts the
attorney-client relation, regardless of who the client is deemed to be.
Any rule that creates an obligation on an attorney to police a fiduciary
should be rejected. (At page 1344).
Duties to Beneficiaries
A. Review Rule 1.2.
B. Communications with Beneficiary. The lawyer should be careful not to allow
the beneficiary to believe that the lawyer represents the beneficiary's interests. It is not
uncommon for the beneficiary of an estate or trust to believe that the fiduciary's lawyer
represents the estate or trust as an entity and thus, to some extent, the beneficiary's
interests. If the lawyer representing the fiduciary believes that this has occurred. the
lawyer should quickly correct the beneficiary's misperceptions and clearly advise the
beneficiary that the lawyer only represents the fiduciary. The lawyer should avoid
making comments, written or oral, which give the beneficiary a false sense of security.
The lawyer should not suggest that the allowance of the fiduciary account is merely
"routine," lest the beneficiary fail to scrutinize the account carefully on the basis of this
representation.
ABA Formal Opinion 94-380 & KBA E-401
A. Review of Majority Rule - Lawyer Represents Fiduciary.
B. Review of KBA Opinion Citing ABA Opinion.
Conclusion of KBA Opinion
r
r
A. Review of Five Points.
1. In representing a fiduciary the' lawyer's client relationship is with the
fiduciary and not with the trust or estate. nor with the beneficiaries of a trust or
estate.
2. The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries of the trust
or estate does not in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations to the
fiduciary under the Rules of Professional Conduct. nor i~pose on the lawyer
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obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer would not have toward other
third parties.
3. The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule 1.6
is not altered by the circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
4. A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with a
decedent's estate or trust regarding the identity of the lawyer's client, and the
lawyer's obligations to that client. A lawyer should not imply that the lawyer
represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries of the estate or trust because of
the probability of confusion. Further, in order to avoid such confusion, a laYl)'er
should not use the term "lawyer for the estate" or the term "lawyer for the trust"
on documents or correspondence or in other dealings with the fiduciary or the
beneficiaries.
S. A lawyer may represent the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a trust
and the beneficiaries of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent of the
multiple clients, and explains the limitations on the lawyer's actions in the event
a conflict arises, and the consequences to the clients if a conflict occurs. Further,
a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple clients only after appropriate
consultation with the multiple clients at the time of the commencement of the
representation.
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B. Recommendations
1.
2.
3.
Get It In Writing
You Do Not Represent Trusts - Estates
Use The Hot Line
VII. Process of Opinion
A. Recognition of Problem - Review By Committee - Through Committee - Board
of Governors.
B. Decision for Kentucky: Lawyers Representing Fiduciaries or Beneficiaries or
Both.
VIII. Miscellaneous Ethical Issues for the Estate Planner
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Joint Representation ofSpouses
Gifts to Lawyers
Will Provision Requiring Appointment as Fiduciary's Lawyer
Lawyer Representation of Fiduciary & Beneficiaries
Lawyer Selling Life Insurance
Lawyer Serving as Fiduciary
Lawyer Disclosure oflnformation After Client's Death
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IX. QuestioDs for Review
Partially disinherited (disgruntled) adult child wants to know the details of preparation of his
mother's trust/will. His mother (my client) died recently. I suspect that he plans to file a will
contest or action to rescind the trust. I am not representing anyone/any estate at this time, so
there is no apparent conflict of interest. I drafted mother's wilVtrust 18 months ago.
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#3
#4
Is there any ethical reason why I should or should not share with him the events
surrounding preparation of mother's documents, as well as letters, drafts and
notes in my file?
Do lowe the mother a continuing duty of confidentiality after her death?
Should I tell the disgruntled child that I will share infonnation with him if he
gives me written consent from all other legatees?
If the child attempts to obtain a court order to have me disclose the infonnation
do I have an affinnative obligation to oppose the child's efforts?
A-85
A-86
-
J
J
j
!.....
.J
APPENDIX A (2)
r
r
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS HOTLINE OPINION
REGARDING THE DUTY TO ADVISE A SURVIVING SPOUSE
OF HIS OR HER RIGHT TO ELECT AGAINST A DECEDENT'S WILL
(including reference to Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 76-16, April 4, 1977)
r
r
This is in response to your request for advice from the Kentucky Bar Association's
Ethics "Hotline" Committee regarding the following two ethics questions.
Ethics Question No.1
Your letter contains a two page statement of facts, however, for purposes of providing
you with advice I will summarize your detailed statement of facts as follows:
1) Do you have a responsibility to advise a surviving spouse·of his right to elect
.against the decedent's Will; and,'· .
D Mr. Jones is living in a nursing home because of his inability to care for himself. At the
executor's request you accompanied the executor to visit Mr. Jones in the nursing home
and at the executor's request you prepared a power ofattorney, and a living will for Mr.
Jones. You state you advised Mr. Jones you represented the executor and you were
preparing tbe documents as an accommodation.
You then stated you heard my ethics' presentation regarding KBA E-401 at this
summer's University of Kentucky's Estate Planning Seminar, and at the end of my presentation
someone posed a hypothetical question to me about the duty of the executor's attorney to advise
the surviving spouse of their right to elect against the will. At that time, I made a comment that
providing such advice may be necessary.. Therefore, based upon my comment at the Seminar
you have asked me the following two questions:
You represent Mr. James Smith) in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Mrs. Mary
Jones. Mr. Smith is a nephew of the decedent and is one of two remainder beneficiaries.
Mrs. Jones' estate exceeds $700,000.
The decedent was married to Mr. Jones, and Mr. Jones survived the decedent. The Will
contains a small bequest to Mr. Jones with the bulk of the Estate passing to Mr. Smith
and another nephew.
You advised the executor/nephew that Mr. Jones, as surviving spouse, could elect to take
his marital share of decedent's estate, and the executor "instructed me not to relay that
information to Mr. Jones."
D
D
D
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2) Ifyou do have a duty to disclose such information to the spouse, how·should you
make the disclosure; that is, in person or by letter to his attorney in fact.
f
r
The Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics Committee has not opined on the specific issue
you have raised; however, the Florida Bar Association's Ethics Committee has considered the
specific questions you have raised. Please find enclosed a copy of Florida Bar Ethics Opinion
J Your letter advises that the names ofthe parties have been changed in order to protect client confidentiality.
r
f
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76-16. April 4, 1977. In response to the question of whether a lawyer is obligated to infonn the
surviving spouse of the spouse's right to elect against the decedent's Will, and take an elective
share, the Florida Ethics Comminee provided the following advice.
"The lawyer is not necessarily required to infonn the surviving spouse of such
rights, but the Comminee believes that it would be advisable to do so in most
instances. When the personal representative is someone other than the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse may be looking to the lawyer or the personal
representative for infonnation even though there is no anomey-client
relationship between them. If the lawyer knows this, we believe he may have a
duty to infonn the surviving spouse of these statutory rights. [f the surviving
spouse has retained a lawyer, there is probably no need to. When the surviving
spouse is the personal representative, we believe the lawyer should advise the
surviving spouse of these rights."
When the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse,
and if the personal representative objects to the lawyer's infonning the surviving
spouse of the surviving spouse's rights, what are the lawyer's responsibilities?
"The right to claim an elective share, or family allowance or exempt property
are, as stated above, rights provided by statute. The personal representative has
the duty to administer the estate according to law, including Sections 732.201,
732.402, and 732.403. He has no duty to try to prevent the exercise of those
rights."
Finally, the last question presented and responded to raises the fundamental question
raised in your correspondence. The last question and answer is as follows.
5. Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the
surviving spouse, would the answer ... be different if the personal
representative's opposition to the spouse claiming an elective share or statutory
entitlements is based upon the personal representative's desire to increase his
own distributive share? No. A personal representative is a fiduciary, and his
private desires vis-a-vis the estate are immaterial.
I find the analysis of the Florida Bar Opinion well considered and consistent with a
lawyer's duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, it is my opinion that you
have a duty to advise the surviving spouse of his rights to elect against the decedent's Will.
Your client's position as a primary residuary beneficiary of the estate may conflict wi~h his
fiduciary duties, and you may not allow yourself to participate, either directly or indirectly in the
possible giving ofa false impression.4
It is my opinion that your advice should be given by lener, and may be provided to the
surviving spouse's anomey in fact.
4 See Rule 4.1. "Truthfulness in Statements to Others" - "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly make a falSe statcrnent ofmaterial fact or law to a third person."
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Ethics Question No.2
Your second question presents an issue that was discussed in Kentucky Bar Association
Ethics Opinion KBA E-376, regarding lawyer participation in the sale of life insurance products.
In your correspondence you stated the following:
I have been approached by various life insurance people, financial planners, and
others in the financial services business for referrals, and they have offered
various fee-sharing incentives, all of which I have not accepted. Another
insurance brokerage company has contacted me and suggested that I recommend
to my clients to consider "no-commission" insurance. Their representatives
suggested to me that it is "ethical" in Kentucky to charge a higher additional
separate legal fee for advising the client on the insurance issues and the benefits
of no-commission insurance. They did, however, recommend that I deliver to
the client a letter which provides full disclosure of my relationship as a lawyer
with the insurance brokerage. The client would supposedly pay a legal fee for
my advice and the referral to the no-commission insurance agency. The
insurance company the policy is finally placed with would pay the insurance
brokerage c·ompany a fee for closing any sale which resulted. There would be no
fee or commission sharing between me, and insurance brokerage or insurance
company.
You made reference to a recent Kentucky ethics opinion, and you have asked what is the
status of the ethics opinions in Kentucky on these matters. Also, you would like to know if this
question has been previously presented to the Ethics Committee, and if you could have the
benefit ofmy experience, etc.
It is my opinion that KBA E-376 provides significant advice on the questions you have
raised; accordingly, I.am enclosing a copy of this Opinion.s Please note the following comments
from this Opinion.
Further, to make our position as clear as possible, we emphasize that a lawyer
has a duty of loyalty to the client, and that advising a client about the disposition
of the client's estate after death, and the sale of life insurance raises inherent
problems of conflicts of interest as the insurer pays the agent (lawyer) to
maximize insurance sales, and the lawyer's responsibility to maintain
independence may be compromised; accordingly, it is necessary for the lawyer
to disclose all of these matters in writing to the client, and to obtain the client's
consent. The disclosure should advise the client that it is appropriate to obtain
independent advice, counsel, in these unique circumstances.
Since the issuance of the referred to opinion there have been no additional opinions on
this subject. Further, I am not aware of any opinions of other Bar Associations on these issues.
As to my advice on the question presented, I would seriously question any insurance advisor who
makes the following statement.
S As a member of the Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics Committee I served as the principal author of the subjcct
opinion, and the comments made in this correspondence reflect the special insights I learned in preparing KBA E-376.
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Their representatives suggested to me that it is "ethical" in Kentucky to charge a
higher additional separate legal fee for advising the client on the insurance issues
and the benefits of no-commission insurance.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the arrangement proposed by the insurance agent
raises serious issues of fraud, false impression, and conflicts of interest. I would not recommend
participating in such an arrangement.
I trust this advice has been of assistance to you and if you have any further questions you
will contact me. This advice is limited to the scope granted the writer as a representative of the
"Hot Line," pursuant to SCR 3.530, the purpose of which is clearly stated that "no attorney shall
be disciplined for any professional act on his part performed in compliance with an opinion
furnished to him on his petition. provided his petition clearly, fairly, accurately, and completely
states his contemplated professional act." This Opinion is not an expression of law nor does it
bind any court.
Very truly yours,
Sheldon G. Gilman
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FLORIDA BAR ETHICS OPINION
OPINION 76-16
April 4, 1977
A surviving spouse who claims an elective share or statutory entitlements does not, without
more, have a conflict of interest with the personal representative of an estate or other
beneficiaries under a will. The attorney for the personal representative has the right and in some
circumstances a duty, to inform the surviving spouse ofthe existence ofthose statutory rights.
Statutes: F.S. §§§§732.201, 732.402, 732.403, 733.504(9)
Chairman Sullivan stated the opinion of the committee:
A member of The Florida Bar submits a number of questions about the rights and duties of the
lawyer for the personal representative of an estate administered under the Florida Probate Code.
The questions and the Committee's answers to them are as follows:
r
r
1. Does the lawyer for the personal representative have the right to inform the surviving
spouse of his or her entitlement to family allowance (Sec. 732.403), exempt property
(Sec. 732.402), or right to claim an elective share (Sec. 732.201)?
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Yes. The purpose ofthe Florida Probate Code is to provide a procedure to pay a decedent's debts
and taxes and transfer and distribute the remaining assets as efficiently and inexpensively as
possible to those entitled to them under the will or by intestacy. It is normal in most instances
that the persons entitled to those assets will look to the personal representative or the lawyer for
the estate to find out what they may expect to receive from the estate. A beneficiary or heir
always has the right, of course, to retain independent counsel.
We believe that the lawyer for the personal representative has the right to provide those persons
with that information and to provide the surviving spouse with information about his or her
rights under the Probate Code. This is to be distinguished from counseling or giving legal
advice.
The surviving spouse frequently is the personal representative. In claiming an elective share, a
family allowance or exempt property we believe the surviving spouse is exercising a right
provided by statute and is 1J.0t acting in conflict with his or her duties as personal representative
of the estate. Section 733.504(9), dealing with causes of removal of a personal representative
because of a conflict of interest, specifically exempts as reasons for removal the surviving
spouse's claiming an elective share or statutory entitlements. We believe that in most instances
.the lawyer for the personal· representative prepares the papers by which the surviving spouse
elects against the will or claims statutory entitlements. We see no ethical problem with this,
provided there is no legal objection to claiming an elective share or entitlements.
If the surviving spouse claims one or more of the rights provided by statute, the result may be
less for other beneficiaries. But the fact that claiming an elective share or statutory entitlements
may alter the manner in which the estate is distributed does not, in the Committee's opinion,
create a conflict of interest that requires the personal representative or his lawyer to refuse to
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provide any infonnation about the existence of those rights and, in effect. to treat the surviving
spouse as an adverse party.
Such a result could force the surviving spouse to seek independent legal advice. We do not
believe that the Probate Code intended to create a proliferation of lawyers; its purpose was just
the opposite.
The Committee recognizes that there may be situations where it is apparent from the outset that
there will be a dispute between a personal representative and a surviving spouse-a will contest,
for example. In such situations, the lawyer for the personal representative should advise the
surviving spouse that an actual or potential conflict of interest exists and suggest that he or she
obtain independent legal advice.
Even where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest between personal representative and
surviving spouse, we do not think the lawyer for the personal representative should refuse to
furnish infonnation about the surviving spouse's legal rights under the Florida Probate Code.
2. Is the lawyer obligated to infonn the surviving spouse of such rights?
The lawyer is not necessarily required to inform the surviving spouse of such rights, but the
Committee believes that it would be advisable to do so in most instances.
When the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse may be looking to the lawyer for the personal representative for information even though
there is no attorney-client relationship between them. If the lawyer knows this, we believe he
may have a duty to inform the surviving spouse of these statutory rights. If the surviving spouse
has retained a lawyer, there is probably no need to. When the surviving spouse is the personal
representative, we believe the lawyer should advise the surviving spouse ofthese rights.
,....
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'3. Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse,
are the rights or obligations of the lawyer in 1. and 2., above, different if the personal
representative objects to the lawyer's informing the surviving spouse of her entitlement?
r
.J
No. The right to claim an elective share, or family allowance or exempt property are, as stated
above, rights provided by statute. The personal representative has the duty to administer the
estate according to law, including Sections 732.201, 732.402 and 732.403. He has no duty to try
to prevent the ex~iseofthose rights.
4. Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse,
would the answer to 3., above, be different if the lawyer had represented, the decedent
arid spouse for a number ofyears? '
No. The fact that the lawyer previously represented the decedent and spouse does not
automatically create a duty to infonn the surviving spouse of his or her statutory rights. But. as
stated in part of our answer to 2., above, the lawyer for the personal representative may have a
duty, as distinguished from a right, to infonn a surviving spouse of certain statutory rights if the
lawyer has represented the decedent and spouse previously and knows the surviving spouse is
looking to him for infonnation.
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5. Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse,
would the answer to 3., above, be different ifthe personal representative's opposition to
the spouse claiming an elective share or statutory entitlements is based upon the personal
representative's desire to increase his own distributive share?
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No. A personal representative is a fiduciary, and his private desires vis-a-vis the estate are
immaterial.
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This paper examines the uses of grantor
retained annuity trusts, sales to grantor trusts, and
appreciation transfer trusts as estate freezing
techniques. The author refers the reader to the
following resources for more informationon these
topics: Practical Drafting (U.S.Trust Company;
Richard B. Covey, editor; especially the April,
1999 issue); Manning and Hesch, "Deferred
Payment Sales to Grantor Trusts, GRATs, and Net
Gifts: Income and Transfer Tax Elements," Tax
Management Estates, Gifts, and Trusts Journal
(Vol. 24, No.1, January 14, I999)(cited herein as
Manning and Hesch); Ellen K. Harrison, "A
Comparison of Retained Annuities and Sales to
GrantorTrusts," ALI-ABA Estate Planning for the
Family Business Owner (July, 1998); and,
Mulligan, Defective Grantor Trusts Offer Many
Tax Advantages, 19 Est. Plan. 131 (May/June
1992).
A. The Big Picture: Estate Freezes After
Chapter 14
1. How We Got Here.
The purpose of an estate freeze
is to limit the value ofcertain of the client's assets
so that estate tax will not be paid on any
appreciation of the "frozen" assets between the
date of the freeze and the date of death. Perhaps
the simplest freeze is accomplished by making a
gift: the value ofthe gifted assets is forever frozen,
as far as the transfer tax system is concerned, at
the gift tax value. If the value of the assets
increases between the date of the gift and the date
ofdeath then estate tax is not paid on the increase.
The maximum amount thatmaybe frozen
through simple gifting is the amount that may be
sheltered by the unified credit (in 1999, $650,000)
and annual exclusion gifts unless the client is
willing to pay gift tax. Paying gift tax is valuable
not only for the freeze potential but also because
the gift tax is removed from the transferor's estate
if the transferor lives for at least three years, thus
saving estate tax on the gift tax. See Pennell and
Williamson, "The Economics ofPrepaying Wealth
Transfer Tax," Trusts and Estates (June, July and
August, 1997) for an extended, and excellent,
discussion of the economics ofgifting.
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Many clients do not want to pay
significant amounts ofgift tax, often because they
lack liquidity, or are hesitant to sell assets and
incur a capital gains tax, although they would like
the benefits of an estate freeze. Prior to Chapter
14, enacted in 1990, several techniques were in
common use. Those techniques are worth
discussing briefly, in oversimplified form, as
background to the issues addressed in this paper.
In addition, certain of the concepts remain an
integral part of freeze transactions today.
One technique was the preferred stock
recapitalization. Suppose a client owned all the
common stock ofa corporation, worth $1 ,000,000,
which the client expected to increase in value.
The corporation would have issued preferred stock
worth, say, $900,000 to the client. In order to
justify a value of$900,000 for the preferred stock
it often would have had a dividend preference (set
at a high rate to justify the lack ofmarketability of
the stock) and certain kinds ofvoting rights. Often
the intent was never to pay the dividend, although
if it were not paid the IRS could attempt to argue
that such nonpayment was a gift if the owner of
the preferred stock was in control of the
corporation. The IRS consistently lost such cases.
See, e.g., Joseph M. Daniels, 68 TCM 1310
(1994); Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529
(1989); and Lewis G. Hutchens Non-Marital Trust,
66 TCM 1599 (1993).
In any event, if the preferred stock were
worth $900,000 then the common stock must be
worth $100,000. The common stock would be
given to the client's donees and any increase in the
value of the corporation would accrue to the
common stock. The value of the corporation to
the holder of the preferred stock was completely
frozen if no dividends were paid on the stock, or
partially frozen if a dividend were paid (or if the
dividend was cumulative and was owed by the
corporation at some future time). An S
corporation could not be recapitalized because S
corporations may have only one class of stock.
Section 1361(c)(4).
For clients with otherassets, a partnership
was used with limited partnership units taking the
place of preferred stock and general units, being
the equivalent ofcommon stock. The frozen units
were retained and the otherunits were given away.
As with the corporate recapitalization, voting
control of the partnership could be split up as was
desired within the family.
Grantor retained income trusts (GRITs)
were also popular. In 1984 new actuarial tables
were issued by the IRS using a 10% earnings
assumption, and replacing the old 6% tables. This
made income interests more valuable and,
consequently, remainder interests less valuable.
Suppose a donor owned $1,000,000 ofbonds and
gave those bonds to a trust in which the donor
retained the income interest for a term of years.
The value of the income interest was subtracted
from the total value ofthe transfer and the value of
the gift for gift tax purposes was what remained.
If the donor died within the 10 year term the total
value of the trust, including any appreciation, was
included in the donor's estate by section 2036. For
this reason the idea was modified to also give the
client-donor a reversion in the trust assets during
the 10 year term. The reversion - the ability to
have the assets either paid to the donor's estate or
subject to the donor's general power of
appointment -- had value but did not "cost" the
donor anything. Through this technique donors
were able to give substantial assets at a reduced
gift tax value. The benefits were increased if the
assets yielded less than a 10% income return. At
the extreme, if the trust were funded with non-
income producing assets then the client would
receive nothing and the freeze would be complete.
The IRS attempted to prevent the use of non-
income producing assets, but was not successful in
preventing the use of the assets that had some
income yield even if it was substantially less than
10%. See Froh v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 1
(I993)(mineral interests under lease); cf. Q'Reilly
v. Corom'r, 95 T.C.. 646 (1990), rev'd and
remanded, 973 F.2d 1403 (8th Cir. 1992)(closely-
held stockproducing about 0.2%ofannual income
which the trustee indicated would not be sold).
Another technique was the buy-sell or
stock restriction agreement. For instance, suppose
a client with a $1,000,000 corporation agreed that
the client's children could purchase the stock in
the corporation for $500,000 at the client's death.
The value of the corporation to the estate was not
2
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$1,000,000 but rather $500,000. Buy-sell
agreements were subject to more challenges than
the recapitalization or the GRIT but would often
withstand challenge if those who could purchase
the assets at death also had a right of first refusal
during the client's lifetime at the same price. In
addition, if a formula price were agreed to, rather
than a fixed price, the agreements were more
likely to be upheld. See Saint Louis County Bank
v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982);
Estate of Joseph H. Lauder, 60 TCM 977 (1990).
Finally, in certain instances a client would
be given rights in stock or partnership units that
disappeared at death. For instance, the client
would have voting stock but the voting rights
would disappear at death. That kind of planning
was vindicated in Estate ofOaniel 1. Harrison. Jr.,
52 TCM 1306 (1987).
2. Effect of Chapter 14.
Chapter 14 was intended to limit
the effectiveness of these freeze techniques. It
followed a failed attempt, section 2036(c), enacted
in 1997 and repealed retroactively in 1990.
Chapter 14 contains four sections.
Section 270 I attempts to limit the
efficiency of recapitalizations by requiring
dividends to be paid and by restricting the use of
certain other preferences that had been used to
increase the value of the frozen stock or
partnership units. Section 2702 generally
eliminates GRITs between parents and children,
substituting instead trusts that pay annuity or
unitrust interests. An exception to the last
statement is that GRITs are allowed for residences;
those are qualified personal residence trusts
(QPRTS). Section 2703 adds requirements for
buy-sell and stockrestriction agreements which, in
most instances, are difficult or impossible to meet
in intra-family transfer situations. Section 2704
contains provisions intended to eliminate the
benefits ofdisappearing rights. Sections 2704 and
2703 have become embroilc:d in issues
surrounding the effectiveness of family limited
partnerships but that is a collateral effect that has
come about subsequent to enactment.
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4. What Do We Do Now?
These actuarial changes have
substantially altered the valuation of income,
annuity, and remainder factors.
The IRS was also directed to issue new
actuarial tables not less often than every 10 years.
T.D. 8819, Reg. 103851-99, sets forth the most
recent tables. As expected, life expectancies have
increased. However, for the very old life
expectancies have actually decreased according to
the 1990 Tables. See Appendix A.
Effective May 1, 1989, section
7520 was added to -the Internal Revenue Code
which established a floating interest rate to be used
to value income and remainder interests (the
applicable federal rate, or AFR). The rate
(rounded to the nearest 0.2%) equals 120% of the
federal mid-term rate under section 1274(d)(l).
That rate is generally higher than income yields on
most investments, but is generally lower, and often
much lower, than the actual yield of investments
when capital appreciation is included. Since 1989
the highest the AFR has been is 11.6% and the
lowest is 5.4%. In general on the 20th ofa month
the AFR for the next month is issued, and the rate
typically lags "economic reality" by 60 to 90 days.
Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts.
1. Overview.
B.
The benefits of a GRAT may be simply
illustrated. Suppose a grantor transfers $1 ,000,000
to a trust with instructions to the trustee to pay to
the grantor for a set number of years an annuity,
say $100,000 per year. If the AFR is 6.2% then
the IRS assumes that at the end of one year the
trust will be worth $1,062,000. After the trust
pays the grantor $ 100,000 it is worth $962,000. In
year two the same pattern is repeated: at the end of
the year the trust is worth $1,022,000 and then
$100,000 is paid and the trust is worth $922,000.
According to the AFR assumption .the trust will
eventually be exhausted and we can calculate how
long that will take. If the trustee is directed to pay
all remaining trust assets to the grantor's children
when the trust is assumed to be exhausted, the
grantor will not have made a gift.
Section 2702 provides that if a
grantor makes a gift to a trust for the benefit ofthe
grantor's family and retains an annuity interest that
is described in Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3 then the
value of the annuity interest, as calculated using
the section 7520 rate, will be subtracted from the
fair market value ofthe property when calculating
the taxable gift. If the requirements are not met
then the value of the gift will be the full fair
market value of the property.
Effect of Section 7520.3.
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We still recommend that clients
make gifts. That point is worth emphasizing
because it is so often-overlooked in the rush to do
other, more "sophisticated,' planning. A particular
kind of gift is that made through an appreciation
transfer trust
We also use grantor retained annuity
trusts (GRATs) and sales to defective grantor
trusts. In each we are trying in large part to use
the section 7520 rate assumption against the IRS.
Stated differently, the techniques work ifthe yield
on the assets - both income and appreciation -
exceeds the assumed rate under section 7520.
Each technique has benefits and risks as discussed
below. In general, the consequences ofthe GRAT
are better understood than are certain aspects of
the sale to the grantor trust, however the sale
technique is often more valuable.
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Suppose, however, that the trust assets
have earned, all along, $100,000 per year. In
reality the $1,000,000 ofassets will still be in the
trust and can be distributed to the children without
gift tax. (An important caveat is that the IRS
position is that a GRAT may not have a zero
remainder, as discussed below.) The earnings may
be in the form of income or appreciation; if the
assets appreciate, a smaller portion will need to be
distributed to the grantor each year to satisfy the
annuity payments.
If the earnings of the trust assets are
insufficient to make the annuity payments then the
trust assets will gradually be exhausted. Ifcreating
the GRAT did not cause a taxable gift then there
would be no negative to creating a GRAT at all.
However, the IRS position that a GRAT will
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always cause some giftmeans that there is a down-
side although normally the down-side is minimal
compared to the potential benefits.
For transfer tax purposes, the ideal GRAT
would have a daily term. At the end of the day a
prorated annuity would be paid. Either some
assets would remain in the trust if the assets
outperformed the AFR that day, and, if not, all
assets would be returned to the grantor to be
transferred into another GRAT the next day. Daily
GRATs have not been approved by the IRS. The
minimum term approved is two years.
2. Requirements.
a. Qualified annuity. A
qualified annuity interest must be a fixed amount.
That amount may be a stated dollar amount or a
fixed fraction (e.g. a percentage) of the initial
value of the trust assets as fmally determined for
federal tax purposes. The amount may increase
but not to more than 120% of the amount for the
previous year (i.e. any increase beyond that is not
a qualified interest that may be subtracted in
calculating the gift). Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3.
The trust must require payment; a right of
withdrawal is not a qualified annuity interest.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(b)(l)(i).
The IRS ruling position is that notes may
not be used as payment. PLR 9604005 (trust
funded with nondividend paying stock and notes
were intended to be used from the inception of the
trust); see also PLR 9718008 (trust authorized
payment in notes); and, contra, PLR 9515039.
The IRS rationale for disallowing the use ofnotes
is that the annuity must be payable in each taxable
year of the trust and a note is not payment, but
rather is a promise to pay.
If a grantor loans money to a trust that
then uses the loan proceeds to make an annuity
payment, the transaction may be construed
similarly. On the other hand, if the trust borrows
from a third party lender the analysis could be
different. If the third party lender were the
children of the grantor they would report the
interest as income.
4
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In the facts ofPLR 9604005, the annuity
payments were to be made entirely with notes and
that was the plan from the inception of the trust.
Arguably if notes were partially used when the
trust assets did notperform as expected, that would
be a different situation and would be less subject to
the IRS substance over form analysis.
b. Term. The annuity
must be stated in the trust and may be for the life
of the annuitant, for a set term of years, or for the
shorter of the two periods. The life of a person
other than the annuitant may not be used to
calculate the trust term. Treas. Reg. §25.2702-
3(d)(3). The minimum term for a GRAT that has
been approved by the IRS is two years. PLR
9239015.
Although a set term ofyears is allowable,
the regulations provide that payments after the
grantor's death are not qualified interests because
they are to the grantor's estate not to the grantor.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(e), Examples 1 and 5.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-2(a)(5) provides
that a qualified interest is the retention ofa power
to revoke a qualified annuity interest of the
grantor's spouse. The use of the provision would
be to reduce the amount of the gift to the trust by
not only the amount of the annuity payable to the
grantor but also to the grantor's spouse. Example
7 of Treas. Reg. §25.2702-2(d)(1) illustrates the
point. However, the Example is ambiguous as to
the result if the grantor dies within the set term.
The IRS has taken the position in PLR 9848004
that a spouse's revocable annuity interest is not a
qualified interest if it only commences upon the
grantor's death during the annuity term. See also
TAM 9707001. The issue is before the Tax Court
in Audrey J. Walton v. Commissioner, Tax Court
Docket No. 3824-99. A Revenue Ruling is much
easier to overturn than is a regulation.
c. The trust must prohibit
payments to persons other than those with
qualified interests while those interests exist.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(d)(2).
d. . The trust must prohibit
commutations of qualified interests. Treas. Reg.
§25.2702-3(d)(4).
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e. The trust must correct
underpayments and overpayments occasioned by
valuation errors, in a manner similar to that of
charitable remainder trusts. Ifpayments are made
in-kind, and the assets distributed appreciate in
value before they are repaid to the trust, the
annuitant need not repay the appreciation; if the
assets decrease in value after distribution, the
annuitant's repayment obligation does not
diminish. Interest may be owed on under or over
payments in accordance with applicable state law.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(b)(2).
f. Excess income may be
paid to the annuitant but does not reduce the
amount of the grantor's initial gift. Treas. Reg.
§25.2702-3(b)(1)(iii).
g. The annuity must be
payable for each taxable yearofthe trust. The trust
must provide that annuity payments be prorated
for short taxable years, per the regulations, but the
regulations also permit the payment ofthe annuity
on the anniversary date of the trust. Treas. Reg.
§25.2702-3(b)(3); the explanation of a change
made on May 5, 1994 (T.D. 8536, 1994-1 C.B.
261); and PLR 9519029. The reasonable
conclusion is that annuity payments may be made
once annually, on the anniversary date ofthe trust.
In addition, payment of the annuity
amount may be deferred no later than the date by
which the trustee is required to file the income tax
return for the trust, without regard to extensions.
Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(b)(1)(i). That would be
the calendar year.
h. The trust must prohibit
additional contributions. Treas. Reg. §25.2702-
3(b)(4).
3. Income tax consequences of a
GRAT.
a. Benefits of Grantor
Trust Status. It is desirable for a GRAT to be a
grantor trust for income tax purposes so that
appreciated assets may be distributed to satisfy the
annuitypayments without triggering recognition of
gain which is the normal result when appreciated
assets are used to satisfy a fIXed obligation, like an
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annuity payment. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B.
184 so holds. However, a Second Circuit case,
Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704 (1984)
holds to the contrary. Despite Rothstein, the IRS
has applied Rev. Rul 85-13 to a number ofgrantor
trust situations: PLR 9535026, sale to grantor trust
for a note is a nonrecognition event; Rev. Rul. 74-
613, 1974-2 C.B. 153, transfer of an installment
note to a grantor trust will not be a disposition and
will not end installment sale treatment; and, PLR
9535026, interest paid by a grantor trust to a
grantor is not income to the grantor nor deductible
by the trust.
If the IRS did change its position what
would be the effect on existing trusts? Prior
distributions would be protected based on Section
7.01(5) of Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814,
which allows taxpayers to rely on Revenue
Rulings in determining the taxation oftransactions.
However, distributions after the change would not
necessarily be protected.
A collateral benefit of a GRAT having
.grantor trust status is that a grantor trust is a
permitted owner of S corporation stock.
b. Creation of Grantor
Trust Status. Grantor trust status is often
automatic due to the application of section 673(a)
which treats the grantor as the owner of a trust if
the grantor has a reversionary interest of over 5%
at the creation of the trust. However, the test must
be applied to income and principal separately.
Because the annuity payments will normally be
greater than the income of the trust, and even
excess income may be accumulated to make future
annuity payments, the income test will be satisfied.
However, whether the test is satisfied with respect
to principal depends on the value of the grantor's
contingent reversion (i.e. what reverts to the
grantor's estate ifthe grantor dies during the term),
which in turns depends on the term ofthe trust, the
annuity payment, and the age ofthe grantor. PLR
9152034 demonstrates the method of calculating
the value of the reversion.
Generally some powershould be given to
the grantor to cause the GRAT to have grantor
trust status. The most commonly used power is
the administrative power of section 675(4)(C)
r
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which is the power to reacquire trust assets by
substituting assets of equivalent value in a
nonfiduciary capacity. PLR 97130 17 sets forth the
IRS position that whether the power is held in a
nonfiduciary capacity is a facts and circumstances
test to be decided by the district director where the
grantor's income tax return is filed. Treas. Reg.
§1.675-1(b)(4) is the authority for the position,
although how there could be facts and
circumstances that create a fiduciary capacity and
override the specific language ofthe instrument is
difficult to imagine.
Maintaining grantor trust status after the
annuity payments end is also desirable in many
instances. That may be because S corporation
stock is held in the trust or because the grantor
desires to pay the income taxes on trust income
(see discussion below, under Gift tax
consequences ofa GRAn. Continuing the section
675(4)(C) power after the annuity payments end
creates the risk that the power will cause the assets
of the trust to be included in the grantor's estate.
The case of Jordhal v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92
(1975), is often cited for the proposition that such
a power will not cause estate inclusion; however,
the case itselfinvolved a power held in a fiduciary
capacity. PLR 9227013 determined that the assets
in such a trust would not be included in the
grantor's estate.
Giving someone other than the grantor
the power ofsubstitution would minimize the risk
of inclusion in the grantor's estate. Is a section
675(4)(C) power held by a nongrantor effective to
create grantor trust status? The regulations under
section 675 state that the power held by any
nonadverse party will create grantor trust status,
but section 675 itself uses the term "reacquire"
which should mean the grantor, or perhaps
someone else who previously owned the property.
PLR 9037011 construes the application of the
powerholder broadly to include any other person,
despite the language of the Code and regulations.
If the grantor has a section 675(4)(C)
power and has the power to release the power, is
the ability to change tax status of the trust a
retained interest under section 2036? There is no
authority on the issue.
6
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Another common approach to creating
grantor trust status, especially after the annuity
payments end, is through section 675(2). If a
trustee does not have the general authority to make
loans to any person without adequate interest or
security, but can do so to the grantor or the
grantor's spouse, such powerwill cause the trust to
be treated as a grantor trust. Arguably borrowing
without adequate interest is a section 2036 power,
thus the power should be restricted to loaning
funds without adequate security. See PLRs
9525032 and 9645013.
Section 675(3) creates grantor trust status
through actual borrowing with inadequate interest
or security if the trustee is the grantor, the
grantor's spouse, or a related or subordinate party.
The loan need not be for more than a day, per Rev.
Rul. 86-82, 1986-1 C.B. 253, but whether a loan
confers grantor trust status with respect to
principal is uncertain. See Benson v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1040 (1981), and Bennett
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 470 (1982), for
discussions that are close, but not exactly, on
point.
4. Gift tax consequences of a
GRAT.
a. Zeroing out. The
amount of the gift that occurs when a GRATis
created is determined by subtracting the value of
the annuity interest from the fair market value of
the trust property contributed. May the annuity
value be equal to the value of the contributed
property? If so then a GRAT could be created
with no gift - a so-called "zeroed out GRAT."
Treas. Reg. §20.2055-2(f)(2), Example I,
allows a charitable lead trust to be zeroed out.
However, as noted above, the IRS has taken the
contrary position with GRATs. In essence, the
IRS position is that if the annuity is for a set term
only, the portion ofthe annuity that would be paid
to the grantor's estate ifthe grantor died during the
term is not a qualified annuity. Stated differently,
the chance that the grantor might die during the
term reduces the value of the annuity. On the
other hand, if the annuity is increased to take into
consideration that the grantor might die during the
term, then Rev. Rul. 77-454 and Treas. Reg.
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§25.7520-3{b)(2) require that the value of the
annuity be reduced by the probability that the trust
will be exhausted during the term and will be
unable to pay the annuity. In short, a GRAT may
not be zeroed out. (However, see Estate of
Benjamin Shapiro, 66 TCM 1067 (1993), which
rejected the rationale of Rev. Rul. 77-454.)
The older the annuitant and the longer the
annuity term, the greater will be the chance that
the annuitant will die during the term and the
greater will be the gift.
As the charts in Appendix B illustrate, a
term certain produces a lower payout and a greater
gift than does a contingent term. Generally a
lower payout produces more efficient transfer tax
results.
b. Effect of increasing
payments. Ifthe annuity payments increase during
the term the amount of the gift will be increased
because the chances of the annuitant dying are
greater in the later years when the larger payments
are to be made. On the other hand, if the trust
assets increase in value substantially during the
GRAT term, then the benefits of increasing
payments may outweigh the added gift.
c. Effect of incorrect
valuation of contributed assets. A GRAT may be
created with the annuity described as a percentage
of the initial fair market value of the trust assets.
If the IRS increases that value on audit then the
annuity also increases. The gift is increased as
well but because the increase is a small percentage
of the trust assets much less than it would have
been had the annuity been stated as a stated dollar
amount. The formula nature of a GRAT is
specifically allowed by Treas. Reg. §25.2702-
3{b)(l)(ii)(B) and thus should not be subject to
Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir.
1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 756 (1944).
d. Effect of multiple
trusts. Generally a GRAT should contain only one
asset, so that the appreciation ofone asset will not
be canceled out by the depreciation of another.
Suppose a grantor creates multiple identical
GRATS; may those be collapsed by the IRS? The
issue my be avoided by using different terms or
7
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trustees, or by having different remaindermen for
each trust.
e. Grantor's payment of
income taxes as an additional gift. Ifa GRATis a
grantor trust the grantor is taxed on alI the income
and capital gains of the trust. If the grantor is not
reimbursed by the GRAT has the grantor made a
gift to the GRAT? The answer depends on
whether under the trust instrument or applicable
state law the grantor has a right ofreimbursement.
Both the original Uniform Principal and
Income Act, and the Revised Uniform Principal
and Income Act, provide that any tax on the trust
upon profit or gain allocated to principal shall be
paid out ofprincipal. If the trust is a grantor trust
is there any tax on the trust? There is little law on
the subject other than two cases from
Pennsylvania, which seem to hold that the
language of the Acts does create a reimbursement
right. Doughty Trust, 6 Fid. Rep. 2d 260 (1986);
French Estate, 61 D&C 2d 654 (1963).
If the trust instrument negates whatever
right ofreimbursement may be given by applicable
state law, does that create an additional gift to the
trust? Stated differently, does a grantor make a
larger gift when giving assets and agreeing to pay
the income taxes than when giving assets subject
to a right ofreimbursement? Normally income tax
consequences are not considered when
determining gift tax - e.g. a gift ofs10,000 in cash
has the same value asa gift of SIO,OOO of zero
basis stock. If the trustee is given the authority to
reimburse but not the direction, is that sufficient to
negate any added gift on funding, yet allow the
grantor to pay the taxes without reimbursement?
The IRS ruling position is that a GRAT
must state that income tax payments will be
reimbursed. PLR 9444033 states that without a
reimbursement provision "an additional gift to a
remainderperson would occur when the grantor
paid tax on any income that would otherwise be
payable from the corpus of the trust." The ruling
is circular because the issue is whether income tax
would be payable on gain to the corpus.
Subsequent rulings have omitted this discussion.
See, e.g., PLR 9543049; 9838017.
GRATs must prohibit additional
contributions. The IRS could take the position that
the payment ofincome tax without reimbursement
is not only a gift but also an additional
contribution. If the grantor intended to pay the
income taxes from the inception of the trust, that
arrangement could invalidate the GRAT, although
that result seems harsh.
5. Estate tax consequences of a
GRAT.
Rev. Rul 82-105, 1982-1 C.B.
133, discusses the amount of a charitable
remainder annuity trust that is included in the
grantorannuitant's estate undersection 2036(a)(1).
The Ruling provides that a calculation be made to
determine the portion of the trust that would be
required to produce the annuity using the then in
effect interest rate (6%). Today, that would be the
AFR. Presumably the same calculation would be
used for a GRAT.
Section 2033 would include any
payments that were required to be made to the
grantor's estate by the GRAT and 2038 would
include those same payments if they were instead
subject to a power of appointment. In limited
instances this inclusion would be greater than that
ofsection 2036. Generally the grantor will have a
reversion upon death during the ftxed term so that
the payments will stop.
Trust assets included by reason ofsection
2036 will be reduced by the value of the gift, per
section 200 1(b). If the entire trust is included in
the grantor annuitant's estate then the entire gift
will be washed out. However, if the grantor and
the grantor's spouse split gifts during the year in
which the GRAT was funded then the half of the
gifts deemed to be mad.e by the spouse will not be
washed out at the grantor's death. Thus, it is
extremely important not to split gifts in the year in
which a GRATis created.
6. Generation skipping tax
consequences of a GRAT.
a. Allocation of GST
exemption. A GRATis usually not a useful
vehicle for transferring assets to grandchildren.
8
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Section 2642(f) and Treas. Reg. §26.2632-
1(c)(30(ii) provide that GST exemption will not be
allocated to the GRAT until the trust assets are not
be included in the grantor's estate (the termination
of the ETIP). Thus the GST exemption cannot be
leveraged by applying it to the trust at creation.
Generally the remainder interest in a
GRAT should be vested in the grantor's children.
If a child dies during the GRAT term the
predeceased child exception does not apply, unless
the grantor dies and the trust assets are included in
the grantor's estate. Even this result is not entirely
certain because the transfer was ftrst subject to gift
tax and there is no direct authority for the position
that subsequent inclusion in an estate is sufficient
to override the earlier gift for purposes of the
exception. Nevertheless, the better policy would
seem to be to allow the predeceased child
exception to apply where the grantor dies during
the term.
One approach to avoiding an unwanted
generation skipping tax would be for the
remainder to pass to the then living children of the
grantor; if a child dies prior to the GRAT term
ending the child's family may be made whole by
an equalization clause in the grantor's Will or by
other gifts. Particular attention must be paid to the
allocation ofestate taxes and the tax-basis ofassets
if the equalization is to occur by Will.
Another approach would be to have the
interest of a deceased child pass to the deceased
child's estate. An advantage would be that no
equalization provision would be needed.
However, the remainder interest would be
included in the deceased child's estate and could
have substantial value, especially towards the end
of the GRAT term. The interest could pass
outright to the deceased child's spouse, or to an
estate trust, and qualify for the marital deduction.
Because a remainderdoes not generate any income
it is uncertain whether the marital deduction would
be available under sections 20S6(b)(S) or (7). If
the grantor were to die after the child but during
the trust term then the trust assets would be
included in the grantor's estate, after having been
included in the child's estate. Section 2013 was
not designed to cover such transactions and its
application to mitigate a double tax is uncertain.
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b. Assignment of
remainder interest. Upon creation ofa GRAT the
remainder interest is worth the gift tax value,
which is normally small. Suppose the interest is
vested in the grantor's living children and those
children assign their interests to their children, the
grantor's grandchildren, immediately upon the
creation of the GRAT. Is this effective for
generation skipping tax purposes? Stated
differently, will the transferor ofthe interest to the
grandchildren be the grantor or the grantor's
children? The IRS may be expected to attack such
a plan using a step-transaction theory. The longer
the time that passes between the creation and the
assignment the more easily maya step-transaction
theory be avoided but the larger the gift
May the assignor allocate GST exemption
to the assignment to create a zero inclusion ratio?
There is no authority on the point. Treas. Reg.
§26.2652-I(a)(5), Example 4, provides that the
assignment of a present interest in a trust has no
effect on the transferor, but that is not on point
with the transaction contemplated here which is
the assignment of a future interest.
Assignment of a remainder interest to a
trust in which one or more persons in the same
generation as the child have an interest, along with
the child's descendants, would postpone any
generation skipping tax if the assignment were
ineffective to change the transferor. For example,
if the assignment were to a trust for the benefit of
the child's spouse and descendants, and the
assignment turned out to be ineffective for GST
purposes, the trust assets could be distributed to
the child's spouse. The death of the spouse prior
to a determination of the generation skipping tax
consequences would eliminate the postponement.
The assignment must be effective under
applicable state law. The interest must be vested
in the child and the trust must not contain a
spendthrift clause that prohibits assignments.
7. Gift tax reporting.
Section 6501(a) provides for a
three year statute of limitations on gifts, subject to
exceptions. Section 6501(c)(9) provides that the
gift tax statute never runs on gifts that are not
9
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disclosed on a gift tax return "in a manner
adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature of
such item." Treas. Reg. §301.650 l(c)-1(e)(2) sets
forth what must be shown in order for a gift to be
adequately disclosed:
(i) A description of the
transactions, including a
description of transferred and
retained interests and the
method (or methods) used to
value each;
(ii) The identity of, and
relationship between, the
transferor, transferee, all
persons participating in the
transactions, and all parties
related to the transferor holding
an equity interest in any entity
involved in the transaction; and
(iii) A detailed description
(including all actuarial factors
and discount rates used) of the
method used to determine the
amount of the gift arising from
the transfer (or taxable event),
including, in the case of an
equity interest that is not
actively traded, the fmancial
and other data used in
determining value. Financial
data should generally include
balance sheets and statements of
net earnings, operating results,
and dividends paid for each of
the 5 years immediately before
the valuation date.
If a gift tax return fully discloses the
amount of the property transferred to the GRAT
and shows the amount excluded by reason of the
grantor's retained annuity interest the three year
statute should apply. If the grantor is taking the
position that the gift is zero, contrary to the
regulations, the gift must be disclosed because it is
of a future interest, according to the Form 709
Instructions.
8. Planning situations with
GRATs.
a. Funding with S
corporation stock. Most S corporations produce a
high pre-income tax rate of return, often as much
as 20% and sometimes more. The effective rate of
return may be increased by creating voting and
nonvoting stock. If the nonvoting stock is
discounted by 40% then the effective rate ofreturn
increases by 67%. To illustrate, suppose an S
corporation is worth $1,000,000 and produces a
pre-income tax return of $180,000. If the S
corporation undergoes a recapitalization that
creates 100 voting shares and 9900 nonvoting .
shares the return attributable to the nonvoting
shares is 99% of$180,000, which is $178,200. If
the 9900 shares are worth $990,000 less a 40%
discount they are worth $594,000. The effective
rate ofreturn is $178,200/$594,000 which is 30%.
(And, 18% X 1.67 = 30%).
b. Funding with rental real
estate. Rental real .estate transferred to a
partnership or limited liability company may have
its pre-income tax rate of return boosted by
discounted limited units or membership interests.
c. Fun din g wit h
partnership units and paving out assets distributed
from the partnership. Suppose discounted
partnership interests are used to fund a GRAT. If
the interests themselves are used to fund the
annuity payments then they must be discounted.
If partnership distributions are made so that the
annuity payments may be made with undiscounted
assets then substantial savings will result The IRS
cannot be expected to accept this result and will
undoubtably argue that the gift of the partnership
units going in should be on an undiscounted basis.
However, if the gift iuufficiently small this may
be a risk the grantor is willing to take.
d. Funding with pre-IPO
assets. Start-up ventures make ideal assets to use
in a GRAT. Generally the start-up has a low value
and will either fail or become very valuable. Ifthe
start-up fails the loss for transfer tax purposes will
be the gift caused by the GRAT. Because the gift
is tied directly to the grantor's chances of dying
during the term, a short term will create a small
10
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gift. To illustrate, the grantor ofa three year trust
must be over 80 for the gift to be as high as 10%
and even at 90 the gift is only a little over 20%. If
the start-up is successful the annuity payments
may be easily satisfied with much higher valued
stock or other interests. The start-up interests
which are paid out in early years may be given to
newGRATs.
e. Horses. Ifone"knows"
that a horse that has a value ofless than $65,000 is
likely to win the Kentucky Derby and Preakness,
the horse would be an excellent candidate for a
GRAT.
f. Paired GRATs.
Suppose a derivative were created that was
guaranteed to double in value by a certain date,
perhaps two or three years into the future.
Because there are no guarantees of assets that
double in value something would need to be given
up. Suppose what was given up was the creation
ofanother derivative that was guaranteed to go to
zero by the same time. For illustration purposes
the doubling derivative is Green and the zero
derivative is Black.
Suppose on the same day grantor creates
two GRATs; one is funded with Green and the
other with Black. What are the results? For
simplicity suppose that two year GRATs are used.
The annuity payout for a two year GRATis
approximately 55.5%; thus, 111% of the initial
value must be paid out over two years. If
$1,000,000 is used - $500,000 in each GRAT -
then (I) all ofthe Black GRAT will be returned to
the grantor, but will have zero value, and (2) from
the Green GRAT will be returned III% of
$500,000 which is $555,000. The Green GRAT
had in it, at the end of the two year term,
$1,000,000; thus $445,000 worth of assets
remained in the trust The actual results would be
less because some payment would be required at
the end of year one. Nevertheless, significant
savings are readily apparent. The gift on such a
transaction would be approximately 1.8% or
$18,000 on a total transfer of$1,000,000.
Is the IRS likely to collapse the
transaction? If so, can collapse be prevented by
having different trustees? What if one spouse
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3. Income tax consequences of a
sale to a grantor trust.
What are the consequences if the note is
not paid offby the time the grantor dies? Manning
and Hesch cite at least 12 articles in support of
their statement that "[t]here is disagreement among
The AFR, used for GRATs, is 120% of
the federal midtenn rate, rounded to the nearest
two-tenths of one percent. Thus, under nonnal
interest rate conditions the section 1274 rate will
be less than the AFR. Because the IRS assumes is
that the assets involved will increase in value at a
slower rate, less must be given back to the grantor
when compared with a GRAT.
There are no established requirements for
a sale to a grantor trust. That is, the sale is not
something subject to a specific Internal Revenue
Code section. However, the key elements are: (a)
a valid sale and note under applicable state law; (b)
a trust that is a grantor trust for income tax
purposes but which is not included in the grantor's
estate for estate tax purposes; and (c) use of a
proper interest rate on the note.
Requirements.2.
A sale to a grantor trust is not
recognized for income tax purposes (see the
discussion above). Thus, the trust takes the
income tax basis of the grantor in the sold assets.
Ifthe note is satisfied with assets, rather than cash,
those assets will be included in the grantor's estate
and will receive a new income tax basis under
section 1014. The assets remaining.in the trust,
representing the appreciation beyond the interest
payments, will have a zero income tax basis.
The interest rate on the note taken back in
the sale must bear interest as calculated by section
1274 in order for the note to be valued at is face
value. Prop. Treas. Reg. § l.l012-2(b)(1) provides
that the value of a note issued by a buyer which
has adequate stated interest under section 1274
will be valued at face. See also Estate ofFrazee v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992). For a note of
more than three but fewer than 10 years the federal
midtenn rate applies; for a note of more than 9
years the federal long tenn rate applies.
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A sale of assets to a grantor trust
overcomes several drawbacks of a GRAT: (a)
although a GRAT produces an initial gift, (unless
the IRS regulatory position is overturned), a sale
does not; (b) a GRAT can benefit only children
(absent the remainder assignment technique and its
attendant risks) whereas GST exemption may be
allocated to the grantor trust that is the buyer; (c)
a GRATis unsuccessful if the grantor dies during
the tenn whereas the sale is effective immediately
with respect to all appreciation after the sale; (d) a
GRAT cannot be commuted but the note may be
prepaid; and (e) GRAT calculations involve the
AFR which is higher than the section 1274 interest
rate that may be used with sales to grantor trusts.
The "sales to a grantor trust"
technique is simple. The grantor establishes a trust
that is a grantor trust for income tax purposes but
that will not be included in the grantor's estate for
estate tax purposes, and sells assets to the trust
taking back a note as payment. The note bears
interest at the rate appropriate under section 1274.
Generally the assets do notproduce sufficient cash
to pay both the interest and principal of the note,
thus, at a future point the note is satisfied with the
assets in the trust, which it is hoped will have
appreciated so that assets remain in the trust after
the note is satisfied. Nonnally the note is
structured as an interest only note with a balloon
payment and no prepayment penalty. Often even
the interest is paid using trust assets. For a variety
of reasons, satisfaction of the note prior the
grantor's death is desirable.
1. Overview.
C. Sales to Grantor Trusts.
creates one trust and the other spouse creates the
second trust?
There are two principal issues that must
be resolved before the sale technique is guaranteed
to be successful: (a) when will the sold assets be
excluded from the grantor's estate; and (b) what
are the income tax consequences of the grantor
dying before the note is paid off.
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the commentators as to the resulting income tax
consequences ifthe deferred paymentnote remains
outstanding at the time ofdeath."
All discussions begin with the same three
authorities: Treas. Reg. §1.l001-2(c), Example 5;
Madorin v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 667 (1985);
and Rev. Rut 77-402,1977-2 C.B. 222. Each of
those involved the acquisition by a grantor trust of
an interest in a tax shelter partnership. The tax
shelter produced phantom losses claimed by the
grantor because the partnership was held in a
grantor trust. When the tax shelter was about to
cease producing losses and convert to producing
phantom income the grantor gave up the power
that had created the grantor trust status. The
grantor hoped that the trust or the beneficiaries
would be taxed on the income, at the lower rates
then in effect. The authorities hold that when the
trust ceased to be a grantor trust a taxable
transaction occurred (the transfer ofa partnership
in which the basis was lower than the liabilities
with the difference being gain to the grantor) the
consequences of which were reportable by the
grantor on the current year's income tax return.
Presumably a similar result would occur
if in a sale to a grantor trust the trust ceased to be
a grantor trust while the grantor was living and
before the note was satisfied. The grantor would
recognize gain based on the unpaid balance of the
note and the trust would acquire a fair market
value basis equal to the amounts remaining due on
the note.
The referenced authorities do not deal
with a grantor trust that loses its status by reason
of the grantor's death. This issue is of substantial
importance. For example, if death causes gain to
be recognized on the assets subject to the sale, then
provision will need to be made for payment ofthe
income taxes. Depending on the amount of
appreciation in the assets that were sold, the
transaction may be favorable or unfavorable. In
addition, the note could continue as an asset of the
grantor's estate thus creating estate tax.
The most likely result may be that death
is not a recognition event. The assets in the trust
would have a basis equal to its obligation on the
note. The note would have a fair market value
12
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basis under section 1014. The gain on the
property originally sold would be avoided,
however gain on any appreciation would remain
and would be taxedwhenever such property were
sold. This theory is supported by analogizing to
the transfer of property from a decedent to the
decedent's estate, which is a nonrecognition event
and by the fact that death does not cause income
tax recapture of negative basis assets held in a
revocable trust (which is obviously a grantor trust).
Stated another way, escaping gain on the sold
assets is the equivalent of escaping gain on the
assets held in an estate.
On the other hand, the analogies are not
necessarily on point. A revocable trust is different
from a trust that is not included in the grantor's
estate. In addition, a sale to a grantor trust
involves, at all times, two legal entities. The
negative basis asset analogy involves only one
legal entity, the taxpayer.
If death is a recognition event then does
recognition occur before death or after death? If
before death then there is no basis step-up and the
trust receives a basis equal to the sales price and
gain would be triggered to the grantor for
reporting on the grantor's fmal income tax return.
The income tax would be deductible under section
2053. If after death, then the trust receives a
purchase price basis and the basis of the note is
stepped-up to fair market value. The value of the
note would depend on its interest rate compared
with the then current section 1274 rate, and
whether or not installment sale treatment would be
available would depend on the normal installment
sale rules.
Virtually all commentators reject the sale
after death approach because there is nothing for
the estate to have sold. That is, the assets are not
included in the estate only the note is. The sale
before death approach cannot be ruled outbecause
there is no authority on point.
Regardless of the treatment of the
transaction at death, the note must be paid off.
Once grantor trust status terminates gain will be
recognized by the trust if appreciated assets are
used or sold to satisfy the note.
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4. Gift tax consequences ofa sale
to a grantor trust.
a. Value of the note. If the
note for which the assets are sold has the same
value as the assets there will be no gift. As
discussed above, the note must bear appropriate
interest under section 1274 to be valued at face. If
the note has less than fair market value interest,
section 7872 may create a gift. See Katzenstein
"Some time Value of Money Issues in Estate
Planning," ALI-ABA Planning Techniques for
Large Estates (Nov. 1998), for a discussion of
sections 483, 1274 and 7872.
Section 2702 provides that certain
retained interests of a grantor are to be valued at
zero. For a sale to a grantor trust to be effective
the interest retained by the grantor must be valued
at the value ofthe sold assets. Apparently, the IRS
has considered the issue as turning on whether the
transaction should be treated as a sale for debt or
an exchange for equity.
PLR 9436006 considered a trust, funded
with $1,200,000 of marketable securities, that
purchased other assets from the grantor for a 25
year note. The note provided for quarterly interest
payments with a balloon principal payment at the
end. The transaction was respected as a sale.
PLR 9535026 considered a trust that
bought assets for a 20 year interest only note with
a balloon principal payment. The IRS determined
that neither section 270 I nor section 2702 would
apply unless the notes were subsequently
determined to be equity and not debt, a question of
fact on which the IRS did not rule.
The ruling also discussed the value ofthe
note and concluded that the value would be equal
to its face only ifthere were no facts presented that
indicated the note would not be paid and if it
appeared that the trust had sufficient assets to pay
the note. The latter issue is important in the
application of section 2036 to these transactions
and will be discussed below.
b. Value of the assets. If
marketable securities are the object ofthe sale then
there will be no valuation issue on the asset side.
13
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Such is rarely the case. With any closely-held
asset - a business, real estate, a partnership, an
LLC, or marketable securities held in an entity -
the issue of the proper value of the assets sold is
significant. If the IRS successfully increases the
value ofthe assets above the value of the note then
the seller will have made a gift of the excess.
With a GRAT the issue ofan excess gift
is mitigated by stating the annuity payable as a
fraction of the assets initially contributed to the
GRAT. If the value of the assets is increased so
will be the annuity owed. Can a sale to a grantor
trust be structured similarly? The ideal clause
would provide that assets ofa certain amount were
intended to have been sold and that any excess
assets were to be returned to the seller.
Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir.
1944), is the bedrock case holding that such
adjustment clauses may be ignored because they
violate public policy: the IRS has no incentive to
audit such transfers because no tax may be
collected.
Three approaches have been suggested to
get around this problem. The flI'St is to attack
Procter head on with a clause that would provide
that the flI'St $X of assets sold will remain in the
trust but all assets in excess onx will be returned
to the seller. Suppose that the sale is intended to
be of $1,000,000 of assets. The trust might
provide that the first $1,200,000 transferred to the
trust by sale would remain in the trust but that any
excess would be is returned to the seller.
Arguably, Procter is inapplicable because the IRS
does have an incentive to audit such transfers to
collect some additional tax.
A second approach would be to sell assets
described as a fraction. For example, assume that
a partnership has 100 general partnership units and
9900 limited partnership units. The partnership
owns $1,000,000 of marketable securities. The
sale is intended to be ofS600,OOO worth oflimited
partnership units. The assets sold would be
described as a fraction of the limited partnership
units, the numerator ofwhich is $600,000 and the
denominator of which is the fair market value of
the limited partnership interests on the date of the
sale. The actual number of units sold would
remain uncertain until the valuation is fIXed,
presumably at the time the gift tax statute of
limitation expires.
A third approach would be to have an
independent determination ofvalue. To illustrate,
the trust could provide that assets added to the trust
by reason of gift would be allocated to charity.
The sale would occur and the trustee would be
required to detennine whether any assets that were
added to the trust were added by gift; that is, was
the note equal to the value of the assets sold. If
yes, then the excess assets would be transferred to
charity. If the trustee incorrectly detennined the
value ofassets at the time oftransfer but was later
"educated" by the IRS an allocation at that time
would be effective to eliminate any gift tax
because the trust had an obligation to charity from
the beginning. Are any of these approaches
effective? There is no authority. See Appendix C
for a discussion of the relevant authorities.
c. Payment of income taxes
by the grantor. If the grantor pays the income
taxes for the trust the grantor may be making an
additional gift as with the GRAT.
5. Estate tax consequences of a
sale to a grantor trust.
a. Trust Creation. Creation
of a trust that is a grantor trust for income tax
purposes but which is not included in the grantor's
estate is generally easy. The simplest example
would be a trust which has the grantor's spouse as
a discretionary beneficiary ofincome andprincipal
(along with the grantor's descendants). Grantor
trust status may be prolonged after the spouse's
death in a number of ways, including those
discussed above.
It is more difficult to have the grantor as
a beneficiary because of the concern that the
creditors of the grantor may reach the trust
property thus causing inclusionundersection 2036
or 2041. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §
156(2). Under Delaware and Alaska law this
problem may be avoided, however the IRS has not
ruled favorably on the issue ofestate tax inclusion
as of yet. PLR 9837007 specifically states that it
is not ruling on the question, although the Service
14
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did rule that a gift to such a trust is complete for
gift tax purposes.
b. Section 2036 inclusion.
Section 2036(a)(l) includes in a grantor's estate
property over which the grantor has a retained
interest. Is a note a retained interest in the assets
sold?
Generally assets that are sold are not
subject to section 2036. In Rev. Rul. 77-193,
1977-1 C.B. 273, a decedent had sold timber rights
prior to death in exchange for notes, one ofwhich
had not matured at death. The Ruling deals with
the sale to an individual, not a trust, and holds that
the obligation to pay was personal to the buyer and
was independent ofwhether or not the sold assets
produced income.
On the other hand, where $5,000,000 in
assets were transferred in a part sale and part gift
transaction for a note with a face value of
$1,500,000, the assets produced $360,000 of
annual dividends and the interest owed was only
$165,000 per year, the Service determined that the
trust assets were included in the transferor's estate.
PLR 925 1004 states that "[f]orpurposes ofsection
2036 it is immaterial that a retained right is stated
in terms of a contractual right or limited to a
specific dollar amount so long as the retained right
is a preferential right to a significant portion ofthe
income."
The risk of section 2036 inclusion is
reduced if the trust contains assets beyond those
which it has bought in the sale transaction.
Although there is no safe-harbor, lore has it that if
the trust has at least 10% more assets than the
assets sold to the trust that will be sufficient. That
lore has been supported by a reported informal
statement of the IRS to that effect. See Abbin,
[S]He Loves Me, [S]He Loves Me Not -
Responding to Succession Planning Needs
Through A Three Dimensional Analysis of
Constructions To Be Applied In Selectingfrom the
Cafeteria of Techniques, 31 U. Miami Est. Plan.
Inst. P1300.1 (0)(1997).
The Ninth Circuit has issued a number of
opinions dealing with transfers to trusts in
exchange for an annuity which are instructive. In
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Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1975), the court held that an annuity was a retained
interest when the only initial funding of the trust
was $1000, the principal of the trust could not be
invaded, and the asset transferred for the annuity
was a nonnegotiable note. On the other hand, in
Estate ofLafargue v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845
(9lh Cir. 1982) principal could be invaded to pay
the annuity, as well as trust income, and the
annuitant did not control the trustee who could
have sold the trust assets if necessary. Stem v.
Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555 (9lh Cir. 1984) is a
similar case.
In Ray v. United States, 762 F.2d 1361
(9'" Cir. 1985), a decedent and his former wife
created a trust from which both the decedent and
the former wife were to receive an annuity.
Principal could be used as well as trust income to
pay the annuity and principal could be invaded for
other ascertainable standards. After both had died
the trust assets were to be distributed to the
couple's children. The court held that half the
trust was included in the decedent's estate because
the interest was not really an annuity interest but
rather was a retained income interest. Among the
decisive factors for the court was that the annuity
payments closely approximated the trust income;
the opinion states: "[t]his tie between the amount
of payments and the trust income is the most
important characteristic which distinguishes this
transaction from an annuity purchase."
Where the grantor in a sale transaction
has recourse to the personal assets ofanother, such
as the trustee, section 2036 is very likely avoided
because the transaction can be analogized to the
sale described in Rev. Rul. 77-193 above. See,
e.g., Estate ofBecklenberg v. Commissioner, 273
F.2d 197 (7'" Cir. 1959). A personal guarantee is
often thought of as ~ way to accomplish the
desired result. PLR 9515039 found that section
2036 would not apply ifguarantors had sufficient
assets to pay, ifcalled upon, and the amount ofthe
payments did not relate to the earnings of the
assets transferred.
The collateral effects of a guarantee are
uncertain. Ifthe guarantor is not compensated for
the guarantee then the guarantor is making a gift at
the time the guarantee is given, rather than later
15
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when the guarantee is called upon. See PLR
9113009. To what or whom is the gift made? Ifto
the trust then does the guarantor become a partial
grantor for income tax purposes and, if so, what is
the effect on the sale? If the guarantor is a
beneficiary ofthe trust, a childfor instance, are the
trust assets included in the child's estate because
the child is both a grantor and beneficiary for
section 2026 purposes? Matters are simplified if
the guarantor is treated as making a gift to the
grantor of the trust (the seller) directly; the
argument would be that the only reason the
guarantor was called on to make payments was
because the trust could not, and if the trust could
not then the guarantor would not be a real
beneficiary of the trust because it would have no
assets. The latter interpretation is without
authority however much it may be a logical
understanding of the "real world" consequences.
If section 2036 applies and the note is
satisfied within three years of death, does section
2035 apply? By its terms section 2035 applies if
there is a transfer of an interest within three years
of death that would have caused section 2036 to
apply. Arguably, payment of a note is not a
"transfer."
In order to ensure that section 2036 does
not apply, and that the note is not treated as equity
and thus a retained interest under section 2702,
and that the note is valued at face, the trust should
be given assets beyond those it obtains in a sale.
That gift must be weighed against the gift that is
caused by the chance that the grantor might die
when creating a GRAT.
6. Generation skipping tax
consequences of a sale to a
grantor trust.
The generation skipping tax
consequences of a sale to a grantor trust are
dependent on whether the trust assets are included
in the grantor's estate. Section 2642(f) prevents
the assignment of generation skipping tax
exemption during any time trust assets will be
included in the transferor's estate. If the assets are
not included in the grantor's estate the ability to
assign GST exemption immediately after the sale
is a significant advantage over a GRAT.
As discussed above with the GRAT, the
payment ofincome taxes may be an additional gift
which will need to be considered for generation
skipping tax purposes.
7. Gift tax reporting.
Ifthe sale to a grantor trust is not
a gift then it does not need to be reported on a gift
tax return. On the other hand, failure to disclose
the transaction means that the gift tax statute of
limitations will never run. Selling for slightly less
than the fair market value of the note so that a gift
may be disclosed as part of the transaction would
appear to start the statute oflimitations and would
seem desirable.
8. Planning situations
a. Gift. followed by Sale.
followed bv Payment with Frozen Assets. Does
the following transaction meet the challenges
posed by the discussion above? Grantor makes a
gift of $1,200,000 to a grantor trust which is not
included in grantor's estate. Grantor sells
$12,000,000 to the trust for a note, interest only
for 20 years, then a balloon payment; the note has
a value ofSII,900,000. The assets to be sold are
C corporation common stock and the trust owns all
of the stock.
The grantor files a gift tax return
reporting two gifts: a SI,200,OOO gift and a
SIOO,OOO gift both of which are split with the
grantor's spouse. Grantor and spouse apply
$1,300,000 of generation skipping tax exemption
to the trust.
The trustee, worried about what happens
if the grantor dies before the note is paid off,
arranges for a recapitalization ofthe stock to create
SIOO,OOO worth of common stock and
$12,900,000 of preferred stock. The preferred
stock's value is supported by a preferred dividend,
although it is noncumulative, and other "bells and
whistles." The note is satisfied with the preferred
stock immediately.
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At death the grantor's estate includes
preferred stock only, with a fixed value.
b. Loan to a !mUltor trust. The
consequences of a loan to a grantor trust are the
same as that of a sale for all purposes except for
the issue of what occurs when the grantor dies.
There is no sale transaction to be accelerated. If
the grantor loans cash to a grantor trust, which
invests in a business, a frozen transaction will
result without any of the income tax risks. In
addition, ifthe business is a start-up that generates
losses, those will flow through the grantor trust to
be used by the grantor, depending on the grantor's
status within the passive loss rules.
D. Appreciation Transfer Trusts.
Much simpler than the GRAT or sale to a
grantor trust is the appreciation transfer trust. A
grantor transfers assets to a trust retaining the
income for life. The trust provides that all
appreciation in excess of the initial amount
transferred will be paid, quarterly, to the grantor's
children. At death, all of the trust assets will be
paid to the grantor's children. The benefit of the
trust is that the gift tax is removed from the
grantor's estate if the grantor dies more than three
years after the gift, with the appreciation transfer
being an additional benefit.
The trust is a grantor trust for income tax
purposes; the gift tax paid should increase the
basis in the trust assets even though the trust is a
grantor trust, thus enabling the assets to be sold
prior to death at less tax cost than would otherwise
have been the case.
The grantor has made a gift of the entire
interest in the trust because the grantor's retained
income right has a value of zero under section
2702.
At the grantor's death the entire value of
the trust will be included in the grantor's estate and
will receive a new income tax basis equal to its
then fair market value. Section 200 1(b) provides
that if a gift is included in the grantor's estate the
gift is "washed out" and the gift tax paid is a credit
against the grantor's estate tax. There is no
authority on the issue of whether the payment of
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the appreciation of the trust to the grantor's
children reduces the amount of the gift that is
washed out; however, in no event is the grantor
worse off than before.
The appreciation willpass to the grantor's
children without gift tax because the grantor has
made a complete gift of the trust property.
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APPENDIX A ....
Life Expectancy Charts -
Mortality: 90CM ..,j
Life
Age Expectancy
----------
50 29.0 ..J
51 28.2
52 27.3
53 26.5
54 25.6
55 24.8 -
56 24.0
57 23.2
58 22.4
59 21.7
60 20.9
61 20.1
62 19.4
63 18.7
64 18.0 -
65 17.3
66 16.6
67 15.9
68 15.2 ".
69 14.6
70 14.0
71 13.3
72 12.7 ..
73 12.1
74 11.6
75 11.0
76 10 ..5
77 9.9 -
78 9.4
79 8.9
80 8.4
81 7.9
82 7.5
83 7.0
84 6.6
85 6.2 £
86 5.8
..,
87 5.5
88 5.1
89 4.8
90 4.5
91 4.2
92 3.9
93 3.7
94 3.5 f.-95 3.3
96 3.1
97 2.9
98 2.8 I
99 2.6 ...
100 2.4
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99 -
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r
r Mortality: 80CNSMT
r LifeAge Expectancy----------
50 27.9
51 27.1
r 52 26.353 25.5
~ 54 24.6
55 23.8
r 56 23.157 22.3
I 58 21.5
59 20.8
60 20.0,. 61 19.3, 62 18.6
63 17.9
64 17.2
r 65 16.566 15.867 15.2
68 14.6
r 69
13.9
70 13.3
71 12.7
72 12.1
73 11.6
r 74 11.075 10.576 10.0
77 9.4
r 78 8.979 8.480 8.0
81 7.5
82 7.1
r- 83 6.7
J
84 6.3
85 6;0
86 5.6
r 87 5.388 5.0. 89 4.7
90 4.4,. 91 4.292 3.9
I 93 3.7
94 3.5
95 3.3
r 96 3.297 3.098 2.9
99 2.8
r 100 2.6Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
I
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B-1: 2 year single life GRAT
B-2: 5 year single life GRAT
B-3: 7 year single life GRAT
B-4: 10 year single life GRAT
B-5: GRAT for a 55 year old
B-6: GRAT for a 65 year old
B-7: GRAT for a 75 year old
B-8: GRAT for an 85 year old
B-9: GRAT for two 50 year olds
B-IO: GRAT for two 60 year olds
B-ll: GRAT for two 70 year olds
B-12: GRAT for two 80 year olds
B-13: GRAT for a 60 and 50 year old
B-14: GRAT for a 70 and 60 year old
B-15: GRAT for an 80 and 70 year old
APPENPIXB
Annuity Analysis Charts
A-II?
-B-1
2 Year Single Life GRAT
..
oJ
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Term: 2 J
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000 !...
'I'~rm Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero OUt Zero Out Example 5 77-454 Diffe"rence
Age Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts "
,...-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
50 0.54849 0.55121 0.00493 0.00491 0.00002
51 0.54849 0.55148 0.00541 0.00539 0.00002 1
52 0.54849 0.55177 0.00594 0.00591 0.00002
,
...J
53 0.54849 0.55209 0.00651 0.00648 0.00003
54 0.54849 0.55242 0.00711 0.00708 0.00003
55 0.54849 0.55279 0.00777 0.00773 0.00004 ,
56 0.54849 0.55319 0.00849 0.00845 0.00004 ~
57 0.54849 0.55366 0.00932 0.00927 0.00005
58 0.54849 0.55418 0.01026 0.01020 0.00006
59 0.54849 0.55473 0.01125 0.01118 0.00007 t
60 0.54849 0.55531 0.01227 0.01218 0.00008 •."
61 0.54849 0.55589 0.01330 0.01320 0.00010
62 0.54849 0.55651 0.01440 0.01429 0.00011
i63 0.54849 0.55720 0.01562 0.01548 "0.00013
64 0.54849 0.55793 0.01691 0.01675 0.00016 ..
65 0.54849 0.55869 0.01824 0.01806 0.00018
66 0.54849 0.55948 0.01964 0.01943 0.00021
67 0.54849 0.56038 0.02120 0.02095 0.00025 '{
68 0.54849 0.56139 0.02297 0.02268 0.00029 ....
69 0.54849 0.56255 0.02499 0.02465 0.00034
70 0.54849 0.56387 0.02726 0.02685 0.00041 J71 0.54849 0.56531 0.02975 0.0.2926 0.0004972 0.54849 0.56687 0.03242 0.03184 0.00058
73 0.54849 0.56848 0.03516 0.03448 0.00068
74 0.54849 0.57016 0.03799 0.03720 0.00080
75 0.54849 0.57193 0.04097 0.04005 0.00093 Iwi
76 0.54849 0.57388 0.04423 0.04314 0.00108
77 0.54849 0.57606 0.04786 0.04659 0.00127
78 0.54849 0.57860 0.05203 0.05052 0.00151
79 0.54849 0.58154 0.05683 0.05502 0.00181 .J
80 0.54849 0.58488 0.06222 0.06004 0.00218
81 0.54849 0.58858 0.06810 0.06548 0.00262
82 0.54849 0.59254 0.07433 0.07119 0.00313
*83 0.54849 0.59666 0.08072 0.07701 0.00371 .",J
84 0.54849 0.60110 0.08752 0.08313 0.00439
85 0.54849 0.60626 0.09528 0.09004 0.00524
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99
""'"
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B-3
7 Year Sinele Life GRAT J
...,
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Term: 7 .;
CUrrent Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000
J
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero Out Zero OUt Example 5 77-454 Difference
Age Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------- -50 0.18169 0.18516 0.01876 0.01834 0.00042
51 0.18169 0.18550 0.02054 0.02003 0.00051
52 0.18169 0.18587 0.02247 0.02186 0.00061
53 0.18169 0.18627 0.02458 0.02385 0.00073 ~
54 0.18169 0.18671 0.02687 0.02600 0.00087
55 0.18169 0.18719 0.02938 0.02833 0.00104
56 0.18169 0.18772 0.03212 0.03087 0.00124 M,
57 0.18169 0.18830 0.03510 0.03362 0.00148 ."j
58 0.18169 0.18892 0.03829 0.03654 0.00175
59 0.18169 0.18958 0.04163 0.03956 0.00206
60 0.18169 0.19027 0.04511 0.04269 0.00242
61 0.18169 0.19100 0.04874 0.04592 0.00282 """
62 0.18169 0.19178 0.05262 0.04934 0.00329
63 0.18169 0.19263 0.05679 0.05295 0.00383
64 0.18169 0.19354 0.06124 0.05676 0.00447 .J
65 0.18169 0.19453 0.06602 0.06079 0.00524
66 0.18169 0.19563 0.07126 0.06511 0.00615
67 0.18169 0.19687 0.07709 0.06985 0.00723 ~
68 0.18169 0.19825 0.08353 0.07501 0.00852 ...
69 0.18169 0.19978 0.09057 0.08056 0.01001
70 0.18169 0.20146 0.09812 0.08640 0.01173
71 0.18169 0.20326 0.10611 o. Q9242 0.01369
72 0.18169 0.20518 0.11450 0.09854 0.01595 ...
73 0.18169 0.20724 0.12327 0.10497 0.01830
74 0.18169 0.20947 0.13261 0.11173 0.02088
75 0.18169 0.21195 0.14275 0.11883 0.02392
76 0.18169 0.21475 0.15394 0.12641 0.02753 WIiI
77 0.18169 0.21793 0.16630 0.13452 0.03178
78 0.18169 0.22155 0.17990 0.14318 0.03672
79 0.18169 0.22561 0.19466 0.15222 0.04244
,
80 0.18169 0.23010 0.21039 0.16136 0.04903 .J
81 0.18169 0.23504 0.22697 0.17033 0.05664
82 0.18169 0.24043 0.24432 0.17904 0.06528
83 0.18169 0.24635 0.26247 0.18902 0.07345 ,
84 0.18169 0.25296 0.28175 0.19898 0.08277
filii
85 0.18169 0.26049 0.30250 ·0.20901 0.09349
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99 J
A-120
,..
I
8-4,.
I
10 Year Sinllie Life GRAT
r
r Zero Out Annuity AnalysisTerm: 10
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
r Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000
t
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
r Zero Out Zero OUt Example 5 77-454 DifferenceAge Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
SO 0.13845 0.14248 0.02823 0.02705 0.00118
r 51 0.13845 0.14287 0.03088 0.02947 0.0014152 0.13845 0.14329 0.03376 0.03208 0.0016953 0.13845 0.14376 0.03689 0.03488 0.00201
54 0.13845 0.14426 0.04026 0.03787 0.00238r 55 0.13845 0.14481 0.04390 0.04107 0.0028356 0.13845 0.14541 0.04784 0.04450 0.00334
57 0.13845 0.14606 0.05208 0.04814 0.00394
58 0.13845 0.14676 0.05658 0.05196 0.00462
r 59 0.13845 0.14750 0.06130 0.05589 0.0054060 0.13845 0.14828 0.06624 0.05993 0.00630
61 0.13845 0.14911 0.07145 0.06410 0.00735
r 62 0.13845 0.15001 0.07705 0.06854 0.0085163 0.13845 0.15100 0.08308 0.07330 0.0097864 0.13845 0.15208 0.08958 0.07831 0.01126
65 0.13845 0.15325 0.09657 0.08359 0.01297
r 66 0.13845 0.15455 0.10414 0.08919 0.0149467 0.13845 0.15599 0.11240 0.09518 0.0172268 0.13845 0.15758 0.12136 0.10151 0.01985
69 0.13845 0.15933 0.13101 0.10814 0.02287
r 70 0.13845 0.16124 0.14131 0.11495 0.0263671 0.13845 0.16331 0.15221 0.1.2181 0.0304072 0.13845 0.16556 0.16374 0.12915 0.03458
73 0.13845 0.16801 0.17590 0.13658 0.03932
r ,4 0.13845 0.17069 0.18887 0.14408 0.0448075 0.13845 0.17368 0.20282 0.15171 0.0511176 0.13845 0.17703 0.21790 0.15952 0.05838
77 0.13845 0.18080 0.23420 0.16744 0.06676
r 78 0.13845 0.18504 0.25177 0.17644 0.0753379 0.13845 0.18980 0.27052 0.18573 0.08479
80 0.13845 0.19507 0.29024 0.19473 0.09551
81 0.13845 0.20088 0.31075 0.20313 0.10763r 82 0.13845 0.20725 0.33196 0.21111 0.1208483 0.13845 0.21428 0.35385 0.22011 0.13374
84 0.13845 0.22211 0.37664 0.22846 0.14818
85 0.13845 0.23093 0.40045 0.23615 0.16430r Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99
r
r
r A-121
GRAT for a SS Year Old
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Age: 55
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero Out Zero Out Example 5 77-454 Difference
Term Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
2 0.54849 0.55279 0.00777 0.00773 0.00004
3 0.37688 0.38138 0.01180 0.01170 0.00011
4 0.29124 0.29597 0.01598 0.01575 0.00023
5 0.23999 0.24496 0.02031 0.01988 0.00042
6 0.20593 0.21116 0.02477 0.02409 0.00069
7 0.18169 0.18719 0.02938 0.02833 0.00104
8 0.16359 0.16937 0.03411 0.03260 0.00151
9 0.14959 0.15565 0.03895 0.03685 0.00210
10 0.13845 0.14481 0.04390 0.04107 0.00283
11 0.12940 0.13606 0.04895 0.04524 0.00372
12 0.12191 0.12888 0.05410 0.04931 0.00479
13 0.11561 0.12291 0.05933 0.05342 0.00592
14 0.11027 0.11789 0.06465 0.05745 0.00720
15 0.10567 0.11363 0.07003 0.06131 0.00873
16 0.10169 0.10999 0.07550 0.06497 0.01053
17 0.09821 0.10687 0.08103 0.06863 0.01241
18 0.09515 0.10418 0.08664 0.07208 0.01456
19 0.09244 0.10185 0.09232 0.07528 0.01704
20 0.09004 0.09982 0.09805 0.07846 0.01958
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99
A-122
B-5
>;-
J
I
J
i....
r
,...,
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r-
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
GRAT for a 65 Year Old
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Age: 65
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero Out Zero OUt Example 5 77-454 Difference
Term Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
2 0.54849 0.55869 0.01824 0.01806 0.00018
3 0.37688 0.38753 0.02749 0.02691 0.00058
4 0.29124 0.30239 0.03688 0.03565 0.00123
5 0.23999 0.25167 0.04643 0.04425 0.00218
6 0.20593 0.21817 0.05614 0.05265 0.00349
7 0.18169 0.19453 0.06602 0.06079 0.00524
8 0.16359 0.17706 0.07607 0.06859 0.00748
9 0.14959 0.16371 0.08626 0.07600 0.01026
10 0.13845 0.15325 0.09657 0.08359 0.01297
11 0.12940 0.14490 0.10696 0.09060 0.01636
12 0.12191 0.13812 0.11741 0.09695 0.02046
13 0.11561 0.13257 0.12789 0.10332 0.02457
14 0.11027 0.12797 0.13838 0.10895 0.02943
15 0.10567 0.12415 0.14886 0.11428 0.03458
16 0.10169 0.12096 0.15932 0.11899 0.04033
17 0.09821 0.11829 0.16975 0.12344 0.04631
18 0.09515 0.11605 0.18012 0.12716 0.05296
19 0.09244 0.11419 0.19041 0.13069 0.05972
20 0.09004 0.11263 0.20058 0.13375 0.06683
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99
A-123
B-6
GRAT for a 75 Year Old
B-7
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Age: 75
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1.0000 .~,-
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero Out Zero Out Example 5 77-454 Difference
Term Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts ....-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
2 0.54849 0.57193 0.04097 0.04005 0.00093
3 0.37688 0.40151 0.06133 0.05841 0.00292
4 0.29124 0.31715 0.08170 0.07554 0.00616 ...
5 0.23999 0.26727 0.10207 0.09123 0.01084
6 0.20593 0.23465 0.12243 0.10526 0.01717
7 0.18169 0.21195 0.14275 0.11883 0.02392 I
8 0.16359 0.19545 0.16298 0.13122 0.03177 ,J
9 0.14959 0.18311 0.18303 0.14157 0.04147
10 0.13845 0.17368 0.20282 0.15171 0.05111
11 0.12940 0.16638 0.22225 0.15987 0.06238
12 0.12191 0.16067 0.24127 0.16717 0.07410 ...
13 0.11561 0.15620 0.25981 0.17358 0.08623
14 0.11027 0.15268 0.27781 0.17861 0.09920
15 0.10567 0.14993 0.29521 0.18255 0.11267 i
16 0.10169 0.14779 0.31195 0.18623 0.12572 ..
17 0.09821 0.14614 0.32798 0.18916 0.13882
18 0.09515 0.14488 0.34326 0.19140 0.15186
19 0.09244 0.14394 0.35774 0.19308 0.16466 ..,j
20 0.09004 0.14323 0.37140 0.19433 0.17707
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99 -
J
A-124
,..,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,..
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
GRAT for a 85 Year Old
Zero Out Annuity Analysis
Age: 85
Current Interest: 6.40% Mortality: 90CM
Annuity Payments Per Year: 1 First Payment Delay: 12
Annuity Adjustment Factor: 1. 0000
Term Contingent Rev. Rul.
Zero Out Zero Out Example 5 77-454 Difference
Term Rate Rate Gift Gift In Gifts
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ----------
2 0.54849 0.60626 0.09528 0.09004 0.00524
3 0.37688 0.43851 0.14053 0.12428 0.01625
4 0.29124 0.35693 0.18406 0.15067 0.03339
5 0.23999 0.30992 0.22564 0.17456 0.05108
6 0.20593 0.28023 0.26516 0.19299 0.07217
7 0.18169 0.26049 0.30250 0.20901 0.09349
8 0.16359 0.24696 0.33756 0.21999 0.11758
9 0.14959 0.23754 0.37024 0.22848 0.14175
10 0.13845 0.23093 0.40045 0.23615 0.16430
11 0.12940 0.22629 0.42818 0.24153 0.18665
12 0.12191 0.22306 0.45349 0.24528 0.20822
13 0.11561 0.22084 0.47647 0.24786 0.22861
14 0.11027 0.21932 0.49723 0.24962 0.24761
15 0.10567 0.21830 0.51594 0.25080 0.26514
16 0.10169 0.21763 0.53275 0.25158 0.28117
17 0.09821 0.21720 0.54784 0.25208 0.29576
18 0.09515 0.21693 0.56138 0.25239 0.30899
19 0.09244 0.21676 0.57353 0.25258 0.32095
20 0.09004 0.21667 0.58444 0.25270 0.33175
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-7-99
A-12S
B-8
-
B-9
GRAT for.Two 50 Year Qlds ....
Age 1: 50 Age 2: 50
CUrrent Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1.0000
12
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2 Two Life Age 1 Age 2
Zero Out Zero Out Zero Out (Only) (Only) Two Life
Term Rate Rate Rate Gift Gift Gift
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
2 0.55121 0.55121 0.54852 0.00491 0.00491 0.00004
3 0.37973 0.37973 0.37691 0.00746 0.00746 0.00008
4 0.29423 0.29423 0.29128 0.01008 0.01008 0.00015
5 0.24313 0.24313 0.24005 0.01277 0.01277 0.00024
6 0.20923 0.20923 0.20600 0.01553 0.01553 0.00037
7 0.18516 0.18516 0.18179 0.01834 0.01834 0.00052
8 0.16724 0.16724 0.16371 0.02120 0.02120 0.00071
9 0.15342 0.15342 0.14974 0.02411 0.02411 0.00095
10 0.14248 0.14248 0.13863 0.02705 0.02705 0.00123
11 0.13362 0.13362 0.12960 0.03002 0.03002 0.00156
12 0.12634 0.12634 0.12215 0.03300 0.03300 0.00195
13 0.12026 0.12026 0.11590 0.03598 0.03598 0.00240
14 0.11513 0.11513 0.11059 0.03894 0.03894 0.00292
15 0.11076 0.11076 0.10605 0.04191 0.04191 0.00350
16 0.10702 0.10702 0.10212 0.04488 0.04488 0.00416
17 0.10378 0.10378 0.09870 0.04779 0.04779 0.00490
18 0.10097 0.10097 0.09571 0.05059 0.05059 0.00571
19 0.09851 0.09851 0.09308 0.05333 0.05333 0.00659
20 0.09637 0.09637 0.09075 0.05604 0.05604 0.00756
Produced on Factors 4.0.5 6-6-99
A-126
J
J
r
r,
r
B-I0
GRAT for Two 60 Year Olds
r Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Contingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
Mortality: 90CM"
1 First Payment Delay:
1. 0000
Age 1: 60 Age 2: 60
Current Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2
(Only) (Only) Two Life
Gift Gift Gift
0.00023
0.00050
0.00090
0.00143
0.00212
0.00296
0.00396
0.00514
0.00651
0.00806
0.00980
0.01174
0.01387
0.01618
0.01864
0.02122
0.02388
0.02664
0.02952
0.01218
0.01829
0.02443
0.03056
0.03666
0.04269
0.04860
0.05436
0.05993
0.06546
0.07090
0.07602
0.08080
0.08564
0.09002
0.09417
0.09805
0.10162
0.10487
12
0.01218
0.01829
0.02443
0.03056
0.03666
0.04269
0.04860
0.05436
0.05993
0.06546
0.07090
0.07602
0.08080
0.08564
0.09002
0.09417
0.09805
0.10162
0.10487
0.54862
0.37707
0.29150
0.24033
0.20637
0.18223
0.16425
0.15038
0.13938
0.13048
0.12315
0.11705
0.11190
0.10753
0.10378
0.10056
0.09778
0.09537
0.09328
Two Life
Zero Out
Rate
0.55531
0.38401
0.29870
0.24781
0.21412
0.19027
0.17258
0.15899
0.14828
0.13966
0.13263
0.12682
0.12196
0.11787
0.11441
0.11147
0.10896
0.10681
0.10497
Age 2
Zero Out
Rate
0.55531
0.38401
0.29870
0.24781
0.21412
0.19027
0.17258
0.15899
0.14828
0.13966
0.13263
0.12682
0.12196
0.11787
0.11441
0.11147
0.10896
0.10681
0.10497
Age 1
Zero Out
Rate
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Term
r
r•
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r A-127
8-11
GRAT for Two 70 Year Olds
Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Contingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)
-
Age 1: 70 Age 2: 70
Current Interest: 6.40t
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1.0000
Term
Age 1
Zero OUt
Rate
Age 2
Zero OUt
Rate
Two Life
Zero Out
Rate
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2
(Only) (Only) Two Life
Gift Gift Gift
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.56387
0.39305
0.30826
0.25789
0.22475
0.20146
0.18434
0.17134
0.16124
0.15326
0.14687
0.14172
0.13755
0.13415
0.13138
0.12913
0.12731
0.12585
0.12467
0.56387
0.39305
0.30826
0.25789
0.22475
0.20146
0.18434
0.17134
0.16124
0.15326
0.14687
0.14172
0.13755
0.13415
0.13138
0.12913
0.12731
0.12585
0.12467
0.54912
0.37781
0.29252
0.24166
0.20803
0.18426
0.16667
0.15321
0.14267
0.13425
0.12745
0.12190
0.11734
0.11358
0.11047
0.10791
0.10581
0.10410
0.10271
0.02685
0.03982
0.05240
0.06446
0.07583
0.08640
0.09655
0.10636
0.11495
0.12315
0.13044
0.13709
0.14274
0.14813
0.15253
0.15618
0.15966
0.16245
0.16470
0.02685
0.03982
0.05240
0.06446
0.07583
0.08640
0.09655
0.10636
0.11495
0.12315
0.13044
0.13709
0.14274
0.14813
0.15253
0.15618
0.15966
0.16245
0.16470
0.00114
0.00245
0.00434
0.00683
0.00989
0.01352
0.01768
0.02230
0.02731
0.03261
0.03806
0.04350
0.04932
0.05484
0.05991
0.06504
0.06931
0.07350
0.07697
.J
Produced on Factors 4.0S 6-6-99
A-128
-
-
r
r
r
B-12
GRAT for Two 80 Year Olds
Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Contingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)r
r
Age 1: 80 Age 2: 80
Current Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1.0000
12
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2 Two Life Age 1 Age 2
Zero Out Zero Out Zero Out (Only) (Only) Two Life
Term Rate Rate Rate Gift Gift Gift
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
2 0.58489 0.58489 0.55175 0.06004 0.06004 0.00587
3 0.41546 0.41546 0.38162 0.08597 0.08597 0.01224
4 0.33215 0.33215 0.29763 0.10869 0.10869 0.02079
5 0.28331 0.28331 0.24815 0.12776 0.12776 0.03109
6 0.25175 0.25175 0.21599 0.14609 0.14609 0.04254
7 0.23010 0.23010 0.19376 0.16136 0.16136 0.05447
8 0.21468 0.21468 0.17779 0.17454 0.17454 0.06607
9 0.20342 0.20342 0.16601 0.18495 0.18495 0.07748
10 0.19507 0.19507 0.15719 0.19473 0.19473 0.08855
11 0.18884 0.18884 0.15054 0.20202 0.20202 0.09760
12 0.18419 0.18419 0.14551 0.20747 0.20747 0.10634
13 0.18072 0.18072 0.14172 0.21187 0.21187 0.11325
14 0.17817 0.17817 0.13889 0.21576 0.21576 0.11841
15 0.17629 0.17629 0.13680 0.21862 0.21862 0.12307
1.6 0.17494 0.17494 0.13527 0.22068 0.22068 0.12666
17 0.17398 0.17398 0.13418 0.22214 0.22214 0.12921
1~ 0.17330 0.17330 0.1.3340 0.22317 0.22317 0.13104
19 0.17284 0.17284 0.13287 0.22387 0.22387 0.13228
20 0.17252 0.17252 0.13251 0.22436 0.22436 0.13312
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
A-129
8-13
GRAT for a 60 and 50 Year Old
Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Con~ingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)
Age 1: 60 Age 2: 50
Current Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1.0000
"j
..J
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2 Two Life Age 1 Age 2
Zero OUt Zero OUt Zero Out (Only) (Only) Two Life
Term Rate Rate Rate Gift Gift Gift
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
2 0.55531 0.55121 0.54855 0.01218 0.00491 0.00009
3 0.38401 0.37973 0.37696 0.01829 0.00746 0.00020
4 0.29870 0.29423 0.29135 0.02443 0.01008 0.00037
5 0.24781 0.24313 0.24013 0.03056 0.01277 0.00059
6 0.21412 0.20923 0.20611 0.03666 0.01553 0.00088
7 0.19027 0.18516 0.18192 0.04269 0.01834 0.00124
8 0.17258 0.16724 0.16387 0.04860 0.02120 0.00169
9 0.15899 0.15342 0.14993 0.05436 0.02411 0.00221
10 0.14828 0.14248 0.13885 0.05993 0.02705 0.00284
11 0.13966 0.13362 0.12987 0.06546 0.03002 0.00356
12 0.13263 0.12634 0.12245 0.07090 0.03300 0.00439
13 0.12682 0.12026 0.11625 0.07602 0.03598 0.00534
14 0.12196 0.11513 0.11099 0.08080 0.03894 0.00641
15 0.11787 0.11076 0.10650 0.08564 0.04191 0.00759
16 0.11441 0.10702 0.10264 0.09002 0.04488 0.00890
17 0.11147 0.10378 0.09928 0.09417 0.04779 0.01033
1!3 0.10896 0.10097 0.09636 0.09805 0.05059 0.01186
19 0.10681 0.09851 0.09380 0.10162 0.05333 0.01350
20 0.10497 0.09637 0.09155 0.10487 0.05604 0.01522
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
A-130
f...
J
r
I
r B-14
r GRAT for a 70 and 60 Year Old
12
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1. 0000
Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Contingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)
Age 1: 70 Age 2: 60
Current Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
Two Life
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2 Age 1 Age 2
Zero Out Zero Out Zero Out (Only) (Only) Two Life
Term Rate Rate Rate Gift Gift Gift
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
2 0.56387 0.55531 0.54878 0.02685 0.01218 0.00051
3 0.39305 0.38401 0.37730 0.03982 0.01829 0.00111
4 0.30826 0.29870 0.29182 0.05240 0.02443 0.00198
5 0.25789 0.24781 0.24074 0.06446 0.03056 0.00313
6 0.22475 0.21412 0.20688 0.07583 0.03666 0.00459
7 0.20146 0.19027 0.18287 0.08640 0.04269 0.00635
8 0.18434 0.17258 0.16501 0.09655 0.04860 0.00842
9 0.17134 0.15899 0.15127 0.10636 0.05436 0.01080
10 0.16124 0.14828 0.14042 0.11495 0.05993 0.01348
11 0.15326 0.13966 0.13167 0.12315 0.06546 0.01644
12 0.14687 0.13263 0.12452 0.13044 0.07090 0.01967
13 0.14172 0.12682 0.11859 0.13709 0.07602 0.02313
14 0.13755 0.12196 0.11363 0.14274 0.08080 0.02677
15 0.13415 0.11787 0.10946 0.14813 0.08564 0.03051
16 0.13138 0.11441 0.10593 0.15253 0.09002 0.03434
17 0.12913 0.11147 0.10292 0.15618 0.09417 0.03834
18 0.12731 0.10896 0.10037 0.15966 0.09805 0.04221
19 0;12585 0.10681 0.09819 0.16245 0.10162 0.04585
20 0.12467 0.10497 0.09633 0.16470 0.10487 0.04960
Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r A-131
a-15
GRAT for a 80 and 70 Year Old
-
Two Life Zero Out Annuity Analysis - Contingent Rate Basis (Last-to-Die)
Age 1: ao Age 2: 70
CUrrent Interest: 6.40%
Annuity Payments Per Year:
Annuity Adjustment Factor:
Mortality: 90CM
1 First Payment Delay:
1.0000
12
J
Rev. Rul. 77-454 Gifts
1------------------------------1
Age 1 Age 2
(Only) (Only) Two Life
Gift Gift GiftTerm
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
~9
20
Age 1
Zero OUt
Rate
0.58489
0.41546
0.33215
0.28331
0.25175
0.23010
0.21468
0.20342
0.19507
0.18884
0.18419
0.18072
0.17817
0.17629
0.17494
0.17398
0.17330
0.17284
0.17252
Age 2
Zero Out
Rate
0.56387
0.39305
0.30826
0.25789
0.22475
0.20146
0.18434
0.17134
0.16124
0.15326
0.14687
0.14172
0.13755
0.13415
0.13138
0.12913
0.12731
0.12585
0.12467
Two Life
Zero Out
Rate
0.54992
0.37898
0.29409
0.24366
0.21049
0.18720
0.17012
0.15719
0.14718
0.13931
0.13306
0.12806
0.12404
0.12081
0.11820
0.11612
0.11445
0.11312
0.11208
0.06004
0.08597
0.10869
0.12776
0.14609
0.16136
0.17454
0.18495
0.19473
0.20202
0.20747
0.21187
0.21576
0.21862
0.22068
0.22214
0.22317
0.22387
0.22436
0.02685
0.03982
0.05240
0.06446
0.07583
0.08640
0.09655
0.10636
0.11495
0.12315
0.13044
0.13709
0.14274
0.14813
0.15253
0.15618
0.15966
0.16245
0.16470
0.00258
0.00549
0.00955
0.01469
0.02079
0.02768
0.03514
0.04290
0.05069
0.05843
0.06634
0.07340
0.08020
0.08613
0.09167
0.09608
0.10017
0.10363
0.10632
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Produced on Factors 4.05 6-6-99
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Charitable Allocation Clauses
Charitable Allocation Clauses:
Can Something That Limits Value Have Unlimited Value?
Tumey P. Berry
Ogden Newell & Welch
Louisville, Kentucky
r,
i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
A charitable allocation clause is an
attempt to minimize the negative effects that can
result from the audit adjustment by the Internal
Revenue Service of the value of noncharitable
gifts or bequests. A donor or decedent would
transfer assets to a trust containing a charitable
allocation clause; the clause would direct the
trustee to allocate contributed assets having a
certain value to a fund for the benefit of taxable
beneficiaries, and to allocate all excess assets to
charity.
To illustrate, parents could contribute
$2, I00,000 in marketable securities to a
partnership that has 100 general partnership units
and 9900 limited partnership units. Parents could
give the 9900 limited units to a trust at an
appraised value of $1,260,000 (a 40% discount).
The trust could provide that the first $1 ,250,000 of
contributed assets be allocated to a fund for the
benefit of parents' children, grandchildren and
other descendants (a family fund), with the
remaining contributed assets being allocated to the
parent's donor advised fund at the local
community foundatiop (or to other designated
charitable organizations). The Trustee would
review the appraisal ofthe limited units and would
provide a copy to the local community foundation.
Assuming the appraisal were in good order, the
community foundation would agree that it should
receive $10,000 worth of units from the transfer
but no more.
1. Benefits.
An effective charitable
allocation clause in a trust might have two
benefits. The IRS may be reluctant to audit
transfers made to a trust containing such a clause
because no gift or estate tax could be collected. In
addition, even if the IRS did audit a transfer, and
increased the value of the transferred assets, the
result would not be payment of gift or estate tax
but rather the reallocation of assets from the
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noncharitable fund to the designated charity. If
that charity were a donor advised fund at a
community foundation, the funds would remain
available for the family's charitable purposes.
2. Drafting the Clause.
A charitable allocation clause
could be drafted as a formula, similar to a
traditional formula marital deduction funding
clause: the amount passing to the family fund
would be the maximum amount that could pass
free ofestate or gift tax by reason ofthe applicable
credit amount (with any appropriate adjustments).
However, a simpler clause might specify a sum
that would pass to the family fund with the
remaining assets passing to the charitable fund.
This approach would work equally well for
lifetime and testamentary transfers.
Charitable allocation clauses in
testamentary situations may be in common use
already. For instance, a bequest of an amount
equal to $1,000,000 to each of a testator's living
children with the residue passing to the testator's
foundation is, in effect, a charitable allocation
clause. The testator's personal representative will
allocate assets to fill the children's $1,000,000
bequests based on the personal representative's
valuation of the estate's assets but such an
allocation will not alter the amount of estate tax
paid by the estate. If the personal representative
undervalues the estate's assets the effect is that the
children will receive "too much" and the
foundation "too little". However, the IRS has little
incentive to challenge valuations in the estate
because no tax will be generated.
A sample clause suitable for an inter
vivos or testamentary transfer might read as
follows:
Trustee will allocate to the trust
administered under Article
for the benefit ofmy spouse and ,
my descendants a fraction ofthe
assets added to the trust, the
numerator of which is
$ and the denominator
ofwhich is the fair market value
of the assets added to the trust
on the date of addition. The
remaining assets will be
allocated to the charitable
organizations identified in
Article _ as provided therein.
Trostee may estimate the value
of the assets to be allocated
hereunder and make a
preliminary allocation ifTrustee
notifies all beneficiaries that the
allocationmay be later adjusted.
Trustee will exercise reasonable
discretion in allocating the
assets and may, but need not,
take into consideration
appraisals of such assets
(whether or not obtained by
Trustee) and any determination
made by a federal or state taxing
authority as to the value ofsuch
assets.
The purpose of a fractional allocation is
to avoid an IRS question about appreciation and
depreciation between the time the assets are added
and the time they are aiiocated. Ifthere is no such
concern then the amount to be allocated to the
family fund may be described as "an amount equal
to" the desired dollar amount.
3. Role of the Charitable
Organization.
The. charitable organization
should receive a copy of the appraisal from the
trostee and should be asked to consent to the
proposed allocation. In general, assuring that the
charitable organization receives something under
the likely appraised values would seem to be
desirable. Not only would the charitable
organization receive assets for its time and trouble
and the trust appears to work because assets
actually went to charity.
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May the donor's private foundation be the
beneficiary? In principle the answer is yes.
However, the purpose of the clause is to reduce
IRS challenges. If the donor's private foundation
is the potential recipient then not only may the IRS
claim that no independentparty valued the gift, but
also that the private foundation improperly
surrendered its legal right to collect from the trost
thereby making a gift to a disqualified person,
(Treas. Reg. §53.4946-1{a){vii». Such a gift
would be an act of self-dealing. Treas. Reg.
§53.4941(f).
A charitable organization should not be
lackadaisical about its duty as the donee under a
charitable allocation clause. A charitable
organization that did not collect all that it were due
could be subject to sanction both by the Internal
Revenue Service, for facilitating private
inurement, and by the attorney general or other
state authority regulating charities.
4. Contrast with Marital
Allocation Clause.
A marital deduction clause is an
alternative to the charitable allocation clause in
order to avoid assets leaving the family unit. Such
a clause allows the IRS to claim that the surviving
spouse made a gift if the marital share is funded
with assets having "too little" value.. In Rev. Rut.
84-105,1984-2 C.B. 197, the IRS determined that
the surviving spouse made a gift by acquiescing to
the underfunding ofa pecuniary marital bequest.
If the trost were a QTIP trost a QTIP
election will need to be made on the donor's next
gift tax return, which must be timely filed, in order
to avoid a tax. The filing may be avoided by using
a general power of appointment marital trost.
S. Use after 1997 Change in the
Gift Tax Statute or
Limitations.
Charitable allocation clauses
were less attractive before the change in the gift
tax statute of limitations. For instance, in TAM
8611004 the National Office redetermined the
number of units of a partnership that had been
-
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given away by the decedent during lifetime in
order to determine the number that should be
included in the decedent's estate. The gift had
been described as such interest in the partnership
as had a stated dollar value. The TAM determined
that even though the decedent and other partners
thought the decedent had assigned a particular
percentage ofthe partnership in fact less had been
assigned; the decedenthadnot made a gift because
the decedent retained the right to repossess the
excess partnership units that had been assigned in
error.
More generally, if the IRS may examine
all gifts at the time of the estate tax audit, the
auditing agent would retain significant leverage by
advocating the reallocation ofassets to a charitable
organization rather than allowing them to stay in
the family fund. The family would be somewhat
happier having assets go to charity rather than to
the government but at the same time the donor had
not known of the readjustment and had not
planned for it.
If gifts to the trust are properly disclosed
the gift tax statute of limitations will expire three
years after the return is filed. Suppose a gift tax
examination results in the increase of gift values
and assets are allocated to charity; the donor
knows of that result (unless the donor has died
before the audit is complete which is unlikely in
most instances) and can plan accordingly. In the
example which began this discussion, suppose the
partnership were valued without a discount. The
allocation clause would create an $800,000
charitable fund at a community foundation which
could be used to benefit the donors' charitable
causes. If the donors intended to bequeath assets
to charity those bequests could be eliminated and
charitable fund assets used instead.
6. Income Tax Deduction.
If assets are allocated to a
charitable organization by the Trustee does the
donor receive an income tax deduction? An
income tax deduction should be allowed to a donor
with respect to whose gift Trustee allocates a part
to a charitable organization within the same
calendar year. The Trustee's actions were
mandated by the trust agreement and thus the
contribution should be treated as being made by
the donor.
What if the Trustee allocates assets to a
charitable organization pursuant to a charitable
allocation clause but does so after the year in
which the donor makes the contribution to the
trust? Section 170 provides that a deduction is
allowed for contributions paid within the taxable
year. Even if the Trustee's subsequent allocation
of assets is retroactive, for purposes of the trust,
section 170 would seem to prohibit any deduction
from being taken as of the date of the initial
contribution. May the donor take an income tax
deduction in the year in which the Trustee's
subsequent allocation is made? The answer ought
to be yes. The donor's income tax position in that
instance is helped if the trust is a grantor trust for
income tax purposes.
7. Is the Clause Effective?
The IRS has consistently
opposed certain arrangements designed to limit its
ability to collect tax by increasing the value of
assets transferred during life or at death. For
instance, a donor may not give assets to a donee
with the proviso that assets having a value in
excess of$X will be returned to the donor. On the
other hand, marital deduction - exemption
equivalent clauses have been used for decades, as
have testamentary formula clauses ofvarious types
(e.g. a formula that zeros out charitable lead trust
gifts). Which analysis is more appropriate for
charitable allocation clauses?
The bedrock case is Commissioner v.
Procter. 142 F.2d 824 (4da Cir. 1944), cert. denied
323 U.S. 756 (1944). The applicable provision
that was struck down in that case read as follows:
Eleventh: The settlor is advised
by counsel and satisfied that the
present transfer is not subja:t to
Federal gift tax. However, in the
event it should be determined
by fmal judgment or order of a
competent federal court of last
resort that any part of the
transfer in trust hereunder is
subject to gift tax it is agreed by
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all the parties hereto that in that
event the excess property
hereby transferred which is
decreed by such court to be
subject to gift tax shall
automatically be deemed not to
be included in the conveyance
in trust hereunder and shall
remain the sole property of
Frederic W. Procter free from
the trust hereby created.
Stated simply, in Procter a gift was made
with an agreement that if more than a certain
amount were determined to have been given the
excess would be returned to the donor. The court
invalidated the clause on three public policy
grounds: (1) public officials would be discouraged
from attempting to collect the tax since the only
effect would be to defeat the gift; (2) the
adjustment provision would tend to obstruct the
administration ofjustice by requiring the court to
address a moot case; and (3) the provisions should
not be permitted to defeat a judgment rendered by
the court.
In King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700
(lOth Cir. 1976) aff'g 424 F. Supp. 117 (D. Colo.
1975), the clause examined provided that in an
intra-family sales transaction if the value of
closely-held stock were determined to be higherby
the Internal Revenue Service the higher price
would be paid. The.District Court and Tenth
Circuit concluded that the purpose of the clause
was not to limit the ability of the IRS to examine
the transaction but rather was part of a sale
conducted on arms-length tenus. The seller did
not make a gift because there was no donative
intentunderTreasmy Regulation Section25.25 12-
8. Because the opinion rests on the arms-length
nature ofthe transaction it is oflimited guidance in
other situations.
In Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78
(1986), parents gave a certain number ofshares to
their sons subject to an adjustment clause that
provided that ifthe value of the shares for gift tax
purposes was increased the sons would return
some shares to the parents but if the value were
decreased the parents would give more shares to
the sons. The Tax Court invalidated the
adjustment clause.
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More recently the Tax Court has
considered a savings clause in a private annuity
situation in Estate of McClendon v. C.I.R., T.C.
Memo. 1993-459. There the private annuity
agreement includedan adjustmentprovisionwhich
increased the annuity if the value of the property
transferred by the annuitant were increased upon
gift tax audit. he court held:
Based upon our review of
Procter and Ward, the
adjustment clause at issue in the
instant case does not merit
consideration for purposes of
determining petitioner's gift tax
liability, and we so hold. In our
view, it makes little sense to
expend precious judicial
resources to resolve the question
of whether a gift resulted from
the private annuity transaction
only to render that issue moot.
Equally important, our
detetmination that the private
annuity agreement resulted in a
taxable gift is not directly
binding on Bart or the
McLendon Family Trust who
are not parties to this case. See
Ward v. Commissioner, supraat
114. Consequently, there being
no assurance that the terms of
the adjustment clause will be
respected, it. shall have no
impact on this case.
A different kind ofadjustment clause was
at issue in Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 239
(1984). There the trust provided that notes would
be issued to the grantors if the value of gifts
exceeded $400,000. However, the determination
ofwhether to issue the notes was left to the trustee:
In the event that the value ofthe
partnership interest listed in
Schedule "A" shall be fInally
detennined to exceed $400,000
for purposes of computing the
California or United States Gift
Tax, and in the opinion of the
Attorney for the trustee a lower
J
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value is not reasonably
defendable, the trustee shall
immediately execute a
promissory note to the trustors
in the usual form at 6 percent
interest in a principal amount
equal to the difference between
the value of such gift and
$400,000. The note shall carry
interest and be effective as· of
the day of the gift. [Italics
added.]
The court found that the discretion ofthe
trustee did make a difference:
We do not believe that the
savings clause here under
consideration falls within the
ambit of Procter ... Procter is
apposite only if we read the
words "fmally determined" to
refer to a final judgment by a
court ofcompetent jurisdiction.
Such an interpretation, however,
would render a nullity the
succeeding phrase "and in the
opinion of the Attorney for the
trustee a lower value is not
reasonably defendable," since it
would be absurd for the trustee
to defend a l~wer value after a
final judgment had been
rendered. We believe the more
reasonable interpretation of the
clause at issue is to read "fmally
determined" to mean either
eventually determined by
appraisers or"determinedbythe
IRS."
•••••
On this reading of the savings
clause, the trustee has no power
to issue notes to the grantors
upon a detennination by a court
that the value of property
transferred to the trustee
exceeded $400,000.
The IRS has contested a formula clause in
Evelyn East v. Commissioner, Tax Court Docket
No. 12019-98. The clause there allocated units
having a certain value to grandchildren's trusts
with excess units being allocated to trusts for
children only. The IRS appears to be taking a
position based on Procter. Taxpayer's counsel has
indicated the case will likely be settled.
This analysis suggests that the kind of
charitable allocation clause under consideration
here is distinguishable in two ways from those
struck down using a Procter analysis. One
distinguishing factor would be that the grantors
would not receive back any excess gifts, rather any
excess would be distributed to charity. A second
distinguishing factor is that the clause is similar to
that in Harwood in that it gives discretion to the
Trustee regarding the amount of the allocation
rather than making it automatic.
Is the effectiveness of the clause
enhanced ifthe IRS is allowed to collectsome tax?
For example, suppose the clause were drafted such
that amounts above $1,100,000 were transferred to
a charitable fund, and then assets appraised at
$1,000,000 were transferred to the trust. The IRS
could adjust the value on audit upwards by
$100,000 and collect gift tax on that additional
gift. However, the amount of the gift tax that
might be owed would be capped at a level
acceptable to the client (in the illustration, the tax
on $100,000).
8. Effect of Special Attacks on
Limited Partnerships.
What is the effect of attacks on
family limited partnerships on the clause. For
instance, if the law turned out to be that no
discounts were allowed for gifts of limited
partnership interests holding marketable securities
to family members, but discounts remained in
place for gifts to others - charities, for instance -
what is the effect on the trust discussed at the
beginning of this section? Presumably the IRS
would take the position that the units had an
undiscounted value for purposes of allocation to
the fund for the descendants. Does that
automatically mean that more is allocated to
charity? The answer could be no if the valuation
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of the units under normal state law valuation
principles is unchanged. Stated differently, if
values increase because appraisals are wrong or
state law rights are misunderstood the clause may
work, but if values increase simply because the
IRS disregards the partnership (under a Mumby
theory for instance) or because section 2703 or
section 2704 alter the valuation in a limited
context - family transfers - the clause may not
work.
May the clause be drafted so that it "ties
in" to value as finally determined for federal gift
tax purposes including Chapter 14 and Mumhy
type arguments? Arguably yes but that would
seem to increase the ability ofthe IRS to argue that
in fact the clause was nothing more than a
mechanism to avoid gift tax.
May the clause be drafted in reverse? To
illustrate, assume $2,100,000 of marketable
securities in a limited partnership with 9900
limited units, representing 99% of the partnership
units. given to a trust. The trust provides that the
fIrst $10,000 worth of units will be allocated to
charity and the next $1,250,000 to a fund for
descendants, and amounts beyond that to charity
again. Is it possible for the IRS to claim that units
have one value on the front and back ends and a
different value in the middle?
9. Conclusion. A charitable
c
allocation clause seems to be an effective
mechanism to limit gift tax expense.
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APPENDIXC
Charity From Nothing: Protection From Environmental and Premises Liabili Under Check-
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Turney P. Berry, Timothy J. Eifler, aad Laurea D. Anderson, aU of Ogden, NeweU & Welch, Louisville, Ky., have
written this special report, which looks at the factors charities need to consider when contributors want to donate
real property. .
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--SUMMARY--
Tumey P. Berry, Timothy 1. Eifler, and Lauren D. Anderson. all ofOgden, Newell & Welch, Louisville, Ky., have
written this special report, which looks at the factors charities need to consider when contributors want to donate real
property.
The authors are attorneys at the finn ofOgden. Newell & Welch, Louisville, Ky. Timothy Eifler practices federal, state,
and local tax. Tumey Berry works on estate planning issues, and Lauren Anderson focuses on environmental law.
--FULLTEXT--
[I) A frequently recurring issue for charities involves whether to accept contributions of real property. Ownership of real
property subjects the owner to potential environmental liability for prior and future releases ofhazardous materiaJs on the
real property as well as premises liability for injuries to persons or property occurring on the real property. This potential
risk can far outweigh any current financial advantage to the charity from accepting such a donation. This article outlines
a potential method whereby charities can accept contnbutions ofreal property and simultaneously avoid incurring
environmental or premises liability under the new "check- the-box" regulations. This article does not address issues
raised by charities engaging in substantial real property activities which go beyond the mere ownership or passive rental
ofreal property.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
[2) At one time, the greatest risk for a charity as a result of receiving a donation of real property was that the real property
could not be used directly by the charity, could not be rented, and was unsaleable. Today, the imposition of liability to
remedy environmental problems on real property may surpass these traditional concerns.
[3] The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation. and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. section 9601 et seq.
(CERCLA) creates the possibility ofsignificant liabilities being imposed on owners and operators ofreal property on
which hazardous materials are located. There are two primary bases for liability under CERCLA - operator liability and
owner liability.
[4) The statute imposes liability on the "operator" ofa parcel ofreal property. 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a)(4)./1I There
seem to be two competing tes~ used to determine whether one is an operator.
[5) The "actual control" test imposes liability if there is substantial control exercised over the property. In certain cues,
this test can reach parent corporations - as well as individual officers, directors and shareholders - who actively
padicipate in the management ofa facility. See United States v. Nortbeastem.Plwmaceutical & Chemical Co. Inc., 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). In other cues, however, the actual control test has resulted in parent corporations being
protected from liability arising out ofreal property owned by wholly-owned subsidiaries. See generally, Lansford-
Coaldale Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993), United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24
(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
[6) The competing standard, the "authority-to-control" test, is met if there is capability to control, even ifthat capability is
Dot utilized. See generally, Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 940, 113 S.CL 377 (1992). This test poses several problems for subsidiaries.
[7] The U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified the application ofoperator liability to parent corporations. In United States
v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct 1876 (1998), the court clarified that a parent corporation cannot be held liable as an operator ofa
polluting facility indirectly through its ownership ofa subsidiary. To hold a parent corporation liable for a polluting
1999 TNT 130-26 - Special Reports (Copyright, 1999, Ta.~ Analysts)
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facility owned by a subsidiary, the parent itself"must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to ... the
leakage or disposal ofbazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations." Id. at 1887.
Control of a subsidiary, ifextensive enough. may give rise to indirect owner liability by piercing the corporate veil, but
not to direct operator liability.
[8] The "actual control" test, whilc easier to satisfy, may not bc ofmuch assistance to a planner. The test ofwhether
actual control exists will be made after an examination ofthe manner in which the affairs of the subsidiary were actually
conducted. However, for real property passively owned by a subsidiary which does not conduct active operations on the
property, it is now clear that operator liability cannot obtain.
[9] Although Bestfoods held that a parent corporation (or an individual corporate principal) may be directly liable as an
operator, owner liability under CERCLA is still essentially a traditional "piercing the corporate veil" exercisc. See
Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct 1876, 1184-85; Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. TJ. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). Cases
holding otherwise are overruled by the decision in Bestfoods. See, e.g., Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. International
Bldg. Prods. Inc., 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cm denied, 502 U.S. 1004 (1991); United States v. Kayser- Roth Corp., 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cm denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2nd Cir. 1996). Piercing
the veil is a function of the state law of the jurisdiction in which the entity is formed; different states look at different
factors and give those factors different respective weights. Factors that are commonly reviewed include: (1) under
capitalization; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment or overpayment ofdividends; (4) dominant
shareholders siphoning off corporate funds; and (5) personal guarantees by shareholders ofcorporate obligations. White
v. Winchester Land Development Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 26 (Ky. App. 1979). Generally speaking, the veil is pierced
where necessary to prevent the use of the corporation, and the benefit oflimited liability, to perpetrate a fraud and to
prevent unjust enrichment
[10] Courts generally will pierce the corporation veil if (1) the shareholders have disregarded corporate formalities (failed
to have appropriate meetings ofdirectors and shareholders or failed to keep proper records ofcorporate actions) or (2)
the corporation is undercapitalized. If an LLC is o~ted with sufficient attention to proper procedures and with
sufficient capital, there should be no owner liability imposed on members.
ll. TRADmONAL METHODS TO PROTECT CHARITABLE ASSETS
[II] To avoid owner liability under federal environmental liability statutes, charities have traditionally sought to place
title to real property into a liability remote entity. The use of a subsidiary corporation to hold real property has the
advantage ofprotecting the charity's assets by providing a layer of limited liability between the real property ownership
and related activities and the organization. This structure provides adequate protection if the appropriate corporate
formalities are observed and the subsidiary is not merely an alter ego for the charity. The entity of choice for charities is
generally a wholly-owned title-holding company exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(c)(2).
[12] A title-holding company must be a corporation (not a trust or association) which is "organized for the exclusive
purpose ofholding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the entire amount thereof,less
expenses, to an organization which itselfis exempt under [section 501]." /21 Section 501(c)(2). A section 501(c)(2)
corporation will not qualify for exemption if it carries on any activity other than holding title to property, conecting
income therefrom, and paying it to the parent Reg. section 1.50I(c)(2)-l (a). The corporation cannot distribute income to
more than one tax-exempt organization unless the organizations are related. 13/ While the exemption provision appears
straightforward, the use of exempt title-holding companies is not without a number of limitations and pitfalls.
[13] Title-holding companies generally cannot receive UBTI, although up to 10 percent UBTI can be incidentally derived
from real property holdings. Sections 501(c)(2) and (25)(G); see also Committee Reports on P.L. 103-66 (Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1993). Therefore, the assets held by such a company must be closely supervised to avoid excessive
UBTI and a possible revocation of the entity's exemption.
[14] Additionally, title-holding companies are descnbed in section 501(c)(2) and are therefore not described in section
170(e)(2). Contnbutions ofreal property to a title-holding company are not tax deductible by a donor for either income
or gift tax purposes. See sections 170 or 2522. To ensure the charitable deduction of the donor, title to such property must
first be contnbuted to the charity and thereafter contributed by the charity to the capital ofthe subsidiary title-holding
company. Transferring real property already owned by a charity to a subsidiary corporation is not as beneficial as initially
acquiring real property in the name of the subsidiary; the subsidiary will not necessarily protect a previous owner, who is
by that time in the chain of title, against environmental liabilities.
[15] A public charity would traditionally establish a supporting organization under section 509(a)(3) as an alternative
title-holding vehicle where the charity wants to avoid being in the chain of title to donated real property or where a title-
holding company would fail to qualify as exempt from federal income tax due to excessive UBTI. This alternative allows
deductlble contributions to be made directly to the liability remote entity. While direct contnbutions of real property to a
title-holding company or a supporting organization avoids the charity being in the chain of title to the property, the care
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and maintenance of the subsidiary adds an additional administrative burden on the charity. The charitable parent must
obtain recognition of the subsidiary's tax- exemption and annually file returns on its behalf. Additionally, a separate set of
books must be maintained for the subsidiary.
ill. TIlE "CHECK-1lIE-BOX" REGULATIONS
[16J Prior to January I, 1997, the entity classification regulations, typically referred to as the Kintner regulations, applied
a four-factor test for determining whether an entity was classified as a corporation or a partnership for federal tax
purposes. A business entity was classified as a corporation if it had more than two of the following corporate
characteristics: (I) limited liability; (2) centralization ofmanagement; (3) free transferability of interests and (4)
continuity of life. In response to a deluge of requests for classification rulings by taxpayers forming limited liability
companies, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated the "check-the-box" entity classification regulations. The
regulations classify state-law corporations as corporations for "federal tax purposes." Reg. section 301.7701-3(a).
Generally, pass-through entity (partnership) status is provided as a default classification for most domestic
unincorporated entities such as LLCs. Such entities have the option under the regulations to elect corporate classification.
The election to be taxed as a corporation is (and a protective election to be taxed as a pass-through can be) made by
"checking a box" on IRS Form 8832 and filing the form within 75 days offormation ofan unincorporated entity.
[17J One new twist in the check-the-box regulations is the creation ofa new classification - the tax nothing. Single-
member unincorporated entities such as single-member LLCs (SMLLCs) are, for tax purposes, disregarded unless such
entities elect to be taxed as corporations. A SMLLC owned by an individual is treated for federal tax purposes as a sole
proprietorship. A corporate owned SMLLC is treated as a branch or division of its corporate member. Despite being
disregarded for Federal tax purposes, under state law, a SMLLC insulates its member from the SMLLCs liabilities.
[18J Tax nothings are currently being tested in a variety of federal income tax arenas. The most notable and widely
publicized use ofa tax nothing is to achieve foreign tax savings. Surprisingly, the IRS is seeking to end this use ofthe tax
nothing. /4/ Similar techniques can be used to lower state income tax liabilities. Surprisingly, no rulings have been issued
in the tax-exempt, gift tax or estate tax areas.
IV. IRS VIEWS OF SMLLCs
[19J The IRS has issued a number ofprivate letter rulings addressing the use ofSMLLCs in section 1031 tax-deferred
exchanges and by S corporation shareholders. These rulings provide a guide to the Service's application of the new
"check-the-box" regulations to transfers of assets and to tax rules requiring specific characteristics of transferors,
transferees, or both.
[20J Under section 1031, a taxpayer who exchanges real property held for investment or for use in a trade or business for
real property ofa "like kind" lVhich is similarly held for investment or for use in a trade or business may defer
recognizing gain on the transfer ofhis or her property. A number ofcases and rulings have clarified that the taxpayer
who transfers the relinquished property must be the same taxpayer who acquires the replacement property in order to
obtain the tax-deferral. See, e.g., TAM 9818003.
[21J In PLRs 9807013 and 9751012, the IRS ruled that a taxpayer's transfer of replacement property from the seller in the
second leg ofa section 1031 exchange directly to the taxpayer's wholly owned SMLLC would not disqualify the taxpayer
from receiving nonrecognition treatment. The IRS concluded that because the SMLLC is disregarded as an entity .
separate from the taxpayer, the transfer of title to the replacement property directly to the SMLLC would be treated as if
the taxpayer had directly received the replacement property. Accordingly, the exchange qualified because the taxpayer
who transferred the relinqu~ed property was the same taxpayer who received the replacement property.
[22J InPLRs 9739014 and 9745017, the IRS addressed the use ofSMLLCs by S corporation shareholders. Shareholders
which otherwise qualified as S corporation shareholders under section 1361(b)( I) each transferred their shares ofstock to
SUI TCs. Although limited liability companies are not listed as qualifying shareholders of an S corpoadion in section
1361(b>, the IRS ruled that an otherwise qualifying shareholder ofan S corporation could hold stock through a SMLLC
without disqualifying the corporation's election. The owner ofa SMLLC is treated as owning the LLCs assets directly.
As a result, any shares held by a SMLLC are treated as being owned directly by the LLCs owner in determining whether
a corporation is eligtble to elect S status or continue its eligibility as an S corporation.
[23J In these rulings, the IRS looked through the SMLLCs to deem the single members as recipients ofproperty actually
transferred to the SMLLCs. Further, the IRS treated the single members as if they owned outright all property owned in
the name of the SMLLCs. This logic should apply equally to property transferred to a SMLLC wholly-owned by a
charity.
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V. STATE REVENUE AUTHORITIES' VIEWS OF SMLLCS
[24] State income taxes are generally based on either federal taxable income or federal adjusted gross income. Further,
most states specifically adopt the federal income tax law and the administrative and judicial interpretations of the federal
income tax law except to the extent required by differences between the state tax law and federal tax law. As a result,
most state revenue au1borities have taken the position that the check-the-box regulations are incoJporated by reference
into the state tax provisions. 151 Some revenue authorities have issued pronouncements that they interpret state income
tax laws to be in conformity with the federal 161 Fmally, a number ofstates have legislatively mandated conformity. m
[25] It would appear that, as a general rule, most states adopt the check-the-box rules. The most notable exception is
Texas which imposes a cOJporate income tax on LLCs regardless of their federal income tax treatment 181 In all but one
of the states adopting conformity, the ~heck-the-box regulations apply for income tax pwposes only. The notable
exception is Alabama which applies the check-the-box regulations for "purposes oftaxation." Ala. Code section 10-12-8
(b).
VI. USE OF TAX NOnnNGS TO ACHIEVE ASSET PROTECTION - FEDERAL INCOME
TAX ISSUES
[26] The check-the-box regulations present charities with twoaltemative methods to achieve liability protection in the
context ofcontributions of real property. Ifa SMLLC is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for all federal
tax purposes, then a charity should be able to structure a contribution ofreal property either as a COJltnbution of the single
membership interest in a SMLLC which holds the real property or as a contribution of the property, not to the charity, but
to a SMLLC wholly-owned by the charity.
[27] The first scenario would involve cooperation by the donor or, for testamentary devises, the executor/executrix ofthe
donor's estate (the transferor). The charity would request that the Transferor create a SMLLC under state law with the
transferor as the SMLLC member. The transferor would then contribute the SMLLC interest to the charity. Under the
second scenario, the charity would itselfcreate the SMLLC. The charity would direct the Transferor to transfer title to the
contributed real property directly to the SMLLC.
[28] It is not economically feasible for a charity to create a separate title-holding company or a supporting organization
for each parcel ofcontnbuted real property. However, the costs and burden ofcreating and maintaining a separate
SMLLC for each such parcel would be minimal. The charity could at minimal cost create a SMLLC for every
contnbution whether the SMLLC is formed by the transferor or the charity. Further, the SMLLC is not constrained by the
limitations ofeither section 50 I(c)(2) and regulations section 1.501(c)(2)-1 or section 501(c)(25). UBTI limitations
would be analyzed not by looking at the operations of the SMLLC but of the entire charity. Thus, oversight of the
SMLLC's operations would be minimal.
[29] Arguably, a SMLLC prcwides greater liability protection than a state law corporation. 191 The corporate formalities
required by LLCs are substantially less than those traditionally required for corporations under state law. Most states
allow for informal governance procedures and do not require that the owners ofLLCs hold regular meetings or record
minutes ofmeetings. Further, many states' LLC statutes provide that the failure to hold meetings ofmembers or managers
or the failure to observe the formalities~g to the calling or conduct ofmeetings will not affect the determination
ofwhether members have personal liability for the obligations ofthe LLC provided the articles oforganization or the
operating agreement of the LLC does not require the holding ofmeetings ofmembers or managers. 1101 Charities can
seek additional liability protection by organizing the SMLLC in a jurisdiction which is reluctant to pierce the veil.
[30] A number ofissues with respect to these alternative methods of receiving contnbutions ofreal property remain open.
In the first scenario, it is not c.lear whether the transferor would be treated as a contnbuting the property owned by the
SMLLC or the SMLLC itself to the charity. This distinction may be critical for qualifying certain contributions. For
example, a contnbution ofa remainder interest in a residence to a public charity qualifies for a charitable contnbution
deduction. Section 170(f)(3)(A). A contnbution ofa SMLLC which owns a remainder interest in a personal residence
should qualify as a deduet1ble contnbution ofeither a SMLLC or the remainder interest However, the tax planner should
be sate1hat the property interest owned by the SMLLC qualifies and cannot base his or her analysis merely on the
qualifying a contnbution ofthe membership interest This can be puticularly important where the LLC is formed under
the law ofa state which mandates that an interest in a SMLLC is personal property. 1111 This distinction also has
implications as to whether the property contributed is ordinary income or capital gain property under section 170(e). The
Service has not issued a ruling as to whether a transfer of a SMLLC interest is treated as the transfer of the underlying
assets for all federal tax pwposes.
[31] The second scenario raises a number of issues under the exempt organizations provisions. While the check-the-box
regulations specify that a SMLLC would be disregarded as separate from its owner for all Federal tax pwposes, the
operation of this rule in conjunction with section 508 is unclear. Section 508 requires that an organization file a notice
(Form 1023) with the Service in order to be treated as exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3). See reg.
section 1.508-1(a)(2). Further, the regulations under section 508 require that the governing instrument contain certain
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provisions. See reg. section 1.508-3. The SMLLC should not have to file an application for exemption if it is disregarded
and treated as part of its exempt owner. Nevertheless, the potential application ofsection 508 jeopardizes the donee's
charitable contribution deduction under sections 170 and 2522 and renders the use by a charity of the second scenario to
be unclear at best.
[32] The Service and donors will likely have concerns as to how donors can be ensured that a SMLLC is a qualified
donee. While a charity may provide donors with a copy ofits determination letter, the letter is silent as to the exemption
ofany SMLLC owned by the charity. It is unclear how the Service will address this problem. Cautious donors will likely
seek rulings on contnbutions ofhigh value real property to SMLLCs wholly-owned by charities. At the very least, such
donors will require that the charity provide the donor with a copy of the charity's determination letter and a Form 8832
filed by the charity with respect to the SMLLC and stamped by the Service, making a protective election for the SMLLC
to be disregarded from its owner.
VII. USE OF TAX NOTHINGS TO ACHIEVE ASSET PROTECTION - STATE AND
LOCAL TAX ISSUES
[33] A SMLLC is a useful tool for a charity to shield itself from environmental and premises liability while avoiding
federal tax problems. However, the effect ofa SMLLC for purposes ofstate and local taxes is much less clear. A number
of issues with respect to sales and use and property taxes remain unaddressed.
[34] States often provide constitutional or statutory sales and use tax exemptions for purchases by a charity of taxable
property or services where such property or services are purchased for use in a charitable activity. Unless a state adopts
the check-the-box regulations for all tax purposes, not just for income tax. a SMLLC should be considered an entity
wholly separate from its charitable owner for non-income taxes. Accordingly, all purchases ofconstruction materials or
other property purchased for use with respect to the property held by a SMLLC will be subject to state sales and use
taxes. The charitable member may be able to purchase these materials directly, thereafter contnbute them to the SMLLC
and thereby qualify for an exemption. II21
[35] Many states also provide constitutional and/or statutory exemptions from property taxes for charitable institutions.
These exemptions are often quite narrow, frequently requiring that the property be actively used for the purposes for
which the institution was established. Rental property or unimproved land often will not qualify. Nevertheless, a number
ofstates have broad charitable exemptions which would include such unrelated real property.
[36] As under state sales and use tax laws, SMLLCs are generally respected as separate entities for state property tax
purposes. A charitably owned SMLLC will be subject to ad valorem tax on its property unless the state where the
property is situated adopts the check-the-box regulations for all taxes. Nevertheless, strong policy arguments can be made
that an intervening SMLLC should not effect a charitable property tax exemption. The fact that the charitable member
wholly controls the SMLLC strongly suggest that the SMLLC should be disregarded for property tax purposes. Such
arguments would be buttresse'8 were the IRS to rule that SMLLCs are treated as subsumed under the 50 I(c)(3) status of
their owners. Alternatively, the SMLLC could be considered a nominee or a mere title holding entity for property tax
purposes. Making such arguments to a state revenue authority could, however, prove damaging in subsequent litigation
over reimbursement for an environmental cleanup or premises liability.
VIII. RULING
[37] It is clear that charities may be able to obtain substantial benefits by using SMLLCs in conjunction with
contnbutions ofreal property. A charity should establish a separate SMLLC for each parcel ofreal property it receives
and should direct that the contnbution be made directly to the SMLLC. The potential application of section 508,
however, continues to cause cOncern as to the viability of this technique to reduce liability exposure.
[38] In early December 1998, the authors submitted a request to the Service for a ruling as to whether a SMLLC owned
by an organization qualifying under section 501(c)(3) will be subsumed within its owner's exemption. Further, we
requested that the IRS address whether contnbutions to such a SmLC will be deductible by the donee.
[39] Subsequent to our request, the Service issued Rev. Proc. 99-4 (January 4, 1999). Section 8.11 now provides that the
Service will not issue a letter ruling with respect to a disregarded entity described in regs. sections 301.770I-I (a)(4), -2,
and -3 when the sole member of the entity is an exempt organization. We understand that the Service is still reviewing
these issues and has not as yet determined its position.
[40] We have similarly requested a ruling from the relevant state revenue authority as to whether, after the donation to
the SMLLC, the property will be exempt from state and local ad valorem taxation. The state revenue authority has
informally stated that it is considering issuing a favorable ruling. Assuming the property tax and federal income tax
hurdles can be overcome, SmLCs offer a viable method to reduce a charity's exposure to potential environmental and
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premises liabilities resulting from accepting donations of teal property.
fOOTNOTES
/1142 U.S.C. section 9607(a)(4) actually imposes liability on the operator ofa "facility." A "facility" is defmed as (A)
any building, stIUcture, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline, well, pit, pond. lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located. 42 U.S.C. section 960 I(9).
121 Note that any organization descn"bed in SOI(c), not just charities descn"bed in SOI(c)(3), can form a title-holding
company.
/3/ GCM 373S1 (1977). Title-holding companies (corporations and trusts) with up to 3S exempt shareholders (or
beneficiaries), whether or not such shareholders (or beneficiaries) are related, may obtain an exemption under section SOl
(c)(2S).
/4/ The IRS issued Notice 98-11, 1998-6 IRB 18, proposing to end this use of tax nothing and has issued proposed and
temporary regulations implementing the Notice. Most recently, IRS issued Notice 98-3S, 1998-27 IRB I, which stated
that the Service will withdraw the Notice 98-11 temporary and proposed regulations and re-propose them to be effective
February 1,2000.
lSI La. Rev. Stat sections 12:1368 and 47:287.701(A); Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-22-103(2.5).
/61 See Del. Reg. section 1.1900-1; Haw. Dept. ofRev., Tax Info. Release 97-4 (8/4/97); Mass. Dept. ofRev., Tech. Info
Release 97-8 (6/16/97); MinD. Dept. ofRevenue, Revenue Notice No. 97-03 (3/17/97); New York Dept. ofTax and Fin.,
TSB-A-96(l9)C (7124/96).
nt See Ky. Rev. Stat. 141.208; 1997 Ariz. S.B. 1298 (4/29/97); 1997 Cal.S.B. 1234; Fla. S.B. 704 (S/22/98).
/8/ Tex. Tax Code section 171.00I(a)(2). Florida and Pennsylvania had similar rules which were recently repealed. Fla.
S.B. 704 (S/22/98); 1997 Pa. H.B. 134 (S/6/97).
/9/ Certain LLC statutes expressly incorporate the law ofpiercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title
31, section (2) and (3). N.D. Cent. Code section 10-32-29(3), Wash. Rev. Code section 2S.IS.060. In other states, courts
are showing a willingness, even without such statutory direction, to apply this equitable doctrine to the still relatively
novelLLC.
110/ See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code section 17101(b), Haw. Rev. Stat. section 428-303(b), Ill. Rev. Stat. section 180/10-10(c),
S.C. Code Ann. section 33-44-303(b), Tenn. Code Ann. section 48-217-101(e) and Iowa Code section 490A.603.
/111 See, e.g., NJ. Rev. Stat section 42:28-43. Query whether a contribution ofan interest in a New Jersey SMLLC
which holds a qualified conservation easement should be treated as real property or personal property for federal income
tax purposes.
/12/ See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling P-1998-163, Kansas Dept. ofRevenue (9/17/98).
END OF FOOTNOTES
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I. OBJECTIVES.
A. Tax - Prevent attribution of the property, for tax
purposes, to any person before the person becomes
entitled to receive the property or to exercise a
general power, given to the person as a beneficiary, to
appoint it.
B. Protection - Avoid claims of creditors and spouses, to
extent consistent with other objectives.
C. Approach outright ownership if one or more beneficially
interested persons exclusively are to possess any
nonfiduciary powers and:
1. one or more independent trustees exclusively are to
possess any fiduciary powers (see II, Col. A,
below); or
2. one or more beneficially interested persons
exclusively are to possess any fiduciary powers (see
II, Col. B, below); or
3. one or more independent trustees exclusively are to
possess any fiduciary powers that beneficially
interested persons cannot possess, and either (i)
one or more independent trustees and one or more
beneficially interested persons are to share any
fiduciary powers that beneficially interested
persons can possess, or (ii) one or more
beneficially interested persons exclusively are to
possess any fiduciary powers that beneficially
interested persons can possess (see II, Col. C,
below) .
B-1
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II. DRAFTING TO APPROACH BENEFITS
(BUT NOT BURDENS) OF OUTRIGHT OWNERSHIP.
J
J
A
Objectives are A, B and C.l
(independent entity is
truatee)
l.a.i. ICaDdatory
diatributi_
of all income to one
peraon (.1)
or
B
Objectivea are A, B and C.2
(beneficially intereated
peraon i. tru.tee)
l.a.i. Same a. A.l.a.i.
or
C
Objective. are A, B and C.l
(beneficially intere.ted
person and independent entity
are tru.tees)
l.a.i. Same a. A.l.a.i.
or
J
J
J
ii. XDcome per diacretion
of independent
truatee, to one
peraon or apray
(ta t and 6)
b. principal per diacretion
of independent truatee,
to one peraon or apray
(lis 5 and 7)
c. Nonfiduciary 5 + 5 power
(U8)
ii. XDcome per
a.certainable
.tandard, to_e
per._, no .pray
(ta)
b. Principal per a.certain-
able .tandard, to _e
per.on, no .pray
(19)
c. Same a. A.l.c.
ii. COIIIbinati_ of
A.l.a.ii. (with one
di.tributee) and
B.l.a.ii. (•• It and
16)
b. COIIIbination of A.l.b.
(with one di.tributee)
and B.l.b. (lis 15 and
17)
c. Same a. A.l.c.
J
]
J
or
2.a. Nonfiduciary power
to withdraw unitruat
percentage
(.U)
b. Additional paymenta
to unitruat recipient
per diacretion
of independent
truatee (aecond
paragraph of .to)
J
J
J
j
J
]
J
Same a. 1..3.
Same aa A.t.
or
b. COIIIbinati_ of A.2.b.
and B.2.b. (.econd
paragraph of 't2)
2.a. Same a. A.2.a.
t.
3.Same as 1..3.
Same a. A.t.
or
b. Additional payments
to unitru.t recipient
per a.certainable
atandard (.econd
paragraph of 'tl)
2.a. Same as A.2.a.
t.
3.Nonfiduciary, inter
vivoa, nongeneral power
of appointment
(U9)
Nonfiduciary ,
teatamentary,
nongeneral power
of appointment
('20)
t.
3.
J
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PART TWO: BEFORE THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULi
A. No one possesses any discretion.
1. Mandatory distribution of income.
The trustee must pay all ordinary income currently
to (a) one person or (b) in fixed shares to more
than one person.
a. Examples:
i. Single distributee (Form #1) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay the
net income to my wife quarter-annually.
ii. Plural distributees (Form #2) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay the
net income quarter-annually to my children,
in equal shares.
b. Taxation of ordinary income.
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
r
r
All of the trust's ordinary income, to the
extent of distributable net income, is
includable in the gross income for income tax
purposes of the (a) distributee or (b) distribu-
tees proportionately. Code §§651 and 652.
2. No distribution permitted of principal.
a. Example (Form #3) :
(B) Principal. The Trustee shall not
distribute principal.
b. Taxation of corpus income.
Generally, none of the trust's corpus income is
deductible from the trust's gross income for
income tax purposes. Code §§641, 643(a) (3),
651, 652, 661 and 662.
B. Discretionary distrinutions: independent trustee
possesses discretion.
1. Examples:
a. Single permissible distributee.
i. Income (Form #4) .
B-3
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to my
wife so much or all, if any, of the net income
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for
any purpose or reason whatsoever, inclUding the
termination of the trust. The Trustee shall
accumulate any net income that it does not pay.
ii. principal (Form #S) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the principal
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for
any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust.
b. Plural permissible distributees.
i. Income (Form #6) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to any
one or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the net income as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time
to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose
or reason whatsoever, including the termination
of the trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
ii. Principal (Form #7) .
(2) PrinciDal. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the principal as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources other-
wise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
2. Taxation of ordinary income.
a. A permissible distributee includes in his or her
gross income for income tax purposes only such
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ordinary income of the trust as he or she
receives. Code §§661 and 662.
b. The balance of the ordinary income is not de-
ductible from the trust's gross income. Code
§§661 and 662.
3. Taxation of corpus income.
Generally, none of the trust's corpus income is
deductible from the trust's gross income for income
tax purposes. Code §§641, 643(a) (3), 661 and 662.
4. Drafting.
a. According to the forms, the trustee's discretion
is unlimited.
i. The trust does not contain any standard,
ascertainable or otherwise.
r
I
r
r
r
f
r
r
b.
ii. The trust does not contain any specifi-
cation of purpose.
Any limiting standard or specification of
purpose tends to impede flexibility.
i. The trustee can make such distributions as
it believes the grantor, if serving as
trustee, would make, including distribution
of the entire trust estate and termination
of the trust.
ii. The trustee can include (or not include)
the trust estate in one or more bene-
ficiaries' gross estates, to such extent as
the trustee believes advisable, taking into
account (i) the portion of the trust that
is exempt from generation-skipping tax and
(ii) the transfer tax bases of the per-
missible distributees.
r
r
r
r
iii. The trustee might be able to avoid mUltiple
incidence of the generation-skipping tax by
means of taxable distributions before the
occurrence of a taxable termination.
C. Discretionary distributions: nonindependent trustee
possesses discretion.
1. Examples:
a. Single permissible distributee.
B-5
i. Income (Form #8) .
(l) Income. The Trustee shall pay to my
wife so much or all, if any, of the net income
as the Trustee determines to be advisable from
time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for her health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
ii. Principal (Form #9) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the principal
as the Trustee determines to be advisable from
time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for her health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
b. Plural permissible distributees.
i. Income (Form #10) .
(l) Income. The Trustee shall pay to any
one or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the net income as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for their respective health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
ii. Principal (Form #11) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more 'of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the principal as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for their respective health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
2. Tax problems.
a. Generally, a person is deemed, for income tax
purposes and transfer tax purposes, to own all
property that he or she can pay to himself or
herself, even if the power holder does not exer-
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cise the power. Code §§678(a) (1), 2041(a) (2)
and 2514 (b) .
b. Further, even a nongenera1 power of appointment
can cause the power holder to make a taxable
gift. If the exercise of a nongenera1 power has
the effect of transferring the beneficial .
interest of the power holder, the exercise might
produce a taxable transfer of any enjoyment that
the power holder forgoes. Rev. Ru1. 79-327,
1979-2 C.B. 342; Regester v. commissioner, 83
T.C. 1 (1984); contra James C. Self, Jr. v.
united States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (ct. C1. 1956),
56-2 USTC '11,613; cf. reg. §25.2511-1(g) (2).
c. A person who can pay property to another, in
discharge of his or her legal obligation, is
regarded to that extent as being able to pay the
property to himself or herself and thus as
having a general power of appointment.
3. Solutions.
a. Preventing (i) ownership (for tax purposes) due
to powers to pay to self and (ii) gifts due to
powers to pay to others: ascertainable
standards.
Use of an ascertainable standard to limit the
power holder's power is a potential solution to
the first and second problems.
i. If the ascertainable standard is described
in Code sections 2041(b) (1) (A) and
2514(c) (1), the power holder's power to pay
to himself or herself is not a general
power of appointment.
ii. The power holder arguably will not be
treated as owning the sUbject income for
income tax purposes.
(a) A judicial gloss supplies the standard
for purposes of Code section 678(a) (1).
(b) See Casner, 3A ESTATE PLANNING §12.9.2
(Lit~le, Brown, Fifth Edition, 1986);
Agnes R. May, 8 T.C. 860 (1947); Ruth
w. Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951);
Townsend v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1380
(1945); United States v. DeBonchamps, ,
278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960), 60-1 USTC
'9430 (involving a legal life estate
but decided under Code §678(a) (1) and
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involving a loosely-written standard
including even the life tenant's
"comfort"); United States v. Smither,
205 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953), 53-2 USTC
'9482 (also involving a standard
including the beneficiaries'
"comfort"); and Funk v. Commissioner,
195 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950), 50-2 USTC
'9507 (involving paYment for the
beneficiaries' "needs." "Thus, its use
[i.e., the use of the word 'needs']
confined the trustee to limits objec-
tively determinable, and any conduct on
[the trustee's] part beyond those
limits would be unreasonable and a
breach of trust .... " 50-2 USTC
'9507). But see Falk v. Commissioner,
189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1951), 51-1 USTC
'9337 cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861, 72 S.
Ct. 89. Cf. Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146
F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945), 45-1 USTC
'9134, cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871, 65
S. Ct. 1017.
iii. If the power is a trustee's fiduciary power
that is limited by an ascertainable stan-
dard described in regulations section
25.2511-1(g) (2), the power holder's exer-
cise of the power to pay to other than
himself or herself property in which he or
she has a beneficial interest but no
general power of appointment is not a
taxable gift.
(a) This ascertainable standard relates to
one or more persons other than the
power holder.
(b) According to regulations section
25.2511-1(g) (2),
"If a trustee has a beneficial interest
in trust property, a transfer of the
property by the trustee is not a tax-
able transfer if it is made pursuant to
a fiduciary power the exercise or
nonexercise of which is limited by a
reasonably fixed or ascertainable
standard which is set forth in the
trust instrument . . . " [emphasis
supplied] .
iv. While some of the important drafting issues
relate to how much discretion the power
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holder may have consistently with the
exception, others relate to the advis-
ability, for nontax reasons, of using
ascertainable standards in particular
configurations.
(a) First, the standard in the forms
requires the trustee to consider the
resources otherwise available to the
distributee.
(i) Required consideration of other
resources tends to limit the power
holder's ability to distribute
trust property.
(A) It tends to require the
distributee to exhaust other
resources, including any
source of support from other
than the trust.
(B) Therefore, it also tends to
cause any distribution that is
made from the trust not to
discharge another person's
obligation to the distributee.
(ii) Conversely, required noncon-
sideration of other resources
tends to limit the power holder's
ability not to distribute trust
property. The concerns that this
formulation presents are whether
it limits sUfficiently the power
holder's access to the property
and whether a paYment can
discharge a legal obligation of
someone who is not named as a
beneficiary.
(iii) The power holder has the greatest
discretion if he or she may, but
need not, consider the resources
otherwise available to the dis-
tributee. This formulation
. broadens the realm within which
the power holder may, but need
not, distribute the property. The
additional concern that it
presents is whether it complies
with those regUlations sections
(i.e., 20.2041-1(c) (2) and
25.2511-1(g) (2» that require the
B-9
standard to limit both the exer-
cise and the nonexercise of the
power.
(iv) Consideration of the distributee's·
other resources should be optional
for at least some tax purposes.
(A) Whether the power holder must
take into account the dis-
tributee's other "income" is
"immaterial" for purposes of
determining whether the
ascertainable standard
exception of Code sections
2041 (b) (1) (A) and 2514 (c) (1)
is applicable. Reg. §20.2041-
l(c) (2).
(B) However, the regulation is
unclear whether "income" is
used advisedly or whether it
crudely refers to "resources"
generally.
(v) This writer recommends the con-
servative approach: do require the
power holder to take into account
resources otherwise available to
the distributee.
(b) Second, the mandatory "shall" (rather
than the permissive "may") requires the
trustee to exercise the power if the
ascertainable event occurs.
(i) The issue is whether an ascer-
tainable standard is sufficient if
it limits the extent to which the
power is exercisable but does not
control whether and when the power
holder must exercise the power.
See generally Estate of Carpenter
v. United States, 80-1 USTC
'13,339 at 84,323 (W.D. wis.
1980) .
(ii) Is the standard sufficient if it
places a "ceiling" upon the
exercise of the power but does not
place a "floor" under it?
(iii) The answer might depend upon the
nature of the power and upon the
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particular tax risk that it
presents.
(A) Certain sections of the
Internal Revenue Code appear
to describe the amount of
power that a person might
possess to benefit himself or
herself without owning the
property for estate, gift or
income tax purposes. They
suggest that the standard need
limit only the extent to which
the power is exercisable. See
Code §§ 2041 (b) (1) (A) ,
2514 (c) (1) and 678 (a) (1); Cf.
reg. §20 . 2041- 1 (c) (2) .
(B) Other statutory and regulatory
provisions seem concerned with
control or discretion, per se.
They suggest that the standard
must limit the power's
exercise and its nonexercise.
See Code §§674(b) (5) (A) and
674 (d); reg. §25 . 2511- 1 (g) (2) i
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74
(2d Cir. 1947), 47-1 USTC
'10,551; Estate of Budlong, 7
T.C. 756 (1946); and Estate of
Carpenter v. United States,
80-1 USTC '13,339 (W.D. Wis.
1980) .
(iv) Again, this writer recommends the
conservative approach: draft the
standard explicitly to limit both
(i) the right to exercise the
power and (ii) the right not to
exercise it.
(A) According to this approach,
the right not to exercise the
power is discretionary only to
a limited extent and a person
who the power can benefit can
force its exercise. Cf.
Security - Peoples Trust Co.
v. United States, 238 F.Supp.
40 (W.D.Pa. 1965), 65-1 USTC
112,294.
(B) Further, this approach might
serve the collateral function
B-ll
of assuring the trust's
creator and the beneficiaries
that the trust will discharge
desired purposes.
(c) Third, an ascertainable standard does
not exist according to regulations
section 25.2511-1(g) (2) if the
trustee's determination regarding
exercise or nonexercise is
"conclusive."
(d) Fourth, if a power is exercisable in
favor of more than one person, an
ascertainable standard can make the
power unwieldy.
(i) A mandate to use the power might
force the power holder unsatis-
factorily to reconcile the
competing interests of the various
beneficiaries.
(A) How should the power holder
reconcile present and future
needs?
(B) How should the power holder
reconcile similar needs of
persons in different
generations?
(ii) The problem is particularly acute
when the power is exercisable in
favor of the power holder.
(A) The power holder has an
inherent conflict.
(B) The conflict might prevent the
power holder from using the
trust for the purposes for
which the grantor intended it.
(e) Fifth, unless each permissible
distributee has limited resources and
is a. person, for example an orphaned
child or an unmarried adult, to whom no
one owes any obligation of support,
this writer generally does not
recommend a trust that requires each
distribution to comply with an
ascertainable standard.
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(i) Required consideration of
resources otherwise available
tends to preclude distributions
and, if each distribution is
sUbject to the standard, impede
the usefulness of the trust.
(ii) Rather, this writer generally
suggests that a useful format is
(1) a mandate to pay income (see
Form #1) coupled with an ascer-
tainable standard with respect to
principal (see Form #9), or (2) a
mandate to pay (see Form #37), or
a right to withdraw (~ Form
#41), a unitrust percentage
coupled with an ascertainable
standard with respect to the
balance of the trust.
Preventing general powers of appointment due to
power holder's powers to pay to other than self.
i. Examples:
(a) Removal of discretion (Form #12) .
(1) No trustee shall possess, or
participate in the exercise of, any
power that, but for this paragraph (1),
the trustee would have to make any
determination with respect to any
payment which would discharge any legal
obligation of the trustee personally.
(b) Prohibition of payment (Form #13) .
~he Trustee shall not make (or have any
power to make) any payment which would
discharge any legal obligation of any
person to whom the Trustee can not make
payment directly.
ii. Purpose.
(a) The ability of a trustee to use trust
prop~rty to discharge his or her legal
obligation seems very unlikely in the
context in which it often is asserted
to exist. Consider a trust in which
(i) the power holder is not named or
described as a permissible distributee
and (ii) the governing instrument does
not explicitly permit paYments for the
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support of any person who is named or
described as a permissible distributee.
(i) In this context, the power
holder's distribution of trust
property in discharge of a
personal obligation of the power
holder seems to be solely for the
benefit of someone who is not
named or described as a
beneficiary.
(ii) Therefore, the distribution
appears to violate the trust.
(b) However, consider a configuration in
which the problem might exist.
(i) Assume that a testator creates a
trust that requires the trustee
currently to pay income to the
grantor's child for life and
permits the trustee to distribute
principal to the child for the
child's health, education and
support, remainder to the child's
descendants, per stirpes, who
survive the child. Assume addi-
tionally that the grantor creates
the trust upon the grantor's
death, the grantor's spouse (the
child's surviving parent) is the
trustee and the child is a minor
when the grantor dies.
(ii) The person serving as trustee is
empowered only to make distribu-
tion~ to other than himself or
herself.
(iii) The ascertainable standard relates
to other than the power holder and
permits distributions for the
named or described distributee's
support.
(iv). The issue is whether a person who
has a legal obligation to support
the named or described distributee
can exercise the power to dis-
charge his or her personal
obligation.
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(v) This result seems impossible if
the ascertainable standard
includes a requirement that the
trustee consider resources
otherwise available to the named
or described distributee.
iii. Drafting.
(a) The draftsperson should assume that an
ascertainable standard can not remove a
power from the category of a general
power of appointment unless the
standard relates to the health,
education or support of the power
holder.
(i) The only ascertainable standards
that, according to applicable
statute, cause a power not to be a
general power are those that
relate to the health, education or
support of the power holder. Code
§§2041 (b) (1) (A) and 2514 (c) (1) .
(ii) The Internal Revenue Service seems
to support this assumption. Rev.
Rul. 79-154, 1979-1 C.B. 301; cf.
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d
Cir. 1947), 47-1 USTC '10,551;
Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756
(1946); and Sowell v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1564 (lOth
Cir. 1983), 83-1 USTC '13,526.
(b) What strategy, then, is appropriate?
(i) The draftsperson absolutely can
prohibit any distribution that
would discharge any legal obliga-
tion owed by a person who is not
named or described as a per-
missible distributee. See Form
#13. Cf. Upjohn v. United States,
72-2 USTC '12,888 (W.D. Mich.
1972) .
(ii) However, if the drafting objective
is only to prevent a general power
of appointment, the appropriate
focus appears to be upon the
particular power relative to the
power holder, rather than upon the
power, per se.
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(iii) Therefore, if the drafting
objective is only to prevent a
general power of appointment, an
absolute prohibition of any
distribution that purportedly can
discharge a legal obligation of a
person who is not named or
described as a permissible
distributee of the distribution
seems unnecessary.
D. Discretionary distributions: combination of (i)
nonindependent trustee possesses some discretion and
(ii) independent trustee possesses other discretion.
1. Examples:
a. Single permissible distributee.
i. Income (Form #14) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to my
wife so much or all, if any, of the net income
as the Trustee determines to be advisable from
time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for her health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the net income as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any net
income that it does not pay.
ii. Principal (Form #15).
(2) principal. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the principal
as the Trustee determines to be advisable from
time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for her health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the principal as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
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whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
b. Plural permissible distributees.
i. Income (Form #16) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to any
one or more of my wife and my descendants, with-
out any duty of equalization, so much or all, if
any, of the net income as the Trustee determines
to be advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide for
their respective health, education and support
in the manner of living to which accustomed.
Additionally, the Trustee shall pay to anyone
or more of my wife and my descendants, without
any duty of equalization, so much or all, if
any, of any balance of the net income as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time
to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose
or reason whatsoever, including the termination
of the trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
ii. Principal (Form #17) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the principal as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for their respective health, education
and support in the manner of living to which ac-
customed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
to anyone or more of my wife and my descen-
dants, without any duty of equalization, so much
or all, if any, of any balance of the principal
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for
any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust.
2. Purpose.
This approach is a combination of the approach
described at B, supra, and the approach described at
C, supra. It can allow greater flexibility than
either of the constituent approaches alone.
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3. Drafting.
This hybrid is usable with (i) an independent
trustee always serving, (ii) an independent trustee
serving only at the instance of a nonindependent
trustee or any person to whom the governing
instrument empowers the independent trustee, if
serving, to distribute trust property or (iii) an
independent trustee serving only at the instance of
any independent person.
This writer often uses "two tiers" of dispositive
powers, with some but not all of the powers granted
solely to an independent trustee. He particularly
uses a variation in which an independent trustee is
not required always to serve and is only a per-
missible or mandatory addition, or a required
successor, to one or more beneficially interested
trustees. See generally united States v. Byrum, 72-
2 USTC '12,859 (Sup. Ct. 1972); united States v.
Winchell, 61-1 USTC '12,015 (9th Cir. 1961); and
Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993).
If an interest holder can add an independent trustee
and the addition shifts an interest so that the
interest holder relinquishes beneficial enjoYment,
arguably a gift lurks somewhere. Consider, for
example, what happens if a holder of a mandatory
income interest can appoint an independent trustee
with the effect of transforming the mandatory income
interest into a discretionary interest. Due to loss
of dominion and control, a gift might occur upon a
mere shift of the interest due to the appointment.
If a gift does not occur upon the shift of the
interest as a result of the appointment, a gift (or
a transfer for estate tax purposes) probably does
occur if and when, because of the holder's
appointment of an independent trustee, the person
who previously had the mandatory income interest
receives less than all of the income.
Consider an embellishment to the system. The
embellishment would permit a beneficially interested
trustee to possess certain powers exclusively,
notwithstanding the discretionary or mandatory
addition of an independent trustee. Absent the
embellishment, the addition of an independent
trustee, discretionary or mandatory, would mean that
the beneficially interested trustee would share all
powers with the new, independent trustee, although,
of course, the independent trustee could (but need
not) delegate back to the beneficially interested
trustee all powers except those that would be
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sensitive in the hands of the beneficially
interested trustee.
Set forth below are some configurations in which
this writer grants one set of powers to a
beneficially-interested trustee and another to an
independent trustee, or grants dispositive powers
only to an independent trustee, and contemplates
that an independent trustee will, or will not, serve
at all times.
a. single distributee.
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i. First configuration.
(a) Facts.
An independent trustee has wide-open
discretion to pay income to one person,
or to accumulate it, and to pay princi-
pal to the same person or not pay it.
(b) Examples:
(i) Irrevocable insurance trust where
insured has only one descendant.
(ii) Wide-open discretionary trust for
one distributee.
(iii) 2S03(c) trust.
(iv) 2642(c) trust.
(v) Crummey trust for non-skip person.
(c) Observations.
(i) Only the independent trustee can
make a distribution.
(ii) No independent trustee is required
to serve.
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(iii) According to one alternative,
either member of the group that
consists of a beneficially
interested trustee and the person
to whom the independent trustee,
if serving, could make any
distribution can direct the
addition of an independent
trustee.
(iv) According to another alternative,
any independent person can direct
the addition of an independent
trustee.
(d) Comment.
A common denominator among the examples
is that the trust might have little
property, and, therefore, no need for
distributions, for an extended period.
Although this configuration does not
involve the grant of any powers to any
beneficially interested trustee, it
presents some of the same issues.
ii. Second configuration.
(a) Facts.
The governing instrument mandates the
trustee to pay income currently to one
person, permits a beneficially inter-
ested trustee to distribute principal
to the income beneficiary according to
an ascertainable standard and accords
an independent trustee wide-open
discretion to 'distribute principal to
the income beneficiary.
(b) Examples:
(i) QTIP, right-to-withdraw and
general-testamentary-power-of-
appointment marital trusts.
(ii). Trust for one person for life,
including credit shelter trust for
sole benefit of settlor's spouse.
(iii) Trust for one person until the
person attains stated age(s).
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(c) Observations.
(i) No independent trustee is required
to serve.
(ii) According to one alternative,
either member of the group that
consists of a beneficially inter-
ested trustee and the person to
whom the independent trustee, if
serving, could make any distribu-
tion can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.
(iii) According to another alternative,
any independent person can direct
the addition of an independent
trustee.
iii. Third configuration.
(a) Facts.
Same as ~~, except, instead of a
mandate concerning income, a bene-
ficially interested trustee either (i)
can pay income to himself or herself,
according to an ascertainable standard,
or (ii) can pay income to one person
other than himself or herself,
according to an ascertainable standard,
and in each case an independent trustee
has wide-open discretion to pay income
to the person who is the permissible
recipient of income.
(b) Examples:
(i) Trust for one person for life,
including credit shelter trust for
sole benefit of settlor's spouse.
(ii) Trust for one person until the
person attains stated age(s) .
r
r
Ir
Ir! <
iv. Fourth configuration.
Also included in this classification is the
ability of an independent trustee to grant
a general testamentary power of appointment
to the person described as the distributee
in i, ii and iii, above, or described as
the primary beneficiary in b.iii, below.
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b. Multiple distributees.
i. Fifth configuration.
(a) Facts.
An independent trustee has wide-open
discretion to pay income to anyone or
more of a number of persons, or to
accumulate it, and to pay principal to
any or more of the same persons or not
to pay it.
(b) Examples:
(i) Irrevocable insurance trust for
mUltiple descendants of grantor.
(ii) Wide-open discretionary trust for
mUltiple distributees.
(c) Observations.
(i) Only the independent trustee can
make a distribution.
(ii) No independent trustee is required
to serve.
(iii) According to one alternative, any
member of the group that consists
of a beneficially interested
trustee and each person to whom
the independent trustee, if
serving, could make any distribu-
tion can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.
(iv) According to another alternative,
any independent person can direct
the addition of an independent
trustee.
(d) Comment.
A common denominator among the examples
is ~hat the trust might have little
property, and, therefore, no need for
distributions, for an extended period.
Although this configuration does not
involve the grant of any powers to any
beneficially interested trustee, it
presents some of the same issues.
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ii. sixth configuration.
(a) Facts.
During the incapacity of the grantor of
a revocable trust, a beneficially
interested trustee can pay income and
principal according to an ascertainable
standard to the grantor and to any
person dependent upon the grantor, and
an independent trustee, acting as an
attorney in fact, can make gifts and
qualified transfers on behalf of the
grantor.
(b) Observations.
(i) No independent trustee is required
to serve.
(ii) According to one alternative, any
member of the group that consists
of a beneficially interested
trustee and each person to whom
the independent trustee, if
serving, could make any distribu-
tion can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.
(iii) According to another alternative,
any independent person can direct
the addition of an independent
trustee.
iii. Seventh configuration.
(a) Facts.
Same as i and ii, above, exce~t when
the trust must terminate with~n a
relatively short period of time (for
example, a trust that is created for
the ~eriod of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuit~es and must terminate within
twenty-one years), the independent
trustee has wide-open discretion to
distribute principal to anyone or more
among the primary beneficiary and the
descendants of the primary beneficiary.
(b) Observations.
(i) Only the inde~endent trustee can
distribute pr~ncipal to descen-
dants of the primary beneficiary.
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c.
(ii) No independent trustee is required
to serve.
(iii) According to one alternative, any
member of the grou~ that consists
of a beneficially ~nterested
trustee and each person to whom
the independent trustee, if
serving, could make any distribu-
tion can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.
Nevertheless, if an independent
trustee, if added, could
distribute any of the trust estate
to other than the p~imary
beneficiary, with the effect of
being able to reduce the amount
that the primary beneficiary
otherwise would have a right to
receive, the primary beneficiary
should not exercise the power to
add an independent trustee. See
"Eighth configuration" at c.,
below.
(iv) According to another alternative,
any independent person can direct
the addition of an independent
trustee.
Configuration in which the system is not used.
Eighth configuration.
i. Facts.
The instrument mandates the trustee to ~ay
income currently to one person but prov~des
that, if an independent trustee is serving,
the independent trustee, instead, has wide-
open discretion to pay income and principal
to one or more members of the group that
consists of the person who previously was
the mandatory beneficiary of income and
that person's descendants.
ii. Observations.
(a) No independent trustee is required to
serve.
(b) An independent trustee serves either as
a successor to, or solely at the
instance of, the mandatory beneficiary
of income.
iii. Comment.
A ~roblem inheres in the coupling of (i) a
sh~ft from a mandatory income interest to a
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discretionary interest with (ii) the
mechanics, described in the preceding
sentence, for initiation of service of an
independent trustee.
Discretionary distributions: noninde~endent person who
is not a fiduciary possesses discret10n (powers of
appointment) .
1. During power holder's life.
a. Five-and-five power.
The "five-and-five" exception to the general
rule concerning the existence of a general power
of appointment permits a person to have
extremely flexible access to property for his or
her benefit without the normal tax cost.
i. Example:
Right to withdraw Greater of $5000 and 5%
(Form #18) .
Additionally,
a [after the Marital Trust entirely has been
distributed or ex~ended,]
if my wife is liv1ng immediately before the
end of a calendar year, the Trustee shall
pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the principal, not to exceed in value the
greater of five thousand dollars and five
percent of the value of the principal as of
the end of the year, as my wife last
directs in writing before the end of the
year.
ii. Transfer Tax Implications and Planning.
The transfer tax implications are discussed
in detail at Part Three,IV,H.4. Suffice it
to say here that a lapse during any
calendar year during the life of the power
holder is treated as a transfer for estate
tax purposes
"only to the extent that the property,
which could have been appointed by
exercise of such lapsed powers, ex-
ceeded in value, at the time of such
lapse, the greater of the following
amounts:
"(A) $5,000, or
"(B) 5 percent of the aggregate
value, at the time of such lapse, of
the assets out of which, or the pro-
ceeds of which, the exercise of the
B-~
lapsed powers could have been
satisfied." Code §2041(b) (2).
The gift tax rules are similar. See
Code §2514 (e) .
iii. Income Tax Implications and Planning.
The most important of the income tax
implications is that the right to withdraw
causes the power holder to own both (i) all
ordinary income that is sUbject to the
power and (ii) all income, ordinary and
other, that is attributable to the
principal. that is subject to the power.
Code §678(a) (1); see generally Code §671
and reg. §1.671-3. The income tax
implications are discussed in detail at
Part Three,IV,H.5.
b. Nongeneral power of appointment.
i. Example {Form #19} :
Additionally, the Trustee shall pay so much
or all, if any, of the principal to such
one or more
a [members of a group consisting exclusively
of my descendants)
b [appointees, other than my wife and the
estate, creditors and creditors of the
estate of my wife,)
in such amounts and portions and subject to
such trusts, terms and conditions as my
wife directs in writing at any time or from
time to time.
c [Section 4.06. Certain Powers of
Appointment. Anything to the contrary
notwithstanding, no power of appointment
granted in this instrument with limitation
of permissible appointees shall be exer-
cisable, directly or indirectly, (a) to
discharge any legal obligation of the
person given the power or (b) in favor of
(i) the person given the power or the
creditors or the estate or the creditors of
the estate of the person given the power or
(ii) any deceased individual or terminated
trust. The preceding sentence shall not
apply to any power given a trustee or to
any power to withdraw.)
ii. Effect of possession and exercise.
The exercise of the power by a power holder
who has a beneficial interest in the
SUbject property is deemed to be a gift to
such extent as the exercise transfers the
power holder's beneficial interest. Rev.
B - 26
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Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342; Regester v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 1 (1984); contra
James C. Self, Jr. v. united States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1956), 56-2 USTC
111,613.
(a) Since the power is not a trustee's
fiduciary power, an ascertainable
standard is not a solution. Reg.
§25 .2511-1 (g) (2) .
(b) The mere possession of this'power does
not include the property in the
transfer tax base of the power holder.
iii. Preventing general power of appointment due
to power holder's powers to pay to other
than self.
The abilitr of a person to exercise this
power to d1scharge his or her legal obliga-
tion seems very unlikely. The power
permits payments only to other than the
power holder. Any parrnent that would
discharge a legal obl1gation of the power
holder would seem to be solely for the
benefit of, and, therefore, a payment to,
someone to whom the power does not permit
distributions and, therefore, would appear
to violate the trust. Assuming that the
issue otherwise would exist, use of vari-
able c in Form #19 should avoid it.
2. After power holder's death: nongeneral power of
appointment exercisable by will.
a. Example (Form #20) :
(B) Disposition on Death of Survivor.
Upon the death of my wife, if my wife survives
me, the Trustee shall distribute the trust
estate of the Remainder Trust to such one or
more
a [mem~bers of a group consisting exclusively of my
descendants]
b [appointees, other than the estate, creditors
and creditors of the estate of my wife,]
in such amounts and portions and subject to such
trusts, terms and conditions as my wife may
appoint by Will specifically referring to this
power. Upon the death of the survivor of my
wife and me, to such extent, if any, as the
trust estate of the Remainder Trust is not
effectively appointed, the Trustee shall
distribute the trust estate of the Remainder
Trust to the Trustee of the Family Trust under
Section 3.04.
B -27
b. Estate and gift tax effect.
Neither the possession nor the exercise of the
testamentary power generates any liability for
gift tax or estate tax.
PART THREE: CHANGES DUE TO PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
I. The Prudent Investor Rule.
The prudent investor rule (the "Rule"), Restatement
(Third) of Trusts §§227 et seq. (1992), is superseding
the prudent person rule, Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§§227 et seq. (1959), as the law of investment of
private trusts. Approximately twenty-seven states have
adopted the version (or the substance of substantial
portions of the version) of the prudent investor rule
set forth in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
promulgated in 1994 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on uniform State laws. Nine other states
and the District of Columbia have adopted other statutes
that require a total portfolio approach to investment
management.
A. Prudent Person Rule.
The prudent person rule served for more than 150
years as the foundation statement of the investment
duties of trustees of private trusts.
1. The prudent person rule originally appeared in
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 pick. (26 Mass.) 446
(1830). According to Harvard College, trustees
should
"observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard
to speCUlation, but in regard to
the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be
invested." Id. at 461.
2. The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, pUblished
by the American Law Institute in 1935, included
the prudent person rule.
3. The Restatement Second of the Law of Trusts,
~ublished by the American Law Institute in 1959,
~ncluded the following statement of the prudent
person rule:
"§227. Investments Which a Trustee
Can Properly Make
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In making investments of trust
funds the trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary
(a) in the absence of provisions
in the terms of the trust or of a
statute otherwise providing, to make
such investments and only such
investments as a prudent man would make
of his own property having in view the
preservation of the estate and the
amount and regularity of the income to
be derived;
(b) in the absence of provisions
in the terms of the trust, to conform
to the statutes, if any, governing
investments by trustees;
(c) to conform to the terms of
the trust, except as stated in §§165-
168."
B. Prudent Investor Rule.
The American Law Institute re~laced the prudent
person rule with the ~rudent 1nvestor rule in May of
1990. The Institute 1n 1992 published a complete
revision, entitled "Restatement of the Law Third
(Trusts), Prudent Investor Rule," of the part of
Restatement Second that addressed the same sUbject.
Unless otherwise noted, all references in this
outline to the prudent investor rule, and to the
Rule, are to the version that appears in Restatement
Third.
1. According to the Restatement Third,
"§227. General Standard of Prudent
Investment
The trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiaries to invest and mana~e the
funds of the trust as a prudent 1nvestor
would, in light of the purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust.
(a) This standard requires the
exercise of reasonable care, skill, and
caution, and is to be applied to
investments not in isolation but in the
context of the trust portfolio and as a
part of an overall investment strategy,
which should incorporate risk and
return Objectives reasonably suitable
to the trust.
(b) In making and implementing
investment decisions, the trustee has a
B -29
duty to diversify the investments of
the trust unless, under the
circumstances, it is prudent not to do
so.
(c) In addition, the trustee
must:
(1) conform to fundamental
fiduciary duties of loyalty (§170)
and impartiality (§183)i
(2) act with prudence in
deciding whether and how to
delegate authority and in the
selection and supervision of
agents (§171)i and
(3) incur only costs that are
reasonable in amount and
appropriate to the investment
responsibilities of the
trusteeship (§188).
(d) The trustee's duties under
this Section are sUb~ect to the rule of
§228, dealing primar1ly with contrary
investment provisions of a trust or
statute."
2. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., of the University of
California (Berkeley) Law School, was the
reporter. Many of his Reporter's Notes, not
reviewed by the Institute, appear with and
elaborate the black letter and the official
Comments.
3. Even before the promulgation of the Rule, a
number of states, including California,
Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, Tennessee and
Washington, had revised their legislation to
adopt some of the principles that emerged in the
Rule. Other states, led by Illinois (760 Ill.
Compo Stat. §§5/5 and 5/5.1) with legislation
effective July 1, 1992, then Virginia (Va. Code
§2645.1), then Florida (Fla. Stat. §§518.11 and
518.112) and then New York (N.Y. Est., Powers
and Trusts Law §11-2.3), quickly adopted
legislation that drew upon the precepts of the
Rule.
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State' Laws approved its Uniform Prudent
Investor Act ("UPIA") during the summer of 1994
and recommended UPIA for enactment in all of the
states. UPIA draws u~on the Illinois
legislation in signif1cant respects. John
Langbein of Yale Universitr Law School was the
reporter. A copy of UPIA ~s included in the
Appendix.
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C. Scope of outline.
This outline focuses solely upon the changes that
the prudent investor rule might produce compared to
the prudent person rule.
II. Reasons for the Rule.
The prudent investor rule is the product of a perception
that the manner in which the prudent person rule had
developed was ~reventing the law from accornmodatin~
modern portfo11o theory and, therefore, was hinder1ng
investment that best served the pu~oses for which
private trusts were created. Specific rules that were
derived from specific results in specific cases, rather
than broad principles, were driving the law. The
promulgation of the prudent investor rule was more an
attempt to restore flexibility than an attempt to change
the foundation statement.
A. Deficiencies of Existing Law.
According to the critics, the law, as it had
developed according to the prudent person rule,
tended to:
(i) Focus upon the propriety of each asset in
isolation rather than as an integral part of a
portfolio,
(ii) Focus upon preservation of nominal value of
principal rather than upon maintenance of
purchasing power,
(iii) Prohibit certain investments entirely,
(iv) Provide a "safe harbor" for certain
investments,
(v) Deter the fiduciary from delegating management,
and
(vi) Deter the fiduciary from acquiring new types of
investment products.
B. Evidence of Dissatisfaction.
The ferment that Ultimately produced the prudent
investor rule is reflected also in
(i) The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds
Act, which applies to funds held by charitable
institutions,
(ii) Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code"), which prohibits any investment that
would prevent a private foundation from
prosecuting its purposes,
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(iii) Section 404(a) (1) (B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§1104(a), and
(iv) Reform, usually relatively narrow in scope, in
various states.
III. Accommodation of Modern Portfolio Theory.
The Rule is designed to accommodate modern portfolio
theory. See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts
§227 Comments; Macey, An Introduction to Modern
Financial Theory (American college of Trust and Estate
Counsel Foundat~on, 2d ed. 1998); Longstreth, Modern
Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (Oxford
University Press, 1986); and Malkiel, A Random Walk Down
Wall Street (Norton, 6th ed. 1996). This accommodation
has vast implications, in turn, for the administration,
planning and drafting of trusts.
A. First Principle of the Theory.
Prominent among the principles of modern portfolio
theory is the concept that the value (price) of an
asset is a function of two factors. The first is
the rate of total return (i.e., ordinary income and
capital appreciation) that the asset is anticipated
to generate. The second is the risk that the actual
return will fall short of the anticipated return.
1. An analysis of the risk of shortfall of return
leads to a focus u~on assets as integral parts
of a whole ~ortfol~o rather than to a focus upon
each asset ~n isolation. This focus in turn
enhances the importance of the rate of total
return.
a. The analysis leads to the conclusion that
determination of whether a trustee has
dischar~ed its duties must focus upon the
manner ~n which the trustee has made
investment decisions. Restatement (Third)
of Trusts §227, Comment b.
b. The analysis leads away from the labeling
of any asset as inherently prudent or
imprudent, per see
c. The behavior of the trustee is ~udged in
relation to circumstances, not 1n a vacuum.
Id.
d. Since the Rule is a rule of trustee conduct
rather than a rule of portfolio
performance, the Rule purports to diminish
the importance of hindsight. Id.
2. The risk of shortfall of return is divided into
two categories.
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a. The first is market risk, sometimes known
as systemic, systematic, nondiversifiable
or compensated risk, i.e., the risk that
the return in the market in which the asset
is situated will fall short of the
anticipated return.
"Certain . . . sorts of risks
~la$ue all firms more or less
1nd1scriminately. This sort
of risk is called market risk,
or sometimes systematic or
undiversifiable risk. The
risk associated with a
presidential assassination, or
a change in the monetary
policy of the Board of
Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or a general
economic downturn affect all
firms, and are, therefore,
examples of market risk."
Macey, Ope cit. 23.
b. The second is nonmarket risk, sometimes
known as diversifiable, specific, unique
or uncompensated risk, i.e., the risk that
something that may occur particularly with
respect to the particular asset may
increase or decrease its return.
"Firm-specific risk, also called
unique risk, residual risk,
unsystematic risk, and
diversifiable risk, refers to those
elements of risk that are unique to
particular companies. The risk
that the chief executive officer of
a particular firm will have a fatal
heart attack, or that an earthquake
or flood will render a ~lant
inoperable, or that a f1rm will
suffer a labor strike all are
examples of firm-specific risks
because they are unique to a
particular company. Some sorts of
firm-specific risks, such as the
risk that the government will cut
the defense budget are unique to
particular classes of firms (i.e.,
contractors), but these sorts of
risks.are also defined as firm-
specific risks." Id. at 23.
According to modern portfolio theory, the market
(for at least a certain class of assets, for
example, stocks, relative to the market for
other assets, for example, bonds) compensates
the investor for market risk (i.e., the first
type of risk). --
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a. Any compensation for this risk is in the
form of an adjustment of the return that
inures to the ~articular asset (i.e.,
generally, a h~gher rate of return
corresponds to a higher market risk of a
shortfall). See generally Restatement
(Third) of Trusts §227, Comment g.
b. Since, other things being equal, investors
seek to avoid volatility, investors attempt
to "charge" as a price for their
investment, and the market (for at least
some assets relative to the market for
other assets) provides, a return that
varies directly with volatility. See
generally Macey, op. cit. 15-17; and
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment
e; see, however, Fama and French, "The
Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns,"
The Journal of Finance (June, 1992) 427.
i. A return that is more volatile because
of the market will tend at certain
times to exceed, and at other times to
fall short of, the return that inures
to assets for which the return is less
volatile.
ii. However, additionally, the market (for
at least some assets relative to the
market for other assets) will tend to
yield to an asset that has a volatile
return a premium return that is
directly attributable to volatility.
iii. Some investors are willing to suffer
lar~e losses over a long time in
ant~cipation of ultimately receiving a
higher return.
iv. other investors are willing to forgo
higher returns in exchange for greater
stability.
v. Arguably, the substance of volatility
rather than volatilit¥, per se, is what
investors seek to avo~d. The substance
of volatility is the likelihood that a
failure to realize a certain return
will prevent a beneficiary from having
something that the trustee wants the
beneficiary to have at the time that
the trustee wants the beneficiary to
have it. See Jeffrey, "A New Paradigm
for Portfolio Risk," The Journal of
Portfolio Management (Fall, 1984) 33.
vi. According to the Restatement Third,
"Risk tolerance [i.e., tolerance of
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4.
s.
volatilit¥ of return] largely depends
on a comb1nation of the regular
distribution requirements of the trust
and any irregular distributions that
may in fact become necessa~ or
appro~riate. These obligat10ns in turn
are 11kely, depending on the terms of
the trust, to be affected b¥ the needs
of one or more of the benef1ciaries.
Thus, these various distribution
requirements facing the trustee
effectively serve to define the
consequences of the volatility risk
with respect to a particular trust."
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227,
Comment e.
Again according to modern portfolio theory, to
the extent the risk of shortfall of return is
nonmarket risk, i.e., the risk is unique to the
particular asset, the market does not compensate
for the risk. See generally Restatement (Third)
of Trusts §227, Comment g. Thus, the market
does not compensate for the risk that an
unanticipated event, such as the departure of
key ~ersonnel, might reduce the fortunes of a
part1cular company.
An investor can regulate market risk by
selecting a level of risk and (at least to some
extent) reward and by selecting investments that
are consistent with that level.
a. For example, the investor can select
investments that are more, less or as risky
as the market as a whole.
b. Stated differently, an investor might
select investments that tend to rise and
fall in value at a rate greater than, less
than or the same as the market as a whole,
and the investor can tend to obtain rewards
that vary commensurately.
c. The trustee should attempt to assemble a
portfolio that maximizes return at any
level of risk. Conversely, the trustee
should attempt to assemble a portfolio that
minimizes risk at any level of return.
d. The Restatement Third makes clear that the
trustee must regard inflation as a risk.
i. It implies that, absent special
circumstances, selection of a level of
reward that will cause inflation to
erode the value of principal breaches
the duty of the trustee to use caution
to preserve safety of capital.
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6.
7 .
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227,
Comments c and e.
ii. A trustee usually has a duty to incur
what risk is necessary to obtain a
return that preserves real values.
e. The trustee should orient itself to the
opportunities. It easily can accomplish a
large ~art of the orientation by
determ1ning both a risk-free return (i.e.,
the return that inures to united states
Treasury obligations) and an average-risk
return (i.e., the return that prevails
generally in the market) .
An investor can protect against nonmarket risk
(i.e., the second type of risk) by diversifying,
i.~., acquiring assets that tend to offset the
un1que r1sk that attends each asset separately.
See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts
§227, Comment g.
a. Therefore, the Rule generally imposes a
duty upon the trustee to eliminate the risk
that is unique to each asset, i.e., a duty
to diversify.
i. Diversification that is accomplished
without pooling of assets can tend to
increase transactional costs.
ii. However, pooling among trusts and with
other investors, by means, for example,
of mutual funds, can accomplish
diversification without increasing
transactional costs.
b. The duty to diversify for the purpose of
eliminating nonmarket risk is a centerpiece
of the Rule.
i. The duty to diversify induces the
trustee to focus upon each asset as an
integral part of a portfolio and not in
isolation.
ii. No asset inherently is appropriate or
inappropriate, per se.
The duty to diversify should solve the problem,
and, therefore, reduce the importance, of
nonmarket risk. Correlatively, it should
elevate the im~ortance of market risk and lead
to the conclus10n that the chief duties of the
trustee are to determine and im~lement the mix
of market risk and reward that 1S appropriate
for the trust.
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B. Second Principle of the Theory.
A second tenet of modern portfolio theory, expressed
in varyin~ degrees of conviction, is that an
investor ~s not able to outperform the market at
whatever mix of risk and reward the investor is
seeking and, therefore, any attempt to do so is
futile, counterproduct;ve and wasteful.· See
generally, Macer, op c~t. 37 et. seg.; and
Restatement (Th~rd) of Trusts ch. 7 (Introduction,
pp. 6-7; Reporter's Notes, pp. 75-76).
1. According to the theory, ca~ital markets are
efficient, information is d~sseminated and
reflected in prices immediately, and, therefore,
no asset is relatively overpriced or
underpriced.
2. This principle has important implications for
the conduct of trustees.
a. It tends to reduce the value of certain
types of advisors and advice.
b. It tends to increase the value of certain
types of investments such as index funds
that tend to mimic a market as a whole.
c. Generally, it tends to sanction the use of
certain strategies of passive investment
and to challenge the use of strategies of
active investment that produce inferior
returns.
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3. The Rule specifically prohibits the trustee from
incurring costs that are not reasonable in
amount. Restatement (Third) of Trusts
§227(c) (3). An implication is that a trustee
that uses a strategy of active investment must
~ustify the increased costs in terms of an
~ncrease in expected returns.
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IV. Diminished Distinction Between Income and principal.
A. General Principles.
The focus of the Rule upon the integration of each
asset into a portfolio (as op~osed to a focus on
each asset separately and in ~solation from each
other asset) and the focus of the Rule generally on
total return from both ordinary income and capital
appreciation (as opposed to a focus solely on
ordinary income, or a focus separately on ordinary
income and capital appreciation) tend to diminish
the focus of the law upon a distinction between
income and principal.
1. The most significant implication of the Rule's
diminishment of the distinction between income
B -37
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and ~rincipal is that the diminishment might
perm1t and encourage planners and drafters to
prepare dis~ositive instruments that do what the
Rule does, ~, reduce or eliminate
distinctions between income and principal and,
therefore, reduce the significance of the
difference between ordinary income and capital
appreciation.
a. This diminishment signals an impending
revolution in drafting and administration
of private trusts.
b. The revolution is the subject of the
balance of this outline.
As a ~ractical matter, at least unless and until
princ1pal and income law is changed to
com~lement the changes that the Rule represents
in 1nvestment law, the Rule's reduction of the
significance of the distinction between income
and principal probably will have little impact
on the amount of ordinar¥ income that a trustee
must generate when admin1stering a trust
according to a governin~ instrument that
includes a functional d1stinction between income
and principal.
a. A revised version of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, ap~roved by the National
Conference of Comm1ssioners on Uniform
State Laws and recommended by it for
enactment in all the states, represents a
step in this direction.
b. Except to any extent that principal and
income law permits deviation from
traditional rules, trustees that administer
trusts which include a functional
distinction between income and principal
will have to continue to observe the
functional distinction.
c. The Rule at least seems to permit trustees
of some of these trusts to focus upon the
production of ordinary income by the
portfolio rather than asset-by-asset.
d. However, trustees of other of these trusts,
such as trusts that are designed to qualify
for the marital deduction because of a
requirement to pay all income to the
s~ouse, apparently must continue to invest,
~1th respect to productivity of ordinary
1ncome, asset-by-asset. Reg. §20.2056(b)-
5(f)(5).
A trust that provides that a ~articular
beneficiarr shall receive ord1nary income and
that princ1pal shall pass solely to one or more
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others requires the trustee to distinguish
carefully between income and principal and to
make all investment decisions on the basis of
impartiality between income and principal.
Example (Form #21) :
(A) Income. The Trustee shall pay the net
income to my wife quarter-annually.
(B) princi1al. The Trustee shall not
distribute princ pal.
(C) Termination. Upon the death of my
wife, the trust shall terminate, and the Trustee
shall distribute the trust estate of the trust
to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my
wife.
4. A trust that permits the trustee to pay
principal to the person to whom the trustee is
re9Uired to pay income tends to reduce, but not
el~minate, the distinction between income and
principal.
Example (Form #22) :
(A) Income. The Trustee shall pay the net
income to my wife quarter-annually.
(B) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the principal
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for
any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust.
(C) Termination. Unless sooner terminated
according to the foregoing, the trust shall
terminate upon the death of my wife, and the
Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the
trust to my descendants, per stirpes, who
survive my wife.
5. A trust that, according to an ascertainable
standard (see Form #23) or without any standard
~see Form #24), permits the trustee to pay
1ncome to a person, or to anyone or more
~ersons in a grou~ of persons, or to accumulate
~t, and to paypr1ncipal to the same person or
persons, tends to eliminate the significance of
the distinction between income and principal and
to free the trustee to concentrate upon total
return.
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a. Example (Form #23) :
(A) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the net
income as the Trustee determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for her health, education and support in
the manner of living to which accustomed.
The Trustee shall accumulate any net income
that it does not pay.
(B) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of the
principal as the Trustee determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for her health, education and support in
the manner of living to which accustomed.
(C) Termination. Unless sooner
terminated according to the foregoing, the
trust shall terminate upon the death of my
wife, and the Trustee shall distribute the
trust estate of the trust to my
descendants, per stirpes, who survive my
wife.
b. Example (Form #24) :
(A) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the net
income as the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion determines to
be advisable from time to time, considering
or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason what-
soever, including the termination of the
trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
(B) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of the
principal as the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion determines to
be advisable from time to time, considering
or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, inclUding the termination of
the trust.
(C) Termination. Unless sooner
terminated according to the foregoing, the
trust shall terminate upon the death of my
wife, and the Trustee shall distribute the
trust estate of the trust to my
. descendants, per stirpes, who survive my
wife.
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B. Facilitating the Change Generally.
Given the decreased importance that the Rule
attaches to whether a particular asset is
unproductive or underproductive of trust accounting
income, the draftsperson should consider (i)
eliminating requirements that assets produce a
requisite amount of ordinary income and (ii) waiving
the application of statuto~ and other law
concerning property that fa1ls to produce a
requisite amount of ordinary income.
Example (Form #2S) :
(1) To retain property in the form and
character in which received and to invest in any
kind of property (including common trust funds
and securities of any trustee), whether or not
income-productive or located in the United
states or authorized for trust investments.
1. However, since, contrary to the Rule, the
marital deduction rules seem to focus upon each
asset in isolation from each other asset, the
draftsperson should not eliminate the ability of
a spouse to insist that the trustee eliminate
from a marital trust any asset that is not
productive. See reg. §20.20S6(b)-S(f) (S).
Example (Form #26) :
Unproductive property shall not be held for more
than a reasonable time in the trust estate of
the Marital Trust without the consent of my
wife.
2. Similarly, when dealin~ with a trustee that has
a beneficial interest 1n the decision about
retention or acquisition of unproductive or
underproductive property and a trust that
mandates the distribution of trust accounting
income, so that the investment decision will
affect how much the trustee personally will
receive, the drafts~erson should not exonerate
the trustee for dev1ating from any productivity
requirements that, absent the exoneration, the
law of the state imposes. See generally Code
§§2041 and 2S14.
C. Annuity Trusts and Unitrusts Generally.
The ability of the trustee, as a matter of law, to
concentrate upon "total return seems to enhance the
importance of annuity trusts and unitrusts.
1. A traditional annuity trust pays a fixed amount
of dollars per period of time, without regard to
whether the annuity amount is derived from
income or from principal.
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2.
3 .
4.
5 .
6.
A conventional unitrust pays a dollar amount per
period of time equal to a fixed percentage of
the total value of the trust estate redetermined
each period, also without regard to whether the
unitrust amount is derived from income or from
principal.
The traditional type of annuity trust produces a
fixed, rigid and unvarying amount to the
annuitant.
a. Attorney William L. Hoisington, commenting
to this writer, suggested the consideration
of an "indexed" annuity that fluctuates
with changes in price levels and purchasing
power.
b. Accordin~ to Hoisington, by being able to
focus, s1mply, upon the number of dollars
necessary to accomplish an objective (for
exam~le, the support of the annuitant> and
know1ng the amount required for this
purpose at the time of the creation of the
trust and that the purchasing power will
remain constant, a client might understand
an indexed annuity trust better than a
unitrust.
Whereas a traditional annuity does not change at
all and an indexed annuity changes according to
changes in values outside the trust, a unitrust
amount is linked to changes in value of the
trust property itself. Therefore, a unitrust
amount precisely reflects changes in the trust
but only roughly reflects changes in price
levels and purchasing power.
a. since the unitrust amount varies directly
with changes in value of the trust
property, the number and the timing of
valuation dates affect the fluctuation of
the amount.
b. A greater number of dates and a greater
time over which they occur tends to produce
a "smoother" flow than a fewer number of
dates over a shorter time.
An annuity trust periodically generates an
Obligation, or debt, in an amount that is fixed
upon the creation of the trust, subject,
however, in the case of a trust that provides an
annuity which is indexed to changes in cost of
livin$' only to fluctuation because of changes
in pr1ce levels.
By com~arison, a conventional unitrust
period1cally generates an obligation in an
amount that is fixed only on the date on which
B -42
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8 .
the trust value that determines the unitrust
amount is determined.
Both an annuity trust and a unitrust seem to
permit the trustee to focus upon total return.
a. An annuity trust seems to require the
trustee to seek the total return that best
will generate the annuity and, consistent
with paYment of the annu1ty, enhance the
assets that can inure to others upon
termination of the annuity.
b. Similarly, a unitrust impels the trustee to
seek the total return that best will
enhance both the unitrust interest and the
property that will inure to others upon
termination of the unitrust interest.
c. Since the level of payout that is re9Uired
from an annuity trust or a unitrust 1S the
principal factor that determines the value
of the property that can continue to
produce the annuity or unitrust amount and
remain when the annuity or unitrust
interest terminates, determination of the
investment objectives for the trust
involves a complex analysis of the extent
to which paYments should decrease the
value, and the extent to which ordinary
income and capital appreciation should
increase the value.
d. By contrast, a trust that pays only income
m1ght imply, relatively directly, that the
investment objectives of the trustee are to
produce a reasonable stream of income and
yet maintain, in real terms, a constant
value of principal.
The payout requirement of the conventional
unitrust seems to place less pressure upon the
trustee than the payout requirement of a
traditional annuity trust, regardless of whether
the distributions are in cash or in kind.
a. The reason is that in a declining market
the ~ayout required from a traditional
annu1ty trust represents an increasing
percentage of a decreasing value, whereas
the payout required from a unitrust is an
unvary1ng percentage of a changing value.
b. Since satisfaction of the required
distribution in kind seems to produce the
same economic effect as satisfaction of the
required distribution in cash, the trustee
seems unable to relieve the pressure by
satisfyin~ the annuity interest or the
unitrust 1nterest in kind.
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Special problems confront any attempt to draft a
trust that both (i) is to qualif¥ for the
marital deduction and also (ii) ~s to permit the
trustee to invest for total return.
9.
a.
b.
c.
An annuity trust that is created by gift,
or by a decedent who dies, after October
24, 1992, might not qualify for the marital
deduction. Code §§2056(b) (7) (B) (ii),
2056 (b) (10), 2523 (e) and 2523 (f) (3) i reg.
§ §20 . 2056 (b) - 7 (e) and 25. 2523 (f) -1 (c) (3) .
Similarly, a trust that is solely a
unitrust might pay less than its income
and, therefore, cannot meet the income
requirement of the marital deduction. Code
§§2056 (b) (5) and (b) (7) .
A trust that pays the greater of (i) trust
accounting income and (ii) a unitrust
amount must pay at least its income and,
therefore, can meet the income requirement.
i. However, the important issue is whether
this "greater-of" arrangement permits
the trustee to focus upon total return.
ii. The concern is that the possibility
that income can exceed the unitrust
amount might force the trustee to
continue to concentrate on producing a
yield in the form of income for trust
accounting purposes.
iii. Attorne¥ William L. Hoisington,
comment~ng to this writer, su~gested,
and this writer agrees, that ~f the
unitrust percentage that is specified
is clearl¥ as high as the yield of
ordinar¥ ~ncome that an income
benefic~ary could demand a trustee to
generate according to state law, the
"greater-of" arran~ement would protect
the income benefic~ary and, therefore,
should free the trustee to invest for
total return. Cf. reg. §20.2056(b)-
5(f)(5).
(a) However, the grantor usually has
noway to know with certainty what
this amount is.
(b) . Selection of a lesser amount can
undermine the elimination of the
focus upon ordinary income.
(c) While selection of a greater
amount can eliminate the focus on
ordinary income, it also can
eliminate a portion of the trust.
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D. Annuity Trust Examples.
1. No trustee possesses any discretion: mandatory
distribution of annuity, no additional
distribution (Form #27) .
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of this
instrument and the date of the first payment for
the year).
• The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount in
equal quarter-annual instal1ments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the annuity amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall not
distribute to the descendant any principal or
income other than according to (1).
2. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of annuity, independent
trustee can make additional distributions
(Form #28) .
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year, after the
descendant has attained thirty years of age, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of this
instrument and the date of the first payment for
the year]
• The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount in
equal quarter-annual instal1ments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the annuity amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, inclUding the termination of the
trust.
3. Nonindependent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of annuity,
nonindependent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #29) .
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year, after the
descendant has attained thirty years of age, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X] dollars
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a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of this
instrument and the date of the first payment for
the year]
• The Trustee shall iay the annuity amount in
equal quarter-annual nstallments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the annuity amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendant's health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
4. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii) independent
trustee possesses other discretion: mandatory
distribution of annuity, independent and
nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #30) .
(l) Annuity Interest. Each year, after the
descendant has attained thirty years of age, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of this
instrument and the date of the first payment for
the year]
• The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount in
equal quarter-annual installments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the annuity amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendant's health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
to the descendant so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the trust estate as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
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E. Conventional unitrust Examples.
1. No trustee possesses any discretion: mandatory
distribution of unitrust amount, no additional
distribution (Form #31) .
(1) unitrust Interest. Each year, the
Trustee shall 'pay to the descendant a unitrust
amount equal to [X] percent of the
a [net fair market value of the assets of the
trust valued as of the first business day of the
year]
b [average of the net fair market values of the
assets of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year and of each year of the
preceding four]
• The Trustee shall pay the unitrust amount in
equal quarter-annual installments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall not
distribute to the descendant any principal or
income other than according to (1).
2. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of unitrust amount,
independent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #32) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year, after
the descendant has attained thirty years of age,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a
unitrust amount equal to [X] percent of the
a [net fair market value of the assets of the
trust valued as of the first business day of the
year]
b [average of the net fair market values of the
assets of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year and of each year of the
preceding four] ,
• The Trustee shall pay the unitrust amount in
equal quarter-annual installments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the ~rust estate as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, inclUding the termination of the
trust.
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3. Nonindependent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of unitrust amount,
nonindependent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #33) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year, after
the descendant has attained thirty years of age,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a
unitrust amount equal to [X) percent of the
a [net fair market value of the assets of the
trust valued as of the first business day of the
year)
b [average of the net fair market values of the
assets of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year and of each year of the
preceding four)
• The Trustee shall pay the unitrust amount in
equal quarter-annual installments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendantls health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
4. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii) independent
trustee possesses other discretion: mandatory
distribution of unitrust amount, independent and
nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #34) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year, after
the descendant has attained thirty years of age,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a
unitrust amount equal to [X] percent of the
a [net fair market value of the assets of the
trust valued as of the first business day of the
year]
b [average of the net fair market values of the
assets of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year and of each year of the
preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust amount in
equal quarter-annual installments from income
and, to the extent that income is not
sufficient, from principal. The Trustee shall
prorate the unitrust amount for any short year.
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(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendantls health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
to the descendant so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the trust estate as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
Mandated-Percentage Unitrusts.
consider expressing as a percentage of the trust
estate, rather than as a dollar amount, the unitrust
interest that the trustee is required to distribute.
1. Compared to a conventional unitrust in which the
unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar
amount, this arrangement enhances flexibility in
(i) timing of recognition of gain and (ii)
determining the identity of the taxpayer that
recognizes the gain.
a. Unless the trustee elects to the contrary
according to subsection 643(e) of the Code,
satisfaction of the percentage in kind
should not produce a deemed sale. See
generally Code §663(a) (1); reg. §§1.661(a)-
2 (f) (1), 1. 1014 - 4 (a) (3) and 1. 663 (a) -
l(b) (1); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286;
Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d
Cir. 1940); and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D.Conn. 1935), affirmed 83 F.2d
1019 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied 299 U.S.
573 (1936).
b. However, if the satisfaction in kind does
not produce a deemed sale, the distributee
.takes for income tax purposes the same
basis that the trustee had. Code §643(e).
c. By making or not making the election
according to subsection 643(e) of the Code,
the trustee can defer or accelerate
recognition of gain and can determine
which, the trustee or the unitrust
recipient, shall pay the tax on any gain.
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G.
2. The ability of the trustee to satisfy the
percentage in kind (rather than in dollars)
should permit the trustee (but not the unitrust
recipient) to avoid the need for cash.
a. Any distribution of an asset in kind will
carry distributable net income from the
trust to the distributee and include it in
the gross income of the distributee to the
extent of the income tax basis of the
trustee in the distributed asset. Code
§§643(e), 661 and 662.
b. Therefore, the distribution in kind will
tend to require the distributee to obtain
cash in order to pay tax.
3. Use of the concept of a percentage gives the
trustee considerable flexibility about how to
satisfy the unitrust interest. If the governing
instrument authorizes the trustee to make
distributions in nonprorata shares, the trustee
should have flexibility that ranges from
satisfying the unitrust interest with one asset '
to satisfying it with a fractional share of each
and every asset including both income and
principal.
Mandated-Percentage Unitrust Examples.
1. No trustee possesses any discretion: mandated
distribution of unitrust percentage, no
additional distribution
(Form #35) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a [Xl
fractional share of the trust estate.
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall not
distribute to the descendant any of the trust
estate other than according to (1).
2. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandated dist!ibution of unitrust percentage,
independent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #36) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year,
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the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a [Xl
fractional share of the trust estate.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
3. Nonindependent trustee possesses discretion:
mandated distribution of unitrust percentage,
nonindependent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #37) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a [Xl
fractional share of the trust estate.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendant's health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
4. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii) independent
trustee possesses other discretion: mandated
distribution of unitrust percentage, independent
and nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #38) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year,
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a [Xl
fractional share of the trust estate.
(2) Additional. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the Trustee
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for the descendant's health, education
and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay
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to the descendant so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the trust estate as the independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
s. Alternative version of subparagraph (1).
(1) unitrust interest. if, after
attaining thirty years of age, the descendant is
living immediately before the end of a calendar
year, the Trustee shall pay to the descendant so
much of the trust estate as is equal in value to
[Xl percent of the value of the trust estate as
of the end of the year.
H. Withdrawable-Percentage ("GIVE-ME-FIVE") Unitrusts.
Next, instead of requiring the trustee to distribute
a unitrust percentage or a unitrust amount, consider
specifying a percentage of the trust estate, not in
excess of five percent (or specifying,
alternatively, so much of the trust estate as has a
value equal to the value of a percentage of the
trust estate, not in excess of five percent) and
providing that the unitrust recipient may, but need
not, withdraw all or any of it until a particular
time each year. The withdrawable-percentage (IIGIVE-
ME-FIVE") unitrust is an attractive alternative to
(i) a trust that mandates the current payment of
income, (ii) a conventional unitrust in which the
unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar amount
and the current payment of the unitrust amount is
mandated and (iii) a unitrust in which the unitrust
interest is expressed as a percentage of the trust
estate and the current distribution of the unitrust
percentage is mandated.
The withdrawable-percentage unitrust is particularly
attractive when (as in a credit shelter or
generation-skipping configuration) the trust is
exempt from the generation-skipping tax and the
primary beneficiary is a nonskip person (~, the
grantor's spouse .or child), or is a skip person
(~, the grantor's grandchild) who is assigned to
a generation higher than that of another skip
person, who might not need, but wants the security
of, the beneficial enjoyment that the trust can
provide. The withdrawable-percentage unitrust
allows the primary beneficiary to consume the
resources of the beneficiary that, if not consumed,
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One version of the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust permits the beneficiary to withdraw a
percentage or fractional share of the trust
estate. An alternative version permits the
beneficiary to withdraw so much of the trust
estate as has a value equal to the value of a
specified fraction of the trust estate as of the
time of lapse of the right to withdraw.
Technically, this aspect of the latter version
seems identical to that which appears in a
conventional unitrust. The only economic
difference between the versions is that the
former version seems to describe something that
can change in value until the trustee satisfies
it, while the latter version seems to impose a
ceiling of a fixed number of dollars. Each
version should produce the same income tax
results. See generally reg. §1.671-3.
The version that permits the beneficiary to
withdraw "so much . . . of the trust estate"
might offer greater flexibility than the version
that permits the beneficiary to withdraw a
will generate liability for gift tax, estate tax or
generation-skipping tax (or more than one of them),
and thus to conserve the trust's resources that are
sheltered from the transfer taxes.
As an example, instead of forcing the grantor's
spouse to receive all income from a marital
deduction trust and all income from a credit shelter
trust, a withdrawable-percentage unitrust can permit
the grantor's spouse to receive all income from the
marital deduction trust, to consume the spouse's
property (or principal of the marital deduction
trust) in an amount that approximates the income of
the credit shelter trust, and thus to conserve the
trust estate of the credit shelter trust.
Similarly, instead of forcing the grantor's child to
receive all income from a trust that has an
inclusion ratio of zero for generation-skipping tax
purposes, a withdrawable-percentage unitrust can
permit the grantor's child to consume the child's
property in an amount that approximates the income
of the generation-skipping trust, or can permit the
trustee to distribute property from a trust that is
not exempt from the generation-skipping tax in an
amount that approximates the income of the trust
that is exempt from the generation-skipping tax, and
thus to conserve the trust estate of the generation-
skipping trust.
1. Alternative Versions.
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"fractional share." If the governing instrument
authorizes the trustee to distribute nonprorata
shares of assets in satisfaction of any
withdrawal, the version that permits the
beneficiary to withdraw a "fractional share"
should vest in the trustee, and arguably solely
in the trustee, the ability to satisfy a
withdrawal with other than a fractional share of
each and every asset. The version that permits
the beneficiary to withdraw "so much . . . of
the trust estate," on the other hand, might
allow the beneficiary, himself or herself, to
select the assets that are to satisfy any
exercise of the right to withdraw.
Advantages.
a. Use of a lapsing right to withdraw, instead
of a mandated payment, permits the unitrust
recipient to exclude the trust estate from
the gross estate of the recipient for
estate tax purposes and from the gifts of
the recipient for gift tax purposes. See,
however, the text at IV.H.6, infra.
b. The right to withdraw also permits the
unitrust recipient to regulate the
efficiency of the trust for generation-
skipping tax purposes by determining
whether a nonskip person (or a skip person
who is in a generation that is higher than
that of another skip person) shall receive
distributions.
c. Additionally, the lapsing right to withdraw
permits the power holder to avoid
dissipation of GST exemption. Id.
d. The unitrust concept eliminates any
functional distinction between income and
principal. Therefore, it permits the
trustee to take full advantage of the
prudent investor rule and modern portfolio
theory by investing for total return.
e. Expression of the unitrust interest as a
percentage (or as so much of the trust
estate as has a value equal to the value of
a percentage), rather than as a dollar
amount, permits satisfaction of the
interest in kind without recognition of
gain.
f. The unitrust percentage of five percent
assures that the unitrust recipient can
receive approximately the same enjoyment
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that he or she would receive if he or she
were to receive all income of a trust that
owned a balanced portfolio of investments.
g. The primary beneficiary can serve as the
sole trustee of a withdrawable-percentage
unitrust at least as well as he or she can
serve as the sole trustee of a mandated-
payment-of-income trust. The primary
beneficiary can serve as the sole trustee
of a withdrawable-percentage unitrust just
as well as he or she can serve as the sole
trustee of a conventional unitrust and a
mandated-percentage unitrust.
h. Since, within limits, the unitrust
recipient, himself or herself, can
determine the transfer tax results, a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust seems more
flexible for transfer tax purposes than (i)
a grant of discretion to an independent
trustee to make distributions (~Form
#24), (ii) a mandate to a trustee to make
distributions (~, for example, Form #21
and Form #31) and (iii) a grant of
discretion, limited by an ascertainable
standard, to a person to make distributions
to himself or herself (see Form #23) .
A Problem.
Although the withdrawable-percentage unitrust
offers superior results for transfer tax
purposes, it poses a problem, fortunately
solvable, for income tax purposes.
a. The right to withdraw includes in the gross
income of the power holder all gross income
that is attributable to the SUbject
property. Code §678(a) (1). If (i) the
inclusion is inadvertent and not desired
and (ii) the power causes inclusion of more
than the income that is attributable to the
property to which the power applies during
the taxable year, the inclusion can present
the power holder with an unexpected and
unwanted. obligation that the power holder
can lack the resources to discharge.
r
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b. Nevertheless, although the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust seems less flexible for
income tax purposes than a power granted to
an independent trustee and, arguably, a
power to withdraw limited by an
B -55
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ascertainable standard, the more
appropriate comparison is probably between
(i) the withdrawable-percentage unitrust
and (ii) a mandate to a trustee to
distribute all income (see, for example,
Form #21) .
Transfer Tax Implications and Planning.
a. Generally, the lapse of a general power of
appointment is treated as a transfer for
gift and estate tax purposes. Code
§ § 2041 (a) (2) and 2514 (b) .
b. However, a lapse during any calendar year
during the life of the power holder is
treated as a transfer for estate tax
purposes
"only to the extent that the property,
which could have been appointed by exercise
of such lapsed powers, exceeded in value,
at the time of such lapse, the greater of
the following amounts:
"(A) $5,000, or
"(B) 5 percent of the aggregate value,
at the time of such lapse, of the assets
out of which, or the proceeds of which, the
exercise of the lapsed powers could have
been satisfied." Code §2 041 (b) (2) .
The gift tax rules are similar. See Code
§2514 (e) .
i. A lapse that is within the limits of
Code sections 2041(b) (2) and 2514(e) is
not a gift for gift tax purposes. Reg.
§§20.2041-3 (d) (3) and 25.2514-3 (c).
ii. Similarly, the lapse is not a transfer
with retained enjoYment for estate tax
purposes. Reg. §20.2041-3(d) and (4).
iii. Possession of the right to withdraw at
the ~eath of the power holder does
include in the gross estate of the
power holder any property that the
power holder could have withdrawn
immediately before death. Code
§ 2041 (b) (1) and reg. §20 . 2041- 3 (d) (3) .
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(a) However, confining the possession
of the power to immediately before
the end of the year should prevent
the power from including any of
the trust estate in the gross
estate of the power holder.
(b) Similarly, conditioning the power
upon the exhaustion of another
trust (for example, a marital-
deduction trust, such as a QTIP or
testamentary-power-of-appointment
trust) that the power holder does
not have discretion to exhaust
prevents the power from including
property in the gross estate of
the power holder unless the power
holder dies after the other trust
is exhausted. Reg. §20.2041-3(b);
cf. Estate of Kurz v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 44 (1993),
affirmed 95-2 USTC 160, 215 (7th
Cir. 1995).
iv. Except to any extent that the power
sUbjects property to gift tax or estate
tax or the power holder exercises the
power, the power does not cause the
power holder to become the transferor
for generation-skipping tax purposes.
Therefore, the power does not dissipate
the effect of allocation of GST
exemption of the original transferor.
Code §2652(a).
c. Where a power of appointment is necessary
to qualify property for the marital
deduction, a right to withdraw is
sufficient only if the grantor's spouse can
exercise the right in all events. Cf. Ltr.
Rul. 8202023 with Estate of Hollingshead v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 578 (1978).
Income Tax Implications and Planning.
r
r
r
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a. The most important of the income tax
implications is that the right to withdraw
causes the power holder to own both (i) all
ordinary income that is sUbject to the
power and (ii) all income, ordinary and
other, that is attributable to the
principal that is sUbject to the power.
Code §678(a) (1); see generally Code §671
and reg. §1.671-3.
B -57
i. For example, a right to withdraw a
fractional portion of a trust estate
causes the power holder to own, for
income tax purposes, all of the
ordinary and other income of the
fractional portion.
(a) Even if the right to withdraw is
exercised, the rules that
apportion income, for income tax
purposes, between a trust and its
beneficiaries based upon the
amount of distributable net income
("dni") that is, or is not,
carried from the trust to the
beneficiaries should not apply to
the portion of the trust that is
subject to the right to withdraw.
Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
(b) Rather, the system should treat
the holder of the power as
receiving that which he or she
already owns.
(c) The holder of a right to withdraw
a fractional portion is regarded,
for income tax purposes, as owning
the fractional portion.
(d) Even though Revenue RUling 67-241,
1967-2 C.B. 225, seems to support
the proposition that the power
holder owns, for income tax
purposes, that which he or she can
withdraw and, therefore, the dni
rules do not apply to any exercise
of the power, the regulations
promulgated according to Code
section 665 (regulations section
1.665(b)-1A(d), Example 4) clearly
assert that the throwback rules do
apply to any exercise of the
power. The partial abolition of
the throwback rules might change
results but should not change any
reasoning. See Code §665(c).
Although the two sets of rules
seem inconsistent and arguably the
throwback rules should not oust
the grantor trust system where the
two systems overlap, the planner
should appreciate the possibility
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that the throwback rules might
apply to an exercise.
ii. The Internal Revenue Service asserts
that even after the right to withdraw
lapses because the power holder fails
to exercise it, except to any extent
that the power holder ceases to be the
"grantor" according to the principles
of Code sections 671 through 677, the
power holder owns, for income tax
purposes, all of the income that the
exercise of the power would have
permitted the power holder to possess.
Code §678(a) (2); and Ltr. Ruls. 9034004
and 8701007.
(a) This result depends upon (i) the
theory that a "lapse" is a
"release" for purposes of Code
section 678(a) (2) or (ii) the
theory that a lapse of a right to
withdraw has the same economic
effect, and should have the same
tax effect, as a withdrawal of
property from a trust and a
recontribution of the property to
the trust. See Early, "Income
taxation of lapsed powers of
withdrawal: Analyzing their
current status," Journal of
Taxation (April, 1985) 198.
(b) Neither of the theories mentioned
in the preceding paragraph clearly
controls.
(i) Code sections 2041(b) (2) and
2514(e), on the one hand,
state that a lapse is treated
as a release except to any
extent that a lapse within the
limits of the five-and-five
rules is not treated as a
release.
jii) Code section 678(a) (2), on the
other hand, does not state
that a lapse ever is treated
as a release. Therefore,
according to the argument, a
release is something other
than a lapse, for purposes of
Code section 678(a) (2).
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(iii) Nevertheless, for purposes of
planning, this writer assumes
that a lapse is equivalent to
a release for purposes of Code
section 678(a) (2).
iii. Assume that a person has a right to
withdraw five percent of a trust that
has $1,000 of principal and that
generates $50 of ordinary income and
$100 of corpus income ratably during
its first year.
(a) As a first example of the
application of the Service's
position, assume that the power
applies during the entire year and
lapses at the end of the year.
(i) The power holder is regarded
as owning five percent of the
trust estate and, therefore,
as owning five percent of the
$50 of ordinary income and
five percent of the $100 of
corpus income.
(ii) Even if the power holder never
possesses any other power to
withdraw, except to any extent
that the power holder ceases
to be the "grantor" according
to the principles of Code
sections 671-677, the power
holder owns, for income tax
purposes, all of the income of
the fractional portion, both
during the year in which the
power exists and at all times
after the power lapses.
(b) As a second example, assume that
the facts are the same as in the
first example except that the
power holder exercises the power.
The results are the same as in the
. first example for the first year
and for as long as the power
holder owns the withdrawn property
and the withdrawn property
continues to be a fractional share
of the aggregate of what is
withdrawn and what remains in the
trust.
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(c) As a third example, assume that
the facts are the same as in the
first example except that the
power exists only on the first day
of the first year. The results
are the same as in the first
example.
(d) As a fourth example, assume that
the facts are the same as in the
first example except that (as in
the forms) the power exists only
immediately before the end of the
year. The results are the same as
in the first example except that
in the first year the power holder
arguably does not own, for income
tax purposes, any of the trust
estate.
(e) As a fifth example, assume that
the facts are the same as in the
first example except that the
power recurs each year. The
Internal Revenue Service might
assert that the power holder
becomes the owner, for income tax
purposes, of an additional portion
of the trust estate each year.
See Code §678(a) (2) and Ltr. Rul.
9034004.
(i) The theory of the Service in
Letter RUling 9034004 is that
a power to withdraw five
percent each year applies to
all of the trust estate (i.e.,
the same property) each year
and, therefore, the power
holder has the right each year
to withdraw five percent of
both (i) the portion of the
trust estate that the power
holder previously did not own
for income tax purposes and
(ii) the portion of the trust
estate that the power holder
previously did own for income
tax purposes.
(ii) The effect of the theory is
that each year the power
holder additionally becomes
the owner for income tax
B - 61
(h) Perhaps a taxpayer can choose any
of the theories, if he or she
follows the chosen theory
consistently.
iv. If tpe gross income of the power holder
would include all ordinary income of
the trust even if the power were not to
exist, the power additionally would
include only a portion of corpus income
in the gross income of the power
holder.
purposes of five percent of
the portion of the trust
estate that previously the
power holder did not own.
(iii) The theory of Letter RUling
9034004 is not binding.
(f) According to another theory
applied to the fifth example, the
power applies each year to all of
the trust estate (i.e., the same
as according to the theory of
Letter RUling 9034004) but the
power applies, for income tax
purposes, each subsequent year the
same as it applies the first year,
so that the portion that the power
holder owns does not increase each
year.
(g) According to yet another theory,
previously discussed, a lapse is
not a release. Therefore, Code
section 678(a) (2) is not operative
and the taxpayer owns only any
portion that the taxpayer
presently can withdraw.
(i) An implication of this theory
is that the amount of income
that the taxpayer owns is a
function of the time that the
power exists.
(ii) Arguably, a power that is
exercisable only immediately
before the end of the year
does not cause the taxpayer to
own any income.
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v. If, on the other hand, the gross income
of the power holder would not include
all ordinary income of the trust if the
power were not to exist, the power
additionally would include a portion of
ordinary income and a portion of corpus
income in the gross income of the power
holder.
vi. The extent to which the addition of the
power would alter the tax burden of the
power holder would depend upon whether
the power would cause the power holder
to own the same, or an additional,
portion of the trust estate each year.
vii. The grantor, in any event, should
consider including sufficient
flexibility to permit the power holder
to receive from the trust sufficient
property to discharge any income tax
liability of the power holder that is
attributable to the trust.
b. An additional implication for income tax
purposes is that even if satisfaction in
kind of a right to withdraw a dollar amount
would produce a deemed sale of the property
that is distributed, expression of the
unitrust interest as a right to withdraw a
fractional (or percentage) portion of the
trust estate (or, alternatively, if the
exercise of the right is not framed as a
withdrawal of a dollar amount, expression
of the unitrust interest as a right to
withdraw as much of the trust estate as has
a value equal to the value of a fractional
portion) should cause satisfaction of the
right in kind not to produce a deemed sale.
Code § 663 (a) (1); reg. § § 1 . 661 (a) - 2 (f) (1) ,
1.1014-4(a) (3) and 1.663(a)-1(b) (1); Rev.
Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Kenan v.
Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940);
and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. SUpp. 113
(D. Conn. 1935), affirmed 83 F.2d 1019 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. denied 299 U.S. 573
(1936); cf. Rev. Rul 67-241, 1967-2 C.B.
225.
i. Some would argue that according to the
theory of Revenue RUling 67-241, 1967-2
C.B. 225, the power holder already
possesses the portion of the trust that
he or she can withdraw and, therefore,
B - 63
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satisfaction in kind of a right to
withdraw even a number of dollars might
not produce a deemed sale and,
accordingly, avoidance of a deemed sale
does not require avoidance of a right
to withdraw a dollar amount.
ii. However, the argument seems to ignore
that satisfaction in kind of a right to
withdraw dollars is not the same as
paYment in dollars.
Interface Between Income Tax and Transfer Tax
Implications. and Planning for It.
By including income in the gross income of a
unitrust recipient who does not receive the
income but who nevertheless pays the income tax
upon it and thus preserves it intact for others,
the right to withdraw might enhance the property
that a given amount of transfer (for gift or
estate tax purposes) can make available for
members of the family of the power holder.
a. However, with uncertain effect, the
Internal Revenue Service might attempt to
treat the power holder's paYment of income
tax as a contribution to the trust to any
extent that the paYment exceeds the amount
that the power holder receives from the
trust. Cf. Ltr. Rul. 9441031.
b. This treatment would include the deemed
contribution in the gross estate or
transfers for gift tax purposes, or
(depending upon the configuration of the
trust) both the gross estate and the
transfers for gift tax purposes, of the
power holder. Code §2511.
c. The power holder can avoid these results by
receiving from the trust, each year,
property that has a value at least equal to
the marginal amount of income tax that the
right to withdraw causes the power holder
to pay.
d. Consider arming the power holder, himself
or herself, with the solution to this
problem by giving the power holder a
nongeneral power to appoint the trust
estate and a continuing right to withdraw
any of the trust estate that, because the
power holder contributed it or is deemed to
B-M
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have contributed it, would be included in
the gross estate of the power holder for
estate tax purposes if the power holder
were to die.
7. Conclusion.
Compared to a trust that mandates the current
payment of all income, a withdrawable-percentage
unitrust might increase the taxable income of
the primary beneficiary and reduce the taxable
income of the trustee. However, since the rate
that applies to the taxable income of a trustee
reaches the maximum at a lower level of taxable
income than the rate that applies to the taxable
income of an individual, the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust usually will not increase
(and often will decrease) the aggregate of the
income tax. Although the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust will tend to increase the
difficulty of determining the income tax, it
will tend not to increase the tax itself. A
withdrawable-percentage unitrust that is
designed for flexibility can cope with the
additional complexity.
Transfer tax advantages and investment
advantages are what make the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust an attractive alternative to
a trust that mandates the current payment of
income. Free of transfer tax, the primary
beneficiary of the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust can cause the trust to conserve at
least all of the trust estate in excess of the
aggregate of the income tax liabilities of the
beneficiary, and of the trustee, with respect to
taxable income that is attributable to the
trust. By contrast, the most that the primary
beneficiary can allow to pass free of transfer
tax by means of the pay-alI-income trust is the
portion of the trust estate that exceeds the sum
of the trust accounting income and the income
tax liability of the trustee. Stated
differently, this portion consists of the trust
accounting principal that remains after the
trustee pays all income tax upon corpus income.
Even assuming that the Internal Revenue Service
is correct about a beneficiary making a
contribution to a trust to the extent that the
beneficiary's payment of income tax upon taxable
income that is attributable to the trust exceeds
what the beneficiary receives from the trust,
(i) all of the trust estate (i.e., trust
B -65
accounting income plus trust accounting
principal) net of the income tax upon the
taxable income that is attributable to the trust
exceeds (ii) the trust accounting principal net
of income tax upon corpus income. The
difference is significant. It consists of the
amount by which trust accounting income exceeds
the income tax that is attributable to the trust
accounting income. stated differently, this
amount is the after-tax income of the trust.
I. withdrawable-Percentage ("GIVE-ME-FIVE")
unitrust Examples.
1. No trustee possesses any discretion: permissive
withdrawal of unitrust percentage, no additional
distribution (Form #39) .
(1) Right to Withdraw. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant such fractional
share (not to exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the
trust estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year. As used in the
preceding sentence, ntrust estate n shall not include
the Included Portion (defined in subsection (2) of
this subsection (e».
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall pay to the
descendant so much or all, if any, of the Included
Portion as the descendant directs in writing at any
time or from time to time. The Included Portion at
any particular time is any of the trust estate that,
because of the descendant1s actual or deemed
contribution, would be included in the gross estate
of the descendant (for purposes of determining the
United states estate tax payable because of the
death of the descendant) if the descendant died at
such time. The Trustee shall not distribute to the
descendant any of the trust estate other than
according to (1) and the first sentence of this (2).
2. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
permissive withdrawal of unitrust percentage,
independent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #40) .
(1) Right to withdraw. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant such fractional
share (not to exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the
trust estate as the descendant last directs in
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writing before the end of the year. As used in the
preceding sentence, ntrust estate n shall not include
the Xncluded Portion (defined in subsection (2) of
this subsection (C».
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall pay to the
descendant so much or all, if any, of the Xncluded
Portion as the descendant directs in writing at any
time or from time to time. The Xncluded Portion at
any particular time is any of the trust estate that,
because of the descendant's actual or deemed
contribution, would be included in the gross estate
of the descendant (for purposes of determining the
united states estate tax payable because of the
death of the descendant) if the descendant died at
such time. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay to
the descendant so much or all, if any, of the trust
estate as the Xndependent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be advisable from
time to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose or
reason whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
3. Nonindependent trustee possesses discretion:
permissive withdrawal of unitrust percentage,
nonindependent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #41) .
(1) Right to Withdraw. Xf, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant such fractional
share (not to exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the
trust estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year. As used in the
preceding sentence, ntrust estate n shall not include
the Xncluded Portion (defined in subsection (2) of
this subsection (C».
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall pay to the
descendant so much or all, if any, of the Xncluded
Portion as the descendant directs in writing at any
time or from time to time. The Xncluded Portion at
any particular time is any of the trust estate that,
because of the descendant's actual or deemed
contribution, would be included in the gross estate
of the descendant" (for purposes of determining the
United states estate tax payable because of the
death of the descendant) if the descendant died at
such time. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay to
the descendant so much or all, if any, of the trust
estate as the Trustee determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering resources otherwise
B-~
available, to provide for the descendant's health,
education and support in the manner of living to
which accustomed.
4. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee possesses
some discretion and (ii) independent trustee
possesses other discretion: permissive withdrawal of
unitrust percentage, independent and nonindependent
trustees can make additional distributions
(Form #42) .
(1) Right to Withdraw. Zf, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
~ediately before the end of a calendar year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant such fractional
share (not to exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the
trust estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year. As used in the
preceding sentence, ntrust estatenshall not include
the Zncluded Portion (defined in subsection (2) of
this subsection (e».
(2) Additional. The Trustee shall pay to the
descendant so much or all, if any, of the Zncluded
Portion as the descendant directs in writing at any
time or from time to time. The Zncluded Portion at
any particular time is any of the trust estate that,
because of the descendant's actual or deemed
contribution, would be included in the gross estate
of the descendant (for purposes of determining the
United states estate tax payable because of the
death of the descendant) if the descendant died at
such time. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay to
the descendant so much or all, if any, of the trust
estate as the Trustee determines to be advisable
from time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for the descendant's health,
education and support in the manner of living to
which accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee shall
pay to the descendant so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the trust estate as the Zndependent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources- otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever,
including the termination of the trust.
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s. Alternative version of subparagraph (1) (Form #43) .
(1) Right to Withdraw. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is living
immediately before the end of a calendar year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much, if any,
of the trust estate, not to exceed in value five
percent of the value of the trust estate as of the
end of the year, as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year. As used in the
preceding sentence, -trust estate- shall not include
the Included Portion (defined in subsection (2) of
this subsection (e».
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APPENDIX
UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
SECTION 1. PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a
trustee who invests and manages trust assets owes a duty to
the beneficiaries of the trust to comply with the prudent
investor rule set forth in this [Act].
(b) The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be
expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by
the provisions of a trust. A trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in
reasonable reliance on the provisions of the trust.
SECTION 2. STANDARD OF CARE, PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, RISK
AND RETURN OBJECTIVES.
(a) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a
prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
(b) A trustee's investment and management decisions
respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in
isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a
whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having
risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.
(c) Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider
in investing and managing trust assets are such of the
following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment
decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of
action plays within the oyerall trust portfolio, which may
include financial assets, interests in closely held
enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and
real property;
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(5) the expected total return from income and the
appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and
preservation of appreciation of capital; and
(8) an asset's special relationship or special
value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or
more of the beneficiaries.
(d) A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify
facts relevant to the investment and management of trust
assets.
(e) A trustee may invest in any kind of property or
type of investment consistent with the standards of this
[Act] .
(f) A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or
is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's
representation that the trustee has special skills or
expertise, has a duty to use those special skills or
expertise.
SECTION 3. DIVERSIFICATION. A trustee shall diversify
the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably
determines that, because of special circumstances, the
purposes of the trust are better served without
diversifying.
SECTION 4. DUTIES AT INCEPTION OF TRUSTEESHIP. Within
a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving
trust assets, a trustee shall review the trust assets and
make and implement decisions concerning the retention and
disposition of assets, in order to bring the trust portfolio
into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust, and with
the requirements of this [Act].
SECTION 5. LOYALTY. A trustee shall invest and manage
the trust assets solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries.
SECTION 6. IMPARTIALITY. If a trust has two or more
beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in
investing and managing the trust assets, taking into account
any differing interests of the beneficiaries.
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SECTION 8. REVIEWING COMPLIANCE. Compliance with the
prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's
decision or action and not by hindsight.
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SECTION 7.
trust assets, a
appropriate and
purposes of the
INVESTMENT COSTS. In investing and managing
trustee may only incur costs that are
reasonable in relation to the assets, the
trust, and the skills of the trustee.
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SECTION 9. DELEGATION OF INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT
FUNCTIONS.
(a) A trustee may delegate investment and management
functions that a prUdent trustee of comparable skills could
properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee
shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
(1) selecting an agent;
(2) establishing the scope and terms of the
delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the
trust; and
(3) periodically reviewing the agent's actions in
order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with
the terms of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a
duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with
the terms of the delegation.
(c) A trustee who complies with the requirements of
subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the
trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the
function was delegated.
(d) By accepting the delegation of a trust function
from the trustee of a trust that is SUbject to the law of
this State, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.
SECTION 1.0. LANGUAGE INVOKING STANDARD OF [ACT]. The
following terms or compar~ble language in the provisions of
a trust, unless otherwise limited or modified, authorizes
any investment or strategy permitted under this [Act]:
"investments permissible by law for investment of trust
funds," "legal investments," "authorized investments,"
"using the jUdgment and care under the circumstances then
prevailing that persons of prUdence, discretion, and
intelligence exercise in the management of their own
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affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income as well as the probable safety of their
capital," "prudent man rule," "prudent trustee rule,"
"prudent person rule," and "prudent investor rule."
SECTION 11. APPLICATION TO EXISTING TRUSTS. This [Act]
applies to trusts existing on and created after its
effective date. As applied to trusts existing on its
effective date, this [Act] governs only decisions or actions
occurring after that date.
SECTION 12. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
sUbject of this [Act] among the States enacting it.
SECTION 13. SHORT TITLE. This [Act] may be cited as
the" [Name of Enacting State] Uniform Prudent Investor Act."
SECTION 14. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this
[Act] or its application to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of this [Act] which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this [Act] are severable.
SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [Act] takes effect
SECTION 16. REPEALS. The following acts and parts of
acts are repealed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
B-~
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
!
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES:
INNOVATIVE USES OF ESOPs
IN ESTATE PLANNING FOR BUSINESS OWNERS
David Ackerman
McBride, Baker & Coles
Chicago, Illinois
. Copyright 1999, David Ackerman
SECTIONC
.~------------------------------..j
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r,
r
,.
I
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
f
r
r
I
r
r
r
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES:
Innovative Uses of ESOPs in Estate Planning for Business Owners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION C-l
A. ESOPs Are An Important But Often Ov.erlooked Estate Planning
Technique For Business Owners C-1
B. Why Estate Planners Should Be Interested In ESOPs C-1
C. Scope Of Presentation C-2
SPECIAL ESTATE PLANNING NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS OWNER C-2
A. Typical Objectives Of Family Business Owner C-2
B. The Odds Against Keeping The Business In The Family C-3
C. Reasons So Few Family Businesses Are Perpetuated C-3
D. Role Of Estate Planner C-3
HOW AN ESOP WORKS C-4
A. Definition C-4
B. Basic Tax Attributes C-4
C. Requirements For Tax-Qualification C-4
D. Limitations On Contributions And Allocations C-5
E. Special ESOP Tax-Qualification Rules C-5
TAX-FREE ROLLOVER ON SALE OF STOCK TO AN ESOP C-7
A. Section 1042 Of The Internal Revenue Code C-7
B. Conditions For Tax-Free Treatment C-7
C. Definition Of "Qualified Securities" C-7
D. The 3D-Percent ESOP Ownership Test C-8
E. "Qualified Replacement Property" C-9
F. Election To Defer Tax C-1D
G. Recapture Of Gain Upon Disposition Of Qualified Replacement Property C-ll
H. Additional Rules ; C-11
THE ESOP AS A TAX-FAVORED FINANCING TECHNIQUE C-ll
A. Deduction Of Principal C-11
B. Example Of A Simple Leveraged ESOP Transaction C-12
THE DIVIDENDS-PAID DEDUCTION C-12
A. Section 404(k) Of The Code C-12
B. No Deduction If Plan Sponsor Is An S Corporation C-12
SECTIONC
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS C-12
A. Dilution Of Equity C-12
B. Repurchase Liability C-13
C. Valuation Of The Stock C-13
VIII. USES OF ESOPS IN ESTATE PLANNING FOR BUSINESS OWNERS C-13
A. Business Perpetuation C-13
B. Diversification Of Wealth C-14
C. Post-Mortem Planning C-15
IX. COMBINING ESOPS WITH OTHER ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES C-15
A. Deferring or Avoiding Recapture Of Gain On Disposition
Of Qualified Replacement Properties C-15
B. Use Of Charitable Remainder Trusts C-17
C. Combining ESOPs And Family Limited Partnerships C-18
X. DEALING WITH RETAINED BUSINESS INTEREST C-19
A. Altematives C-19
B. Retention Of Remaining Business Interests C-19
C. Sale of Business Or Public Offering C-20
D. Gifts C-20
E. Other Planning Techniques C-21
APPENDIX A: SUCCESSION PLANNING EXAMPLE C-23
APPENDIX B: ILLUSTRATION OF A LEVERAGED ESOP C-25
SECfIONC
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
~.
r
r
r
r
r 1.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES --
INNOVATIVE USE OF ESOPS IN ESTATE PLANNING
FOR BUSINESS OWNERS
By David Ackennan
McBride Baker & Coles
Chicago, lllinois
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ESOPs are an Important but often Overlooked Estate Planning Technique
for Business Owners
Special tax incentives for ESOPs make them attractive, not only as
employee benefit plans, but also as an estate planning tool
Estate planners still think of ESOPs merely as employee benefit
plans
Employee benefits lawyers often fail to see how ESOPs can be used
in estate planning because of their unfamiliarity with the estate tax
rules
Why Estate Planners Should be Interested in ESOPs
1. ESOPs can be used effectively to accomplish important estate
planning objectives ofbusiness owners
a source of liquidity with which to pay estate taxes
b. deferring or completely avoiding recognition of income
c. converting ordinary income into capital gain
d. facilitation ofprivate business ownership succession
C -1
e. reducing the after-tax cost of borrowing
f. reducing the effective rate of transfer taxes
2. Implementation of an ESOP generally triggers a need for reconsideration
ofa business owner's estate plan
a. nature ofowner's wealth substantially changed
b. implementation of ESOP often creates opportunities for use of other
estate planning techniques
(1) immediately after a leveraged ESOP transaction, value of plan
sponsor's stock is depressed - - and this creates opportunities
for tax-effective gifts
(2) charitable remainder trusts can be used effectively to hold low-
basis replacement properties purchased with proceeds of a tax-
deferred sale to an ESOP
c. family limited partnerships can be combined effectively with ESOP
transactions
C. Scope of Presentation
1. Special estate planning needs of business owners which can be addressed
by ESOPs
2. General overview of how ESOPs work
3. Description of special tax incentives for ESOPs which make them
attractive as an estate planning technique
4. How ESOPs can be used in estate planning
5. Combining ESOPs with other estate planning techniques
II. SPECIAL ESTATE PLANNING NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS OWNER
A. TyPical Objectives ofFamily Business Owner
1. Maintain business in family
2. Retire with adequate and assured income
3. Security for spouse
C -2
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4. Treat children equally
5. Minimize taxes
B. The Odds against Keeping the Business in the Family
1. Less than one out of three family businesses will make it through a second
generation
2. Only about one out of five family businesses will make it through a third
generation
C. Reasons So Few Family Businesses are Perpetuated
1. "Forced" sale ofbusiness
a. failure to groom successors
b. failure to plan for payment ofestate taxes
2. Disagreements among successor family members
a. children and cousins not active in business may desire or need
dividend income from the business
b. children and cousins active in the business likely will prefer not to
pay large dividends
(1) desire to fund future expansion out of accumulated earnings
(2) draw salaries and, therefore, have no need to obtain additional
dividend income
D. Role ofEstate Planner
1. Encourage business owner to consider what will happen to the business
after he or she dies or retires
2. Present planning ideas to address the business owner's needs
3. Implement plan
4. Monitor plan to assure that it remains appropriate, taking into account - -
a. changes in client's circumstances, and
b. changes in tax and other laws
C - 3
III. HOW AN ESOP WORKS
A. Definition: employee benefit plan designed to invest primarily in stock of the
sponsoring employer
B. Basic Tax Attributes
1. Contributions to the plan are deductible by the sponsoring employer
(within applicable limits, which are described in Section III D below)
2. Income earned by the ESOP trust is exempt from tax
3. Participants in the ESOP do not recognize income until their benefits are
withdrawn
C. Requirements for Tax-Qualification
1. Participation in the plan must be available to a broad cross-section of
employees
a. cannot limit participation to a select group of key executives
b. union employees may be excluded
2. Benefits must be allocated in a nondiscriminatory manner
a. benefits may not be allocated in a way that unduly favors officers,
shareholders, or highly-compensated employees
b. safe harbor: benefits may be allocated in proportion to relative
compensation of participating employees
(1) however, any compensation in excess of $160,000 must be
disregarded
(2) $160,000 cap subject to adjustment to reflect changes in the
cost of living
3. Written plan
4. Vesting standards
a. seven-year graded
b. five-year "cliff'
-c -4
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5. A trust must be established to hold the employer securities and other
assets of the plan
a. trust must be administered for the exclusive benefit of the
participants in the plan and their beneficiaries
b. trustee subject to "prudent person" and other fiduciary rules of
ERISA
D. Limitations on Contributions and Allocations
1. Limits on tax-deductible contributions
a. general rule: maximum annual deduction limited to 15 percent of
compensation of participants in plan ("covered compensation")
b. maximum deductible amount may be increased to 25 percent of
covered compensation if a money purchase pension plan is included
as part of the ESOP
c. increased limits for amounts allocated to repay an ESOP loan (for C
corporations only)
(1) contributions used to pay interest are fully deductible
(2) contributions used to pay principal are deductible up to 25
percent of covered compensation
2. Individual allocation limitation
a. general rule: lesser of25 percent of compensation or $30,000
b. this limitation does not apply to contributions used to repay interest
on an ESOP loan or forfeitures if no more than one-third of the
employer contributions applied to repayment of principal is allocated
to "highly compensated employees"
E. Special ESOP Tax-Qualification Rules
1. Voting Rights
a. voting rights on publicly-traded securities must be passed through to
participants
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b. pass-through of voting rights with respect to other securities may be
limited to extraordinary transactions (such as a merger, sale of
substantially all assets, recapitalization, or liquidation)
(1) if participants' voting rights are limited, the trustee will vote the
stock
(2) trustee may be subject to direction by other designated persons
(~.g., ESOP Committee)
2. Distribution Rules
a. timing: unless a participant elects a later date, distributions must
commence no later than one year after the close of the plan year -
(1) in which he or she terminates employment due to reaching
normal retirement age, disability, or death; or
(2) which is the fifth plan year following the plan year in which he
or she otherwise separates from service
b. distributions of securities acquired with the proceeds of a loan may
be delayed until the loan is repaid
c. benefits may be distributed in installments over five years (over a
longer term where the benefits exceed $725,000)
d. right to demand employer securities: a participant may demand that
his or her benefits be distributed in the form of stock of the employer,
unless either - -
(1) articles of incorporation or by-laws restrict ownership of
employer securities to employees
(2) plan sponsor is an S corporation
3. Put Option
a. unless the employer's stock is publicly traded, a partIcIpant may
require the employer to repurchase any employer stock distributed to
him or her at a price determined under a "fair valuation fonnula"
b. if benefits are distributed in a lump sum, the employer may elect to
pay the purchase price upon exercise of the put option in installments
over a period not to exceed five years
C-6
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4. Diversification Requirements
a. at least three investment options must be offered to participants who
have attained age 55 and who have completed ten years of
participation in the plan
b. alternative: distribute cash equal to the amount with respect to which
an investment option otherwise must have been provided
c. amount subject to direction by participant
(1) twenty-five percent of the balance credited to his or her account
during the first five years after diversification right accrues
(2) fifty percent thereafter
TAX-FREE ROLLOVER ON SALE OF STOCK TO AN ESOP
A. Section 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") provides an
opportunity for a tax-free rollover of the proceeds of a sale of stock to an
ESOP if the proceeds are reinvested in securities ofother corporations
1. Available only with respect to sales of common stock of 'private C
corporations
2. The stock must have been owned by the seller for at least three years
B. Conditions for Tax-Free Treatment
1. Sale of "qualified securities" to an ESOP
2. Immediately after the sale, the ESOP owns at least 30 percent of the
sponsoring employer's stock
3. Sale proceeds are reinvested in "qualified replacement property" (stocks or
bonds ofdomestic operating corporations)
4. Election to defer tax
C. Definition Of "Qualified Securities"
1. Must be "employer securities"
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a. common stock issued by the employer (or by a corporation which is a
member of the same controlled group as the employer) having a
combination of voting power and dividend rights equal to or in excess of:
(1) that class of common stock of the employer (or of any other
member of the controlled group) having the greatest voting
power, and
(2) that class of common stock of the employer (or of any other
member of the controlled group) having the greatest dividend
rights
b. certain noncallable preferred stock also may qualify
2. The employer securities must have been issued by a domestic C
corporation that has no stock outstanding that is readily tradable on an
established securities market
3. The employer securities must not have been received by the taxpayer in --
a. a distribution from a tax-qualified employee benefit plan, or
b. a transfer pursuant to an option or other right to acquire stock to
which the provisions of Sections 83, 422, or 423 of the Code apply
D. The 3D-Percent ESOP Ownership Test
1. Immediately after the sale, the ESOP must own either --
a. 30 percent of each class ofoutstanding stock or the plan sponsor, or
b. 30 percent of the total value of all outstanding stock of the plan
sponsor
2. For this purpose, the term "stock" does not include nonvoting preferred
stock which is not convertible into another class of stock
3. Note: 3D-percent test is applied immediately after the transaction
a. this means that it is not necessary for a corporation to have
previously adopted an ESOP in order to set up a tax-deferred sale
b. rather, an ESOP can be set up for the purpose of arranging a tax-
deferred sale
C - 8
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E. "Qualified Replacement Property"
1. Definition: any security issued by a domestic operating corporation (other
than the plan sponsor or any member of a controlled group which includes
the plan sponsor)
2. Definition of "security"
a. a share of stock in a corporation
b. a right to subscribe for or to receive a share of stock in a corporation
c. a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of
indebtedness, issued by a corporation with interest coupons or in
registered form
3. Definition of "operating corporation": a corporation more than 50 percent
of the assets of which were, at the time that the security was purchased or
before the close of the replacement period, used in the active conduct of a
trade or business
a. financial institutions and Insurance companies are treated as
"operating corporations"
b. controlling and controlled corporations are treated as a single
corporation
4. Passive investment income test
a. a security issued by a domestic operating corporation will not be
"qualified replacement property" if, for the taxable year preceding the
taxable year in which the security was purchased, the corporation had
passive investment income in excess of 25 percent of the
corporation's gross receipts
b. "passive investment income" means gross receipts derived from
royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges
of securities
5. Replacement Period: the qualified replacement properties must be
purchased within the "replacement period" in order for the sale to the
ESOP to qualify for nonrecognition treatment
a. the replacement period begins three months before the date on which
the sale of the qualified securities to the ESOP occurs, and
b. the replacement period ends twelve months after the date of the sale
C-9
6. Basis and holding period for qualified replacement properties
a. taxpayer's basis in qualified replacement properties is reduced by gain
deferred in connection with sale to ESOP
(I) in effect, carryover basis
(2) if more than one item of qualified replacement property is
purchased, the carryover basis is prorated among all of the
qualified replacement properties on the basis of their relative
values
b. tacking of holding period: the taxpayer's holding period for the
qualified replacement properties includes the period during which the
taxpayer held the qualified securities sold to the ESOP
F. Election to Defer Tax
I. Election to defer tax pursuant to Section 1042 of the Code must be made
in a "statement of election" attached to the taxpayer's income tax return
for the taxable year in which the ESOP sale occurs
a. once made, the election is irrevocable
b. the temporary regulations provide that if the election is not made in a
timely manner, the taxpayer may not later make an election on an
amended return [Temp. Regs. §1.1042-1T (Q&A-3)]
c. temporary regulations set forth information to be included In
statement of election [Temp. Regs. §1.1042-IT (Q&A-3)(b)]
2. Qualified replacement properties must be described in "statements of
purchase" which must be filed with the taxpayer's tax returns
a. statements of purchase must describe the qualified replacement
property and state the date of the purchase and the cost of the
property
b. statements of purchase must be notarized not later than 30 days after
the purchase
3. Partial elections
a. a taxpayer may elect to defer part, but not all, of the gain realized in
connection with a sale of qualified securities to an ESOP
C -10
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b. ~.g., if a taxpayer sells to an ESOP qualified securities in which his or
her basis is $1 million for a price of $11 million and purchases $9
million of qualified replacement properties, then $1 million of gain
would be recognized
G. Recapture of Gain upon Disposition ofQualified Replacement Property
1. General Rule: upon disposition of qualified replacement property, gain
recognized to extent of the gain previously deferred under Section 1042 of
the Code by reason of the taxpayer's acquisition of the qualified
replacement property
2. Exceptions: no recogmtlon of gain in connection with transfers of
qualified replacement properties by reason of any of the following - -
a. death of the taxpayer
b. a gift by the taxpayer
c. a corporate reorganization to which Section 368 of the Code applies
(unless the taxpayer controls the acquiring or acquired corporation
and the qualified replacement property is substituted-basis property
in the hands of the transferee)
d. a transaction to which Section 1042 of the Code applies
H. Additional Rules
1. If the ESOP disposes of the employer securities with respect to which the
Section 1042 election has been made within three years, the plan sponsor
is subject to a ten-percent excise tax
2. Seller's shares must not be allocated back to the seller or to related parties
or to 25-percent shareholders
THE ESOP AS A TAX-FAVORED FINANCING TECHNIQUE
A. Deduction ofPrincipal
I. The fiduciary rules applicable to tax-qualified plans generally prohibit
sponsoring employers from lending money to a qualified plan,
guaranteeing a loan to a plan, or providing collateral for a loan
2. However, a special exemption is provided for loans to ESOPs, where the
loan proceeds are used to acquire common stock of the sponsoring
employer
C-II
B. Example of a Simple Leveraged ESOP Transaction:
1. The ESOP uses the loan proceeds to purchase shares of the sponsoring
corporation, either from the corporation or from stockholders;
2. The corporation makes annual cash contributions to the ESOP in amounts
sufficient to amortize the loan; and
3. The corporation takes deductions for the amounts so contributed (for both
the amounts used to pay principal as well as the amounts used to pay
interest)
VI. THE DIVIDENDS-PAID DEDUCTION
A. Section 404(k) of the Code allows a tax deduction for cash dividends paid on
employer stock held by an ESOP if the dividends either are --
1. used to make payments on an ESOP loan, the proceeds of which were
used to acquire the employer securities with respect to which the
dividends are paid, or
2. paid in cash to the plan participants or paid to the plan and then distributed
to the participants within 90 days after the close of the plan year in which
the dividends are paid
B. No Deduction if Plan Sponsor is an S Corporation
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
A. Dilution ofEquity
1. After an ESOP is put in place, participants share in all future growth of the
business on a pro rata basis
2. "Cost" of sharing equity with employees may be offset, in part or in full,
by:
a. increases in employee productivity,
b. reductions in other employee benefits, and
c. tax savings
C -12
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B. Repurchase Liability
I. If the stock of an employer that sponsors an ESOP is not publicly traded,
the participants have the right to require the sponsoring employer (not the
ESOP) to repurchase any shares distributed to them
2. Before establishing an ESOP, a company should consider whether this put
option requirement might impose an undue financial burden upon the
company at any time in the future
a. although the repurchase liability initially may be modest, it will grow,
perhaps rapidly, as the ESOP matures and as more shares of stock
are allocated to accounts ofemployees
b. moreover, if the company is successful, the value of the shares
themselves should increase
3. Methods for managing the repurchase liability
a. pay-as-you-go
b. establish cash reserves, either within the ESOP or in a "sinking fund"
controlled by the company
c. insurance
d. repurchase through ESOP, thereby making cost of shares tax-
deductible
c. Valuation of the Stock
1. Valuations are required at least once a year and whenever stock is sold or
contributed to an ESOP
2. All valuations of employer stock held by an ESOP that is not publicly
traded must be made by an independent appraiser
VIII. USES OF ESOPS IN ESTATE PLANNING FOR BUSINESS OWNERS
A. Business Perpetuation
1. ESOPS present an attractive alternative to sale of business if younger
executives have been adequately trained to manage the business
C -13
2. ESOP sale provides source of liquid assets which can be used for the
following purposes:
a. payment of estate taxes, and
b. providing properties other than stock of the family business for
inheritance by family members who will not be employed by the
business
3. Control over the business can be retained by the family
a. a minority interest in the business can be sold to the ESOP
b. even if ESOP holds a majority interest, control in fact not likely to
change
(1) seller, members of seller's family, or other officers or directors
can be selected as trustee, with right to vote stock
(2) even if trustee is independent, change in control unlikely
(a) trustee can be subject to direction from a committee
selected by the Board ofDirectors
(b) independent trustee not likely to change management in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, even if it has
power to do so
4. Tax-advantaged financing
B. Diversification ofWealth
1. ESOP sale is an attractive alternative a sale to a third party
2. Disadvantages of sales to third parties
a. hard to find third parties who will purchase a minority interest in a
private company
b. if a buyer can be found, he or she will demand substantial discounts
for lack of control and lack of marketability
c. sale to third party will be taxable
3. Sale to ESOP
a. seller can retain control
C -14
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b. if a minority interest is sold, a minority-interest discount must be
taken in determining sales price, but little or no discount for lack of
marketability is required because ESOP participants will have a put
option
c. tax can be deferred
4. Comparison to stock redemption
a. stock redemption taxable, most likely at ordinary income rates
b. the owner's stock is repurchased with "after-tax dollars" (as
compared to the use of "pre-tax dollars" in a leveraged ESOP
transaction)
C. Post-Mortem Planning
1. Financing for purchase of stock from estate can be arranged on a tax-
advantaged basis
2. No need for income tax deferral since stock basis will be stepped up to fair
market value in estate
3. Avoid "forced" sale to outside parties
COMBINING ESOPS WITH OTHER ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES
A. Deferring or Avoiding Recapture of Gain on Disposition of Qualified
Replacement Properties
1. If a taxpayer elects to defer recognition of gain in connection with a sale
to a stock to an ESOP, the taxpayer takes a carryover basis in the qualified
replacement properties
2. Investing the ESOP sale proceeds
a. investment considerations (beyond scope of this presentation)
b. tax considerations
(1) long-term planning horizon: the longer the replacement
properties are held, the longer the tax on the gain realized in the
ESOP transaction is deferred
C - 15
(2) capital gains tax can be completely avoided if replacement
properties are held until the death of the taxpayer, under the
nonnal rules allowing for a step-up in basis at death
3. Diversified Portfolio
a. easiest strategy
b. deferred gain recognized proportionately when qualified replacement
properties are sold
4. Floating Rate Notes
a. long-tenn U.S. corporate bonds
(1) interest rate: "floating," based on an index (such as LffiOR or
commercial paper rate)
(2) tenn: typically 40-60 years
(3) call protection for 20 years or more
b. "Monetization": borrow against the notes and buy and sell securities
in a margin account
c. benefits of investing in floating-rate notes
(1) can trade securities in margin account on a tax-free basis
(2) flexibility: in margin account, alternative investments are
available (~.g. partnerships, real estate, life insurance)
(3) assets purchased with loans secured by floating-rate notes may
be used to fund a family limited partnership (see discussion at
Section IX-C below)
5. Gifts
a. outright gifts
C -16
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b. gifts in trust
c. GRATs for children
B. Use of Charitable Remainder Trusts
1. Transfer of qualified replacement properties to a charitable remainder trust
does not trigger recognition of income
2. Benefits of transfer to charitable trust
a. tax on gain from sale to ESOP pennanently avoided
(1) charitable trust can sell replacement properties and reinvest
without incurring tax liability
(2) allows for active trading and continued diversification of ESOP
sale-proceeds portfolio
b. income tax deduction for taxpayer
c. trust pays an annual income from earnings on the trust fund for the
remaining life of the taxpayer or for the remaining lives of the
taxpayer and his or her spouse
d. substantial deferred benefit for charitable beneficiary
3. Alternative structure: gift of company stock to charitable trust, followed
by sale to ESOP
a. tax consequences
(1) tax deduction for taxpayer
(2) no tax to charitable trust upon sale of stock to ESOP
(3) taxpayer avoids estate taxation on transferred stock, while
retaining annuity interest
C -17
b. comparison to gift of qualified replacement properties
(1) can sell less than a 30-percent interest to the ESOP
(2) seller and member of seller's family can participate in the ESOP
C. Combining ESOPs and Family Limited Partnerships
1. Set up family limited partnership prior to ESOP transaction and transfer
minority interest in family corporation to partnership
a. should qualify for minority-interest discount
b. additional valuation discount attributable to holding of stock In
family limited partnership
c. family limited partnership can sell stock to ESOP on a tax-deferred
basis and reinvest in a diversified portfolio of qualified replacement
properties
(1) if the stock is sold in an integrated transaction with a sufficient
amount of other stock to provide the ESOP with a controlling
interest, stock can be sold to ESOP at a control price (far in
excess of the value used for gift tax purposes)
(2) stock can be sold to ESOP on an installment basis, taking
advantage of current low interest rates
(3) some of the family partnership units can be transferred to a
generation-skipping trust
d. Disadvantages
(1) family limited partnership cannot make in-kind distributions of
qualified replacement properties without triggering recognition
ofgain
(2) carryover basis for qualified replacement properties
C - 18
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2. Post-ESOP family limited partnership
a. proceeds from ESOP sale cannot be transferred directly to a family
limited partnership and qualify for the tax deferral because an interest
in a partnership does not constitute qualified replacement property
b. a transfer of qualified replacement properties to a family limited
partnership will trigger recognition ofgain
c. gain recognition can be avoided if cash from a loan secured by
floating-rate notes is used to fund the family limited partnership (or
assets purchased with the proceeds from a loan against floating-rate
notes may be used)
DEALING WITH RETAINED BUSINESS INTEREST
A. Alternatives
1. Hold
2. Sell business or go public in the future
3. Sell more shares to ESOP in future
4. Gifts to children and grandchildren
a. outright
b. use of trusts
B. Retention of Remaining Business Interests
1. Preserve options
2. Wait and see how designated successors are working out
a. if they are able to manage the business, a second-stage ESOP
transaction can be implemented in the future
b. if successor management does not perform well, company can be
sold or another alternative can be pursued
C -19
C. Sale of Business or Public Offering
1. Existence ofESOP will not preclude a future sale of the business or public
stock offering
2. Proceeds from sale or public offering will have to be shared with ESOP
(but in the meantime owner has diversified wealth on a tax-deferred basis)
D. Gifts-
I. The period immediately following a leveraged ESOP transaction is an ideal
time to make a gift of stock of the plan sponsor
a. value of stock depressed by ESOP indebtedness
b. value of stock likely to appreciate rapidly as debt is paid down and
company grows
2. If owner gives away enough shares to reduce his or her ownership interest
below 50 percent, the estate then wilI be entitled to minority-interest
discount for estate tax purposes
3. Example: owner sells 30 percent of stock of family company to ESOP
and then makes a gift of 21 percent of the outstanding shares to his or her
children
a. value of stock depressed by reason ofESOP indebtedness
b. in addition, a minority-interest discount can be taken
c. retained interest in owner's estate also qualifies for minority-interest
discount
4. Use of trusts
a. generation-skipping trusts
b. GRATs
(1) use of a GRAT can be facilitated by causing the company to
make an Selection
(2) annuity interest then can be funded with distributions that would
be made by corporation anyway to cover shareholders' tax
liabilities
C -20
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(3) no tax on share of corporate income allocable to ESOP
(4) S election cannot be made until year after year in which tax-
deferred sale takes place
E. Other Planning Techniques
1. Preferred stock recapitalization
2. Installment sale
C - 21
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APPENDIX A
SUCCESSION PLANNING EXAMPLE
I. Facts
A. Frank owns all of the stock ofa corporation
B. Frank is 70 years old and is ready to retire
C. Frank's son, Sam, is 40 years old and desires to take over management of the
business
D. Most of Frank's wealth consists ofhis stock of the corporation
E. The value of the corporation is approximately $10 million
F. The corporation has 100 employees
ll. Objectives
A. Frank's Objectives:
1. Develop a plan to enable him to retire with an adequate and assured
mcome
2. Diversify his personal wealth
3. Transfer control of the business to Sam
B. Sam's Objectives:
1. Take over management of the business
2. Assure retirement security for Frank
3. Minimize long-term debt burden imposed upon company
4. Provide incentive for key employees to help Sam to expand the business
Ill. Alternatives
A. Sell the Business
B. Installment Purchase by Sam
C. Redeem part or all of Frank's stock
D. Use an ESOP to Purchase Some or All of Frank's Stock
C -23
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r ILLUSTRATION OF A LEVERAGED ESOP
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Fiduciary Management 01the Closely Held Business
by
Sheldon G. Gilman
Louisville, Kentucky
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1.1(a) These materials reviewthe rules which establish the basis for fiduciary conduct in the
management ofclosely held businesses. Also, these materials review some ofthe cases which have
interpreted the rules establishing fiduciary conduct. An analysis ofspecific rules and cases are for
purposes of illustration and for determining proper conduct. These materials do not constitute a
review of the law of all 50 states.
I.I(b) These materials review defensive planning strategies that may be available to the
fiduciary to minimize the risks of fiduciary administration involving the management, control and
sale of a closely held business.
1.I (c) Definitions.
I.I(c)(I) A closely held business encompasses a corporation, limited liability
company, partnership ora sole proprietorship where the ownership is concentrated in a small
group of individuals, typically a family unit.
1.I (c)(2) Fiduciary is the person charged with the responsibility for estate and trust
administration, and is sometimes referred to as personal representative, executor and trustee.
1.2 Reasons for Fiduciary Management. There are many reasons for a client to prefer that the
business be continued and/or managed by a fiduciary, and it is imperative that the fiduciary
understand and document the client's reasons for preferring fiduciary management.
1.2(a) Difficulty in Developing Alternative Plans. The decedent may not have had time to
develop alternate arrangements for the profitable disposal ofthe business. Experience indicates that
the bargaining position ofa retiring owner is weak, and in many situations it is better to continue the
income stream generated by the business compared to a sale of the business at a reduced value and
then take the risk a collecting the purchase price. Further, the problems in business valuation, market
share limitations and unknown collection ability are real. In this situation the client recognizes the
problem, but prefers that someone else deal with it. The client's lack of action and the reasons
therefore should be documented.
1.2(b) Quality of Business Opportunity. The decedent may believe that it is desirable to
retain the business for the benefit of his/her family, especially if the business is relatively secure,
yields a high rate of return, and has competent management. Many businesses today are operated
by absentee owners with effective and properly compensated executive employees.
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1.3 Reasons for Higher Level of Fiduciary Concern.
1.3(a) Litigation to surcharge a fiduciary has become more common as we Americans
become more accustomed to blaming others when a bad result occurs. The reasons for an increase
in litigation are stated below.
1.3(a)(I) As estate administration becomes more complex, especially as tax laws
constantly change and numerous tax elections become available, the opportunity for error
increases.
1.3(a)(2) Beneficiaries expect and demand more from fiduciaries, and the
beneficiaries expectations are not always realistic.
1.3(a)(3) There is greater conflict today among a client's beneficiaries who do not .
share the same family environment - second spouses; his children; her children; our children;
the children in the business; the children or in-laws not in the business, etc.
1.3(a)(4) Fiduciary advertising creates a higher level of expectation by the
beneficiaries.
1.3(a)(5) Fiduciaries face increasing competition for business, forcing them to be
more accommodating to beneficiaries leading to a situation ofinability to meet expectations.
1.3(a)(6) Absent local participation by responsible fiduciary management, and or
direction by fiduciary executive officer group; either the real managers don't know, don't
understand and/or have not created realistic expectations.
1.4 Protections of Fiduciary. A fiduciary is best protected by performing due diligence, as
reviewed in this presentation1 and then documenting in a clear and unequivocal manner the steps
taken to protect the various competing interests - beneficiaries and business (creditors and minority
shareholders). The fiduciary must assume that it will be sued for breach of fiduciary
responsibilities - start to buildyour defense before day one!
1.4(a) Develop Guidelines. The importance of developing guidelines and policies for the
fiduciary management of a closely held business is imperative. The more thorough the guidelines
the more likely the fiduciary will be protected when the disgruntled beneficiary commences an action
against the fiduciary. A fiduciary should disclose its guidelines to customers and beneficiaries. In
the development of fiduciary guidelines consider the following.
1.4(a)(I) Acceptance of Trust Appointment. The time to determine whether you
will serve is before you are appointed. Your guidelines will protect you from a faulty start,
and once you are appointed keep in mind that it is very difficult to resign without substantial
exposure and great risk. If you are not aware of your appointment before the date of
decedent's death, that may be a clue that you may not want to serve as the fiduciary.
1 See Article 9 of this outline - Fiduciary Business Examination Issues.
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1.4(a)(2) Preparation for Operating a Closely Held Business. Is there anyone in the
business who has the capacity to assume the responsibility for business management before
the business owner's death? Does the fiduciary have the capacity to manage a business or
does the instrument and/or law pennit delegation? What arrangements may be made for
payment of business debts, especially any owed to the fiduciary.
1.4(a)(3) Establish "Control" Guidelines. Detennine the level of control that the
fiduciary will exercise when you take over the business. What will be your level of
participation?
1.4(a)(4) Establish Confidentiality Guidelines. As you will be required to disclose
all conflicts of interests, what are your fiduciary guidelines for maintaining confidentiality
ofsuch things as bank customer records, conflicting trust relationships? The law in this area
is not clear!
1.4(a)(5) Establish Method of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest. Develop a user
friendly letter that explains possible conflicts; for example, that you are a bank, you have a
depository relationship, and a trust relationship with various beneficiaries, employees ofthe
company and you have concluded that such relationships are nonnal and customary and do
not, in your careful review, constitute an improper relationship. Further, that if and when a
situation occurs which gives rise to a conflict ofinterest you will then infonn all parties. The
point is: take the lead - get outfront ofthe issueP
1.4(a)(6) Detennine Level ofBeneficiary Competence. Do any ofthe beneficiaries
have the ability to manage the business? Are the beneficiaries hostile or is beneficiary's
counsel hostile? Do you understand the reasons and the sources for the hostility - is it aploy
to establish a basis for removal of the fiduciary?
1.4(b) Document Perfonnance ofDue Diligence. The failure to document the extent ofthe
due diligence process and the extent of infonning the beneficiary will only serve to confinn the
disgruntled beneficiary's claims ofmismanagement, breach offiduciary duty and lead to an ultimate
finding of fiduciary misconduct.
1.5(b) Positives & Negatives ofBoard Members. The members ofthe fiduciary's Board of
Directors and Community Advisory Boards usually get to their position by bringing business to the
1.5(a) Positives & Negatives of Commercial Department. A professional fiduciary is
usually thankful for the commercial side oftheir business for leads and development ofpositive bank
relationships. However, there is a "curse" that comes with the relationship - the professional
fiduciary has a responsibility to teach the commercial side the problems offiduciary responsibility
and conflicts ofinterest. [Charging the highest rate ofinterest to your fiduciary controlled business
may be a breach of a fiduciary obligation - the potential for losses exceeds the gains.]
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1.5 Develop Education Program for Staff & Board Members.
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2 See Exhibit 1 - Letter to Advisory Committee - Fiduciary Stock.
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commercial side of the bank's fiduciary's business. These Board members must be taught the
fiduciary's rules for playing golf and lunching safely!
2. REVIEW OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY RULES - IN GENERAL.
2.1 ~evelop an Understanding Conflict of Interest Rules.
2.1(a) Conflict ofInterest Rules in the Business Setting. In Meinhardv. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458 (1928) Benjamin Cardozo clarified the application of fiduciary conflict rules to business
transactions. Salmon had taken a lease on a hotel for 20 years, with an obligation to convert the
property to stores and offices. Meinhard agreed to put up half the money, they were to share the
profits, and Salmon was to be the sole managing partner. Near the end of the 20 year term, a new
owner of the property, who also owned adjoining land, wanted to tear down the existing buildings
and construct a larger building. In order to accomplish the project, he negotiated with a company
controlled by Salmon. A new $3 million building was to be erected, and the new rent would be from
$350,000 to $475,000, as compared with the original $55,000 rent. Meinhard was not informed of
the project until after the new lease had been signed, and he brought suit claiming that he was
deprived ofthe chance to participate in the new opportunity thatarose out ofthe original venture and
asserting his right to a share of the new lease. Cardozo's opinion treated the case as presenting a
major issue of fiduciary conduct.
Many forms ofconduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard ofbehavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude ofcourts ofequity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion"
of particular exceptions. Meinhardv. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 at 464,164 N.E. 545 at 546
(1928).
2.1(b) Conflict ofInterest Rules and Lawyer Ethics. For lawyers serving as a fiduciary the
lawyer must be mindful of the lawyer conflict rules which prohibit direct conflicts and situations
where the lawyer's role would be "materially" limited. See Rules 1.7 and 1.8, and the Comments to
the Rules of Professional Conduct.3
2.1(c) Conflict of Interest Rules and Fiduciaries. There are various types of potential
conflict ofinterest situations, and different conclusions result from each type ofconflict relationship.
Defining the nature ofthe conflict and commenting on such conflicts is an appropriate place to begin
this analysis. While it is easy to quote fiduciary responsibilities in the abstract, like "duty ofloyalty,"
"good faith," "duty to deal impartially" and avoidance of "self-dealing" it is often difficult, in the
abstract to see the potential conflict.
2.1(c)(I) Trustee - Beneficiary Direct Conflict. The typical example is where the
trustee's own personal interests conflict with the beneficiary's personal interests. For
3See Exhibit 2 - Conflict Rules for Lawyers
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example, a corporate fiduciary wants to purchase property to build a new bank building and
the trust estate owns the real property - the bank wants the cheapest price and the trust estate
wants the highest price. The trustee's business interests and the beneficiary's interests create
a conflict of interest.
2.1(c)(2) Trustee Beneficiary to Beneficiary Conflict. The typical example is a
multiple trust situation; for example, a marital deduction trust and the by-pass trust. It is not
unusual for the marital deduction trust to provide for encroachments on principal for the
spouse's benefit with one set ofremaindermen. The by-pass trust may also provide for the
surviving spouse with a different set of remaindermen. In this situation the trustee has no
personal interest in either trust, but the trustee's exercise of the power to encroach upon
principal ofone trust or the other will adversely impact the amount of the economic benefit
for the remainder beneficiaries; hence, the creation of a conflict of interest.
2.1(c)(3) Trustee Trust to Trust Conflict. The typical example is where the
economic interests of one trust conflict with the economic interests of another trust. For
example, trustee while administering trust A enters into a contract with energy company to
exploit mineral interests on property owned by trustee oftrust A. Now, the energy company
wants to exploit mineral interests on adjoining property which is owned by the same trustee
oftrust B. The contract for trust B is better than the contract for trust A, and the contract for
trust B will adversely affect the economic interests of trust A.
2.1(c)(4) Possible Safe Resolutions.
2.1(c)(4)(A) Disclose All Information. As the trustee has a duty to fully
disclose to the beneficiary all facts and circumstances which have come to the
fiduciary's knowledge, a prudent fiduciary would disclose more rather than less, and
solicit advice from the beneficiaries and request their direction.
2.1(c)(4)(B) Recommend that Independent Advice be Obtained. The
trustee should recommend that the beneficiaries obtain independent advice, free of
the advice or recommendation ofthe trustee.
2.1(c)(4)(C) Apply to Court for Instructions. Where a question exists as
to the fairness of a fiduciary's actions, applying to the court for instructions is the
only safe response. See 125 ALR656.
2.2 General Fiduciary Duties. A fiduciary is under a duty to act for the benefit of the estate,
and the fiduciary's duties include the following.
2.2(a) Read the Will and Trust. The first and most important duty ofthe trustee is to study
and become thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the will or trust instrument, and thereafter
follow such provisions.4
4 See Loring - A Trustee's Handbook, Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1998.
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2.2(b) The Duty to Administer the Trust. A fiduciary who has accepted the administration
ofa trust/estate cannot resign without court approval, and/or the consent ofall beneficiaries. Further,
the fiduciary is responsible to carry out the wishes of its client; not necessarily the wishes of the
beneficiaries.
2.2(c) The Duty ofLoyalty. A fiduciary must act solely in the interests ofthe beneficiaries;
however, when questions ofdisclosure ofconflicts of interest arise, there are significant problems
for the fiduciary.
2.2(c)(1) How do you deal with correspondent bank relationships?
2.2(c)(2) How do you deal with customer account records - are bank customer
account records confidential?
2.2(c)(3) How do you deal with the multiple trusts, multiple set of beneficiary
issues, and should these relationships disclosed?
2.2(c)(4) Are there inter-locking directorships or bank lending relationships?
Consider the following Example:
An examination ofthe financial statements for The Lincoln Company discloses cash
deposits of$4 million in the bank fiduciary's commercial department, and Company
loans from the bank fiduciary of $5 million. Ask:
o Is there a interest rate differential?
o Is all the borrowing necessary?
o Should the fiduciary make arrangements to terminate the lending relationship?
2.2(c)(5) Are there interlocking ownership ofstock? Have you checked other trust
relationships?
2.2(c)(6) Are there creditors ofthe business that affect your fiduciary management
ofthe business? What about competing business relationships - who does the fiduciary do
business with?
2.2(c)(7) Ifa lawyer serves as the fiduciary then the lawyer fiduciary must also learn
to deal with lawyer ethics' conflict rules.
2.2(d) The Duty Not to Delegate. Generally, discretionary acts may not be delegated, only
pure ministerial acts may be delegated. For obvious reasons, a fiduciary may not wish to take an
active part in the conduct of the business; however, as the decedent placed great faith in the
fiduciary's talents and capabilities by charging the fiduciary with the care of the property, it is
generally held that the trustee must personally perform those acts and duties which require the
exercise of discretion.
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2.2(d)(1) Should the fiduciary personally undertake the day-to-day transactions of
the business or may the fiduciary employ a manager, and in this event, what degree ofcontrol
must the fiduciary place over the manager?
2.2(d)(2) Some of the circumstances that have been considered by the courts to
determine the "reasonableness" of the delegation of authority include the following.
2.2(d)(2)(A) The provisions of the instrument - broad or narrow?
2.2(d)(2)(B) Distance of the fiduciary to the situs of the business?
2.2(d)(2)(C) Decedent's former practices in the management of the
business?
2.2(d)(2)(D) Methods currently employed by competitors in operating
similar businesses?
2.2(d)(2)(E) The fiduciary's possession ofthe requisite skill for managing
the type ofbusiness?
2.2(d)(3) Some states have enacted statutes that permit the delegation of certain
powers and duties to another trustee.
2.2(e) The Duty to Keep and Render Accounts. The fiduciary must maintain clear records
of receipts, disbursements, gains and losses. The fiduciary must make reports to the beneficiaries.
2.2(t) The Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care and Skill. A fiduciary must exercise the care
and skill of a prudent person in administering an estate/trust. The fiduciary's primary goal is to
preserve the assets entrusted to the fiduciary.
2.2(g) The Duty to Take and Keep Control ofTrust Assets.
2.2(g)(1) A fiduciary must take possession of and maintain control of each trust
asset. How is that to be accomplished in a closely held business? Court and commentaries
advise that the fiduciary should take "control," however, there is very little guidance as to
what is meant by this word - control. Does it mean being a part of management, being a
board member, showing up at the place of business each day, receiving and reviewing
business management reports?
2.2(g)(2) Some courts have indicated that they would attribute control to the estate
when the fiduciary exercises control and votes the stock.
2.2(h) The Duty to Preserve Trust Property. A fiduciary has a duty to apply the skill of a
person ofordinary prudence in preserving the entire trust estate, and this may compel the fiduciary
to sell the closely held business interest. The attitude is based upon a beliefthat normal fluctuations
of business fortune are so unpredictable that a fiduciary should not risk trust funds in such an
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investment, that the knowledge and skill required to operate a business are beyond the expected
capacity ofthe average fiduciary, and that continuing a decedent's business is fundamentally at odds
with the other obligations and duties of the fiduciary.
2.2(i) The Duty to Enforce Claims. A fiduciary has a duty to take reasonable steps to collect
claims of the trust.
2.2(j) The Duty to Keep Trust Property Separate. A fiduciary must keep estate property
separate from its own property, and the fiduciary must designate estate property as property ofthe
estate.
2.2(k) The Duty to Make Trust Property Productive. A fiduciary has a duty to invest trust
funds so they will be productive ofincome. Also, note that property held in a marital deduction trust
must pennit the spouse to make the property productive of income or convert it within a reasonable
time. See Treasury Regulation §20.2056(b)(7) and PLR 8931005. What do you do when the closely
held business corporation does not pay dividends?
2.2(1) The Duty. to Be Impartial With Beneficiaries. Any discretion that a fiduciary
exercises in favor of one beneficiary over another must be based upon the provisions of the
governing instrument. Consider the following problems.
2.2(1)(1) A spouse who elects to take against the Will and claims the marital share
provided by statute. Is the spouse a beneficiary for purposes of fiduciary responsibility?
2.2(1)(2) Predeceased husband's trust gives surviving spouse a life estate with
remainder to children ofhis first marriage. Trustee has broad discretionary powers to spray
income and principal for use and benefit of spouse. Surviving spouse creates her own
revocable living trust and puts the bulk ofher assets into the trust, giving the trustee broad
discretionary powers. At spouse's death the remaining trust assets pass to her children from
her first marriage. During surviving spouse's life the trustee makes distributions from
predeceased husband's trust for surviving spouse's benefit, and at her death the husband's
children attack the fiduciary for making such distributions.
2.3 Prudent Investor Rule.
2.3(a) General Rule of Section 227 ofthe Restatement (Third) ofTrusts provides:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds ofthe trust as
a prudent investor would, in light ofthe purposes, tenns, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances ofthe trust.
(a) This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is
to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as
a part ofan overall investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives
reasonably suitable to the trust.
(b) In making and implementing investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to
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diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do
so.
(c) In addition, the trustee must:
(1) conform to fundamental fiduciary duties ofloyalty and impartiality;
(2) act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate authority and
in the selection and supervision of agents; and
(3) incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the
investment responsibilities of the trusteeship.
(d) The trustee's duties under this Section are subject to the rule of §228, dealing
primarily with contrary investment provisions of a trust or statute.
2.3(b) Duty with Respect to Original Investments. The prudent investor rule includes a
separate section with respect to the handling of original investments.
2.3(b)(1) Section 229 of the Restatement (/'hird) ofTrusts provides:
[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries, within a reasonable time after the
creation of the trust, to review the contents of the trust estate and to make and implement
decisions concerning the retention and disposition of original investments in order to
conform to the requirements of §§ 227 and 228.
2.3(b)(2) In a discussion ofthe Prudent Investor Rule on Section 229, the following
comments were made.
"A general authorization to the trustee to retain original investments is not a safe
harbor and does not absolve the trustee from undertaking the procedure described in section
229. Similarly, language in the governing instrument that authorizes the retention of a
specific asset, such as a family business, does not excuse the trustee from discharging the
duties described in section 229 and, by reference, sections 227 and 228, including duties of
care, caution, diversification, and impartiality. However, subject to the trustee's duty of
impartiality and consistent with the purposes ofthe trust, the trustee is permitted to consider
any special relationship between particular property and an objective of the grantor."s
2.3(c) Effect of"Sole Discretion." A reference in an instrument to a fiduciary acting in its
"sole discretion" means that in the absence ofbad faith or gross negligence the fiduciary cannot be
held liable for the exercise or non-exercise of fiduciary powers. The comments ofthe Restatement
ofTrusts provides, in part, the following:
The mere fact that the trustee is given discretion does not authorize him to act beyond the
5 Jerold I. Hom, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio Theory, and Private Trusts:
DraftingandAdministration Including the "Give-Me-Five" Unitrust, 23 Real Property, Probate and
Trust Journal 1, at page 20 (Spring 1998).
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bounds ofa reasonable judgment. The settlor may, however, manifest an intention that the
trustee's judgment need not be exercised reasonably, even where there is standard by which
the reasonableness ofthe trustee's conduct can be judged.••• The mere fact that the trustee
has acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient ground for
interposition by the cowt, so long as the trustee acts in a state ofmind not contemplated by
the settlor. Thus, the trustee will not be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive
other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily to act arbitrarily
without an exercise ofhis judgment.
2.4 Legislative Response to Prudent Rules. Numerous states have enacted various provisions
to protect and guide the fiduciary in the application ofthe prudent investor rules, and many ofthese
provisions will have applicability to protect the fiduciary in the management of the closely held
business.
2.4(a) Avoidance ofLiability Provisions. Some states permit a fiduciary to be relieved of
responsibility for a breach oftrust ifan appropriate provision is in the instrument except in instances
of actions constituting abuse.
2.4(b) Delegation of Management Functions. Some states have enacted provisions that
permit a fiduciary to delegate investment and management functions.
2.4(c) Reliance On and Approval ofBeneficiaries or Advisors. Some states have enacted
provisions that will permit the fiduciary to protect themselves if they refer questions of fiduciary
administration to the beneficiaries or an advisory committee.
2.4(d) California - CA Probate §16401 - Liability for acts of agents
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the trustee is not liable to the beneficiary for the
acts or omissions ofan agent.
(b) Under any ofthe circumstances described in this subdivision, the trustee is liable to the
beneficiary for an act or omission of an agent employed by the trustee in the administration of the
trust that would be a breach of the trust if committed by the trustee:
(1) Where the trustee directs the act of the agent.
(2) Where the trustee delegates to the agent the authority to perform an act that the
trustee is under a duty not to delegate.
(3) Where the trustee does not use reasonable prudence in the selection ofthe agent
or the retention of the agent selected by the trustee.
(4) Where.the trustee does not periodically review the agent's overall performance
and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(5) Where the trustee conceals the act of the agent.
(6) Where the trustee neglects to take reasonable steps to compel the agent to redress
the wrong in a case where the trustee knows of the agent's acts or omissions.
(c) The liability ofa trustee for acts or omissions ofagents that occurred before July 1, 1987,
is governed by prior law and not by this section.
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2.4(e) Colorado - § 15-1-307
Whenever an instrument under which a fiduciary is acting reserves to the settler or vests in
an advisory or investment committee or in any other person or persons including one or more other
fiduciaries, to the exclusion ofthe fiduciary or to the exclusion ofone or more ofseveral fiduciaries,
authority to direct the making or retention ofany investment, the excluded fiduciary or fiduciaries
shall not be liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the making or
retention of any investment pursuant to such direction.
2.4(t) Delaware - § 3313
(a) Where 1 or more persons are given authority by the terms of a governing instrument to
direct, consent to, or disapprove a fiduciary's investment decisions, or proposed investment
decisions, such persons shall be considered to be fiduciaries when exercising such authority unless
the governing instrument provides otherwise.
(b) Ifa governing instrument provides that a fiduciary is to make investment decisions upon
the direction of an adviser, and the fiduciary acts in accordance with such a direction, then except
in cases ofwillful misconduct, the fiduciary shall not be liable for any loss resulting from any such
act.
(c) Ifa governing instrument provides that a fiduciary is to make investment decisions with
the consent ofan adviser, then except in cases ofwilful misconduct or gross negligence, the fiduciary
shall not be liable for any loss resulting from any act taken or omitted as the result ofsuch adviser's
not providing such consent after being requested by the fiduciary to do so.
(d) For purposes ofthis section "investment decision" means with respect to any investment,
the retention, purchases, sale, exchange, tender orother transactions affecting the ownership thereof.
2.4(g) Florida - § 518.112
(1) A fiduciary may delegate any part or all of the investment functions, with regard to acts
constituting investment functions that a prudent investor ofcomparable skills might delegate under
the circumstances, to an investment agent as provided in subsection (3), if the fiduciary exercises
reasonable care, judgment, and caution in selecting the investment agent, in establishing the scope
and specific terms of any delegation, and in reviewing periodically the agent's actions in order to
monitor overall performance and compliance with the scope and specific terms ofthe delegation.
(3) A fiduciary, may delegate investment functions to an investment agent under subsection
(1) or subsection (2), if:
(b) In the case of a trust or estate, the fiduciary has given written notice, of its
intention to begin delegating investment functions under this section, to all beneficiaries, or
their legal representative, eligible to receive distributions from the trust or estate within 30
days of the delegation unless such notice is waived by the eligible beneficiaries entitled to
receive such notice. This notice shall thereafter, until or unless the beneficiaries eligible to
receive income from the trust or distributions from the estate oat the time are notified to the
contrary, authorize the trustee or legal representative to delegate investment functions
pursuant to this subsection. This discretion to revoke the delegation does not imply under
subsection (2) any continuing obligation to review the agent's actions.
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(4) If all requirements of subsection (3) are satisfied, the fiduciary shall not be responsible
otherwise for the investment decisions nor actions or omissions ofthe investment agent to which the
investment functions are delegated.
2.4(h) Illinois - 760 ILCS 5/4.09
To appoint attorneys, auditors, financial advisers and other agents and to pay reasonable
compensation to such appointees. If the trustee uses reasonable care, skill, and caution in the
selection ofthe agent, the trustee may rely upon the advice or recommendation ofthe agent without
further investigation and, except as may otherwise be provided in subsection (b) Section 5.1 with
respect to investment agents, shall have no responsibility for actions taken or omitted upon the
advice or recommendation ofthe agent.
2.4(i) Kentucky - KRS 287.275
(1) When an instrument, under which a bank empowered to act as a fiduciary or trust
company acts, reserves in the grantor, or vests in an advisory or investment committee or in one (1)
or more other persons, any power, including, but not limited to, the authority to direct the
acquisition, disposition, or retention of any investment or the power to authorize any act that the
bank or trust company may propose, the fiduciary is not liable, either individually or as a fiduciary,
for either ofthe following:
(a) Any loss that results from compliance with an authorized direction ofthe grantor,
committee, person, or persons; or
(b) Any loss that results from a failure to take any action proposed by the bank or
trust company that requires the prior authorization of the grantor, committee, person, or
persons if the bank or trust company timely sought but failed to obtain that authorization.
(2) The bank or trust company referred to in subsection (1) of this section is relieved from
any obligation to perform investment reviews and make recommendations with respect to any
investments to the extent the grantor, an advisory or investment committee, or one (1) or more other
persons have authority to direct the acquisition, disposition, or retention of any investment.
(3) This section shall not apply to the extent that the instrument, under which the bank or
trust company referred to in subsection (1) of this section acts, contains provisions that are
inconsistent with this section.
2.4(j) Texas - § 114.003
Ifa trust instrument reserves or vests authority in any person to the exclusion ofthe trustee,
including the settlor, an advisory or investment committee, or one or more cotrustees, to direct the
making or retention of an investment or to perform any other act in the management or
administration of the trust, the excluded trustee or cotrustees is not liable for a loss resulting from
the exercise ofthe authority in regard to the investments, management, or administration ofthe trust.
3. PLANNING BEFORE BUSINESS OWNER'S DEATH.
3.1 Develop Understanding With Settlor - Client.
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3.1(a) Document Settlor's Objectives. As the trustee is responsible to administer the trust
pursuant to the settlor's desires, the designated fiduciary should carefully document, in writing, the
settlor's plans and desires. The fiduciary should consider the following specific actions.
3.1(a)(I) Determine Settlor's Role in Business. What is the nature ofthe settlor's
interest, and can the business continue without him/her. What is competency of various
levels of management? Should advance action be taken to dispose of business or should
efforts be made to continue to the business until the settlor's death, and then liquidated.
3.1(a)(2) Determine Basis for Sale of Business. If the business is to be sold, or
should be sold, what recommendations for action does the client have; specifically, who
should the fiduciary contact to sell the business; who would be probable buyers, who would
be good advisors?
3.1(a)(3) Determine Sufficiency ofCash. A review ofprobable cash requirements
is essential. Consider extension of time to pay estate taxes under Code §6166, and life
insurance opportunities - especially second-to-die policies.
3.1(a)(4) Confirm Authority ofTrustee. Confirmwith the estate planning client the
risks and costs ofmaintaining a business under a trust, and that estate planning documents
grant sufficient authority and have settlor prepare private letters, memorandums that
document settlor's intent.
3.1(a)(5) Confirm Level of Fiduciary Compensation. The time to obtain an
approval and contract agreement for level ofcompensation is at the beginning, before actions
have started - not later when no one is pleased with results obtained.
3.1(b) Coordinate Planning With Family Members. Ifat all possible, attempt to participate
in a meeting with the adult family members to review the general nature of the client's estate plan
and his objectives. Attempt to ensure that the beneficiaries hear, first hand, their parent's intent,
desires, and objectives. Attempt to resolve conflicts now, with your client's effective participation.
r 3.2 Develop Mechanism for Fiduciary Oversight.6
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3.2(a) Consider Use of Advisory Committee. The use of an advisory committee to
participate in the review and supervision of the client's estate and business interests will properly
protect the trustee's actions. Ifthe fiduciary submits reports and recommendations to the advisory
committee for direction, and when the fiduciary acts pursuant to the directions ofthe committee the
fiduciary should receive "full acquittance." Ifstate law does not provide for giving the fiduciary "full
acquittance," then make sure it gets into the will or trust.
3.2(b) Consider Co-Fiduciary. In the event oftwo or more fiduciaries, then determine how
differences of opinion will be resolved and who is to have primary responsibility for the business;
6 Lack of planning to properly cover the fiduciary's legal interests is a fatal mistake, as
documented in numerous cases.
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that is, retention, sale, etc. Some states specifically permit a delegation ofa power to another trustee.
For example, see Wash. Rev. Code §30.99.030(3).
3.2(c) Consider Appointment ofAgents or Independent Fiduciary. Allowing the fiduciary
to delegate complex responsibility issues or develop basis ofjoint review will usually only serve to
protect the fiduciary. Acting alone may only create an opportunity for the fiduciary to serve as the
"target" in a litigation gallery.
3.3 Legal Authority for Continuation ofBusiness. Numerous'states have specific provisions
denying a fiduciary the right to carry on a decedent's business. In these states it is possible to
petition the court to continue the business. An examination ofstate law ofthe decedent's domicile
is imperative, especially in those situations where a change of domicile is contemplated.
3.4 Shareholder Restriction Agreements.
3.4(a) The law does not favor restrictive provisions of a shareholder or corporate stock
restriction agreement.
3.4(a)(1) The Uniform Commercial Code, Section 8-204, generally provides that
restrictions on the transfer of stock are invalid unless the restrictions are stated
"conspicuously" on the face of the stock certificate.' Check the stock certificate!
3.4(a)(2) Are the provisions ofthe agreement intended to restrict the testamentary
transfer ofthe owner's interest? The general rule ofconstruction is that unless a restriction
is specific, it will not be applied to a transfer of securities by operation of law - and that
includes ''transfers'' resulting from death. In one case a restriction on ''transfer or sale" was
held inapplicable to a bequest ofstock.8 The greater weight ofauthority is to the effect that
if the restriction is reasonable and the stock has been accepted with knowledge of it,
particularly a provision giving a close corporation or its stockholders an option or
opportunity to purchase the stock, the agreement is valid. However, many states have strictly
construed stock restriction agreements to deny the restrictive effect of such agreements.9
3.4(b) It is appropriate to consider various funding mechanisms, terms of payment, life
, UCC §8-204. Effect of issuer's restrictions on transfer.
A restriction on transfer of a security imposed by the issuer, even if otherwise lawful, is
ineffective against a person without knowledge ofthe restriction unless:
(l) The security is certificated and the restriction is noted conspicuously on the security
certificate; or
(2) The security is uncertificated and the registered owner has been notified ofthe restriction.
8 See Taylor's Adm 'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957).
9 See Elson v. Security State Bank ofAllerton, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525; Guaranty
Laundry Co. v. Pullliam, 198 Oklo 667,181 P.2d 1007; Wentworth v. Russell State Bank, 167 Kan.
246, 205 P.2d 972.
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insurance, and the methodology for determining value.
3.4(c) Review affect of bargain sales under the contemplated stock restriction agreement
because a "bargain sale" will not bind the IRS. You do not want to sell at a low price, and have the
IRS determine a high price for imposing taxes - you wind up with no money to pay taxes.
3.4(d) InMatterofGalewitz, 5N.Y. 2d 721,152 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1958), the decedent and
his son entered into a contract providing an option in the survivor to have an option to purchase all
the shares of the deceased at a price determined by a court appointed accountant, with the option
price to be determined at date ofdeath. The executors retained title until the purchase price for the
shares were fully paid. The son was entitled to profits occurring after decedent's death where delay
resulted from litigation over validity ofcontract.
3.4(e) In Isaacson v. Beau Label Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d420, 93 A.D.2d 880 (N.Y. 1983) the
surviving spouse claimed that the shareholders' agreement was illegal and unenforceable because
the price under the agreement would, in the spouse's view, constitute inadequate consideration in
exchange for her mandatory offer ofsale ofthe decedent's stock to the corporation. The Court held
that the fact that a buy-sell provision ofa shareholders' agreement can be a testamentary substitute
does not create a right to challenge the adequacy of consideration under such agreement. Absent
allegations offraud, duress or undue influence, shareholderagreement executed by deceased husband
were valid and enforceable against the surviving spouse.
3.5 One Form of Suggested Language for Will & Trust.10
3.5(a) Continuation of Business.
My fiduciary (personal representative/trustee) may continue any business of mine for such
period and upon such terms as my fiduciary determines, including the power to (a) invest additional
sums in the business oven to the extent that the trust may be invested largely or entirely in the
business without liability for loss resulting from lack ofdiversification, (b) to act as or to select other
persons (including any beneficiary) to act as directors, officers or other employees ofsuch business,
to be compensated without regard to such person being a beneficiary and (c) to make such other
arrangements as the trustee determines.
3.5(b) Authorization to Serve on Board.
My fiduciary may serve as a director ofXYZ corporation or may designate another to serve
as director, and to receive (or permit such other person to receive) director's fees that will be in
addition to its compensation as fiduciary of my estate or trust, and to pay obtain and payout of
principal or income the cost of liability insurance for any such director.
10 The suggested form provisions are adopted from the Trust & Will Provisions ofPractical
Drafting, published by the U.S. Trust Company ofNew York (1998).
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3.5(c) Retention ofExperts.
My fiduciary may retain any pay from my estate investment bankers, appraisers, accountants.
legal counsel and others when my fiduciary determines that such services are desirable in connection
with the affairs ofXYZ corporation.
3.5(d) Section 303 Redemption. [Does this provision imply mandatory use of§303, which
would adversely affect ability to extendpayment ofestate taxes under §6I66?J
If my estate includes the stock of any corporation which, together with other stock of the
same or a different corporation includible in my estate that satisfies the requirements of Internal
Revenue Code Section 303, I direct that any property received by my fiduciary from the corporation
in connection with a redemption ofthe stock shall not be used to satisfy the provisions ofany marital
and charitable bequests.
3.5(e) Negating Duty to Test Market.
If my fiduciary determines to dispose of the securities of the XYZ corporation, it will be
under no obligation to solicit offers from third parties and, based solely upon appraisal ofa qualified
appraiser, my fiduciary may sell the securities to another shareholder (including a trust beneficiary)
or to the Corporation upon such terms as it in its sole discretion deems reasonable.
3.5(t) Approval of Conflicts of Interest.
In the exercise oftheir powers, one or more ofmy fiduciaries may have conflicting fiduciary
and individual interests and I direct that such interests will not be a basis for any fiduciary not
participating in the exercise of such fiduciary's powers as to my business interests.
3.6 An Alternate Form of Language. I I
To retain and continue the operation of any business, in any form, for such period, or to
dispose of the business at such time and upon such terms, as shall seem advisable, to invest
additional property in the business, even to the extent the property administrable under this
instrument may be invested largely or entirely in the business, to act as, or to select anyone or more
persons (including any fiduciary, or officer ofthe business, and any beneficiary) to act as, directors,
officers, and employees ofthe business, to pay compensation for so acting without regard to whether
the payee is a fiduciary (or an officer of the business) or a beneficiary and to make such other
arrangements with respect to the business as shall seem advisable.
II Jerold I. Hom, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio Theory, and Private Trusts:
DraftingandAdministration Including the "Give-Me-Five" Unitrust, 23 Real Property, Probate and
Trust Journal 1, at page 22 (Spring 1998).
D -16
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3.7(b) "s" Corporation Stock. To appoint the stock ofa corporation which is taxed as an
"S" corporation for Federal income tax purposes to such person or persons who are beneficiaries of
any trust created under this instrument in such interests and proportions, including an appointment
in trust for any such person or persons as long as such trust qualifies as an eligible shareholder of
an "S" corporation so as· to allow the corporation to maintain its income tax status as an "S"
corporation. Any separate trust will have provisions identical to the trust in which such stock would
otherwise be held, except that: (i) all ofthe income ofsuch trust will be distributed to the beneficiary
of such trust; (ii) no distributions ofprincipal from such trust may be made to any individual other
than the beneficiary during the beneficiary's lifetime; (iii) during the beneficiary's lifetime, no one
will have the power to appoint any portion ofthe Trust Property to anyone other than the beneficiary;
and (iv) in the event that any other requirements are imposed on a trust in order to make such trust
eligible for treatment as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, such separate trust will be modified to meet
such other requirements. In addition, the Trustee is authorized to make any elections or give any
consents which are required to achieve or maintain S corporation status for stock to be held in trust
3.7(a) Closely Held Business Powers. To retain, and to purchase and retain, any business
interest transferred to the Trustee, as shareholder, security holder, creditor, partner or otherwise, for
any period of time whatsoever, even though the interest may constitute all or a large portion ofthe
Trust principal; to comply with the provisions of any agreement restricting transfer of the interest;
to participate in the conduct of the related business or rely upon others to do so, and to take or
delegate to others discretionary power to take any action with respect to its management and affairs
which an individual could take as outright owner of the business or the business interest, including
the voting of stock (by separate trust or otherwise regardless of whether that separate trust will
extend for a term within or beyond the term of the Trust) and the determination ofall questions of
policy; to execute and amend partnership agreements; to participate in any incorporation,
reorganization, merger consolidation, sale ofassets, recapitalization, liquidation or dissolutionofthe
business, or any change in its nature, or in any buy-sell, stock restriction, or stock redemption
agreements; to invest in additional stock or securities of, or make secured, unsecured, or
subordinated loans to, the business with trust funds; to take all appropriate actions to prevent,
identify, or respond to actual or threatened violations of any environmental law or regulation
thereunder; to elect or employ with compensation, as directors, officers, employees, or agents ofthe
business, any persons, including a Trustee of any trust held under this instrument, or any director,
officer, employee, or agent ofa Corporate Trustee ofany trust held under this instrument, without
adversely affecting the compensation to which that Trustee would otherwise be entitled; to rely upon
reports ofcertified public accountants as to the operations and financial condition of the business,
without independent investigation; to deal with and act for the business in any capacity (including
in the case ofa Corporate Trustee any banking or trust capacity and the loaning ofmoney out ofthe
Trustee's own funds) and to be compensated therefor; and to sell or liquidate the business or any
interest in the business.
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3.7 Gilman Trust Power Provisions.12
r
r-,
r
r
12 I do not remember the original sources of these provisions, however, to the best of my
recollection they have been adopted from various forms, and have been revised over the last 25 years
based upon some good and bad.experiences.
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pursuant to this instrument and may also enter into such stock purchase, voting or other agreements
as the Trustee determines necessary or appropriate for the protection of the trust, the shareholders
of the S corporation and/or the deemed shareholders of the S corporation.
3.7(c) Conflict ofInterest. To engage in transactions with the Trustee in an individual
capacity, or with any business entity in which the Trustee is employed or has an interest, including
a sale, purchase, or loan ofproperty. In no event will any such transaction be treated as a conflict
ofinterest or similar prohibited act unless it is proved that the Trustee was clearly motivated by and
acted in its own self-interest, knowing that such action was not in the interests of the Trust.
3.7(d) Restrictions on Sale ofBusiness Interests. Notwithstanding any provision in this
instrument to the contrary, the Trustee will not sell or dispose of any of my business interests in
XXX, AAA, DDD, whether in the form ofa shareholder interest in a corporation, partnership interest
in a partnership, ora membership interest in a limited liability company or any successor, subsidiary,
or any affiliated business organization therewith without the prior written consent of the Advisory
Committee. Further, prior to the voting ofany ofmy interests in any ofsuch business organizations
or of any successor, subsidiary, or affiliated company, the Trustee will consult with and be bound
by the decision ofthe Advisory Committee in regard thereto. The Trustee will be relieved from all
liability resulting from actions taken pursuant thereto. As the Trustee may be retaining such business
interest as an asset ofthis Trust pursuant to the direction ofthe Advisory Committee, the Trustee will
be relieved of any responsibility for following the direction of the Advisory Committee. It is
expected that the Trustee's fees will be adjusted to reflect its "custodial" relationship with regards
to such business organization.
3.8 Suggested Advisory Committee Provision. The advantages ofusing advisory committees
to the fiduciary can be very helpful, and the following provisions and discussion may be helpful to
a client and fiduciary's understanding of their relationships. Many states have adopted provisions
that protect a fiduciary ifthe fiduciary's actions have been approved by the beneficiaries or advisory
committee.
3.8(a) Powers. The Committee, acting through a majority of its members, has the powers
that have been conferred upon it at various points throughout this instrument and has the following
specific discretionary powers and authority:
3.8(a)(I) To consult with the Trustee with respect to general investment policy.
3.8(a)(2) To consult with the Trustee regarding discretionary encroachments upon
principal..
3.8(a)(3) To direct the Trustee with regard to the specific selection of assets for
purchase, sale, retention, and transfer ifthe Committee deems it necessary or appropriate to
do so. The Advis'ory Committee may employ and designate other persons to recommend
purchases and sales, in which event the Committee will notify the Trustee in writing ofsuch
appointment. Until notified in writing that such appointment has been revoked, the Trustee
will have no power over such investments ofthe Trust other than that ofa Custodian. In this
event, the Trustee and Committee may consider a reduction in the amount of the Trustee's
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3.8(b) To direct the Trustee with regard to the selection, retention and evaluation ofpolicies
oflife insurance, and absent the specific direction ofthe Advisory Committee, the Trustee will have
no authority or obligation to purchase, exchange or surrender any life insurance policy which is held
as an asset of this Trust. The Trustee has no responsibility to undertake any review or to provide
advice regarding any life insurance policy nor will the Trustee be responsible for the investment
performance, or lack thereof, by any issuer ofany life insurance policy held as an asset ofthis Trust.
3.8(c) To remove the Trustee at any time and appoint a successor independent Trustee. In
case the Committee terminates or ceases to exist, then a majority of the beneficiaries may remove
the Trustee and appoint a successor Trustee, such Trustee must be "independent" within the meaning
of Internal Revenue Code Section 674(c).
3.8(d) To appoint an Investment Advisor to advise and direct the Trustee regarding the
investment of trust assets. The Committee may remove the Investment Advisor at any time and
appoint a successor. In the event that no successor is appointed, or the Investment Advisor fails to
serve as such, then the Trustee will again become responsible for the investment ofTrust assets. The
Committee will determine the amount ofthe Investment Advisor's fee and inform the Trustee ofthe
fee determination, and the fee will be payable from the Trust estate as an administration expense.
The Trustee will be relieved from liability resulting from actions taken pursuant to the directions of
the Investment Advisor. The appointment of an Investment Advisor will not in any way limit or
otherwise affect the discretion or responsibility given to the Trustee with regard to the use and
enjoyment of the Trust estate. During the period an Investment Advisor is acting hereunder, the
Trustee will act as a Custodial Trustee concerning the Trust Property and will have no investment
responsibility for the Trust assets. In this event, the Trustee and Committee may consider a
reduction in the amount of the Trustee's fees.
3.8(e) The Trustee may reimburse members of the Committee for costs and expenses
incurred in their role as advisors. Any expenses paid will be considered a cost ofthe administration
ofthe Trust concerned. Further, members ofthe Committee may be compensated for their services
as such.
3.8(f) No member of the Committee will at any time be held liable for any action taken or
not taken (including any action taken or not taken in exercising a business judgment and/or in
making payments to or for the benefit of any beneficiary), or for any loss or depreciation of value
ofany property in any trust created hereby, whether due to an error ofjudgment or otherwise, where
such member of the Committee has not acted in bad faith. In the case of the delegation of any
discretionary power hereunder, the member ofthe Committee so delegating will not be liable for the
acts, omissions or defaults ofthe agents, servants or employees to whom the delegation is made. The
member ofthe Committee will be entitled to recover from the Trust estate (but only to the extent of
the assets therein at the time a request for such recovery is made) for any and all losses, damages,
expenses (including attorney fees), claims, lawsuits or judgments incurred or suffered by such
member ofthe Committee, whether individually or in a fiduciary capacity by virtue of, or in any way
arising from, any action taken or not taken by, or allegedly taken or not taken by such member ofthe
Committee; except that no member of the Committee will be entitled to recover any such amount
if it is established to a certainty by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction that such
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person was acting in bad faith at such time.
3.8(g) Members of the Committee will at all times act as, and have the obligations of,
fiduciaries. If the Committee fails to respond to requests for advice from the Trustee or if the
Committee is divided and is unable to reach a decision, then the Trustee will act to protect the
interests of the beneficiaries as the Trustee deems best in the exercise of its independent fiduciary
discretion. Further, no party dealing with the Trustee has any duty to see if the Trustee is acting
within the scope of the Trustee's authority. The Trustee will incur no liability when it acts at the
direction ofthe Committee or the Committee's designee. Further, the Trustee will be held harmless
form any actions taken as a direction from the Committee or the Committee's designee.
3.9 Relationship of Advisory Committee and Fiduciary. In order to resolve or remove any
doubt as to the relationship of the fiduciary and the advisory committee the following provision is
suggested for careful consideration.
It is my desire that the Trustee and the Advisory Committee work together to carry out the
terms and provisions ofthe Trust(s) created under this instrument. I have given my Trustee full and
complete powers for the administration ofthe Trust(s) that I created under this instrument; provided,
however, such empowerment provisions are subject to the review and approval of the Advisory
Committee as the Committee performs its oversight functions. It is my desire that my Trustee
develop a plan for the administration ofthe Trust(s) created hereunder, and to submit such planes)
to the Advisory Committee for its review and approval.
4. PLANNING AFTER DECEDENT'S DEATH.
4.1 General. The fiduciary should determine the nature ofthe decedent's interest in the business
and the most immediate steps to protect the beneficiaries interests. General rules of fiduciary
standards need to be reviewed and then observed. The fiduciary should have a meeting with all
persons who will have responsibility for fiduciary administration, and the review ofactions should
be confirmed in writing.
4.1(a) Commence Examination ofBusiness.13
4.1(b) Solicit Accountant's Recommendations.14
4.1(c) Acts of Prior Fiduciary. Was decedent's affairs managed by a guardian or other
fiduciary and do the actions of the prior fiduciary need to be examined?
4.1(d) Fiduciary Authority to Operate Business. Absent express authority, a fiduciary may
not continue a business beyond a reasonable period that is necessary to dispose ofthe business in a
reasonable manner, and diversify an estate's investments. Authority may be derived from the
governing instrument, statute, consent of all interested parties, court order, or may arise by
13See Article 8 ofthis outline - Fiduciary Business Examination Issues.
14See Exhibit 5 - Accountant's Review.
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implication.
4.1(e) Legality of Business Operations. Are the major aspects of the decedent's business
operations in conformity with law? Is the business qualified to do business in the states in which it
conducts its business operations?
4.1(f) Confirm Level ofFiduciary Compensation. The understanding should be in writing,
and noticed to adult beneficiaries and approved by probate court.
4.1(g) Prudent Investor Rule. A fiduciary charged with continuing a business must conduct
itself as would a reasonably prudent businessman engaged in a similar operation. See the above
discussion of the Prudent Investor Rule.
4.1(h) Delegation. A fiduciary may not delegate certain acts and duties to another except
where permitted by law or the instrument, and it is questionable whether such provisions would be
effective for protecting the fiduciary.
4.1(i) Control. The fiduciary should exercise and take control over the decedent's assets.
The foremost duty ofa fiduciary is the obligation to preserve the assets ofthe estate/trust. However,
often it is questionable how control is achieved when the decedent owns less than all ofthe business'
ownership interests.
4.1(i)(I) Can the business survive during the transition? Is there anyone who can
continue the business as it currently exists?
4.1(i)(2) The fiduciary should attempt to stabilize the business and appoint
appropriate review mechanisms.
4.1(i)(3) How should or can the fiduciary take over control of the Board of
Directors; should the fiduciary attempt to replace the entire Board of Directors? Should
efforts be made to do away with the Board and have direct shareholder voting on all issues?
Do the Articles ofIncorporation or state law require cumulative voting for directors?
4.1(i)(4) .The fiduciary should exercise financial control over the business.
4.10) Form ofBusiness. Ifthe decedent's business is in the form other than a corporation
or limited liability company, then serious action needs to occur to exam the one issue ofpersonal
liability to the fiduciary and possible risk to the decedent's entire estate. It may be appropriate to
organize the decedent's business in the form of a corporation or a limited liability company.
4.1(k) Tax Structure of Business. Is the business taxed as "C" or "S"? Should "S" be
elected or terminated.
4.2 Control ofBusiness Issues. The dual roles ofthe trustee creates conflict between the duties
ofthe trustee to the beneficiary and to the corporation which can lead to self-dealing and other forms
of abuse.
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4.2(a) Control Positions. IS The position of control arises by the exercise of the rights
attendant to the equity or voting interest ofthe company or in the selection ofthe trustee to a director
or officer position with the company. It may also entail the use ofpower over the company's equity
or voting interests to elect persons associated with the trustee.
4.2(b) Self-Dealing & Conflict ofInterests. As expressed time and time again, a fiduciary
must avoid self-dealing and conflict of interests; however, in many circumstances, such issues are
ultimately resolved on an after the fact basis.
4.2(b)(I) The situation is created by the decedent (settlor) not by the trustee; if the
decedent places the fiduciary in such position then some form ofassumption must be made
that the decedent knew the logical consequences which would result from such action.
4.2(b)(2) A conflict exists between the duty owed by the trustee in the management
position to the company and its shareholders in general and that owed by the trustee to the
trust and the beneficiaries thereof.
4.2(b)(3) In situations where the fiduciary is to sell the business, the courts have
indicated that the fiduciary always has a conflict of interest. When the fiduciary is called
upon to sell the business it needs to be in the position to obtain the highest price to benefit
the trust, but, in many situations fiduciaries have negotiated a low price to benefit the
company which is redeeming the stock. (See, for example, Childs v. National BankofAustin,
658 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.1981.)
4.2(c) Alternatives for Resolving Conflicts ofInterest. Most courts will be deferential to
trustee - managers in the resolution ofconflicts, but rarely do the courts give guidance as to how the
fiduciary's duties are to be resolved. Alternative possibilities include the following, even though no
one approach will best resolve the problems caused by various conflict of interest issues.
4.2(c)(1) The fiduciary manager in protecting the business for the beneficiaries
benefit and also protect the beneficiaries, might refrain from acting in a way that might
benefit one over the other. While this may give the appearance ofbeing fair, it is not because
it may be contrary to the decedent's presumed intent. Moreover, a failure to act is often
tantamount to taking a position.
4.2(c)(2) The fiduciary must act to equally promote both interests as much as
possible. This is almost impossible if irreconcilable conflict between the interests exist.
4.2(c)(3) The fiduciary may act in the interest of either the business or the
beneficiaries, at the fiduciary's option. While this may give the fiduciary comfort, it is hardly
fair to the trust beneficiaries.
IS This paper will not deal with compensation issues ofthe trustee who becomes an executor
and is deserving ofcompensation for performance ofservices rendered in such capacity and who also
becomes an executive or director who may become entitled to a salary, stock options or other forms
of remuneration or incentive compensation.
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4.2(c)(4) The fiduciary must always act in the best interests ofthe beneficiaries and
this is consistent with the intent of fiduciary responsibility and, as a practical matter, the
interests are one and the same. The appointment ofa fiduciary is arguably the reason for the
decedent's appointment of the fiduciary. A later circumstance that arises to cause the
interests to conflict should not detract from that fundamental goal.
4.2(c)(5) The fiduciary must always act in the best interests of the business. This
position might make sense because it may be argued that the decedent intended that the
fiduciary would have a primary duty to the business; however, this position is inconsistent
the nature of fiduciary responsibility as the courts understand it.
4.2(d) Determine Fiduciary's Authority to Assume Control.
4.2(d)(1) When the instrument (will or trust) authorizes the trustee to assume
management control of a business then the terms of the instrument are operative to protect
the fiduciary's action in taking control ofthe business. The fact that a conflict of interest is
created is not an impediment to the trustee assuming a management position because the
decedent created the potential conflict.
4.2(d)(2) When the instrument is silent or ambiguous the issues involve not only
the propriety of taking a management position, but compensation, conflicts of interest and
self-dealing. The general rule against self-dealing and conflicts of interest can not be
ignored; hence permission and/or direction from the beneficiaries and/or a supervising court
become imperative. In the absence ofgaining proper authority, it is appropriate to consider
resignation. Important facts and the surrounding circumstances that may be supportive of
the fiduciary's action to take control include the following:
o Was the decedent active in the business for the period prior to his death, and
what, exactly, was the decedent's role - active or passive?
o What actions had the intended fiduciary taken to secure or clarify his position
prior to decedent's death?
o What was the fiduciary's relationship with the business and the decedent
prior to decedent's death? Was the fiduciary or its representatives acting as
a creditor, advisor, or a participating board member?
o What plans, if any, did decedent leave for the management of the business?
For example, is there successor management already operating the business?
Were other persons available for management positions?
4.3 Preserving Business. A fiduciary must act to preserve and protect the decedent's business
and its assets. Therefore, careful attention to the following important items is imperative.
4.3(a) Determine & Monitor Cash Requirements. If the business does not have sufficient
cash resources then determine appropriate course of action to keep from failing.
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4.3(b) Determine Ability of Management. Attempt to ensure continuity of business
opportunities and present management.
4.3(c) Determine Level ofFiduciary Participation. Will the fiduciary's best action be to take
over management or to serve in an advisory position. Do not jump without knowing where you will
land.
4.4 Determine Propriety of Business Actions. A review should be undertaken to determine
the propriety ofactions ofofficers and members ofBoard ofDirectors. For example, has the Board
ofDirectors (managers) approved compensation arrangements for officers; loans from and to banks,
and to insiders (officers and members of Board ofDirectors), and real estate transactions, etc.
4.5 Sale ofBusiness Issues. As a general principal, a fiduciary is required to sell the decedent's
business interests as soon as practicable after death.
4.5(a) Fiduciary Authority to Sell. It is important to determine the authority ofthe fiduciary
to cause a sale ofthe decedent's business interests; that is, is the fiduciary authorized to sell pursuant
to the governing instrument, statute or consent of all interested parties or by court decree.
4.5(a)(I) For those states following Model Business CorporationAct, a corporation
may sell or lease "all, or substantially all" ofits property in the "usual and regular course of
business," or pledge or mortgage all assets whether or not within the usual course of
business, without having to get shareholder approval of the transaction. Where a sale or
lease ofall or substantially all ofa corporation's assets is not made in the usual and regular
course ofbusiness, approval by a majority ofshareholders is required. Although most states
require only a bare majority of shareholders to approve a sale or lease, some states require
a two thirds majority.
4.5(a)(2) What constitutes the "ordinary business" ofa corporation depends on the
business the corporation is in. Whether property represents "all or substantially all" of the
assets of a corporation depends on whether the transfer of the property would substantially
affect eh existence and purpose ofthe corporation.
4.5(b) Pre-emptive Rights of Shareholders. State law may impose a limitation upon the
ability ofa controlling shareholder or a member ofa control group to redeem stock without offering
the same opportunity to shareholders who are not members of that group.
4.5(c) Notice to Beneficiaries of Certain Transactions. In some states a fiduciary may not
enter into a "significant non-routine transaction" in the absence of a "compelling circumstance"
without providing notice to the beneficiaries of the nature and terms ofthe intended transaction. In
these states, the sale of a closely held business is included within the list of defined "non-routine
transactions."
4.5(d) Employ Appraiser to Determine Value and Review Appraisal. It is necessary to have
a preliminary determination of value, and, in many cases, multiple appraisals and reviews of
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appraisals are not only appropriate but necessary. Careful consideration should be given to ERISA16
rules for detennining valuations issues. Valuations for the Internal Revenue Service usually do not
bear any relationship to the fiduciary concerns raised by disgruntled beneficiaries.
4.S(e) Revenue Ruling 59-60 provides the "age-old" guidance regarding the valuation for
estate and gift tax purposes ofstock in a closely held business. A fiduciary must personally devote
significant time to an analysis of the factors so as to better prepare themselves for negotiations for
the sale of the business and reasoned communication with the beneficiaries. The Ruling lists the
following factors for detennining value, and the fiduciary should know how to apply these factors
to the decedent's business.
4.S(e)(1) The nature of the business and its history from its inception.
4.S(e)(2) The economic outlook in general and the outlook ofthe specific industry
in particular.
4.S(e)(3) .The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
4.S(e)(4) The earning capacity of the company. NOTE - §5 of the Ruling states:
"Earnings may be the most important criterion of value in some cases whereas asset value
will receive primary consideration in others. In general, ... primary consideration to earnings
when valuing stocks ofcompanies which sell products or services to the public; conversely,
in the investment or holding type ofcompany, the appraiser may accord the greatest weight
to the assets underlying the security to be valued. 17
4.S(e)(S) The dividend-paying capacity. NOTE - The Ruling states: "Where an
actual or effective controlling interest in a corporation is to be valued, the dividend paying
factor is not a material element, since the payment ofsuch dividends is discretionary with the
controlling stockholders. The individual or group in control can substitute salaries and
bonuses for dividends, thus reducing net income and understating the dividend-paying
capacity of the company."
4.S(e)(6) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
4.S(e)(7) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued.
4.S(e)(8) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a
similar line ofbusiness having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either
on an exchange or over-the-counter.
16 The reference to ERISA is to the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974,
as amended.
17 The IRS Valuation Guide suggests that when investment assets and operating assets are
being valued, the earnings from the operating assets should be capitalized and investment assets
should be valued at their current values.
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4.5(e)(9) §4.02(b) makes clear that the loss of a "one-man" business may have a
depressing effect. 18
4.5(1) Sale to Majority Shareholder. In Brown v. AlliedCorrugated Box Company, 91 Cal.
App. 3d 477 (1979), the court held that a discount for lack ofcontrol was not appropriate when the
sale was to a majority shareholder.
4.5(g) Built In Gains' Taxes. The IRS recognizes the effect ofthe double tax on the sale of
corporate assets.
4.5(h) Tax Effects of Estate Tax Value. Consider tax affect of low appraisal values to
establish estate tax value and higher selling price at capital gains' rates. Determine the effect ifthe
surviving spouse renounces the will and takes the statutory share. As a general principal, the
surviving spouse would pay capital gains taxes but not pay estate taxes.
4.5(i) Restricted Stock. A decedent's closely held business which is represented by
"restricted stock" must be considered in terms ofdetermining value and the freedom of transfer. 19
4.6 Supporting Documents - Sale of Business.
4.6(a) Solicitation ofBids.20
4.6(b) Fiduciary Representation and Warranties. 21
4.7 Effect of Spouse Electing Against the Will.
4.7(a) Hall v. Elliott, 236 Md 196,202 A.2d 726 (MD 1964), decedent bequeathed the bulk
of his shares of his closely held business to the employees with restrictions in order to ensure
continued control of company by the employees. The decedent's spouse renounced the Will, and
elected her marital share. The Court held the employees were entitled to compensation out of
residuary estate when the shares of the closely held business were adeemed by spouse's election
against the Will.
18 Estate ofHuntsmanv. Comm 'r., 66 T.C. 861 (1976), the value ofdecedent's business was
discounted to reflect his death despite the fact that the company had competent officers to replace
him. However, in Estate ofStirton Oman, 53 TCM 52 (1987), a key person discount was rejected
because the decedent's son "had taken over the management ofthe company before his father's death
and continued thereafter to manage the company."
19 In Estate ofGilfordv. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 38 (1987), in a case where the decedent's closely
held business' shares were actively traded in the over-the counter market, and decedent's "restricted
stock" could not be sold free ofsuch restrictions, a valuation discount of35 percent was appropriate.
20See Exhibit 3 - Letter Requesting Bids
21See Exhibit 4 - Seller's Special Representations and Warranties.
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4.7(b) In Winters National Bank & Trust eo. v. Riffe, 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 206N.E.2d 212 (OH
1965), the surviving spouse's share would exclude the decedent's interest in closely held business
when the spouse's share could be satisfied entirely from assets other than corporate stock which had
been specifically bequeathed in trust.
4.7(c) In BurkEstate, 37 D. & C. 2d 528 (Pa. 1965), the decedent had entered into a buy-sell
agreement with son giving the son the right to purchase all common shares at a fixed price per share.
The surviving spouse exercised her elective right; the Court held that spouse's right attached to one-
third of each asset, including stock, rather than to the proceeds of sale of the stock pursuant to the
buy-sell agreement. The value of the stock at death exceeded the agreement sales price.
4.7(d) In Matter ofRiefberg, 58 N.Y.2d 134,446 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1983), the Court held
that a buy-sell agreement was a testamentary substitute under the New York statute which required
that decedent's property be available to the surviving spouse's elective share. The shareholders'
agreement was amended one day before decedent's death to provide that corporation pay entire value
ofdecedent's shares directly to his former wife, her four children and another individual. The court
found that the agreement was a ''testamentary substitute," and, therefore, the value of that interest
was includible in computing estate against which decedent's surviving spouse could exercise her
statutory right of election.
5. OBLIGATIONS TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS.22
5.1 Duty to Disclose Information. The Board of Directors and a majority shareholder have a
fiduciary duty to disclose material information when seeking shareholder action and when
disseminating information to minority shareholders. In the absence of a request for shareholder
action, corporation law generally does not require directors to provide shareholders with information
concerning the finances or affairs of the corporation.
5.1(a) In Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case
alleging that the Board ofDirectors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting the Corporation to
disseminate false financial information that ultimately led to the Corporation's loss of value of$2
billion, the Court complimented Professor Hamermesh for an excellent article on the subjecf3 and
made the following key points.
o The director's fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders has been
characterized by this Court as a triad: due care, good faith, and loyalty. That triparte
fiduciary duty does not operate intermittently but is the constant compass by which all
director actions for the corporation and interactions with its shareholders must be guided.
o The directors' duty to disclose all available material information in connection with a request
22 The source ofsome these materials have been based upon commentary and analysis found
in Fletcher Cyc Corp §8.
23 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: A Corporate Director's Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1087 (1996).
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for shareholder action must be balanced against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate
enterprise, in particular, by keeping certain financial infonnation confidential. Directors are
required to provide shareholders with all infonnation that is material to the action being
requested and to provide a balanced, truthful account of all matters disclosed in the
communications with shareholders. Accordingly, directors have definitive guidance in
discharging their fiduciary duty by an analysis of the factual circumstances relating to the
specific shareholder action being requested and an inquiry into the potential for deception
or misinfonnation.
o Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false communications from directors
even in the absence of a request for shareholder action. When the directors are not seeking
shareholder action, but are deliberately misinfonning shareholders about the business ofthe
corporation, either directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty.
That violation may result in a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of
action for damages. There may also be a basis for equitable relief to remedy the violation.
5.1(b) In Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992), the Delaware Supreme
Court responded to an action commenced by minority shareholders that Shell had provided material
misstatements in connection with a merger. The Court stated: "It is only logical that a majority
shareholderwho directs a subsidiary to prepare certain disclosure materials and then distributes those
materials to minority shareholders should be held accountable for any errors contained therein."
5.1(c) In Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillian, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988), an
unsuccessful bidder at corporate auction sued to preliminarily enjoin lockup agreement between
corporate directors and ''white knight." The Court held that asset lockup option granted to white
knight by target corporation as part ofmerger agreement was invalid and unenforceable. The Court
made the following key points:
o While corporate directors may rely in good faith upon infonnation, opinions, reports or
statements presented by corporate officers, employees and experts selected with reasonable
care, they may not avoid their active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as significant
as a sale of corporate control, particularly where corporate insiders are among bidders.
o Delaware law imposes an unremitting duty of candor not only on corporate officers and
directors, but also on those who are privy to material infonnation obtained in course of
representing corporate interests.
o Fiduciaries, corporate or otherwise, may not use superior infonnation or knowledge to
mislead others in perfonnance of their own fiduciary obligations.
5.2 Majori!y Shareholder's Fiduciary Obligation to Minority Shareholders. The owners
of a controlling interest in a corporation are said to owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders; hence, the majority shareholder must act in good faith with respect to the rights of
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minority shareholders, and with respect to the transfer of control.24 The majority shareholders
occupy a fiduciary relationship toward minority shareholders, similar to that ofthe corporation itself
or its officers and directors.25 Further, the same fiduciary duty is due from a dominant or controlling
shareholder to the minority as is due from the director of a corporation to the shareholders.
5.2(a) Closely Held Corporation Issues. In closely held corporations the shareholders must
bear toward each other the same relationship oftrust and confidence which prevails in partnerships.26
In the family held corporation, a special relationship may exist between shareholders because ofthe
blood relationship; however, it has been determined that the mere relationship ofbrother and sister
does not by itselfcreate a fiduciary relationship.27 See Nixon v. Blackwell, discussed below, to the
contrary, where the court opined: "A stockholder who bargains for stock in a closely-held
corporation and who pays for those shares can make a business judgment whether to buy into such
a minority position, and if so on what terms."
5.2(b) Minority Shareholder as Employee. There is a distinction between a duty a
corporation owes a minority shareholder, as a shareholder, from any duty it might owe a minority
shareholder as an employee. However, when considering the employment relationship, courts will
consider all forms of evidence, the parties situation, and other particulars of the case.28
5.2(c) Effect ofShareholderAgreement. When a shareholders' agreement determines price,
and the agreement is unambiguous, and the agreement has been entered into without fraud,
misleading or overreaching, the agreement will prevail. The cases then apply the situation when
fraud, misleading actions or overreaching has occurred.29
5.3 Nature of Obligation to Minority Shareholders.
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5.3(a) Explanation ofFiduciary Duty. The majority shareholders' actions must be free from
fraud, and must not amount to a wanton destruction ofthe rights of the minority. Where a majority
shareholder stands to benefit as a controlling shareholder, the majority's actions must be intrinsically
24 See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462; United States v. Byrum, 408 US 125
(applying Ohio law); Slattery v. Bower, 924 F2d 6 (CA1 1991)(applying Maine law); Grigsby v. CMI
Corp., 590 F Supp 826 (ND Cal 1984); Clagettv. Hutchinson,583 F2d 1259 (CA4 1978).
25 See Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn 263,422 A2d 311.
26 See Pedro v. Pedro, 463 NW2d 285 (Minn App 1990).
27 See In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 98 AD2d 413, 469 NYS2d 931. However, this is most
inconsistent with the fiduciary standards Benjamin Cardozo would have employed, especially in light
ofhis special relationship with his sister. See Cardozo, Andrew L. Kaufman, Harvard University
Press (1998).
28 See Pedro, infra.
29 See Estate ofMeller v. AdolfMeller Co., 554 A2d 648 (RI 1989).
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fair to the minority interest,30 The test applied when minority shareholders brought suit against the
majority, alleging a breach of the strict faith duty owed to them by the majority, was whether the
controlling group could demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its actions.31
5.3(b) Rights of Employee vs. Non-Employee Shareholders. In Nixon v. Blackwell,626
A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), the minority shareholders brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty as
result of allegedly discriminatory policy unfairly favoring employee shareholders by establishing
ESOP, key man insurance plans, liquidity offered by ESOP, etc. The Delaware Supreme Court held
that the fairness test, rather than business judgment rule applied to determine whether directors of
closely held corporation- treated non-employee minority shareholders unfairly, and that after
substantial proof, it was determined that majority met its burden ofproving the entire fairness of
their dealing with non-employee shareholders. Further, the Court opined that it would not create
judicially-created rules to protect minority shareholders ofclosely held businesses. "A stockholder
who bargains for stock in a closely-held corporation and who pays for those shares can make a
business judgment whether to buy into such a minority position, and if so on what terms."
5.4 Special Obligations Upon Sale of Company.
5.4(a) Majority Shareholder's General Rights of Sale.
5.4(a)(1) A majority shareholder may sell their controlling interest without liability
for any profits so long as the majority does not dominate, mislead or interfere with other
shareholders in the exercise of their rights or abuse their position or control. A majority
shareholder who becomes a director or paid officer ofthe corporation is not precluded from
selling, even at a premium, his shares of stock.32 A majority shareholder is generally under
no duty to the minority shareholders to refrain from receiving a premium upon the sale ofthe
controlling stock. Many ofthe cases on point explain why this theory oflaw is limited, will
not be applied, and the circumstances upon which the majority shareholderwill be held liable
to the minority shareholders.
5.4(a)(2) A majority shareholder who is also a director or officer owes no fiduciary
duty to other shareholders regarding the terms ofsale ofpersonal shares ofstock, where such
sales does not affect the general well being ofthe corporation.33 The degree offiduciary duty
owed by the majority shareholder to the minority shareholder has been characterized as a
30 See Slatttery v. Bower, 924 F2d 6 (CAl 1991).
31 See Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass 215, 479 NE2d 173.
32 See Treadway Co., Inc. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp 668 (SD NY 1980), affd 638 F2d 357
(CA2 1981). In Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222 (Del Ch 1990) the Court stated: "Shareholder has
right to sell his or her stock and in ordinary course owes no duty in that connection to other
shareholders when acting in good faith.
33 See Eliasen v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 569 F Supp 84 (ED Wis 1982).
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relative standard, varying with the circumstances.34 The sale ofa majority interest may result
in a breach of a fiduciary duty if the purchasers will loot or mismanage the corporation, or
if the sale involves fraud, misuse of confidential information, wrongful appropriation of
corporation assets, or personal use of a business advantage that rightfully belongs to the
corporation.
5.4(a)(3) Majority shareholders may sell their stock to another corporation although
it might be detrimental to minority shareholders to have another corporation control the
majority of the stock. A majority shareholder, however, has no duty to sell its holdings in
a corporation merely because the sale would profit the minority shareholders.35
5.4(b) Duty to Examine Motives of Purchaser. The controlling shareholder occupies a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders with respect to the transfer ofcontrol,
and are under a duty not to transfer control to outsiders if the circumstances are such as to awaken
suspicion and put a prudent person on guard, unless a reasonably adequate investigation discloses
facts that would convince a reasonable person theat not fraud is intended or likely to result. It has
been held that a majority shareholder who is also a director, when contemplating sale of majority
stock at a price not available to other shareholders and which sale may prejudice the minority
shareholders, has a duty to act affirmatively and openly with full disclosure, and a violation ofthis
fiduciary obligation is actionable by the minority shareholders.36 However, some courts have
required actual knowledge ofthe purchaser's fraudulent intent as a requisite to the finding ofbreach
of fiduciary duty.37
5.5 Recognition of Right to Premium For Control.
5.5(a) Control of Corporation is Personal. A majority shareholder's power to control the
corporation is not a corporate asset; therefore, on a sale of the stock the value of this aspect of
ownership need not be shared with the other, minority, shareholders. In the absence of fraud, a
shareholder who desires to gain control ofa corporation is free to pay other shareholders a premium
in order to gain such control. The shareholder attempting to gain control need not pay all minority
shareholders equally. However, it has been held that where a majority shareholder has sold at a
premium controlling interest in a corporation to the corporation's customers at a time ofunusually
high profits, the majority shareholder may have to share the gain with minority shareholders whose
34 Degree of duty ~s not as compelling in situation where offer is merely made to purchase
stock, where presumably minority shareholder is free to decline to participate, as it is in case of
merger, where minority shareholder's interest is transformedregardless ofwhether or not he consents
to action. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 402 A2d 5 (Del Ch 1979).
35 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A2d 840 (Del 1987).
36 See Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal App2d 252, 76 Cal Rptr 781.
37 See Essex Universal Corp. v.. Yates, 305 F2d 572.
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interests would otherwise be injured.38
5.5(b) Minority Shareholders Do Not Have Right To Premium. In Mendel v. Carroll, 651
A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994), the Chancery Court responded to the minority's request to require the
Board of Directors to issue option shares in order that offerors could dilute voting power of an
existing control block ofstock. The family that controlled the corporation's stock had made an offer
to purchase the shares at $25.75 per share while a competing third party had offered $27.80 per
share. The Court denied the minority's request holding that the difference in price reflected the third
party's control premium, and that the controlling-shareholders were entitled to that premium and did
not have to offer it to the minority shareholders. "The law has acknowledged, albeit in a guarded
and complex way, the legitimacy of the acceptance by controlling shareholders of a control
premium."
5.6 Burden of Persuasion. When a majority shareholder, deemed to be a fiduciary, is
challenged for having engaged in self-dealing, the majority shareholder has the burden of coming
forward with evidence and the burden ofpersuasion to show that the transaction was scrupulously
fair.39 Fiduciaries have the burden of proving both: (1) their good faith in dealing with the
corporations they control; and, (2) the inherent fairness ofthose dealings to those corporations, their
shareholders and their creditors.4o In cases based on a violation of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff is not
required to prove injury or economic loss as a condition of relief.
6. COURT RESPONSES TO PRUDENT RULES AND SALE OF BUSINESSES.
6.1 In Estate ofDoelger, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1938), the Court made some careful distinctions
between the responsibilities of a fiduciary of an estate and the application of the fiduciary
relationship when conducted in the form of a business corporation. The court made the following
inciteful comments:
A clear distinction must be made between the powers and limitations ofa corporation
formed pursuant to directions in the will and the powers and limitations of a trustee
appointed under the will. The testator designates his trustee and has power to give the trustee
absolute and unlimited discretion in investments. As the testator has such power, ifhe does
not use it and says nothing about the trustee's right to invest, the law limits the trustee to
what are designated as legal investments. But the testator cannot either create, or confer
powers on, a corporation. The sovereign alone has such power. And when on the executors
38 See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F2d 173, where the Court commented: "We do not mean
to suggest that a majority shareholder cannot dispose of a controlling block of stock to outsiders
without having to account to this corporation for profits or even never do this with impunity when
the buyer is an interested customer for the corporation's product, although when the sale necessarily
results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate goodwill and consequent unusual profit to the
fiduciary who has caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains.
39 See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F Supp 361; and Farber v. Servan Land Co.,
393 F Supp 633; Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal App2d 252, 76 Cal Rptr 781.
40 See Garner v. Pearson, 545 F Supp 549.
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petition it creates a corporation, the state and not the testator gives the corporation all the
powers it possesses, including the powers ofinvestment that are usual, legal and customary
in such corporation. As the testator can give no power to the corporation, his silence does
not keep from it any the law confers. In the case of the trustee, since the testator has the
power to give discretionary authority in investments, silence means limitation. In the case
of the corporation, since the testator has no such power, silence means the absence of
limitation. (At pages 339-340.)
6.2 In Taylor v. Nationsbank Corporation, 481 S.E.2d 358 (NC 1997), the Court sustained the
beneficiaries efforts to obtain a copy ofthe trust instruments in order to determine the method used
to pay them their cash bequests. The Court stated that §173 of the Restatement (Second) ofTrusts
makes it clear that the trustee must always provide beneficiaries complete and accurate information
and documentation regarding the administration of the trust.
6.3 In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 253 Va. 30, 480 S.E.2d 488 (VA 1997), the Court required that the
trustee disclose the entire trust agreement to the beneficiary. "The beneficiary is entitled to review
the trust documents in their entirety in order to assure the trustees are discharging their duty to deal
impartially with all the beneficiaries within the restrictions and conditions imposed by the Trust
Agreement."
6.4 In Allard v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 99 Wn.2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983), the Washington
Supreme Court held that the trustee had a duty to inform the beneficiaries of the contemplated sale
of real property comprising the entire trust estate because such sale is a "significant non-routine
transaction." Such a sale could not occur in the absence of a "compelling circumstance" without
providing written notice to the beneficiaries of the nature and terms of the intended transaction.
6.5 In Matter ofMendIeson, 46 Misc.2d 960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1965), the decedent made a
"special request" that shares ofa company be retained and not sold "unless a sale thereof is deemed
for the best interests ofmy estate by my said executor or trustee." The court held the fiduciary liable
for a loss caused by a devaluation ofthe business, and stated: "The duty ofthe trustee here was not
so much to watch the market but the business itself which faltered."
6.6 In Arthur E. Kettle, 423 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3rd Dept. 1980), the decedent's Will provided that the
stock ofthe corporation be retained "unless c()mpelling reasons arise for [its] disposal." Within two
months of acquiring the stock the fiduciary sold half the stock in order to diversify the trust estate,
and the widow sued the fiduciary for its actions as she deemed it unnecessary to sell the stock. The
court required that the stock be repurchased because the fiduciary demonstratedno compelling
reason for selling the stock, and that the fiduciary pay all costs associated with the repurchase.
6.7 InEI Boletin Popular Pub. Co. v. Springer, 33 N.M. 275, 265 Pac. 713 (1928), the fiduciary
employed a full time manager to run the business and the fiduciary exercised supervisory control
over the hired manager. The court indicated that the extent ofdelegation ofmanagerial duties was
to be decided with reference to reasonableness under the circumstances.
6.8 In First Ala. Bank ofHuntsville v. Spragins, 515 So.2d 962 (Ala. 1987), the corporate trustee
retained its own stock, which constituted inception assets, for more than eight years, and the value
of the stock represented about 75 percent of the trust estate. The decedent had been president and
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chainnan of the board of directors of the corporate fiduciary. During the eight years the stock
increased in value, and the Will specifically authorized investments to be made "regardless oflack
of diversification," and for the trustee to retain assets "originally received ••• without liability for
depreciation or loss through error ofjudgment." The beneficiaries contended that these provisions
did not protect the fiduciary when a violation ofthe duty ofloyalty existed and retention constituted
self-dealing. The Court found that a breach oftrust occurred. In detennining the amount ofdamages
the Court relied on expert testimony that showed the differences in the principal values of the
prudently and imprudently managed estates and the income earned on each, taking into consideration
trust distributions. The difference in appreciation ofa diversified quality investment portfolio over
the amount of the appreciation in the Bank stock was about $1 million; hence, this was the amount
ofdetermined damages. Plus punitive damages and court costs!
6.9 In Goddardv. ContinentalNat. Bank& Trust, 532N.E.2d435 (111.1988), the Court reviewed
whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter oflaw, that the settlor unambiguously authorized
the trustees to continue to hold the stock "come what may." The Court detennined that this "phrase
certainly is not the equivalent ofan intent to retain the property indefinitely. Accordingly, we cannot
agree with the trial court's finding that the settlor's intent is unambiguous. In other words, we
believe the trust provisions are capable ofmore than one meaning••••" The case was sent back to
the trial court who applied the "come what may" standard, and then found that the fiduciary
committed a breach of trust.
6.10 In Hoffman v. First Virginia Banis, 263 S.E.2d 402 (1980), the court held that an
authorization in the Will that made specific reference to the Virginia prudent person statute, and
waived it, was sufficient to protect the fiduciary from its application.
6.11 In Hatcher v. United States Nat. Banko{Oregon, 643 P.2d 359 (Ore. App. 1982), the court
reviewed a fiduciary's actions in selling the decedent's closely held stock. The court found that the
fiduciary committed a breach of trust because the fiduciary did not make a thorough appraisal
detennining the value ofthe stock before selling it, and the fiduciary should have at least tested the
market to detennine the stock's value. The fiduciary breached its trust by failing to: (1) obtain fair
market value for the corporate stock; (2) failing to obtain beneficiary approval; (3) not getting any
cash at closing; (4) only obtaining a pledge ofthe stock that was the subject ofthe sale and this stock
was not to have voting rights; (5) not providing for any restrictions on salaries or dividends payable
by corporation; (6) not providing for any restrictions on the corporation mortgaging its assets and/or
incurring indebtedness, and, finally (7) providing for an interest rate substantially below an
appropriate market rate based upon the provisions of the sales agreement. The Court construed the
exoneration provision as nothing more than a statement of the prudent person rule, and that
exoneration provisions would not be pennitted to apply to provide additional protection.
6.12 In Estate o(Stern, New York (1989) the court explained the problems that arise when the
stock constituting control ofthe company is held in trust and the trustee, son ofthe founder, is both
a family member beneficiary and chiefexecutive officer ofthe company. The daughter commenced
an action to cause her brother's removal as trustee because ofhis failure to make the trust productive
of income. The Court granted the requested relief because the court concluded that the interests of
the corporation were more important to the son, and the son had not considered a sale of the stock
to the public because it would jeopardize the son trustee's control of the corporate business to the
son's personal detriment. The son's personal interest is in direct conflict with the son's duty of
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undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries; hence, the court removed the son trustee.
6.13 In Johnson v. Witkowski, 573 N.E. 2d 513, (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), the Court, in setting aside
a sale of the business made the following comments:
6.14 In Donahue VS. RoddElectrotype Co. o[New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578,328 N.E.2d 505
(1975), the Court held that a closely held business may not purchase its shares from a stockholder
who is a member of a control group without offering stockholders outside of the group an equal
opportunity to sell a ratable number of their shares at the same price. Courts from Alaska, Florida,
Illinois, and Ohio have followed this holding.
6.15 In InterFirst BankDallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987), the beneficiaries
sued the trustee for an alleged imprudent sale of one-third interest in a closely held business. The
trustee making the sale succeeded an original individual trustee whose final accounting indicated a
value of$185 per share. The shares were redeemed by the closely held business a few months later
for $512 per share. Few previous sales of stock had been made, and the previous highest sale had
been for $163. The book value of the shares was determined to be $1,409. At trial the jury
determined the stock's fair market value at $1,549. Actual damages of$1 million were awarded,
including interest of $265,000. The beneficiaries were awarded $]0 million in punitive damages.
The decedent's Will provided: "The Trustee shall never be liable for any action or failure to act
hereunder in the absence ofproofofbad faith." The Appeals Court noted that this provision meant
the trustee's liability had to be based upon self dealing, bad faith or intentionally adverse acts or
reckless indifference towards the interests ofthe trust beneficiaries. The Court in holding the trustee
liable, although reducing punitive damages to $2.7 million, made the following important points:
We note initially that the difficulty arises here because of the defendants' multiple
roles. They were trustees of the trust and were also stockholders, directors, and
officers of a close corporation involved in transactions in which they stood on both
sides ·and in which they had a self-interest. In each capacity, the defendants had
fiduciary duties. Wearing more than one hat - here, at least three - requires a
fiduciary to be very nimble as well as most prudent. While the fiduciary may purport
to wear one hat at a particular moment, in truth, all hats are worn together at all
times.
Directors ofcorporation who also served as trustees ofcorporation's stock breached
their fiduciary duties when they caused corporation to guaranty a loan to another
corporation without authorization of the Board of Directors and later caused the
corporation to guaranty loans used to finance an acquisition of another company,
where the directors had a financial interest, and the result ofall the transactions was
to release them from their personal guaranties.
The fiduciary did not obtain an outside appraisal for the stock and did not inform the
beneficiaries of the proposed sale.
The fiduciary's trust officer testified that because the stock comprised more than one-
third ofthe total trust the stock should be sold in order to diversify the trust estate and
generate more income. The trust officer concluded that the Company was the only
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likely purchaser, and he applied his own valuation methodology to determine the
price per share. He was aware that the Company's earnings had dramatically
increased, but he concluded that this a "short-lived phenomenon."
o A fiduciary is obligated to secure competitive bidding and make attempts to obtain
offers from other sources.
o "If [the fiduciary] had made a diligent effort to get the best price possible for the
stock by publicizing its· sale, by notifying the beneficiaries, by getting an outside
appraisal, and by then accepting the highest offer, its actions would not have been in
bad faith. If [the fiduciary] had not been in the position of obtaining an advantage
for itself as a lender to [the business], a self-serving motive could not be inferred
from the situation. But the combination ofthese three factors presents circumstances
evincing badfaith andself-dealing to the detriment ofthe beneficiaries ofthe trusts.
• .• The price ofone-third ofthe market value is a fact from which inferences ofbad
faith and self-dealing can be drawn."
o The fiduciary objected to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it had no
duty to consult with the beneficiaries before selling the stock. The court determined
that a fiduciary has a duty to inform beneficiaries of material facts relating to non-
routine transactions which significantly affect the trust prior to the transaction taking
place. "While Texas law does not require the consent of the beneficiaries before
selling trust assets, the fact that the property is in a trust does not require that the
beneficiaries are to be kept in ignorance of the administration of the trust."
6.16 In Rippey v. Denver United States National Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718 (CO. 1967), the
beneficiaries successfully sued the bank fiduciary for selling the trust's stock of the closely held
company to the company's management when the fiduciary sold the company without contacting a
potential competing buyer who foreseeably would have paid more for the business, especially when
the fiduciary did not even give the company's competitor an opportunity to make an offer. The
beneficiaries argued that the fiduciary deliberately sold the stock at a lower price to the company's
management because the-company's management representatives contacted the fiduciary's bank
directors in attempts to influence the sale. The court stated:
Even though will authorized trustee to sell trust property in its sole judgment at private sale
without advertisement or notice to anyone, without aid or necessity of any court order,
without consulting beneficiaries and without regard to their opinions, desires or judgment
and to sell at such price and upon such terms as trustee should determine trustee was not
authorized to act unreasonably or operate beyond bounds ofprudent judgment.
The fiduciary then attempted to rely upon an exculpatory provision in the decedent's Will, and the
Court responded, stating:
It is doubtful whether this provision applies to a loss which resulted from a sale which was
not conducted in accordance with orthodox trust principles. But even if it does apply it falls
short ofexculpating the Bank here. Such a provision is usually held to add nothing. In does
not limit the trustee liability for even negligence.
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6.17 In Giagnorio v. Emmett C. Torkelson Trust, 292 Ill. App.3d 318, 686 N.E.2d 42 (IL 1997),
a contingent beneficiary brought action against decedent's surviving spouse who as trustee sold the
business stock to another beneficiary. The contingent beneficiary alleged that the trustee sold stock
for substantially less than- appraised value, with no money down, and without adequate protection
in event ofpurchaser's insolvency stated cause of action and fiduciary held liable.
6.18 In Huntington National Bank v. Wolfe & Huntington National Bank, 99 Ohio App.3d 585,
651 N.E.2d 458(1994), the fiduciaiy brought a declaratory action in probate court to seek
determination oftheir authority to sell stock offamily corporation and distribute cash. The fiduciary
acknowledged that he had a conflict of interest in sale of stock, but that he had selected an
independent appraiser to determine the value of the stock, obtained approval of independent bank
fiduciary, and advised beneficiaries ofhis intended actions and sought probate court approval. The
appellate court dismissed the beneficiaries appeal from a decision in favor of fiduciary.
6.19 In Murphy v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 699 P.2d 13 (CO., 1985), the court found the
fiduciary liable for breach oftrust by not securing competitive bidding, by not properly maintaining
trust property in order to enhance its value for sale was sufficient evidence of fiduciary's breach of
duty ofloyalty.
6.20 In C. Green Charitable Trust & Jaffe v. Comercia Bank - Detroit, a bank fiduciary was liable
to trust for a bad faith violation of fiduciary duties with regard to the sale of trust property by not
disclosing name of purchaser to the trust's beneficiaries and to the co-trustee, and by failing to
adequately establish the value of the property and failing to obtain highest price available for
property.
6.21 In Wilmington Trust Company v. Coulter, 41 Del.Ch. 548,200 A.2d 441 (DE., 1964), held
bank fiduciary liable for breach of trust by failing to inform co·trustee when it received offer to
purchase stock at a one·third higher price than that fixed by an as yet unbinding agreement for sale
of stock and did not reconsider the sale prior to completing the sale.
6.22 In Thomas v. Turner, Ky. App.736 S.W.2d 343 (1987), the court stated that a bank
fiduciary's sale of trust property to a substantial customer ofbank constituted a conflict of interest
which should have prevented sale from occurring; bank as trustee gave special consideration to
customer that it could not give to other potential purchasers if land had been offered at public
auction, trustee made no efforts to market land through its real estate division or with any real estate
broker, trustee never informed beneficiaries of the contemplated sale, and after customer
communicate its first purchase offer to fiduciary, the fiduciary did not so much as make a
counteroffer.
6.23 In In re Mendleson 's Will, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1965), the court held that fiduciary who failed
to make reasonable effort to dispose of the shares of a close corporation within a year after a duty
arose to dispose of such shares because of decline in value was liable for breach of duty.
6.24 In Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537 (Georgia, 11 th Cir.1996), a trustee
bank's interests conflicted with those of beneficiary in violation of duty of undivided loyalty, by
virtue of bank's holding of its parent company's stock in trust and overlapping and interlocking
management of the two corporations. Attempts by trustee to resign was evidence of its bad faith.
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6.25 In In re Pulitzer's Estate, 260 N. Y. Supp. 975 (lS! Dep't, 1932), the decedent's estate
contained the stock ofa publishing corporation, and one ofthe corporation's assets was a newspaper.
The court granted the fiduciary's request to cause the corporation to sell the newspaper, but refused
to give guidance as to how to how to cause the corporation to make the sale. The court recognized
that the newspaper is an asset ofthe corporation and not the estate, yet it proceeded to authorize its
sale on the theory that this is necessary to protect the trust estate. The court asserted its power over
corporate assets, but then refused to sanction the details of the sale, showing a regard for the
corporate entity.
6.26 In Howardv. Shay, 100F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1996). The former employees ofa company who
participated in the company's ESOP brought an action under ERISA for a breach ofa fiduciary duty
in connection with the sale by the ESOP of its sole asset, company stock. The ESOP originally
purchased the stock for $10.67 a share, and, upon the ESOP's termination, sold the shares at $14.40
per share. The sales price was based on a report of an independent appraiser, Arthur Young &
Company, and the appraiser's report was accepted by the fiduciaries without further review. Arthur
Young determined that the per share asset value was $83; however, the reduction in price to $14.40
was based upon substantial reductions for lack ofmarketability and minority ownership. In finding
the fiduciaries liable for a breach of its fiduciary duties the Court made the following statements.
o Although securing an independent assessment from a financial advisor or legal
counsel is evidence ofa thorough investigation, ... , it is not a complete defense to a
charge ofimprudence. As Judge Friendly has explained, independent expert advice
is not a "whitewash." The fiduciary must (1) investigate the expert's qualifications,
(2) provide the expert with complete and accurate information, and (3) make certain
that reliance on the expert's advice is reasonably justified under the circumstances.
o We agree that the district court exhibited some confusion over the correct articulation
ofthe prudent man standard. The business judgment rule is a creature ofcorporate,
not trust, law. But we reverse on the grounds that even if the district court applied
the prudent man standard, it did not apply it correctly. The fiduciaries failed to carry
their burden ofproving that they fulfilled their duties ofcare and loyalty and that the
ESOP received adequate consideration. The focus is on the thoroughness of the
investigation. The fiduciaries completed the transaction without negotiation. Rather
than shop the stock to a third party buyer or appoint a non-conflicted fiduciary, the
fiduciaries relied on the Arthur Young valuation, and they did not question the
valuation or retain a second firm to review it.
o An independent appraisal "is not a magic wand that fiduciaries may simply wave
over a transaction to ensure that their responsibilities are fulfilled. It is a tool and,
like all tools, is useful only ifused properly." To justifiably rely on an independent
appraisal, a conflicted fiduciary need not become an expert in the valuation ofclosely
held corporations. But the fiduciary is required to make an honest, objective effort
to read the valuation, understand it, and question the methods and assumptions that
do not make sense. Ifafter a careful review of the valuation and a discussion with
the expert, there are stiU uncertainties, the fiduciary should have a second firm review
the valuation.
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o The crucial distinction between Cunningham and the case before us is that the
Cunningham fiduciaries - the company's board ofdirectors - knew that the company
had not perfonned as well as the growth projections. In effect, they new that the
expert's appraisal was out of date. In this case, however, the majority faults the
fiduciaries not for providing inaccurate data to the expert, but for failing to question
the expert's methodology and valuation assumptions. The district court specifically
found that the fiduciaries in this case used an appropriate selection process in
choosing Arthur Young, and that they provided Arthur Young with all relevant,
material infonnation. Unless that finding is clearly erroneous, this court should hold
that the fiduciaries acted prudently. The majority's unprecedented rule essentially
requires the fiduciaries to be experts in subjects in which they admittedly have
insufficient knowledge or experience. Fiduciaries use experts precisely because they
are not qualified to do the appraisal themselves; once they have carefully selected and
adequately infonned the expert, they should be able to rely on the expert's
conclusions.
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7. BENEFICIARIES vs. BUSINESS & INCOME vs. REMAINDERMEN.
7.1 Multiple Fiduciary Duties. When a closely held business is a substantial asset ofthe trust,
and the trust has various split interests; for example, different income and remainder beneficiaries,
the fiduciary should expect that conflict problems will quickly rise to an open level ofhostility. As
a general rule, closely held corporations are under-capitalized and have needs for the accumulation
of current income to finance business growth. Further, as a matter of financial and tax policy, the
owners of closely held businesses do not want their businesses paying significant dividends, but
instead would rather have such excess sources of income distributed in the fonn wages, employee
fringe benefits, expensive business trips, and the like.
7.I(a) Rights of Income Beneficiaries.
7.I(a)(I) The most typical example is the marital deduction trust, where the
instrument must give the spouse the right to demand that the fiduciary make trust income
productive in order for the trust assets to qualify for the marital deduction. What does the
fiduciary do when the spouse exercises that right?
7.I(a)(2) What happens when the closely held business is an asset of a charitable
remainder trust; the charity wants income and the instrument requires the payment of an
annuity or unitrust amount?
7.1(b) Duty ofLoyalty. While a fiduciary has a duty ofloyalty - the obligation to act solely
in the best interests ofthe beneficiaries - the mere statement ofthe test offers no real guidance to the
fiduciary who attempts to'comply with the multiple problems ofsplit beneficial interests on the one
hand, and corporate responsibilities to creditors and minority shareholders on the other. The duty of
loyalty ofthe corporate director is also clearly established and has been said to be analogous to that
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of a trustee to a beneficiary.41
7.2 Fiduciary Control of Corporation & Payment of Dividends.
7.2(a) Board of Directors Control Corporation - Not the Fiduciary?
7.2(a)(I) The case ofIn the Matter ofKoretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951) is
helpful to an analysis of who controls an operating corporation; that is, the fiduciary
shareholder or the corporation's board of directors. The testator left the controlling shares
of the closely held business in trust for his family, and when the court found reasons to
remove the fiduciary, the court provided the following advice. "The corporations were not
made parties defendant. The business ofa corporation is operated by its board ofdirectors,
and ownership by the estate of the controlling interest of the outstanding stock confers no
power upon the fiduciaries of the estate (whether they be executors or trustees) to bind the
corporation." According to the Court, the question is: Must the fiduciary who controls the
corporation cause the corporation to follow rules oftrust administration so as to ensure that
income beneficiaries benefit from the trust estate?" Note the court's response:
o The trustee has a duty to exercise his control so as to favor the beneficiaries
of the trust. "But the ... principle does not embrace a duty to advance the
interests of a beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and other
outstanding stockholders' interest."
o The court stated: "it is the duty of a board of directors to manage the
corporate affairs solely in the interest ofthe corporation, 'quite regardless of
the effect of its policies and management upon the fortunes of individual
stockholders in the corporation. "
7.2(a)(2) The case ofD'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo, 137 N.J. Eq. 63,43 A.2d 169
(1945), the court reviewed a situation where the testator attempted to impose requirements
upon the heirs ofhis controlling shares ofstock to cause the corporation to employ and pay
defined sums to his other family members. The court opined that the heirs who received the
stock were not required to comply with the testator's wishes because the corporation is
controlled by its board of directors and not by the shareholders.
7.2(a)(3) In Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A. 2d 162 (N.J. 1952), the court addressed the
question of the power of the trustee to withhold dividends when he is acting as director of
the corporation. The duty of the trustee to vote shares in such a way as to promote the
interests of the beneficiaries was recognized, but the court stated that this obligation "does
not embrace a duty to advance the interests ofa beneficiary at the expense ofthe corporation
and other outstanding stockholders' interests. That duty must be adjusted with the duty ofa
director as such."
7.2(b) Payment of Dividends.
41 See 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations §§ 838-988.
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7.2(b)(1) Generally - No Right to Dividends.
7.2(b)(1)(A) "If the corporate entity is inviolate, the corporation's net
income must be considered its own to spend or save as its directors see fit, the life
beneficiary ofa trust which has for its res the majority ofthe shares can look only to
such dividends as may be declared from this net income. There are two Pennsylvania
cases which unhesitatingly adopt this conclusion. The shares, it is pointed out, and
the corporation, belong to the estate.,>42
7.2(b)(1)(B) The position of most courts appears to be that where the
fiduciary does not hold all of the shares of the corporation he will not be held in
breach of trust merely because he has failed to prevent accumulations of surplus
necessary to the continued vitality and growth of the business. The effect of these
decisions is to liberate the trustee and the business from the application oftrust rules
as to principal and income and to focus the trustee's duty to make the assets
productive ofincome, not on the corporate surplus, but on the continued retention of
the business interest by the trust.
7.2(b)(2) On the Other Hand - Why not? A close examination of general
corporation law discloses that unless the payment ofdividends impair a corporation's capital
or the corporation suffers insolvency, corporate law neither views excessively liberal
dividend policies as unlawful nor renders the directors liable for such action.
7.2(c) Depreciation of Corporate Assets. Depreciation is an expense properly charged
against corporate income -and a failure to depreciate assets will overstate income. A refusal to take
depreciation is a continuing impairment of capital, and will adversely affect the corporate entity.
Noted trust authorities have stated that:
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in trust to pay the
income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the principal to another
beneficiary is wasting property, the trustee under a duty to the beneficiary who is entitled to
the principal, either (a) to make provision for amortization, or (b) to sell such property. [See
Restatement (Second) Trusts §239.]
7.3 Responsibilities to Minority Shareholders. There are a significant number ofcases that
hold that majority stockholders are in a fiduciary relationship to the minority stockholders and the
corporate creditors when the majority interest uses its voting power to exercise actual control over
the operations ofthe corporation.43 It is not the power to elect directors which imposes this duty, but
rather the use ofthis power in such a way as to control directorial discretion by making the directors
agents of the majority shareholders.
7.4 Observation. The law oftrusts fails to provide workable rules on the question ofretention
and distribution of earnings of a business held in trust. The line drawn between principal and
42 Notes, Corporations in Decedents' Estates, 27 Virginia Law Review 497 at 501 (1941).
43 See Rohrlich, Law & Practice in Corporate Control, 96-110.
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income, based on distinctions between repairs and improvements, between "temporary" and
"permanent" improvements, between "wasting assets" and not-so-wasting assets, between
"amortization" and "depreciation," along with countless other confused ideas, impose singly and
collectively a rigid stranglehold on the trustee - controlled business enterprise of the kind which
often cannot be avoided.
8. SELECTED TAX ISSUES AFFECTING FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION.
8.1 Section 6166 - Deferral of Estate Tax on Business Assets.
8.1(a) Overview. §6166 permits an extension of time for payment of the estate tax when
the estate consists largely ofan interest in a closely held business. The estate tax can be deferred for
as much as 14 years from the date the estate tax return was due to be filed if the benefits of §6166
are timely elected, and the IRS approves the election. In 1984, Congress amended §6166 to permit
stock in holding companies to be treated as business stock in certain situations, and in 1997,
Congress lowered the interest rate payable on the estate tax that has been deferred, and eliminated
income and estate tax deductions for the interest paid.
8.1(b) General Rules of §6166.
8.1(b)(I) Qualification -- §6166(a)(1) and (2). An executor may elect to pay part
or all of the estate tax in two or more equal installments, but not exceeding 10 installments,
ifthe gross estate ofa U.S. citizen or resident includes an interest in a closely held business
worth more than 35% ofthe adjusted gross estate. Qualifying estates may defer that portion
ofthe estate tax not payable in the proportion which the closely held business amount bears
to the adjusted gross estate.
8.1(b)(2) Payment Dates -- §6166(a)(3). The first installment ofestate tax must be
paid not more than five years after the date prescribed for filing the estate tax return,
determined without regard to any extensions oftime for filing the return. Each succeeding
installment must be paid on or before the next anniversary of such date. A fiduciary should
elect the maximum benefit available because ifan election is made for a period that is less
than the maximum allowable, a longer period cannot be elected after the date for making the
initial election.
8.1(b)(3) The Election -- §6166(d). The election must be made not later than the
date prescribed for filing the estate tax return, including extensions. The district director is
responsible for deciding if an election meets the conditions of §6166 and the fiduciary is to
be notified if the election is not accepted.
8.1(b)(4) Declaratory Judgment to Determine §6166 Eligibility. The Taxpayer
ReliefAct of 1997, grants an estate access to the Tax Court to resolve disputes regarding the
estate's eligibility for deferral without being required to pay the full amount of estate tax
before seekingjudicial reviewofthe ineligibility determination. Exhaustion ofadministrative
remedies within the IRS is required before an action.
8.1(c) Definitions and Special Rules.
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8.1(c)(1) Interest in Closely Held Business -- §6166(b)(1). "Interest in a closely held
business" means one or more of the following: (I) a trade or business carried on as a
proprietorship; (ii) a partnership carrying on a trade or business ifeither the partnership has
15 or fewer partners, or 20% or more ofthe total capital interest in the partnership is included
in the decedent's gross estate; (iii) a corporation carrying on a trade or business ifeither the
corporation has 15 or fewer shareholders, or 20% or more in value ofthe corporation's voting
stock is included "in the decedent's gross estate.44 If the business is conducted as a sole
proprietorship, then only the assets actually used in the business are considered in making
the determination as to an "interest in a closely held business. ,,45
8.1(c)(2) Qualification as a Trade or Business. Active business activity is required,
and passive investments will not qualify as a business, although §6166 does not define "trade
or business." The IRS takes the position that to qualify for estate tax deferral, the decedent
must have owned an interest in a "corporation carrying on a trade or business," and this
means that a business entity carrying on a "manufacturing, mercantile, or service enterprise"
meets the necessary requirements while the "mere management ofpassive investment assets"
does not.46 While the legislative history of all three versions of §6166 is silent as to what
constitutes a business, there is no indication that the word "business" should be construed
differently under §6166 than under any other section using that term.
8.1(c)(2)(A) A large number of controversies surround the ownership by
a decedent of real estate, either as a farm or improved by buildings. If the decedent
(personally or through an agent) took part in the management ofa farm, the business
was an active one, and the estate qualified for deferral under §6166.47 Similarly, ifthe
decedent rented the land to sharecroppers, but took part in farm management
decisions and received a portion of the produce, the business was active and the
estate qualified for tax deferral.
8.1(c)(2)(B) In PLR 9801009, the IRS ruled that a decedent's real estate
leasing and management business qualified as a business under §6166(b) even though
decedent delegated management responsibilities during his last illness, because
decedent's level of activity (being on 24-hour call for emergencies, personally
operating and managing the properties) was more than a mere owner managing
investments).
44 §6166(b)(1).
45 A timber business held by a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary has also
qualified. TAM 9635004 advised that land the decedent owned, which comprised two-thirds ofthe
land used in the cattle ranching business the decedent engaged in as a partner in a partnership, was
an interest in a closely held business under §6166(b)(I)(A). The National Office concluded that the
asset qualifies for §6166 treatment even though it was owned by the decedent individually, and not
by the partnership.
46 See, e.g., TAM 8448006.
47 See, e.g., TAM 8432007, as well as Rev. Rul. 75-366.
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8.1(c)(2)(C) If the decedent merely owned the property and rented it, the
business was one of mere management of passive assets, and the estate did not
qualify for tax deferral.48
8.1(c)(3) More Closely Held Business Rules -- §6166(b)(2).
8.1(c)(3)(A) Determinations called for by the definition "interest in a
closely held business" are made immediately before the decedent's death.
8.1(c)(3)(B) An interest in a closely held business owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust is treated as being
owned proportionately by or for its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries, except
that no person is treated as a beneficiary of a trust who does not have a present
interest in the trust. A decedent is treated as owning all the stock and partnership
interests held by the decedent or any member ofhis family as defined by §267(c)(4), .
which treats the decedent's spouse, lineal descendants, ancestors, and siblings as
members ofthe decedent's family. According to the IRS, the §6166(b)(2) attribution
rules apply for purposes ofdetermining whether a partnership or corporation has 15
or fewer partners or shareholders within the meaning of§6166(b)(1), but do not apply
for purposes of the 35% ofadjusted gross estate test of §6166(a)(l), the 20% test in
§§6166(b)(I)(B)(I) and 6166(b)(I)(C)(I), or the formula used in determining the
maximum amount of tax that may be paid in installments set forth in §6166(a)(2).
8.1(c)(4) Farm Structures -- §6166(b)(3). Farm residences and related
improvements receive special consideration for purposes of determining whether an estate
meets the 35% test of§6166. The interest in a closely held business "which is in the business
of farming" includes any interest in residential buildings and related improvements on the
farm which are occupied on a regular basis by the owner or lessee of the farm, or by their
employees, for purposes of operating or maintaining the farm.
8.1(c)(5) Non-Readily-Tradable Securities -- §6166(b)(7). A special election and
definitions are provided in §6166(b)(7) to allow some deferral -- though on a less favorable
basis -- to certain estates owning capital interests in a partnership or non-readily-tradable
stock but which do not qualify for deferral under regular §6166. If the executor makes an
election under this subsection so as to qualify for §6166 deferral, the five-year standoff
period for beginning payments ofestate tax installments and the special 4% interest rate of
§6601G) do not apply.
8.1(c)(6) Holding Company Election -- §6166(b)(8). Estates owning stock in a
holding company may also qualify for §6166 ifthe executor makes a §6166(b)(8) election.
In this instance, an estate is considered to own stock in the business company, the stock of
which is held directly or indirectly through one or more holding companies. Further, to
48 See, e.g., TAM 8451014; PLRs 8524037 and 9015009 (partnership only collected rents);
but see rulings finding active conduct of a real estate rental service business, rather than mere
management of investments, PLRs 9517006, 9223028, 8942018, 8829013, 8804029; 9634006.
D -44
r
r
r,.
r,,.
I
r
r
•
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
qualify for the election the stock ofall such companies -- holding or business companies --
must be "non-readily-tradable" stock, as defined under §6166(b)(7)(B).
8.1(c)(6)(A) The stock in the business company which the estate is deemed
to hold is treated as voting stock "to the extent that voting stock in the holding
company owns directly (or through voting stock of one or more other holding
companies) voting stock in the business company."
8.1(c)(6)(B) A holding company is defined as any corporation holding
stock in another corporation, and a "business company" is defined as any corporation
carrying on "a trade or business" as defined in §6166. §6166(b)(8) has been held not
to be either a clarification ofprior law (the first §6166) or retroactive, with the result
that stock in a bank holding company does not satisfy the trade or business
requirement. See Moore v. U.S., 87-2 USTC Para. 13,741 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
8.1(c)(6)(C) §6166(b)(9)(B)(iii) provides another exception, which appears
to allow a holding company that is also a business company to qualify directly under
§6166(a)(l) for estate tax deferral. This exception applies to a parent corporation
owning 20% or more in value of the voting stock of a subsidiary, or a subsidiary
which has 15 or fewer stockholders, and 80% or more of the value of the assets of
such subsidiary or parent is attributable to assets used in carrying on a trade or
business. Ifthese conditions are met, the parent and all such subsidiaries are treated
"as one corporation" for purposes ofapplying the §6166(b)(9)(B)(ii) "passive asset"
test, which defines a passive asset as "any stock in another corporation" (emphasis
added). Apparently, ifa parent and subsidiary are treated as one corporation there can
be no stock "in another corporation," hence no "passive asset." For the purposes of
this rule, when applying the test as to whether 80% or more in value of the assets of
each corporation is attributable to assets used in carrying on a trade or business, the
stock ofa business company held by a holding company is not taken into account
8.l(c)(7) Deferral Not Available for Portion of Business Consisting of Passive
Assets -- §6166(b)(9). The "closely held business amount" of §6166(b)(5) used in
determining the portion ofestate tax deferred under §6166(a)(2), as well as "the value ofan
interest in a closely held business" used in determining whether the estate qualifies for
deferral under §6166(a)(1 ), excludes the portion of the interest in a closely held business
attributable to "passive assets." These are assets not used in carrying on a trade or business,
and include any stock in another corporation unless: (I) the stock is deemed to be held by the
decedent by reason of the holding company election of §6166(b)(8); and (ii) the stock
qualified under §6166(a)(I) as exceeding 35% of the adjusted gross estate.
8.l(d) Multiple Closely Held Businesses -- §6166(c). If20% or more of the total value of
each closely held business is held by the estate, the aggregate of all such holdings is treated as an
interest in a single closely held business for determining qualification for §6166 estate tax deferral.
For purposes ofmeeting the 20% requirement, an interest in a closely held business which represents
an interest in property held by the decedent and the surviving spouse as community property or as
joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, or tenants in common, will be included in determining the value
of the decedent's gross estate.
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8.1(e) Loss of Right to Defer Payment of Estate Tax -- §6166(g). There are four
circumstances which accelerate the estate's deferred obligation to pay estate taxes: (1) disposition
of business interest or withdrawals from business; (2) distribution of insufficient income by the
estate; (3) default in payment ofinstallment amounts or interest; and (4) violation of lien condition
under §6324A. The sale ofsome ofthe businesses' assets will not be treated as a disposition under
§6166(g)(I)(A) if the proceeds are applied to reduce mortgage debt on encumbered assets of the
operating business, or applied to the payment ofbusiness debts. A like-kind exchange under §1031
is not a considered a disposition. The following distributions are treated as not triggering the
acceleration rules: (1) a transfer of the decedent's property to a person entitled to it under the
decedent's will, the applicable law of intestate succession, or under a trust created by the decedent;
and (2) subsequent transfers ofproperty by reason ofdeath, so long as each transferee is a member
of the family, as defined in accordance with the attribution rules of §267(c)(4).
8.1(1) Coordination of §303 and §6166. If the estate's interest qualifies for §303, then a
decedent's stock may be redeemed by the corporation to pay estate taxes and administrative expenses .
without such redemption being characterized as a dividend; Le., the redemption will be characterized
as a sale or exchange ofthe stock subject to capital gain, rather than ordinary dividend treatment.
8.1(1)(1) In order to coordinate §303 with §6166, the value of the stock needs to
exceed 35% ofthe excess ofthe value ofthe gross estate over the deductions allowed under
§§2053 and 2054. §303 redemptions may be made within four years after the decedent's
death, and during the §6166 deferral period, if the amount of taxes or administration
expenses justifying §303 redemptions are paid within one year after the §303 redemption.
For purposes ofmeasuring distributions or withdrawals and the amount ofthe estate's interest
in the business, certain redemptions to which §303 applies are (I) not treated as distributions
or withdrawals and (ii) are considered as reducing the value of the estate's interest in the
closely held business.
8.1(1)(2) The condition required for a §303 redemption not to be treated as a
distribution, and for the acceleration base to be reduced by the amount of the §303
redemption, has caused controversy. However, the 1976 House Report on §303 stated that
303 and 6166 should operate in harmony as the extended period for redemption is intended
to more closely correlate (the two sections), particularly in that it would allow the
corporation to build up liquid assets and redeem stock so that the payment ofthe estate taxes
might be made at any time throughout the period for making installment tax payments.
8.2 The Family Owned Business Deduction. The requirements for the new Qualified Family
Owned Business Deduction are very similar to the requirements for the Special Use Valuation
election under Code §2032A.
8.2(a) Prior Exclusion Rules. The Qualified Family Owned Business Deduction of Code
§2057 began as an exclusion rather than as a deduction. Prior law permitted an executor to exclude
up to $1.3 million in value of a qualified family owned business interest from the taxable estate.
Generally, the exclusion was available if an estate contained a substantial ownership interest in a
family business and that interest was left to one or more "qualified heirs."
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8.2(b) New Deduction Provision. Now an executor may elect to deduct an amount, which
when combined with the unified credit, equals $1.3 million of a qualified family owned business
interest. Under §2057(a), the estate tax liability of an estate for which the executor elects the
deduction is calculated as if the estate were allowed a maximum qualified family-owned business
deduction of$675,000 and an applicable exclusion amount under §2010 (Le., the amount exempted
by the unified credit) of $625,000, regardless of the year in which the decedent dies. If the estate
includes less than $675,000 ofqualified family-owned business interests, the applicable exclusion
amount is increased on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but only up to the applicable exclusion amount
generally available for the year ofdeath.
Example: D dies in 2005, when the applicable exclusion amount is $800,000, with an estate
that includes qualified family-owned business interests valued at $675,000 or more. The
estate tax liability is calculated ac; ifthe estate were allowed a deduction of$675,000, and the
applicable exclusion amount is limited to $625,000. If instead D's estate includes QFOBIs
of$500,000 or less, all ofthe QFOBIs could be deducted from the estate, and the applicable
exclusion amount would be $800,000. If D's estate includes QFOBIs valued between
$500,000 and $675,000, all of the QFOBIs could be deducted from the estate, and the
applicable exclusion amount would be calculated as the excess of $1.3 million over the
amount of the QFOBIs. Thus, if D's QFOBIs were valued at $600,000, the applicable
exclusion amount would be $700,000.
8.2(c) Five Basic Requirements.
8.2(c)(1) The owner ofthe interest must have been a U.S. citizen or resident at the
time of death.
8.2(c)(2) The interest must be a qualified interest in a family owned business.
8.2(c)(3) The value ofthe decedent's family owned business interest that are passed
to a "qualified heir" must exceed 50 percent ofvalue ofthe decedent's adjusted gross estate.
8.2(c)(4) The decedent oranotherfamily member must have materially participated
in the business during at least five ofthe eight years preceding the decedent's date ofdeath.
8.2(c)(5) The executor must file an election along with a recapture agreement
signed by the heirs receiving the interest.
8.2(d) Family Business Interest Requirement. This involves a two-pronged test: (1) the
decedent must have "owned" the interest, and (2) to be qualified the interest must represent
ownership in a "family business." The ownership must be owned in one ofthe following ways: (1)
50 percent directly or indirectly owned by the decedent and/or members of the decedent's family;
(2) 70 percent directly or indirectly owned by members of two families; or (3) 90 percent directly
or indirectly owned by members of three families.
8.2(e) Prohibited Interests. A business whose principal place ofbusiness is outside the U.S.;
an interest that was readily tradeable on a securities exchange any time within three years of
decedent's death; and an interest in a business where more than 35 percent ofthe income ofthe trade
D -47
or business would qualify as personal holding company income, will not qualify for the deduction
treatment.
8.2(1) Qualified Heirs. A qualified heir is a member of the decedent's family, or an
individual who has been actively employed by the trade or business for a least 10 years prior to the
decedent's date of death.
8.2(g) Conclusion. Is it worth it? The requirements ofthe new reliefprovision are complex
and exacting. Are the potential tax savings worth the cost ofcompliance and the loss of flexibility
the election imposes?
8.3 S Corporation Planning. A corporation must satisfy all the requirements ofCode §1361;
and may not: (a) have more than 75 shareholders; (b) have as a shareholder a person who is not an
individual, other than an estate, certain trusts, and certain exempt organizations; (c) have a
nonresident alien as a shareholder; and (d) have more than one class of stock. Further, certain
corporations are ineligible for S corporation status, such as financial institutions using the reserve
method ofaccounting, insurance companies, a corporation electing to use the §936 possessions tax
credit, and a DISC or former DISC.
8.3(a) Number ofShareholders. An S corporation can have no more than 75 shareholders,
and stock attribution rules do not apply, except in the case of a husband and wife who are U.S.
citizens or residents, who are considered to be one shareholder whether they own the stock jointly
or separately. The estate of either spouse also qualifies for this treatment, as long as a decedent
spouse's estate is not a foreign estate. An estate that holds S corporation stock is considered as one
shareholder (the estate, not the beneficiaries, is considered the shareholder). Regs. §1.1361-1(h) sets
forth who the shareholders are for purposes ofcounting the number ofshareholders when subchapter
S stock is held by a trust. Each potential current beneficiary of an electing small business trust is
counted as a separate shareholder.
8.3(b) Types of Eligible Shareholders. There are nine types of eligible S corporation
shareholders: (1) individuals; (2) estates during the period of administration; (3) a voting trust; (4)
a "grantor" trust, as that status is determined under §§673-677; (5) a trust treated under §678 as
owned by an individual other than the grantor; (6) a qualified subchapter S trust (QSST); (7) a "will
recipient" trust with respect to stock transferred to it pursuant to the terms ofa will, but only for the
two-year period beginning on the day on which the stock is transferred to it; (8) an electing small
business trust, as defined in §1361(e); (9) a qualified tax-exempt shareholder, as defined in
§1361(c)(6), i.e., a qualified retirement plan trust.
8.3(b)(1) Where the sole purpose for retaining stock of an S corporation in the
estate is to facilitate the installment payment ofthe estate tax under §6166, the administration
of the estate is not considered in existence beyond a reasonable period for §641(a)(3)
purposes and the estate will be an eligible shareholder for the period during which the estate
complies with the provisions of §6166.49
49 Rev. Rul. 76-23, 1976-2 C.B. 264.
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8.3(b)(2) A grantor or §678 trust which continues in existence after the death ofthe
deemed owner is pennitted to remain as an S shareholder for two years after the deemed
owner's death. The estate of the deemed owner is treated as the shareholder.
8.3(b)(3) An estate qualifies as a shareholder ofan S corporation, and an executor
or administrator does not need to affinn consent to the election. Regs. §1.641(b)-3(a)
provides that an estate is tenninated for federal income tax purposes after the expiration of
a reasonable period for perfonnance by the executor ofthe ordinary duties ofadministration,
such as the collection of assets and the payment of debts, taxes, and bequests.
8.3(c) Trusts as S Corporation Shareholders.
8.3(c)(1) Trust All of Which Is Owned by One Individual. §1361(c)(2)(A)(I)
provides that a trust all ofwhich is treated as owned by one individual (whether or not the
grantor) is an eligible S corporation shareholder. The deemed owner is treated as the
shareholder and, thus, must be a U.S. citizen or resident. To satisfy the "all ofwhich" test,
an individual must be treated as owning both the income and corpus of the trust under one
ofthe provisions of§§673-678. An individual will be treated as owning both the income and
the corpus by reason ofa power over or interest in both ordinary income and corpus. If this
is the case, the individual takes all items of income, deduction, and credit, including capital
gain and losses, into account in computing his income tax liability.
8.3(c)(2) Grantor Trust. A grantor trust is a trust all of which is owned by the
grantor under one ofthe provisions of§§673-677. The grantor is treated as the owner ofthe
trust if: (1) the grantor or the grantor's spouse has a reversionary interest in either the income
or principal exceeding 5% ofthe value ofthe trust as ofits inception (§673); (2) the grantor
or the grantor's spouse has the power to control the beneficial enjoyment ofthe trust property
without the approval or consent of an adverse party (§674); (3) the grantor or the grantor's
spouse has certain' administrative powers (§675); (4) the grantor or the grantor's spouse has
the power to revoke the trust (§676); or (5) the income ofthe trust may be distributed to the
grantor or the grantor's spouse or may be applied to the payment of premiums on life
insurance policies on their lives (§677).
8.3(c)(3) GRAT and GRUT. A grantor retained annuity trust ("GRAT") and a
grantor retained unitrust ("GRUT") are irrevocable trusts to which the grantor transfers
property while retaining the right to receive an annuity or unitrust interest, respectively, for
a tenn ofyears with the property thereafter passing to others, such as the grantor's children.
A GRAT or GRUT qualifies to hold S corporation stock if the trust instrument includes
provisions that cause the grantor to be taxed on all ofthe income earned by the trust, i.e., by
making the trust a wholly grantor trust for income tax purposes. The grantor's retained
annuity or unitrust interest is not sufficient, since it is not a right to all the income of the
trust. There are a variety of provisions that can be added to a GRAT or GRUT to create
wholly grantor trust status. For example, retention by the grantor of a §673 reversionary
interest or certain §675 administrative powers results in the trust being a grantor trust for
income tax purposes; e.g. the grantor having the power, acting alone and in a nonfiduciary
capacity, to reacquire property of the trust by substituting other property of an equivalent
value, causing the trust to be treated as a grantor trust under §675(4).
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8.3(c)(4) §678 Trust. A trust all of which is treated under §678 as owned by an
individual other than the grantor is also a permitted Scorporation shareholder. An individual
is treated as the owner of the trust if the individual has the power to vest all the principal or
income in themselves, or has previously partially released or otherwise modified such a
power while retaining such control as would subject the grantor ofa trust to treatment as the
owner thereof under §§671-677.
8.3(c)(5) Two-Year Trust. §1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) provides that a grantor or §678 trust
which-continues in -existence after the death of the -deemed owner is a permitted S
corporation shareholder for a period oftwo years after the deemed owner's death.
8.3(c)(6) "Will Recipient" Trust. A trust that acquires its stock pursuant to the
terms of a will is an eligible S corporation shareholder; however, the eligibility of a will
recipient trust lasts only for a period oftwo years, beginning with the day on which the stock
is distributed to the trust. The estate of the testator is treated as the shareholder until the
earlier of the transfer of that stock by the trust or the expiration of the two-year period
beginning on the day that the stock is transferred to the trust.
8.3(c)(7) Voting Trust. A trust created to exercise the voting power of stock
transferred to it m'ay be an S shareholder. Each trust beneficiary is counted in determining
the number of shareholders, and each beneficiary must be an eligible shareholder.
8.3(c)(8) Qualified Subchapter S Trust ("QSST"). In order for a trust to be eligible
for QSST status, it must satisfy the requirements ofRegs. §1.1361-1G)(l )(ii) from the date
the QSST election is made or from the effective date of the QSST election (whichever is
earlier) throughout the entire period that the current income beneficiary and any successor
income beneficiary is the trust income beneficiary. If the terms ofthe trust do not preclude
the possibility that any ofthe QSST requirements are not met, the trust will not qualify as a
QSST.
8.3(c)(8)(A) The trust instrument must require that it will have only one
current income beneficiary. §1361(d)(3) permits a share ofa trust to be treated as a
separate trust for QSST purposes if it qualifies as a "substantially separate and
independent share of a trust within the meaning of Section 663(c)." Each separate
share also counts as one shareholder. The separate share rule may be applied even
though separate and independent accounts are not maintained or required, and no
. physical segregation ofassets is maintained or required.so The separate share rule has
been followed when the trust is not a discretionary sprinkle trust but, instead, directs
the trustee' to distribute the income (and principal) to the beneficiaries in a certain
way, for example, equally or in certain percentages.SI
so See Regs. §1.663(c)-I(c). Regs. §1.1361-1G)(3) references the §663(c) regulations in
defining a separate and independent share for QSST purposes.
SI In Rev. Rul. 93-31 the IRS ruled that a separate share trust cannot qualify as a QSST if
there is even a remote possibility that the trust corpus will be distributed during the current income
beneficiary's lifetime to someone else. The trust provided that income is payable equally to B and
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8.3(c)(8)(B) The current income beneficiary must be a U.S. citizen or
resident.
8.3(c)(8)(C) All the income is, or is required to be, distributed currently to
the income beneficiary; it is not necessary that the trust instrument provide that all
the income be distributed to the current income beneficiary. As long as all income is
in fact distributed to the current income beneficiary, and no other beneficiary, the
requirement is met. PLR 8836057 provides that when a trust meets all the QSST
requirements, and contains a provision allowing the beneficiary to elect annually to
have the trustee retain all or a portion ofthe trust income does not change the status
ofthe trust as a QSST.
8.3(c)(8)(D) The trust instrument must contain a provision that any
principal distributed during the beneficiary's life may be distributed only to the
beneficiary. Ifthe terms ofthe trust are silent with respect to corpus distributions, and
distributions to persons other than the current income beneficiary are permitted under
local law, then the terms ofthe trust do not preclude the possibility that corpus may
be distributed to someone other than the income beneficiary and the trust is not a
QSST.52
8.3(c)(8)(E) The trust instrument must require that the beneficiary's income
interest must end on the beneficiary's death or the trust's earlier termination.
8.3(c)(8)(F) The trust instrument must require that if the trust terminates
during the beneficiary's life, all the trust assets must be distributed to the beneficiary.
8.3(c)(8)(G) Various types of trusts created for other estate planning
purposes also may qualify as QSSTs while others may not qualify.
r, • General Power of Appointment Marital Deduction Trust would qualify;however, the marital deduction may be disallowed with respect to that part
ofa marital trust which is funded with stock in a closely held business if the
terms ofthe trust or any buy-sell agreement governing the stock do not either
r,
r•
r
r
C and that the trustee has discretion to pay corpus to B for B's health, education, support, or
maintenance, after considering B's other income. Even though B's other income was so substantial
that the possibility ofexercise of the power to distribute corpus was remote, the IRS stated that C's
share of the trust is not a QSST because of the possibility, even though remote, that C's share of
corpus will be distributed to someone other than C during C's lifetime
52 See Regs. §1.1361-IG)(I)(iii). In Rev. Rut. 93-79 the IRS ruled that a defective QSST
retroactively reformed by a state court to prevent any distribution of corpus to a beneficiary other
than the current income beneficiary was not retroactively recognized as a qualified S corporation
shareholder, explaining that a retroactive change ofthe legal effect ofa completed transaction does
not have any retroactive effect for federal tax purposes. The IRS stated, however, that the trust
reformation would be recognized prospectively, allowing the corporation to file a new S corporation
election for a subsequent taxable year without waiting out the five-year period required by §1362(g).
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allow stock transfers without the consent of an individual other than the
surviving spouse, or give individuals other than the surviving spouse the right
to purchase the stock for a price significantly below its fair market value.s3
• QTIP Trust - Two elections must be made when a QTIP trust is to qualify as
a QSST: one by the executor to qualify the trust for the marital deduction and
another by the beneficiary of the trust to qualify the trust as a QSST.
• A §2056A qualified domestic trust ("QDOT") cannot qualify as a QSST
unless the beneficiary is a U.S. resident.
• §2503(c) Trusts. This trust, for the benefit of a minor, is designed to satisfy
the present-interest requirement for the annual gift tax exclusion, and has
only one income beneficiary. Only the income beneficiary qualifies for corpus
distributions during his or her lifetime; and upon termination of the trust
during the life of the beneficiary the trust assets are to be distributed to the
beneficiary. Thus, a 2503(c) trust qualifies as a QSST, provided the trustee
distributes, or is required to distribute,the income at least annually to the
beneficiary.
• Charitable Remainder Trust - In Rev. Rul. 92-48 the IRS concluded that a
charitable remainder annuity trust or unitrust cannot qualify as a QSST and
vice versa. Consequently, assets other than S corporation stock must be used
to fund charitable remainder trusts. The IRS based its ruling on the mutual
exclusivity of charitable remainder trusts and QSSTs under the two distinct
systems of income taxation applicable to the respective trusts. The QSST
election causes the beneficiary of the trust to be treated as the owner of the
portion of the trust consisting of S corporation stock under §678(a) and
guarantees that the beneficiary is taxed on all the income earned by the trust
relating to the stock. In contrast, the beneficiary ofan income interest under
a charitable remainder trust is only taxable on the unitrust or annuity amount,
and the trust would therefore represent, in effect, two owners ofS corporation
stock: the income beneficiary and the trust.
• Unified Credit "Sprinkle" Trust may qualify as a QSST if it has only one
beneficiary and the trust meets all the other QSST requirements. The typical
unified credit sprinkle trust permitting the trustee to distribute income to the
surviving spouse and issue does not qualify as a QSST. However, the terms
of such a trust can be effectively modified by means of agreement or
disClaimers.
8.3(c)(9) Electing Small Business Trust. The Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996 allowed an electing small business trust, defined in §1361(e), to be an S corporation
S3 See TAM 9147065
D -52
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shareholder. This type oftrust, unlike a QSST, may have multiple beneficiaries, accumulate
income, sprinkle both income and principal among the beneficiaries, and serve as a
generation-skipping vehicle. Therefore, additional options are available for both inter vivos
and testamentary transfers of S corporation stock. To qualify for this treatment: (1) all
beneficiaries of the trust must be individuals, estates, or charities and other organizations
described in §170(c)(2)-(5); (2) no interest in the trust may be acquired by purchase; and (3)
an election must be made by the trustee.
8.3(c)(9)(A) §1361(e)(I)(B) explicitly prohibits a QSST or tax-exempt trust
from qualifying as an electing small business trust. §1361(e)(1)(C) defines
acquisition by purchase as any acquisition having a cost basis under §1012. This
requirement has the effect ofmandating that all interests in the trust be acquired by
gift orbequest. Charitable remainderannuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts
also are prohibited by statute from qualifying as electing small business trusts.
8.3(c)(9)(B) The election to be treated as an electing small business trust
is described in Notice 97-12, 1997-1 C.B. 385. Until the IRS publishes a form on
which to make the election, it may be made by filing a statement with the IRS
Service Center with which the S corporation files its income tax return.
8.3(c)(9)(C) There are explicit rules for determining how an electing small
business trust is treated for purposes of the 75-shareholder limitation.
§1361(c)(2)(B)(v) provides that each "potential current beneficiary" is treated as a
shareholder, except that during any period when there is no potential current
beneficiary, the trust is treated as the shareholder. Section 1361(e)(2) defines
potential current beneficiary, with respect to any period, as any person who during
that period is entitled to, or who may receive at the discretion of any person, an
income or principal distribution. Therefore, care should be taken in defining potential
beneficiaries so that the 75-shareholder limit is not exceeded inadvertently (e.g., by
after-born children, contingent beneficiaries becoming potential current beneficiaries
on the death ofthe original beneficiary, etc.).
8.3(c)(9)(D) Because ofthe multiple beneficiary and sprinkle possibilities
ofthese trusts, they have the potential to add flexibility. For example, a credit shelter
trust with multiple beneficiaries may qualify, as maya decedent's revocable grantor
trust that becomes irrevocable at death,· regardless of the number of permissible
beneficiaries (subject to the 75 shareholder limit) and without the two-yearpost-death
eligibility period limitation. Similarly, an irrevocable inter vivos trust allowing
discretionary income and principal distributions can be established as a gifting device
to take advantage of the §2503(b) gift tax annual exclusion. Allowing charities as
contingent remainder beneficiaries allows the use of S corporation stock to make
charitable gifts.
8.3(d) Estate Administration Considerations.
8.3(d)(l) SElection - The estate ofa deceased shareholder need not file a consent
to the S election, nor does it have the power to revoke the election, unless it owns more than
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50% ofthe outstanding shares. Ifthe estate transfers S corporation stock to a trust that meets
the QSST requirements, the beneficiary of the trust must elect to have the trust qualify as a
QSST within two "months and 16 days of the transfer.
8.3(d)(2) Income Tax Considerations - An estate holding S corporation stock has
distributable net income, even if the S corporation does not distribute currently all of its
income. Thus, distributions by the estate to beneficiaries that would otherwise have been
nontaxable, may be taxable to the beneficiaries.
8.3(d)(3) §303 Redemption - A §303 redemption may apply with respect to a
deceased shareholder's interest in an S corporation. However, it is less important for an S
corporation shareholder to have a redemption qualify as a sale or exchange rather than as a
dividend, because the distribution is applied against basis. The direct taxation of the S
corporation's income to its shareholders, whether or not distributed, and flow-through ofall
other corporate items, coupled with equivalent basis adjustments ofthe shareholders' shares,
results in little gain or loss to the shareholder in connection with redemption distributions.
If the S corporation has accumulated earnings and profits from C corporation years, any
distribution is applied against basis to the extent ofthe AAA account. Distributions in excess
ofAAA are taxable as dividends to the extent ofaccumulated earnings and profits, and then
tax-free to the extent of stock basis.
8.3(d)(4) "§6166 Installment Payment - The executor or administrator may be able
to elect to pay any estate taxes due in installments pursuant to §6166.
8.3(d)(5) Election ofFiscal Year for Estate - The executor should consider electing
a fiscal year for the estate in order to defer income taxation of S corporation income in the
event the estate is still open during any part ofthe calendar year following the year in which
the shareholder died.
8.3(d)(6) Terminating the Election - The executor should determine whether the S
corporation status is still advantageous. If termination is desirable, the executor must
determine how and when the election can be terminated. If the estate owns more than one
halfofthe shares ofstock ofthe S corporation, the executor can revoke the election without
the consent ofthe other shareholders. Considerations such as the passing through ofincome
items and distributions of previously taxed income may make timing of the revocation
important. Except when the revocation specifies a prospective date on which it is to become
effective, a revocation made during the taxable year and on or before the 15th day ofthe third
month ofthe taxable year is effective on the first day of such taxable year, and a revocation
made after the 15th day ofthe third month ofthe taxable year is effective on the first day of
the following taxable year. The executor can also effect the termination of the election
without the consent ofthe other shareholders by either transferring the stock to an ineligible
shareholder, or by transferring the stock to a sufficient number of transferees so that the
number ofshareholders exceeds the §1361(b) limit. In either case, the corporation's S status
will end immediately. Before terminating the election, the executor must determine whether
there are any agreements in effect which would prevent the termination, or which would
make the estate or the beneficiaries liable to the other shareholders for any loss or tax
incurred by the other shareholders on account of the termination. In addition, the executor
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should consider whether or not the tennination will later be advantageous to the beneficiaries
when the S corporation stock is in their hands, since S corporation status cannot be reelected
for five years unless the IRS consents.
8.3(d)(7) Making the Election - The executor should consider whether it would be
advantageous to convert a C corporation ofwhich the decedent was a shareholder into an S
corporation after his or her death in the event the corporation meets all the eligibility
requirements. Unlike tennination of the election, however, the consent of all of the
shareholders is required to make the S election. The executor must consent to the election
for the estate. Factors to be considered by the executor before making the election include:
8.3(d)(7)(A) The Shareholders' Income Needs - Ifthe corporation has been
profitable and all ofthe beneficiaries have substantial income from other sources, the
election may not be desirable. However, ifthe beneficiaries need additional income,
an S election may be desirable. Under §1366(b), the character ofany item ofincome,
loss, or deduction is the same in the hands of the shareholder as it was to the
corporation. This may be important, for example, if the beneficiary could use a
capital loss to offset a capital gain.
8.3(d)(7)(B) The Business Needs of the Corporation - If the corporation
needs to retain its earnings for business purposes, it may not be able to distribute
sufficient cash to the beneficiaries to enable them to pay the tax on the undistributed
taxable income. In addition, ifthe decedent was a dominant force in the business, his
or her death may make it important to retain earnings within the corporation in the
interest ofsurvival or growth. The need to retain earnings may also arise where the
corporation is obligated to redeem the decedent-shareholder's stock pursuant to a
buy-sell agreement and must borrow the purchase price, thus forcing the corporation
to accumulate earnings to repay the debt.
8.3(d)(7)(C) The Effect on Net Operating Loss Carry-overs - No
carryforward or carry back items arising in a taxable year in which a corporation was
a C corporation may be carried to a taxable year in which the corporation is an S
corporation, but an S corporation year is treated as an elapsed year in detennining the
number ofyears these items may be carried forward or back. Thus, ifthe corporation
has a net operating loss carryover, the S corporation election will cause the carryover
to be unavailable during any S corporation year, and if the corporation continues to
operate as an S corporation, the carryover ultimately will be lost. If the
decedent-shareholder was unable to deduct the corporation's losses because ofhis or
her low basis in the stock, the §1014 step-up in basis of the stock in the hands ofthe
beneficiaries may make the deductibility of future losses a reason to make the
election.
8.3(d)(7)(D) Loss ofFiscal Year - Ifa C corporation has an advantageous
fiscal year which it desires to retain, making the election may cause the corporation
to forfeit that fiscal year and switch either to a calendar year or other fiscal year "for
which the corporation establishes a business purpose."
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8.3(d)(7)(E) Employee Fringe Benefits - S corporations enjoy essential
parity with C corporations for qualified plan purposes. However, S corporation
benefits are limited severely for shareholders who own more than 2% of the
outstanding S corporation stock or possess more than 2% of the total combined
voting power of the S corporation stock, because §1372 treats such shareholders as
though they were partners in a partnership. If the beneficiaries of the stock are
actively involved in the business and enjoy such benefits, making the election may
not be desirable.
8.3(e) Sale ofCompany - Post Closing Events. Assuming that a sale of the Company will
not occur on December 31, then consideration must be given to post closing events. The following
suggested form language explains the problem and addresses the issue.
If the Corporation's Shares are transferred pursuant to the terms ofthis Agreement,
then it is agreed that in order to ensure that a selling shareholder is not affected by
any Corporation post-sale taxable events, the Corporation and the Shareholders will
use the "closing-of-the-books" income tax method whenever a Selling Shareholder
sells all oftier stock on a day other than the last day ofthe Corporations's fiscal year.
Under the "closing-of-the-books" method, the Selling Shareholder's allocation of
items for the taxable year will be computed as ifthe Corporation's taxable year ended
on the day of the Selling Shareholder's termination of interest. Further, it is
understood and agreed that the Corporation will recognize two taxable years, the fist
of which will end ·on the date of such Selling Shareholder's termination of interest,
and the second ofwhich will be from the date ofsuch sale until the end ofthe fiscal
year. The parties will file all income tax returns consistent with the "closing-of-the-
books" method.
9. FIDUCIARY BUSINESS EXAMINATION ISSUES.
9.1 Develop Your Checklist. In order to better understand the value of a business and in
preparation for sale, it is imperative that the fiduciary commence, upon appointment, an examination
ofthe business, an examination for conflicts ofinterest and develop safeguards to avoid self-dealing.
This checklist is presented as a starting point in this examination.54
9.2 Identify Business Interested Parties and Potential for Conflicts. Prepare a list that
identifies each person who is connected to the business. Are any of these persons or organizations
a beneficiary ofany other trust or associated (client, customer or vendor) with the fiduciary? If so,
determine the nature of such relationship, and whether a conflict exists.
9.2(a) All shareholders - percentage ownership interests and names of immediate family.
9.2(b) All officers - including honorary, emeritus, or "ofcounsel" relationships
54 This checklist is not complete! This checklist has been prepared from a list of practical
mistakes - use it with caution!
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9.2(c) All members of the Board ofDirectors and advisory boards.
9.2(d) All advisors including accounting and law finns and owners of these advisors.
9.2(e) Substantial customers.
9.2(t) Substantial creditors - including the fiduciary itself, and the estate or trust.
9.3 Identify Fiduciary Interested Parties and Potential for Conflicts. Prepare a list that
identifies all persons and organizations who might be affected by the business and detennine if a
conflict exists.
9.3(a) All Beneficiaries of the estate and their relationship to the fiduciary and other
fiduciary relationships. .
9.3(b) Customer Relationships ofbusiness to fiduciary and vice-versa.
9.3(c) Lending Relationships - does the fiduciary lend money to the business or to the
beneficiaries.
9.3(d) Depository Relationships - what deposits are maintained by the business or
beneficiaries.
9.3(e) Leasing Relationships.
9.3(t) Fiduciary Board ofDirectors, including community advisory committees.
9.3(g) Fiduciary Relationships with anyone listed on business lists.
9.4 Disclose Conflicts. After perfonning conflicts check advise beneficiaries, their counsel, the
court and whoever that a conflicts check has been made and you are satisfied that you may serve as
fiduciary.
9.5 Initial Examination of Beneficiary Issues.
9.5(a) Conferwith each beneficiary and detennine their needs; financial abilities; concerns;
desires; their attitudes about the business, and knowledge of any possible conflicts of interest.
Document all findings - ask ifthey have any ideas or suggestions for the sale ofthe business.
9.5(b) Confer with each beneficiary's lawyer or other advisor and confinn or review your
findings regarding your discussions with the beneficiary with them, and knowledge ofany possible
conflicts of interest. Ask for concurring opinion in writing.
9.6 Initial Examination of Business Issues. Make immediate determination ifbusiness may
continue operations on a profitable basis - and make due diligence examination of following.
9.6(a) Identify the size of the business holding in relation to total outstanding ownership
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interests - does fiduciary have effective or legal "control?"
9.6(b) Identify the size of the business holding in relation to other assets of estate.
9.6(c) Employ ari independent accounting firm to conduct an examination of the business
financial statements, income tax returns, and books and records and request a confidential reply.
9.6(d) Employ appraisers to commence independent valuation ofbusiness interests. Make
an initial determination ofwhether one or two appraisals wiH be needed; who will review report of
appraisals. Examine and compare appraisal issues to employee stock ownership plans.
9.7 Employ Counsel to Examine Legal Structure of Entity.
'9.7(a) Business organization counsel along with probate counsel should be employed to
conduct an in-depth examination of organization's articles of formation (incorporation or
organization), by-laws, operating agreements, and obtain advice on the following matters.
9.7(b) Obtain Good Standing Certificates of state where Seller is incorporated; and states
where business is qualified to do business. Is the business organization qualified to do business in
all the states that it is doing business?
9.7(c) Review all minutes of Board of Directors and the minutes of committees, e.g.,
executive, nominating, compensation, and audit committees. Are these matters current? Has the
Board ofDirectors (managers) approved compensation arrangements; loans from and to banks, and
to insiders (officers and members of Board of Directors), and real estate transactions, etc.
9.7(d) Determine if stock restriction agreements are in effect. Ifso, then:
9.7(d)(l) Is restrictive transfer language "conspicuous" on the face of the stock
certificates or other instruments which evidence ownership?
9.7(d)(2) Will agreement may affect the ability to sell stock and at what price?
9.7(d)(3) Will agreement be operative to deny "transfer" ofcertificate underprobate
law?
9.7(d)(4) Are there any corporate law restrictions on corporate redemption of
decedent's shares and will corporate law restrictions adversely affect ability of corporation
to redeem stock? Are there impairment ofcapital or redemption on pro-rata basis among all
shareholders?
9.7(d)(5) .What is the effect of such agreement if surviving spouse elects marital
share under state law?
9.7(e) Should the Articles of Incorporation - Organization be revised to permit direct
shareholder or member voting on all issues thereby doing away with Board of Directors or
Managers? How are Directors elected - is cumulative voting required under law of state
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incorporated under or under By-laws?
9.7(f) Inquire as to the existence ofany partnership or joint venture affiliations, trusts and
agency relationships.
9.7(g) Investigate any predecessor organizations and the term of any prior acquisitions,
mergers or consolidations.
9.7(h) Determine legal authority to sell stock to outsiders vs. current shareholders.
9.8 Develop Program for Monitoring ofBusiness Activity. Require an appropriate schedule
of reports from officers and demand specific recommendations for action to secure business.
,.
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9.9 Prepare Financial Analysis.
9.9(a) Obtain financial statements for five preceding years, and if financial statements are
not audited, determine if limited audit is necessary. Have financial statements reviewed by an
independent accounting firm.
9.9(b) Working Capital Ratio - for at least three years.
9.9(c) Annual Inventory Turnover - for at least three years.
9.9(d) Aging schedule of accounts receivable.
9.9(e) Cash Deposits - Reserves vs. Liabilities - are cash resources being used wisely?
r 9.9(f) Obligations to Estate or Trust - should these obligations be paid - is it intended that
they be paid?
r
r
r
p
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9.10 Review S Corporation Issues.
9.1O(a)Terminating the Election - Is the S corporation status still advantageous. Pass through
items and distributions of PTI make timing of revocation important. Before terminating election,
determine whether there are any agreements which prevent the termination, or which would make
the estate or beneficiaries liable to other shareholders for any loss or tax incurred on account of
termination. Will a termination of an election be advantageous to the beneficiaries when the S
corporation stock is in their hands? (S corporation status cannot be reelected for five years unless
IRS consents.)
9.10(b)Making the Election - Would it be advantageous to convert C corporation into an S
corporation, consent of all shareholders is required, and following factors should be considered.
9.10(b)(I) The Shareholders' Income Needs - Determine shareholders need for
additional taxable income. The character of any item of income, loss, or deduction is the
same in the hands of the shareholder, and this may be important, for example, if the
beneficiary could use a capital loss to offset a capital gain.
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9.1O(b)(2) Corporation's Business Needs - Ifthe corporation needs to retain earnings
for business purposes, it may not be able to distribute sufficient cash to the beneficiaries to
enable them to pay the tax on undistributed taxable income. Ifdecedent was a dominant force
in the business, death may make it important to retain earnings for corporation's survival or
growth, or to fund the corporation's obligation to redeem the decedent's stock.
9.10(b)(3) Effect on NOL Carry-overs - If the corporation has a NOL carryover, an
S corporation election will cause the carryover to be unavailable during any S corporation
year, and,possiblY,ultimately lost. Ifthe decedent was unable to deduct corporation's losses
because of a low basis in the stock, the §1014 step-up in basis of the stock in the hands of
the beneficiaries may make the deductibility of future losses a reason to make the election.
9.10(b)(4) Loss ofFiscal Year - Ifa C corporation has an advantageous fiscal year
which it desires to retain, making the election may cause the loss of that fiscal year.
9.1O(b)(5) Employee Fringe Benefits - S corporation benefits are limited for
shareholders who own more than 2% of an S corporation's stock; if the beneficiaries are
actively involved in the business making the election may not be desirable.
9.10(c) Sale of Company - consider affect of post sale events and consider imposing a
"closing of the books" method for determining income.
9.11 Antitrust Implications. Consider possible antitrust considerations of any disposition or
acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and other federal statutes, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing. Specifically, commence a review ofpossible purchasers and motives of any buyer.
9.11(a)Determine the business' relevant market products and market areas.
9.11(b)Review marketing practices and trade membership practices.
9.11(c)lnquire as to past antitrust problems of the business and any allegations or
investigations or price fixing, monopolization, injunctions and consent decrees.
9.12 Bank Accounts. Obtain a list ofall bank and escrow and investment accounts - review of
conflicts, and financial resources and sufficiency of such amounts.
9.13 Employee Information. The following types of information should be carefully reviewed
by the fiduciary's counsel.
9.13(a)Review all managing agreements, employment agreements, non-competition
agreements, consulting agreements and secrecy agreements.
9.13(b)Determineifany oral employment agreements or company policies exist which could
create employment rights, etc.
9.13(c)Review incentive compensation, deferred compensation, cash and stock bonus
arrangements, e.g., (a) annual bonus arrangements for cash or stock; (b) long term arrangements for
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cash or stock; (c) fixed versus discretionary plans; (d) "Golden Parachute" arrangements; ISOs; and
(f) Non-qualified stock option plans.
9.13(d)Review all qualified plans including (a) defmed benefit plans; (b) defined contribution
plans; (c) Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs"); and (e) Multi-employer plans.
9.13(e) Review all non-qualified deferred compensation plans, including Supplemental
Employee Retirement Plans ("SERPs"); and Excess benefit plans; life insurance; insured or self-
insured arrangements; Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Arrangements ("VEBAs") and with regard
to such plans does the business' financial statements reflect the liability under all of such plans?
9.14 Insurance. Contact and obtain independent advice regarding adequacy of insurance
coverage.
9.15 Inventory. Deteqnine whether inventory is in the hands ofvendors, at customer locations
or otherwise, detennine whether any inventory on hand is owned by someone other than the
business, that is, consignment, work-in-process, demos and contract work. Detennine obsolescence,
marketability of inventory.
9.16 Labor Relations. Conduct a review ofany collective bargaining contracts, and detennine
any specific contractual to notify or bargain with the union regarding the sale of the business, to
provide severance pay; if closing a plant or making major changes in work assignments are
contemplated, check restrictive, statutory, court and NLRB decisions.
9.17 Litigation. Obtain a complete litigation list and review auditor's attorney inquiry letters and
replies for the prior five years, and have updated by current letter from counsel. Inquire as to the
existence of consent decrees and applicable injunctions, etc. Inquire as to the potential exposure
relating to any other activities ofpertaining to the business.
9.18 Loans and Commitments. Obtain and review tenns, binding effect, assignability, etc., of
all business loans, including bank loans, bonds, industrial development bonds, and loans to officers,
members ofBoard ofDirectors. What is effect ofany possible conflicts ofloans and any covenants
in loan agreements on a sale of the business.
9.19 Franchise and Distributorships. Detennine if there are any such agreements and ability
to assign, including trademarks, patent, licenses, etc.
9.20 Properties. Obtain title opinions on real estate and check for environmental studies. Perfonn
Unifonn Commercial Code, tax and other lien searches in all applicable jurisdictions. Detennine
location and condition ofall plants, machinery and equipment, and title to equipment. With regard
to real property do the following.
9.20(a)Ascertain whether land or facilities have ever been used for the treatment, storage or
disposal ofhazardous wastes or hazardous substances and whether operation is subject to contingent
liability for such activities.
9.20(b)Detennine whether any surface area under which any coal is owned or leased by the
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business is the subject of any petitions to designate the area as unsuitable for surface coal mining.
9.20(c) Determine whether any conditions or practices exist on any surface area owned by
Seller or overlaying minerals being extracted by Seller which would constitute a common law
nUIsance.
9.21 Depreciation Schedules. Examine depreciation methods and determine reasonability and
propriety, not only for accounting purposes, but also for economic substance.
9.22 Regulatory Considerations. Determine the requirements of all federal, state and local
regulatory authorities as to the transfer, assignment or sale, permits or licenses, or both. Determine
ifnew permits are required or if increased bond amounts will be required.
9.23 Securities Filings. Obtain copies of all filings made with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and state securities agencies related to the Seller and its stock, including:
1OKs, 1OQs, and 8ks; Proxy or informational statements; Registration Statements, such as S-1 s, S-7s,
or S-8s; and Annual reports to shareholders.
9.24 Other Tax Matters. Obtain copies of all tax returns for all open years. Seek advice
regarding the following tax elections.
9.24(a) Obtain list ofall tax accounting methods and elections, cash or accrual, depreciation
methods, last in first out or first in first out, etc.
9.24(b)Determine.the effects ofany recapture provisions; such as, Depreciation - IRC §1245
and §1250; LIFO Inventory - IRC §336.
9.24(c)If the business uses the completed contract method of accounting for long-term
contracts, determine ifa sale will accelerate or force conversion to percentage completion method.
9.24(d)Determine whether any persons that the business treats as an independent contractor
could be classified as an employee by the IRS.
9.24(e)Does the corporation have a potential unreasonable accumulation of earnings
problem, as defined in §53l ?
9.24(t) Who is the tax matters partner? Confer with the tax matters partner and confirm
status of any tax issues. If no tax matters partner, then ask treasurer for tax status.
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EXHIBIT 1
BANK erA LETTER55
Dear Advisory Committee Members:
As you may know, Mr. Doe recently transferred 2,325 shares of the common stock of our
Bank's stock to the Family Irrevocable Trust. It is the policy of our Bank to require specific
authorization to hold this security. Without this authorization, our Bank's policy is to sell this
holding in order to avoid the possibility of any conflict or the appearance of a conflict.
Ifyou wish us to retain this holding (including any stock dividends, stock splits, and related
securities, such as those received as a result of an acquisition, merger, reorganization or
recapitalization), you must sign this letter of direction. By signing this letter, you hereby approve,
ratify and affirm the retention of these and any related shares. You further agree, on behalf of
yourselfand your successors, that our Bank and its affiliates and officers will not be held liable for
any loss or depreciation in value or decrease or loss of income sustained by the Trust and its
beneficiaries as a result ofour following your directions. You further agree that all members ofthe
Advisory Committee must agree to the provisions ofthis letter ofinstruction or we will liquidate this
holding.
By signing this letter, you also understand and acknowledge that other officers, directors and
employees of our Bank and our affiliates may be in possession of information concerning this
security, at any given point in time, which, ifdisclosed to you might impact on your decision to give
these instructions or to keep them in effect. However, the disclosure of such information to you or
your acting upon such information might constitute improper actions under state and federal
securities laws and other legal and ethical considerations. You therefore relieve us and our affiliates,
as well as all our officers, directors, and employees and our affiliates, from any duty to disclose to
you or to any other person any information, public or non-public, regarding the securities referred
to in this correspondence and you release our Bank and our affiliates from any duty to take any action
to sell (or purchase additional) such securities unless and until this direction is revoked in writing.
You further understand that any sale of such securities upon your direction may be delayed or
prohibited because of our Bank's policies which prohibit sales of its own securities during certain
periods when insider information may (or may be deemed to) exist.
This direction shall remain in effect until revoked in writing.
Very truly,
I hereby acknowledge and understand the foregoing and agree to its provisions.
Advisory Board Member
55Exhibit 1
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EXHIBIT 2
CONFLICT RULES FOR LA WYERs«'
Rule 1. 7: Conflict o[Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse
to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer re~onably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation ofthat client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's
own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications
of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Comments to Rule 1. 7
Loyalty to a Client
[1] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An
impermissible conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event
the representation should be declined. If such a conflict arises after representation has been
undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more
than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by
Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(c).
[2] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation
directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses that general
rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in
some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation
in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing
economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies
only when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the other.
[3] Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course ofaction for the client because of the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be
available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate
and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses ofaction that reasonably should be
pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to
accommodate the other interest involved.
S6Exhibit 2
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Consultation and Consent
[4] A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as
indicated in paragraph (a)(l) with respect to representation directly adverse to a client, and
paragraph (b)(I) with respect to material limitations on representation ofa client, when a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under
the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide
representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than one client is involved, the
question ofconflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances
where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the
lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one ofthe clients refuses to consent to
the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer
cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
Lawyer's Interests
[5] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to
undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and
1.5. If the probity ofa laWyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer may not allow
related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an
enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
Conflicts in Litigation
[6] Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation. Simultaneous
representation ofparties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or
codefendants, is governed by paragraph (b). An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of
substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an
opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the
claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The
potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other
hand, common representation ofpersons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse
effect is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving
intermediation between clients.
[7] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in
some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances
in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an
enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise
in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the
enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token,
government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings
in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation
can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a
degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
[8] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that
has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected.
Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial
courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.
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Interest ofPerson Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[9] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is infonned of
that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to
the client. See Rule I.8(t). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting
interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to
provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's
professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are
involved in a controversy. in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide
funds for separate legal representation ofthe directors or employees, if the clients consent after
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence.
Other Conflict Situations
[10] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to
assess. Relevant factors in detennining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the
duration and intimacy ofthe lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the
functions being perfonned by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the
likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often one of
proximity and degree.
[11] For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose
interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is pennissible
where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest
among them.
[12] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A
lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and
wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate
administration the identity ofthe client may be unclear under the law ofa particular jurisdiction.
Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved.
[13] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of
directors should detennine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer
may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions ofthe directors.
Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the
potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the
possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If
there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party
[14] Resolving questions ofconflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the
lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is
reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the
court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is
such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration ofjustice, opposing counsel
may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for
it can be misused as a technique ofharassment. See Scope.
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Rule 1.8. Conflict ofInterest: Prollibited Transactions.
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and tenns on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel
in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use infonnation relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of
the client unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as
parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift,
except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an
agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial
part on infonnation relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation, except that:
(I) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment ofwhich
may be contingent on the outcome ofthe matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of
litigation on behalf of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client
unless:
(1) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement between the client and the
third party or the client consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence ofprofessional judgment or
with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Infonnation relating to representation ofa client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate
settlement of the claims ofor against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as
to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after consultation, including
disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client
for malpractice unless pennitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the
agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or fonner client
without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in
connection therewith.
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(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a
client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the
other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
G) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(l) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
Comments to Rule 1.8
Transactions between Client and Lawyer
[1] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and
reasonable to the client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the
client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the
representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client
is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to acquire nearby
property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a)
does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client
for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or
brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and
utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and
the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of
fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of
appreciation is permitted. If effectuation ofa substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument
such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the detached advice that another
lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the
donee or the gift is not substantial.
Literary Rights
[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the
conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the
personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract
from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph
(d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property
from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the
arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph G).
Person Paying/or Lawyer's Services
[4] Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid
for by a third party unless such payment is provided for in an agreement between the client and
the third party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the requirements ofRule 1.6
concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a
class, consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure.
Limiting Liabiliry
[5] Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in
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legal opinions and memoranda.
Family Relationships Between Lawyers
[6] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in
the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in paragraph
(i) is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.
Acquisition ofInterest in Litigation
[7] Paragraph G) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in common-law
champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule
1.5 and the exception for certain advances ofthe costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e).
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EXHIHIT 3
Dear _
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Re:
LETTER REQUESTING BIDS
Sale of Shares of the Lincoln Company, Inc.
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ABC Bank, as executor of the Estate of Abraham Lincoln is preparing to sell its 57
percent ownership of the issued and outstanding shares of common capital stock of the Lincoln
Company, Inc. ("Company").
We welcome a proposal by you under the following terms:
1. As the fiduciary for the Estate ofAbraham Lincoln we have made a decision to pursue all
opportunities to sell all of the Estate's shares of the Company. The proposed sale of stock will
be subject to the terms ofthe buy/sell agreement, a copy of which has been provide to you. To
date, most, but not all minority shareholders have indicated that they are willing to sell their
interests. Accordingly, and subject to satisfactory completion of reasonable due diligence:
1.1 Please state in exact dollar terms the amount you would agree to pay in cash for
100 percent of the Company's stock, under conditions in which (i) all shareholders would receive
proportional payments in accordance with their respective interests, and (ii) no additional
consideration would be paid to any shareholder or beneficiary, or representative of any
shareholder or beneficiary, in excess of the consideration paid for the shareholder's stock;
1.2 With the agreement that no later than 45 days after the Executor's acceptance of a
non-binding letter of intent, all 'parties will enter into a mutually acceptable stock purchase
agreement containing terms and conditions customary for transactions of this nature; and
1.3 With ABC being obligated to make only those representations and warranties set
out on the attached Appendix entitled "Seller's Special Representations and Warranties."
2. In the event that not all minority shareholders are willing to sell their interests;
2.1 Please also indicate whether you would be interested in purchasing only the
Estate's 57 percent interest in the Company, under conditions in which no additional
consideration would be paid to any shareholder or beneficiary, or representative of any
shareholder or beneficiary, in excess of the consideration paid for the Estate's interest. If so,
please state in exact dollar terms the amount you would agree to pay in cash for the Estate's 57
percent interest in the Company.
2.2 Please also indicate the minimum amount of the Company's stock (greater than
the Estate's 57 percent interest in the Company, but less than 100 percent) that you would want to
purchase, under conditions in which no additional consideration would be paid to any
shareholder or beneficiary, or representative of any shareholder or beneficiary, in excess of the
consideration paid for the Estate's interest.
3. Your response must be received by this office, directed to my attention, no later than 4:00
p.m. EST on _
D -71
4. If any circumstances (such as corporate approvals or regulatory filings) will prevent you
from being able to close this transaction in the next 60 days, we will still be interested in
receiving a proposal, with an explanation of those circumstances, and a recognition that
acceptance of a proposal involving any delay will require a premium above the price that
otherwise might be paid by other potential purchasers.
5. If any other circumstances make you unwilling or unable to submit a proposal satisfying
the above terms, but you believe that ABC and the beneficiaries might nevertheless be interested
in considering a proposal under different terms, please let us know.
It is our intent to evaluate all proposals received by the _ deadline, and then arrange
meetings with the three highest offerors to negotiate about material issues and obtain a
conditional letter of intent with one of those three. At that we would intend to discontinue
further discussions with all other offerors.
Very truly yours,
Estate ofAbraham Lincoln,
BY: ABC Bank, Executor
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EXHIBIT 4
SELLER'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIONSAND WARRANTIES
1.1 Fiduciary as Seller. ABC Bank in its fiduciary capacity as Executor ofthe Estate ofAbraham
Lincoln ("Seller") makes the following special representations and warranties. Under no
circumstances shall Seller be deemed as making any representation or warranties in its individual
capacity or on behalfof assets ofABC Bank or the Seller other than with regard to the shares.
1.2 Ownership of Stock. The Seller is the lawful owner of 400 shares of the issued and
outstanding shares of common capital stock of the Lincoln Corporation, (the "Shares") and such
Shares are free and clear ofall liens, encumbrances, restrictions and claims ofevery kind; Seller has
full legal right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement, and to sell, assign, transfer and
convey the Shares so owned by it pursuant to this Agreement; the delivery to the Purchaser of the
Shares pursuant to the provisions ofthis Agreement will transfer to Purchaser valid title thereto, free
and clear ofall liens, incumbrances, restrictions and claims of every kind.
1.3 Capital Stock. The Company has an authorized capitalization consisting of 1000 shares of
common stock, no par value per share, ofwhich 616 shares are issued and outstanding and no shares
are held as treasury stock. All such outstanding shares have been duly authorized and validly issued
and are fully paid and non-assessable. There are no outstanding options, warrants, rights, calls,
commitments, conversion rights, rights of exchange, plans or other agreements of any character
providing for the purchase, issuance or sale of any shares of the capital stock of the Company.
1.4 Organization. To the knowledge of Seller, the Company is a corporation, duly organized,
validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of Delaware.
1.5 Duties Under the ·Will. All proceedings required by the provisions of the Last Will and
Testament of Abraham Lincoln to be taken in connection with the execution and delivery of this
Agreement will have been duly and validly completed by the Closing. Seller has the power and
authority to sell the shares for the consideration set forth in this Agreement.
1.6 Financial Statements. To the knowledge ofSeller, the Company's Financial Statements have
been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied
during the periods indicated, and fairly present the fmancial position and net worth ofthe Company
as of the date on the Balance Sheet included in the Financial Statements, and the results ofSeller's
operations for the period indicated. Since the date ofthe last financial statements, there has been no
material adverse change in and to the Company or the shares.
1.7 No Litigation. There is no litigation pending or threatened which would affect the Seller's
right to convey the shares.
1.8 Title to Properties. To the knowledge of Seller, the Company has title to all properties
purported to be owned by it.
1.9 Laws. To the knowledge of the Seller, the Company has complied with all material laws
applicable to it.
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MATTERS RESULTING FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVIEWS
Buy-Sell Agreements
Are there any buy-sell agreements? None are disclosed in the financial statements. If such
agreements could bind the Company (rather than other stockholders), their existence and general
terms should be disclosed. Ifno such agreements exist, you may want to consider the advisability
of such agreements for certain shareholders or all of the shareholders.
Cash Value of Life Insurance
Regarding cash value oflife insurance: The 1997 income tax return indicates $41,820 ofnon-taxable
"life insurance proceeds." The 1997 statement of cash flows indicates proceeds of $261 ,996 were
realized from "redemption ofofficer's life insurance policy." The non-taxable proceeds reported in
the tax return is the difference between the $220,176 December 31, 1996, cash surrender value, and
the $261,996 ofcash proceeds reported in the 1997 financial statements. You may wish to ask for
a more complete explanation of the transaction and the underlying reasons for the decision to cash
in the policy.
The financial statements disclose that inventory is carried at LIFO cost which is not in
excess of market value. There is no indication in the footnotes as to the amount at which the
inventories would be reflected if they were carried at FIFO or similar cost. Such disclosure is.
required, and would be beneficial in analyzing the financial statements since LIFO generally is a tax
deferral method and, in a rising market, tends to understate profits.
Asset Bases and Canying Amounts
The financial statements do not reflect the dollar difference between the tax bases of assets and
liabilities and their carrying amounts in the financial statements. Although this information is not
required to be disclosed, it is generally included in the notes to the financial statements because it
provides very useful information to a stockholder or potential investor/purchaser ofan electing "S"
Corporation.
Previously Taxed Income
The financial statements do not indicate the amount ofincome in retained earnings previously taxed
to the stockholders (through the financial statement date) that could be paid in future dividends free
of tax to the stockholders. This is particularly useful information to stockholders of electing "S"
Corporations.
Note Receivable as Current Asset
The financial statements include, as a current asset, an interest-bearing note receivable in the amount
of $729,786, which has been outstanding at least since December 31, 1994. The due date, which
appears to have been extended annually, is indicated to be July 30, 1998 in the 1997 financial
statements. Ifthe note has been extended again, it may be appropriate to ask the following: Why does
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the note continue to be carried as a current asset? Has the interest (at prime) been paid annually? Is
the debtor a continuing customer? Should collateral be obtained?
Management Letter
Are the auditors issuing management comments at the conclusion of the annual audit? As a
significant stockholder, you may be interested in seeing such comments and the related responses
from management.
MATTERS RESULTING FROM TAX RETURNS REVIEWS
Missing Forms 8824
The 1994/1995 financial statements contain a footnote that the Company committed to build an
subsequent to December 31, 1995. Funding was going to be partially obtained by the use of$600,000
of "trade-ins".
Ifthe Company treated these trade-ins as a tax-free exchange oflike-kind property, it seems a Form
8824 should have been included in the 1996 or 1997 tax return. The copies of the tax returns we
received did not contain this form.
Further, considering the vast investment the Company has in vehicles, it would seem logical that the
Company often exchanges old vehicles for new ones. Forms 8824 are also required for these type
exchanges. None of the tax returns contain these forms.
Allocation of Expenses Attributable to Passive Income
The Company maintains a significant cash balance which appears to annually produce in excess of
____ interest/passive income. The regulations require that any expenses (personnel costs
devoted to managing the related investments, etc.) be separately stated on the corporate income tax
return as "portfolio deductions", as opposed to treating such expenses as regular operating expenses.
Portfolio expenses pass through an S-corporation as miscellaneous itemized deductions to the
shareholders; amounts probably not deductible on the shareholders' personal tax returns because of
the limitation on the deductibility of itemized deductions. The tax returns do not reflect such an
allocation.
Possibly, Company management canjustify no allocation ofexpenses to the interest income, but it
seems the Internal Revenue Service would have a difficult time accepting such a position.
Even if the Company should be allocating expenses to portfolio deductions, the amount at issue is
probably not material.
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Depreciation ofLuxury Vehicles
Page 2 of the Forms 4562 contained in the 1995 and 1996 returns, reports two vehicles with zero
(nil) business use, which implies 100% personal use. Presumably, such vehicles would only be
provided to officer/shareholders. These vehicles were depreciated under the '''normal'' restrictions
on luxury vehicles, but, possibly, could have been subject to the more restrictive straight line
depreciation for use by greater than 5% shareholders when business use does not exceed 50%. This
is the rule, even if total personal use is valued and reported to the officer/shareholder as additional
W-2 compensation.
Even if this is the situation, the depreciation would only be a "timing difference" and, more likely
than not, an immaterial amount.
Disclosure Issues
The financial statements state that the Company utilizes the LIFO method to value certain of its
inventories. The 1995 Federal return (page 2, Schedule A) discloses that the LIFO method is utilized.
The 1996 and 1997 returns contain no such similar statement.
The 1995 and 1996 returns reflect an answer to a question regarding accumulated earnings and
profits (page 2, Schedule B) that such accumulated earnings and profits exist. The 1997 return does
not contain a similar response.
Ifthese are simply disclosure errors, we are not aware ofany penalties which would be assessed for
inadequate disclosure.
Officers' Life Insurance
Premiums paid for officers' life insurance (aLI) are not deductible in computing taxable income,
even though they are considered an expense for financial statementpurposes. Likewise, the increase
in the cash surrender value of aLI, treated as income for financial statement purposes, is not
considered to be taxable in computing taxable income.
The 1996 return, for example, reflects that nondeductible premiums were $9,438 for the year, but
the return does not reflect a decrease in financial statement income for the increase in cash surrender
value of the aLI between 1995 and 1996, $15,161. Possibly, the preparer ofthe return "netted" the
income and expense reported on the financial statements, which would mean that the actual
premiums were $24,599.
At best case, the return is somewhat confusing on this issue. At worst case, the reduction in taxable
income for the increase in the cash surrender value did not occur.
Accumulated Adjustments Account CAAA) and Other Adjustments Account COAA)
These are complex provisions related to S-Corporations and a discussion ofeach is beyond the scope
of this letter.
But, as reflected on the returns (page 4, Schedule M-2,), the Company is reporting no amounts as
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OAA. For example, the portions ofOLI, premiums that do not increase the cash surrender value of
a policy (Le., pure insurance element) are nondeductible/noncapital expenditures that should be
reported as OAA. Likewise the insurance proceeds of$411,820 reported on the 1997 return should
have been reported as OAA as opposed to AAA.
This is another disclosure issue that probably has little probability of creating a reporting penalty.
But, if the Company ever did distribute an amount exceeding the correct amount of cumulative
AAA, the shareholders might very well be reporting an incorrect amount oftaxable vs. non-taxable
income.
r, PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Potential Conversion ofthe Company to a Limited Liability Company
The Company owns 50% of Company, a joint venture. It would be fairly simple to convert
the joint venture to a limited liability Company, with no tax consequences whatsoever. Conversion
to an LLC may be advisable to insulate the assets ofThe Company from exposure to potential
liability arising from operations of the Company.
We realize that this scheme could be considered a "sham", and if a similar scheme was taken for
Federal purposes, Internal Revenue would surely challenge it as a sham. But, we have been verbally
assured by senior members ofthe Revenue Cabinet that, although, they disfavor this scheme,
the Revenue Cabinet is powerless to challenge it because the statute provides that the license tax can
only be assessed against corporations.
Based on the balance sheet (Schedule L) contained in the 1997 return, it appears that the Company
is annually liable for $50,000 to $60,000 of (State) License tax. Partnerships and LLCs are not
subject to this tax. A potential method of avoiding this tax is for the Company to form an LLC,
contribute its assets and liabilities to the LLC, elect for the LLC to be taxed as an S-corporation,
liquidate the corporation, and then to distribute member interests in the LLC to the shareholders in
the same percentage as stock previously owned. A corporate tax return is still filed (as an
LLC), but the LLC is not subject to the license tax.
to an LLCPotential Conversion of
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Use of Significant Cash and Cash Equivalents
The financial statements indicate a large amount ofcash and cash 'equivalents at year-end. It may
be possible to increase earnings by using a significant portion of this low interest yielding cash to
pay down the interest bearing debts of the Company, only borrowing temporarily during the year
against available credit lines. The financial statements at December 31, 1997 indicate cash and cash
equivalents totaling $7,875,784 and total notes and mortgages payable of$8,922,125. Ifyou assume
that debts of about $6 million were liquidated for the last six months ofthe year by using the cash
equivalents, the pre-tax earnings could be increased by around $100,000 per year by saving the
interest differential. Further, if the debt reduction were held over the end of the year, the corporate
license tax savings would be around $12,000, since debt is included in the definition of capital for
purposes of this tax. This comment recognizes that a healthy balance sheet is required for success
in the construction industry. However, we are suggesting that the Company could use its healthy
r
f D -79
borrowing power to obtain a short-tenn credit facility, as a substitute for long-tenn borrowings and
increase net earnings as illustrated above.
Possible Sale of Company
The earnings of the Company reflect steady annual increases for the last several years, with a
significant increase for 1997. The earnings pattern suggests that the Company could be a prime
candidate for purchase, and that the present time may reflect the best opportunity for maximum
realization ofvalue. Many other factors should be considered, including but not limited to, age and
depth of management; market saturation and competition in the area; and stockholders'
considerations relative to diversification of investments.
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C.
Scope of Outline
This outline will provide an overview ofselect income tax issues arising in the estate
administration setting, including the decedent's final Form 1040, income taxation of
the surviving spouse and survivors, income tax basis adjustments arising as a result
ofdeath, post-death differences between probate estates and revocable trusts, and the
liability of assets and parties for the decedent's income tax liabilities.
Income Tax Minimization is Important
It is the author's premise that insufficient attention is paid by practitioners to income
tax minimization. Income tax issues impact almost all decedents and survivors (not
just those wealthy clients with gift and estate tax problems), and significant dollar
savings can be achieved.
Recommended Reference Materials
For in-depth treatment on this area and related topics, see the following resources,
all ofwhich are supplemented at least annually:
...
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1.
2.
3.
Tax Guide for Survivors, Executors, and Administrators, Publication #559
(Internal Revenue Service).
Federal Income Taxation ofEstates and Trusts, Second Edition, by Howard
M. Zaritsky and Norman M. Lane (Warren Gorham Lamont).
Federal Income Taxation of Estates, Trusts, and Beneficiaries, Second
Edition, by M. Carr Ferguson, James J. Freeland, and Mark L. Ascher
(Shepard's McGraw-Hill).
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A. General Income Tax Considerations
1. Notice ofFiduciary Relationship
5. PPC's 1041 Deskbook, by Hugh H. Sprunt, James F. Reeves, Dan W. Youse,
and Blake T. Smith (Practitioner's Publishing Company).
4. Income Taxation ofFiduciaries andBeneficiaries, by Byrle M. Abbin, David
K. Carlson, and Mark Vorsatz (Little, Brown and Company).
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The Form 56 must be signed by the fiduciary and must be filed with
the IRS office where the retum(s) of the person for whom the
fiduciary is acting must be filed. Treas. Reg. §301.6903-1(b).
Written notice of the termination of such fiduciary relationship (on
Form 56) should also be filed with the same office ofthe IRS where
the initial Form 56 was filed. The notice must state the name and
address of any substitute fiduciary and be accompanied by
satisfactory evidence oftermination offiduciary relationship. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6903-I(b).
d.
c.
a. The executor [or if none, the testamentary trustee, residuary
legatee(s), or distributee(s)] should file Form 56 with the IRS to
advise the IRS ofthe fiduciary relationship. IRC §6903; Treas. Reg.
§§601.503; 301.6903.
b. A short-form certificate or authenticated copy ofletters testamentary
or letters of administration showing that the executor's authority is
still in effect at the time the Form 56 is filed, otherwise an appropriate
statement by the trustee, legatee, or distributee, should accompany the
Form 56. Treas. Reg. §§601.503; 301.6903.
6. Post Mortem Tax Planning, Second Edition, by Jerry Kasner (Shepard's
McGraw-Hill).
7. IRS Practice and Procedure, Second Edition, by Michael I. Saltzman
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont).
THE FINAL FORM 1040, PRIOR RETURNS, THE SURVIVING SPOUSE, AND BASIS
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2. Gathering Tax Background Information
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b.
c.
d.
Need for Information
It will be necessary to determine what income tax returns have or
have not been filed by the decedent, and to examine such returns, in
order to ascertain whether or not all required returns have been
properly filed.
Ascertaining What Tax Returns Have Been Filed
The IRS will inform you what tax returns have been filed by the
decedent. It is necessary for the executor to make a written request
for a "Record of Account" from the appropriate region. The
executor's letters of appointment (and a Form 2848 Power of
Attorney if the executor's attorney is to get the information) should
be included with the request. The IRS response will be supplied free
of charge. Call 1-800-829-1040 for details.
Ascertaining the Amount of the Decedent's Income
The executor may not be certain that he or she has information
concerning all ofthe decedent's income relating to years for which the
executor will file income tax returns on behalfof the decedent. It is
necessary to request in writing "All Information Returns" (you should
be as specific as possible) in writing from the appropriate region.
Information is available after August 1st relating to the prior year,
and six years worth ofinformation is kept in the IRS computers. The
executor's letters of appointment (and a Form 2848 Power of
Attorney if the executor's attorney is to get the information) should
be included with the request. The IRS response will be supplied free
ofcharge. Call 1-800-829-1040 for details.
Getting Copies ofPrior Filed Tax Returns
Copies of prior income tax returns filed by the decedent can be
obtained from the IRS via Form 4506. Consider requesting at the
same time copies ofgift tax returns filed by the decedent. Be sure to
make your request to the proper region or district, based upon where
the decedent filed the return in question. The executor's letters of
appointment (and a Form 2848 Power of Attorney if the executor's
attorney is to get the information) should be included with the
request. The IRS response will be supplied for a fee ($23 per return
last time the author checked). Call 1-800-829-1040 for details.
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e. Contact District Disclosure Officer
Any questions concerning what information is available from the
IRS, or procedurally how to get at such information, should be
directed to the IRS District Disclosure Officer. Such person is
usually very knowledgeable and helpful with regard to such matters.
Duty to File Retumsand Pay Tax Due
a. Liability ofFiduciaries
(1) The executor or administrator of the estate of a decedent, or
other person charged with the property of a decedent, is
required to file the final income tax return for such decedent.
IRC §6012(b); Treas. Reg. §§1.6012-3(b)(1); 1.6012-1.
(2) Pursuant to the concept of"fiduciary liability" the executor is
personally liable for the income and gift tax liability of the
decedent, at least to the extent that assets of the decedent
come within the reach of such executor. 31 USC §3713.
(3) Fiduciary liability may be personally imposed on every
executor, administrator, assignee or "other person" who
distributes the living or deceased debtor's property to other
creditors before he satisfies a debt due to the United States.
31 USC §§3713(a) and 3713(b).
(a) Such liability is imposed only when, by virtue ofthe
insolvency of a deceased debtor's estate or of the
insolvency and collective creditor proceeding
involving a living debtor, the priority of 31 USC
§3713(a) is applicable.
(b) The fiduciary's liability is limited to debts (or
distributions) actually paid before the debt due to the
United States.
(c) The fiduciary must know or have reason to know of
the government's tax claim.
b. Liability ofTransferees
(1) Transferee liability may make the transferee of property: (a)
of a taxpayer personally liable for income taxes, (b) of a
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(a) The taxpayer transferred property to another person;
Transferee liability at equity exists under IRC §6901 if the
government can prove:
Transferee liability at law exists under IRC §6901 if the
government can prove:
decedent personally liable for estate taxes, and (c) ofa donor
personally liable for gift taxes. IRC §6901.
At the time of the transfer and at the time transferee
liability is asserted, the taxpayer was liable for a tax;
There is a valid contract between the
taxpayer-transferor and the transferee; and
Under the terms of that contract, the transferee
assumed the liabilities of the taxpayer, including the
obligation to pay the tax or specifically the obligation
to pay the taxes of the transferor.
The taxpayer transferred property to another person;
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(2)
(3)
r
r
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(b) At the time of the transfer and at the time transferee
liability is asserted, the taxpayer was liable for the tax;
,..
!
(c) The transfer was made after liability for the tax
accrued, whether or not the tax was actually assessed
at the time ofthe transfer;
(d) The transfer was made for less than full or adequate
consideration;
r
I
r,
r
(e)
(f)
The transferor was insolvent at the time ofthe transfer
or the transfer left the transferor insolvent; and
The government has exhausted all reasonable efforts
to collect the tax from the taxpayer-transferor before
proceeding against the transferee.
..
I
,.
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c. Liability of Consenting Spouses
In the case ofjoint income tax returns, joint and several liability is
imposed on husband and wife for that year's income tax liability.
IRC §6013(d)(3).
d. General Tax Lien
After assessment, demand, and failure to pay, a general tax lien
attaches automatically to "all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to the [taxpayer]". IRC §6013(d)(3).
e. Priority of Tax Claims
(1) In a probate setting, the state law rules relating to the time and
place for filing claims don't apply to the tax claims of the
United States. Board ofComm'rs ofJackson Countyv. U.S.,
308 US 343 (1939); United States v. Summerlin, 310 US 414
(1940).
(2) Section 3713(a) of the Revised Statutes generally provides
that a debt due to the United States be satisfied first whenever
the estate ofa deceased taxpayer/debtor is insufficient to pay
all creditors.
(3) Although no exceptions are made in Section 3713(a) of the
Revised Statutes for the payment ofadministration expenses,
the IRS nevertheless appears to recognize exceptions for
administration expenses, funeral expenses, and widow's
allowance. GCM 22499, 1941-1 CB-272 and Rev. Ru180-
112, 1980-1 CB 306.
Place for Filing Income Tax Returns:
a. The final Form 1040 should normally be filed in the internal revenue
district in which is located the legal residence or principal place of
business of the person making the return (i.e., based upon where the
executor is located, which is not necessarily where the decedent filed
his or her returns), or at the service center serving such internal
revenue district. IRC §6091(b)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. §31.6091-1(a).
b. However, if such person has no legal residence or principal place of
business in any internal revenue district, the return should be filed
with the District Director, Internal Revenue Service, Baltimore,
F-6
J
J
j
J
j
J
j
j
J
J
J
J
j
J
J
J
J
J
J
Applicable Statutes ofLimitations
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a.
Maryland, 21202, except as provided in the case of returns of
taxpayers outside the United States. Treas. Reg. § 1.6091-2(a).
However, the return made by a person outside the United States
having no legal residence or principal place of business in any
internal revenue district should be filed with the Director of
International Operations, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
20225, unless the legal residence or principal place of business of
such person, or the principal place of business or principal office or
agency ofsuch corporation, is located in the Virgin Islands or Puerto
Rico, in which case the return shall be filed with the Director of
International Operations, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Hato Rey,
Puerto Rico 00917. Treas. Reg. § 31.6091-1(c).
Assessment of Additional Tax Due
r
r
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Income tax must normally be assessed within three years after
the related return was filed, whether or not such return was
timely filed. IRC §6501(a).
The normal three year income tax statute of limitations is
extended to six years if the taxpayer makes a substantial
omission (in excess of 25%) of the amount of gross income
shown on the return. IRC §6501(e)(1).
There is no limit on the statute of limitations where a false
return was filed, there is a wilful attempt to evade tax, or no
return was filed. IRC §6501(c).
The normally applicable statute of limitations is extended as
to transferees --- for one year in the case of the initial
transferee, and as to transferees oftransferees, for as much as
three years after the expiration ofthe period oflimitations for
assessment against the initial transferor. IRC §6901(c).
The taxpayer and government can agree to indefinitely extend
an income tax (but not estate tax) statute oflimitations prior
to the expiration ofthe statute. IRC §6501(c)(4).
F-7
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c. Request for Prompt Assessment
b. Claiming Refund ofTax Paid
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A tax refund claim must generally be filed within
three years from the time the related return was filed
or two years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever ofsuch periods expires later, or ifno return
was filed, within two years from the time the tax was
paid. IRC §6511(a).
Equitable mitigation provisions exist that may be
useful in cases where a refund or credit would
otherwise be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. See IRC §§1311-1314; 1341.
Special rules extend the time for filing a claim for
refund in cases where the period for assessing tax has
been extended and in other cases. IRC §§6511(c);
6511(d).
(1)
(3)
(2)
The executor may request a discharge from personal liability for
income and gift tax liabilities ofthe decedent (which gives the IRS
nine months to collect such taxes from the executor) by making a
request for such a discharge (no official form) pursuant to IRC §2204.
This does not shorten the statute of limitations (i.e., the IRS could
still assert the tax due by pursuing the assets, transferees, etc.), and it
is not believed that this increases the audit exposure on such returns.
The executor may shorten to 18 months the period oftime for the IRS
to assess additional taxes on returns previously filed by the decedent
or the executor by separately filing Form 4810. Treas. Reg.
§301.6501(d)-I(b). It is not believed that this increases the audit
exposure on such returns.
d. Discharge From Personal Liability
a. Applicable Rules and Definitions.
1. Return Filing Requirements.
B.
,..
,.
(1),.
/,
(2),..
Ifclient turned 65 on January 1, 1999, he or she is considered
to be age 65 at end of 1998.
Gross income means all income received in the form
of money, goods, property, and services that is not
exempt from tax, including any gain on the sale of a
home (even if part or all of gain may be excluded or
postponed).
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Income Tax Return Filing Thresholds. See IRe §6012(a).
(3) IfHead ofHousehold, under age 65 - Gross income of$8,450
in 1996; $8,700 in 1997; $8,950 in 1998; and $9,100 in 1999.
(8) Married, Filing Separately - Gross income of$2,550 in 1996;
$2,650 in 1997; $2,700 in 1998; and $2,750 in 1999.
Social security benefits are not included unless the
taxpayer is married filing separately and lived with his
or her spouse any time during the year in question.
(3)
(1) If Single (including divorced and legally separated), under
age 65 - Gross income of $6,550 in 1996; $6,800 in 1997;
$6,950 in 1998; and $7,050 in 1999.
(2) If Single (including divorced and legally separated), 65 or
older - Gross income of $7,550 in 1996; $7,800 in 1997;
$8,000 in 1998; and $8,100 in 1999.
(4) IfHead ofHousehold, 65 or older - Gross income of $9,450
in 1996; $9,700 in 1997; $10,000 in 1998; and $10,150 in
1999.
(5) If Married, Joint Return, both spouses under 65 - Gross
income of $11,800 in 1996; $12,200 in 1997; $12,500 in
1998; and $12,700 in 1999.
(6) If Married, Joint Return, one spouse 65 or older - Gross
income of $12,600 in 1996; $13,000 in 1997; $13,350 in
1998; and $13,550 in 1999.
(7) If Married, Joint Return, both spouses 65 or older - Gross
income of $13,400 in 1996; $13,800 in 1997; $14,200 in
1998; and $14,400 in 1999.
r
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(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
If a Single Dependent, under 65:
(a) Unearned income of$1 or more and all income more
than $600 (in 1996), $650 (in 1997), and $700 (in
1998 and 1999); or
(b) No unearned income, and earned income and all
income more than $4,000 (in 1996), $4,150 (in 1997),
$4,250 (in 1998), and $4,300 (in 1999); and
(c) Ifclient is blind, add $1,000 to these numbers in 1996
and 1997, and $1,050 to these numbers in 1998 and
1999.
Ifa Qualifying Widow(er) with depended child, under age 65
- Gross income of$9,350 (in 1996); $9,550 (in 1997); $9,800
(in 1998); and $9,950 (in 1999). If client is blind, add $800
to these numbers in 1996 and 1997, and add $850 to these
numbers in 1998 and 1999.
Ifa Qualifying Widow(er) with dependent child, 65 or older-
Gross income of $10,150 (in 1996); $10,350 (in 1997);
$10,650 (in 1998); and $10,800 (in 1999). If client is blind,
add $800 to these numbers in 1996 and 1997, and add $850
to these numbers in 1998 and 1999.
If a Single Dependent, 65 or older
(a) Earned income more than $5,000 (in 1996), $5,150
(in 1997), $5,300 (in 1998), and $5,350 in 1999,
(b) Unearned income more than $1,600 (in 1996), $1,650
(in 1997), and $1,750 (in 1998 and 1999), or
(c) Gross income exceeds total of earned income (up to
$4,000 in 1996, $4,150 in 1997, $4,250 in 1998 or
$4,300 in 1999), or $600 (in 1996), $650 (in 1997), or
$700 (in 1998 and 1999), whichever is larger, plus
$1,000 (in 1996 and 1997) or $1,050 (in 1998 and
1999); and
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(d) Ifclient is blind, add $1,000 to these numbers in 1997
and 1998, and add $1,050 to these numbers in 1998
and 1999.
r
(13) If a Married Dependent, under 65
(a) Earned income exceeds $3,350 (in 1996), $3,450 (in
1997), $3,550 (in 1998), and $3,600 in 1999,
(b) Unearned income of$1 or more and gross income was
more than $600 (in 1996), $650 (in 1997), and $700
(in 1998 and 1999); or
(c) Gross income was at least $5 and spouse files a
separate return on Form 1040 and itemizes
deductions.,.
r
(d) For purposes of(a) and (b), ifclient is blind, add $800
to these numbers in 1996 and 1997, and add $850 to
these numbers in 1998 and 1999.
r
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(14) If a Married Dependent, 65 or older
(a) Earned income exceeds $3,950 (in 1996), $4,100 (in
1997), $4,250 (in 1998), and $4,300 (in 1999),
(b) Unearned income exceeds $1,400 (in 1996), $1,450
(in 1997), $1,550 (in 1998 and 1999),
(c) Gross income exceeds total of earned income (up to
$3,350 in 1996, $3,450 in 1997, $3,550 in 1998, and
$3,600 in 1999), or $600 in 1996, $650 in 1997, and
$700 in 1998 and 1999), whichever is larger, plus
$800 (in 1996 and 1997) and $850 (in 1998 and
1999); or
(d) Gross income was at least $5 and spouse files a
separate return on Form 1040 and itemizes
deductions.
(e) For purposes of (a), b), and (c), if client is blind, add
$800 to these numbers in 1996 and 1997, and add
$850 to these numbers in 1998 and 1999.
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(15) If owe any special taxes, such as self-employment tax,
alternative minimum tax, recapture taxes, excise taxes. etc.
c. Voluntary Income Tax Filing Situations
It will be desirable to file a return not otherwise required to be filed
in order to collect a refund due to withheld income taxes, estimated
tax paid, other refundable tax credits, etc., or possibly just to get the
decedent "out of the computer" at IRS.
Computation of Tax Due on Final Form 1040
a. Income on the Final Form 1040
(1) The final income tax return includes only those items that the
decedent would have in such period under the decedent's
method (i.e., cash or accrual) of accounting.
(2) S corporation shareholders are taxed on their pro rata share of
items of income, deduction and credits for year of death on
their final form 1040 (via the proration method unless all of
the shareholders agree to the closing of the books method).
IRC §1366.
(3) Historically, partnerships did not usually terminate for tax
purposes on the death of a partner. Treas. Reg. §1.706-
1(c)(3)(ii). This meant that the final form 1040 ofa partner
who died on any date other than December 31 st reflected no
partnership income, and the successor (usually the estate) was
taxed on the decedent's share of partnership income for its
entire year. Effective for partnership taxable years beginning
after 1997, the taxable year of a partnership will close upon
the death of a partner, causing the pre-death share of the
partnership's income to be reported on the deceased partner's
final Form 1040. TRA '97, §1246.
(4) Dividends and interest received after date ofdeath (but before
the asset is retitled into the estate's name) will often have
post-death income wrongfully reported as the decedent's
income. In order to avoid IRS matching program problems,
report on the final Form 1040 the full amount reported to the
IRS on Form 1099s as taxable to the decedent, and back out
those amounts received after date ofdeath which are properly
reportable on the estate's Form 1041.
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(5)
(6)
Accrued interest on Series E and EE United States Savings
Bonds (and previously accrued Series E or EE interest rolled
into Series H or HH United States Savings Bonds) which has
not yet been income taxed can be reported as income in the
decedent's final year ifso elected. IRC §454(a).
A cash basis decedent will often have a final paycheck (plus
accrued vacation time, sick time, etc.) paid after death.
But if a cash-basis income taxpayer is the beneficiary of an
estate or trust in his or her year ofdeath, the decedent's final
form 1040 must nevertheless include any distributions of
Income actually received before death. Treas. Reg.
§§1.652(c)-2 and 1.662(c)-2. In the example set forth in the
prior paragraph, if the distributions were made in July and
An income beneficiary ofan estate or trust generally includes
in gross income his or her share ofsuch entity's income for its
taxable year which ends with, or within, the beneficiary's tax
year. IRC §§652(c) and 662(c). For example, all
distributions made between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998
from an estate having a June 30 fiscal year end will be taxable
to the distributee on his or her 1998 income tax return as ifall
such distributions were made on June 30, 1998.
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(7)
(8)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Such payment is an asset of the probate estate (and
should be paid to the estate, not to the survivors
directly), and should be reported as taxable to the
estate (not the deceased individual).
Ifpayment of amounts due is made by the employer
in the employee's year ofdeath, no federal income tax
is withheld, but Social Security tax, Medicare tax, and
Federal Unemployment tax are to be withheld. IRS
Publication #15 (1-98), Circular E, Employer's Tax
Guide, Section 15.
If payment of amounts due is made by the employer
in any year subsequent to the year ofthe employee's
death, no federal income tax, Social Security tax,
Medicare tax, or Federal Unemployment tax are to
be withheld. IRS Publication #15 (1-98), Circular E,
Employer's Tax Guide, Section 15.
r F -13
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August, 1997, and the distributee died in October, 1997, all
such distributions would instead be taxable on distributee's
final 1997 income tax return.
(9) The IRS has held that the subsequent exercise by a donee of
a transferable stock option is taxable to the employee at the
time ofexercise under IRC §83. See PLR 9616035 (4/19/96).
If the employee dies before exercise, is there income on the
final form, or does the income tax burden shift to the donee?
(10) Income items, such as advances and draws against subsequent
commission income, may be received with the possibility of
having to be later repaid. Such items are income in the year
received, pursuant to the "claim ofright" doctrine.
(11) Taxpayers may convert regular IRAs to Roth IRAs and report
the tax due by reason of the conversion over a four year
period (commencing in the year ofconversion). IRC §408A.
All such previously untaxed income resulting from such a
conversion to a Roth IRA will be included as income on the
decedent's final form 1040 unless the surviving spouse is the
beneficiary of all of the decedent's Roth IRAs and elects to
continue reporting the previously untaxed income under the
four year rule. See proposed regulation, REG-115393-98
(Tax Analysts Doc. 98-115393-98), published 9/3/98, Fed.
Reg. 9/3/98, Vol. 63 #171, at p. 46939 and 446,940.
Deductions on the Final Form 1040
(1) Only deductions relating to items actually paid prior to death
are generally deductible on a cash-basis taxpayer's final Form
1040.
(2) A decedent's estate may not make a post-death IRA
contribution on behalfofan individual who could have made
a contribution for the year involved, nor can the executor
make a post-death contribution to a spousal IRA on behalfon
behalfof a decedent's unemployed spouse. PLR 8439066.
(3) Medical expenses of the decedent paid out ofthe estate (but
apparently not those paid by a revocable living trust) within
one year after date of death may be deducted if so elected.
This may require going back and amending a previously filed
final form 1040. IRC §§213(c), 642(g).
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Death of the Owner of a Passive Activity ("PAL") Asset
(a) Congress enacted the passive activity loss ("PAL")
rules to limit a taxpayer's ability to offset non-passive
sources ofincome (active income, such as salary, and
portfolio income, such as dividends and interest) with
losses from passive sources (such as rental real
estate).
(b) Death ofthe owner ofa PAL does constitute a defined
disposition of a PAL. IRC §469(g)(2).
(c) A deduction is allowable on the decedent's final Form
1040 only to the extent that the suspended passive
activity loss exceeds the IRC §1014 basis step-up.
(d) For example, assume that the decedent had an asset
having a fair market value of $100, an adjusted basis
before death of $60, and a suspended PAL of $50.
The basis of such asset is stepped up by $40 to its
$100 fair market value at the decedent's death, and a
$10 loss (i.e., the $50 suspended loss, less the $40
basis step-up at death) is deductible on the decedent's
final Form 1040.
"... where the annuity payments cease by reason ofdeath of
the annuitant, and as of the date of cessation there is a
unrecovered investment in the contract, and the amount of
that unrecovered investment shall be allowed as a deduction
to the annuitant for his or her last taxable year." IRC
§72(b)(3)(A).
Certain unused investment tax credits on termination may be
taken as a deduction on the final income tax return, and are a
"miscellaneous itemized deduction" for purposes ofthe 2% of
AGI deduction floor. IRC §196(b).
The decedent's right to claim a dependency exemption
pursuant to IRC §152 may be impacted by the decedent's
death. Death does not impact the relationship between the
decedent and dependent. But death may cause the decedent
to lose such dependency exemption by reason of having
provided less than the required portion of the dependent's
total support in the year ofdeath.
F - 15
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c. Treatment of Open Transactions and Unused Carryforwards
(1) Loss carryforwards (capital losses, NOLs, charitable
deductions, etc.) attributable to the decedent die with the
decedent. Rev. Rul. 74-175, 1974-1 CB 52.
(2) Loss carryforwards attributable to the surviving spouse can
continue to be carried forward by such surviving spouse. It
is thus necessary to allocate such carryforward items between
the decedent and the surviving spouse.
(3) Certain unused qualified business credits that would
otherwise be lost may be claimed as a deduction. IRC
§196(b); Treas. Reg. §1.196-1(b).
(4) The gain from the sale ofa personal residence by the executor
of an estate under an executory contract entered into by the
decedent prior to death qualifies for the pre-TRA '97 IRC
§121 exclusion relating to the exclusion ofgain from the sale
of a personal residence.. Rev. Rul. 82-1, 1982-1 CB 26,
revoking Rev. Rul 70-459, 1970-2 CB 22.
(5) There is mixed authority as to whether the decedent's estate
or other successor in interest can make a post-death
reinvestment of involuntary conversion proceeds in order to
avoid recognition of income. Much authority would allow
such a tax-free reinvestment. But it would appear necessary
that the estate (and not the subsequent distributee) make such
reinvestment. See Goodman Estate (CA 3, 1952), 199 F.2d
895,42 AFTR 877,52-2 USTC ~9556; Morris Estate (CA 4,
1972),454 F.2d208, 29 AFTR2d 72-391, 72-1 USTC~9177,
affg 55 USTC 636 (1971); Gregg Estate, 69 TC 468 (1977);
Chichesterv. U.S. (DCAL, 1978), 42 AFTR2d 78-5139, 78-1
USTC ~9458; Rev. Rul. 58-407, 1958-2 CB 404. But see
Jayne Estate, 61 TC 744 (1974); Rev. Rul. 64-161 CB 298,
revoking Rev. Rul. 58-407, 1958-2 CB 404.
Other Final Form 1040 Issues and Considerations
a. Accounting Periods and Methods ofAccounting
(1) For the decedent's taxable year which ends with the date of
his death, the return shall cover the period during which the
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decedent was alive. IRC §6012(b)(I); Treas. Reg. §1.6012-
3(b)(1).
(2) A decedent's final tax year thus ends with the date of his or
her death. Treas. Reg. §1.451-1(b)(1).
(3) The final return is filed and the tax paid as ifthe decedent had
lived until the end of his or her last tax year (i.e., needn't
annualize final return benefits such as exemption). Treas.
Reg. §1.443-1(a)(2).
b. Return Filing and Tax Payment Deadlines
(1) The decedent's final income tax return is due on the normal
date that it would have been due if the decedent had not died
(i.e., usually April 15th of the calendar year following the
death ofthe decedent). Treas. Reg. §1.6072-l(b). This will
frustrate survivors in the case ofmany smaller estates, where
the only reason why settlement ofa decedent's affairs cannot
be completed is the need to file the final Form 1040 (which
cannot be filed prior to January 1st following the decedent's
date ofdeath).
(2) An extension of time to file the income tax return may be
requested. IRC §608l.
(3) An extension of time to pay the income tax due may be
requested. IRC §6l61.
c. Filing Status in Year ofDeath
(1) A joint income tax return for the year of the decedent's death
can be filed for the decedent's income through date of death
and the surviving spouse's income for the entire year if so
elected. IRC §6013(a).
(2) Husband and wife status for a given year is determined at the
time ofdeath ifone spouse dies before the end ofthe tax year.
Thus an estate would have to file either "jointly" or as
"married filing separately", and a surviving spouse (unless he
or she remarried prior to year end and thus qualifies to file
jointly with the new spouse) similarly must file either
"jointly" or as "married filing separately" (i.e., not as single).
IRC §6013(d)(1)(B).
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(6)
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(9)
A joint return can be filed where the taxable years of the
decedent and surviving spouse are different only if such
taxable years begin on the same day and end on different days
because one ofthem died. IRC §6013(a).
No joint return with the decedent can be filed ifthe surviving
spouse remarries prior to the end of the taxable year or if the
tax year of either spouse is a 'short' year because ofa change
in accounting method. Treas. Reg. §1.6013-1(d)(2).
Normally the decedent's executor must consent to the filing
of a joint return on behalf of a decedent. However, a
surviving spouse can unilaterally file a joint return if: (a) No
return has yet been made by the decedent for the tax year for
which the joint return is made, (2) No executor has been
appointed by the time the joint tax return is filed, and (3) no
executor is appointed before the due date for filing the
surviving spouse's tax return. Treas. Reg. §1.6013-1(d)(3).
The executor can disaffirm any joint return filed by the
decedent's surviving spouse. IRC §6013(a)(3).
Ajoint final form 1040 should be signed by both the executor
and surviving spouse, but the surviving spouse can sign on his
or her own behalf and "as surviving spouse" if no executor
has been appointed.
If a joint return is filed, there is joint and several liability for
the entire tax due. IRC §6013(d)(3).
It is necessary to allocate the joint tax liability or joint refund
between the decedent and the surviving spouse in order to
determine what must be included (or can be deducted) on the
Form 706 (Federal Estate Tax Return) ofthe deceased. Treas.
Reg. §20.2053-6(f). See, Rev. Rut. 57-78, 1957-1 CB 30,
clarifying Rev. Rut. 56-290, 1956-1 CB 445. Such
determination may also be relevant to creditors or children
from a prior marriage where all ofthe decedent's assets do not
pass to the surviving spouse (i.e., imagine a case where the
decedent's assets are placed in trust, income to the second
spouse for life, remainder to the kids from the first marriage
- the parties want the right amount, but no more, relating to
the decedent's share of the taxes paid from the estate).
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d. Execution ofFinal Return
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The word "DECEASED" should be written across the top ofthe Final
fonn 1040 and the date ofthe decedent's death should appear after the
decedent's name in the name and address box at the top of the final
fonn 1040. IRS Pub 559, (1996), page 3.
Estimated Income Tax Payments
The estate may not be required to file or pay estimated tax with
respect to decedent's income on the final Fonn 1040. See IRC §6654;
Treas. Reg. §§1.6015(b); 1.6153-1(a)(4).
Miscellaneous Elections
Claim for Refund
Taxes Due by Military and Other KIAs
(3) But the executor must attach to the return a copy ofthe court
certificate showing that he or she was appointed the executor.
IRS Pub 559, (1996), page 3.
Miscellaneous elections for events occurring prior to death, such as
for involuntary conversions and exclusion of gain from the sale ofa
personal residence. IRC §§121; 1033; 1034.
However, if the person claiming the refund is a surviving
spouse filing a joint return with the decedent, or a court-
appointed or certified executor filing an original return for the
decedent, Fonn 1310 is not needed.
Generally, a person who is filing a return for a decedent and
claiming a refund must file a Fonn 1310, Statement ofPerson
Claiming Refund Due a Deceased Taxpayer, with the return.
Active duty military personnel and certain military or civilian
employees ofthe United States who are killed in action, or die
as a result of certain terroristic or military action, may have
all of their income tax liabilities for the year of death and
prior years excused. See IRC 692.
(1)
(2)
(1)
g.
h.
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(2) Certain survivor benefits paid by reason of the death of a
public safety officer will be exempt from income taxation,
effective for amounts received in taxable years beginning
after 1996, with respect to individuals dying after that date.
Section 1528 ofTRA '97, amending IRC §101.
Planning Considerations for Final Returns
a. Adjust Estimated Income Tax Payments and Withholding
No estimated tax payments relating to the decedent's income need be
made after the decedent's death, but the surviving spouse will want to
amend his or her estimated tax declaration and withholding
exemptions. IRC §6654.
b. Accelerate Income to Avoid Wasting Tax Benefits
It may be advantageous to cause income to be recognized on the final
form 1040 where net operating losses, unused charitable deductions,
unused investment tax credits, unused capital losses, or other tax
benefits exist that will be lost upon the taxpayer's death. Ideally, such
tax benefits will be used to offset the tax liability from items of
income in respect ofa decedent which will not qualify for stepped up
basis_at death (such as electing out of installment sales reporting on
installment notes receivable, electing to be taxed on accrued E and EE
savings bond interest, the surviving spouse not electing to continue
the installment reporting of conversion income resulting from the
conversion of a regular IRA to a Roth IRA, etc.).
c. Accounting Method for Computing Flow-Through Entity Income
S corporation shareholders (and after TRA '97, partners in
partnerships) are taxed on their pre-death share of income,
deductions, and credits for the year ofdeath on their final Form 1040.
S corporation income is apportioned using the averaging method,
unless the closing of the books (exact) method is elected.
Partnerships use a closing of the books (exact) method, unless the
averaging method is elected.
d. Offsetting Transactions by Surviving Spouse
The surviving spouse may want to recognize gains or losses, or
accelerate income or deductions, so as to offset/utilize the losses,
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Income Taxation of the Surviving Spouse
Joint Return Option
The surviving spouse may file separately or join in the filing ofa joint return
for the year ofdeath. However, ifthe surviving spouse is not remarried and
does not file jointly, he/she must use married filing separately status in the
year of the decedent's death. IRC §6013. Beware of the joint and several
liability for all ofthe tax on a joint return that is created by filing jointly.
r
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e.
f.
gains, or high income of the decedent through the filing of a final
joint return.
Coordinate With Other Fiduciaries
It is not uncommon for there to be wasted or under-utilized
deductions and credits, or an unusually low effective income tax
bracket, on the decedent's final form 1040. Ifajoint final return is to
be filed, choice ofa fiscal year (e.g., December 31 st or sooner) and the
making ofdistributions from the estate or trust that will carry out DNI
that will be taxable to the surviving spouse in the year of death,
should be considered to shift income onto the final return.
Possible Need to Recognize Gains or Losses
The surviving spouse may want to recognize gains or losses, so as to
offset/utilize the losses or gains attributable to the decedent (and
which opportunity will be lost if not utilized on the decedent's final
Form 1040) in the event that a joint return is to be filed.
r
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Continued Use of Joint Rates
A surviving spouse may be entitled to use joint tax rates for two additional
years ifhe/she maintains a home for a dependent child. IRC §§I(a); 2(a).
Continued Use ofHead ofHousehold Rates
A surviving spouse may be entitled to use head ofhousehold tax rates while
unmarried and not a surviving spouse if he/she maintains a home for a
dependent child or other qualified dependent. IRC §§1(b); 2(b).
Adjust Own Withholding Status and Estimated Tax Payments
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The surviving spouse will want to review and possibly amend his/her
withholding status and/or estimated tax payments.
IRA Contribution by Nonworking Surviving Spouse
A nonworking surviving spouse can make a post-death spousal IRA
contribution to the surviving spouse's own IRA for the year of the working
spouse's death, provided that the working spouse had sufficient pre-death
earnings, although no contribution can be made to the decedent's IRA. PLR
8527083.
Available AMT Exemption Amount
A "surviving spouse" as defined in IRC §2(a), for the year ofthe decedent's
death and the succeeding two tax years, is entitled to an AMT exemption of
$45,000, reduced by 25% ofany excess ofAMTI over $150,000 (rather than
the normal AMT exemption applicable to single persons of$33,750, reduced
by 25% of any excess AMTI over $112,500). IRC §§55(d); 55(d)(3).
Computation of Subsequent NOLs
An NOL incurred by a surviving spouse and carried back to a marriage year
can only be applied against the surviving spouse's own income in such prior
year. Rev. Rut. 65-140, 1965-1 CB 127. It does not matter that the surviving
spouse was remarried in the loss year, nor that the surviving spouse resided
in a community property state in the loss year. Rev. Rut. 71-382, 1971-2 CB
156.
Possible Grandfathered Interest Exclusion
A surviving spouse electing to leave life insurance proceeds payable by
reason of his or her spouse's death with the life insurance company may
exclude up to $1,000 per year of interest income pursuant to provisions of
IRC §101(d). Such provision still allows such exclusion with reference to
amounts received with respect to deaths occurring on or before October 22,
1986. Section 1001(d) ofPub. L. 99-514 (TRA '86), amending IRC §101(d).
Community Property Basis Adjustment
The decedent's property is, ofcourse, going to have its basis adjusted to fair
market value pursuant to IRC §1014. Additionally, the surviving spouse's
one-half interest in community property will also have its basis adjusted to
fair market value at the decedent's death. IRC §1014(b)(6).
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Basis Adjustments at Death
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General Rule. IRC §1014
The basis of property acquired from a decedent generally becomes the fair
market value of that property at date of death unless one of the exceptions
outlined below applies. IRC §1014.
Property Acquired From a Decedent
Property acquired from a decedent includes virtually any property deemed
owned by the decedent for estate tax purposes (i.e., included in the decedent's
gross estate), including probate and non-probate property, whether or not the
decedent's gross estate was large enough to require the filing ofa Form 706
Federal Estate Tax Return:
r
r
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b.
c.
Property in which the decedent had an interest. IRC §2033.
Any property owned by the decedent (i.e., probate property) is caught
under this provision. -
Dower or curtesy interests. IRC §2034.
The estate cannot ignore property which the surviving spouse can
demand under dower, curtesy, or other state law provisions creating
statutory or elective property rights. All of the decedent's property
is thus included, although an offsetting marital deduction may be
allowed.
Adjustments for gifts made within three years of decedent's death.
IRC §2035.
Certain property and rights no longer held by the decedent are taxed
as part of the decedent's estate, including life insurance on the
decedent's life where incidents ofownership were given away within
three years of the decedent's death, gift taxes on gifts made within
three years of the decedent's death, and property in which the
decedent released a IRC §2036, 2037, or 2038 power or interest
within three years of his or her death.
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Transfers with retained life estate. IRC §2036.
Property given away by the decedent is nevertheless included as a
part of the decedent's estate where the use of (or income from) such
property was retained until the decedent's death.
Transfers which take effect at death. IRC §2037.
Property given away by the decedent is nevertheless included as a
part ofthe decedent's estate where the decedent retained a reversion
worth more than 5% and someone else can get the property by
surviving the decedent (i.e., Donor to Beneficiary for life, remainder
to Donor if then living, otherwise to Beneficiary's descendants).
Revocable transfers. IRC §2038.
Property given away by the decedent is nevertheless included as a
part ofthe decedent's estate where the decedent retained a prohibited
power to alter, amend, or revoke the transferred property until the
decedent's death.
Annuities. IRC §2039.
Annuities (including IRAs and other qualified plan benefits) passing
to another at the decedent's death which arose from contributions
made by the decedent (or an employer on behalfof the decedent) are
included in the decedent's estate (although such assets will usually
constitute income in respect ofa decedent and get no basis step-up).
Joint interests. IRC §2040.
Some portion of property in which the decedent has an interest as a
joint tenant (or tenant by the entirety) is included in the decedent's
estate.
Powers of appointment. IRC §2041.
Property over which the decedent held too broad of a power of
appointment (as defined in this section) will be deemed owned by the
decedent for estate tax purposes.
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Exceptions to General Basis Rules
a. Exception ifElect Alternate Valuation
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Proceeds oflife insurance. IRC §2042.
The proceeds of life insurance on the decedent's life where the
decedent held a so-called "incident of ownership" is included in the
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes.
Transfers for insufficient consideration. IRC §2043.
Some portion of an asset otherwise to all be included in the
decedent's taxable estate may be excluded if a third party co-owner
contributed separate funds towards the acquisition or maintenance of
such property.
Certainproperty for which marital deduction was previously allowed.
IRC §2044.
The assets in a QTIP marital trust established by a prior spouse ofthe
decedent for the decedent's benefit are taxable as assets of the
decedent at the decedent's death.
If alternate valuation has been elected under IRC §2032, the IRC
§2032 value becomes the new basis. IRC §1014.
r
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Alternate valuation can only be elected where the gross estate
and estate tax due are both reduced as a result ofthe election.
Ifalternate valuation is elected, all estate assets are subjected
to the alternate valuation rules (i.e., no "pick and choose").
Alternate valuation causes the value of the assets six months
after date of death to be used, unless the assets are disposed
or distributed sooner, in which case their value at such earlier
date ofdisposition or distribution is used.
Joint tenancy property is treated like probate property for
alternate valuation purposes. Death (and the resulting passage
ofownership to the survivingjoint tenant) is not a disposition
for alternate valuation purposes, but the subsequent
disposition (by gift or sale) by the surviving joint tenant
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within the six months after the decedent's death is such a
disposition. Rev. Rul. 59-213, 1959-1C.B. 244.
Exception ifElect Special Use Valuation
(1) If special use valuation has been elected under IRC §2032A,
the §2032A value becomes the new basis. IRC §1014.
(2) If the special use property is disposed of so as to result in
additional estate tax being due, making an election is
necessary to increase the property's basis to its date ofdeath
value. IRC §§1016(c)(1) and 1016(c)(5)(B); Treas. Reg.
§301.9100-4T(f).
(3) Ifno election is made, there is no adjustment to the property's
basis. Conf. Rept. No. 97-215 (PL 97-34), p. 251.
(4) It should be noted that no similar provision applies to IRC
§2033A qualified family-owned businesses receiving a
valuation break (that provision is structured as an exclusion,
rather than as a deduction), so such qualified family-owned
businesses get full date of death fair market value basis.
Exception for Income in Respect of a Decedent ("IRD") Items
(1) Items ofincome in respect ofa decedent under IRC §691 are
not entitled to stepped-up basis at the decedent's death.
Examples of such items include IRA and pension plan
proceeds, renewal commissions, deferred compensation, and
installment notes receivable.
(2) Special Rules re Partnerships
The basis of a partnership interest acquired from a decedent
is the date of death (or alternate) value, increased by the
estate's (or other successor's) share of partnership liabilities
and reduced by the income in respect of a decedent
attributable to such partnership interest. Treas. Reg. §1.742-
1.
(3) Special Rules re S Corporations
The basis of S corporation stock must be reduced by the
income in respect of a decedent attributable to such stock.
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Exception re Qualified Conservation Easement
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(4)
IRC §1367(b)(4), effective with respect to decedents dying
after August 20, 1996
Certain Lifetime Constructive Sales
Certain lifetime constructive sales, amounting to hedging
(constructive sale) transactions, such as going "short against
the box" during lifetime in order to lock in profit and pull out
cash will no longer be able to be closed out income tax free
after death, as the pre-death portion of the gain will be
considered IRD taxable to the estate or other successor. TRA
'97, §1001(d)(3), addingIRC §1259, effective (with complex
exceptions) to constructive sales made after June 8, 1997.
r
r
r e.
A carryover of the decedent's income tax cost basis will occur with
respect to that portion of a property which is excluded from the
decedent's estate by reason of a qualified conservation easement.
TRA '97, §508, amending IRC §§170,1014, 2031, and 2032A,
effective for decedents dying after 1997.
Exception re Certain Recently Gifted Property
Exception re Previously Gifted Property
Property received as a gift by the decedent within one year of the
decedent's death which is gifted by the decedent back to the donor
will not receive an adjustment to basis by reason of the decedent's
death. IRC §1014(e).
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(3)
Property gifted during lifetime that is nevertheless included
in the decedent's estate for estate tax purposes (such as IRC
§§2035, 2036, 2037, or 2038 property) will be entitled to an
IRC §1014 basis adjustment by reason of the decedent's
death,
But the transferee must reduce such new date ofdeath basis
by any depreciation, depletion, or amortization taken by such
transferee. Treas. Reg. §1.1014-3(d).
Conceptually difficult issues are raised when previously
gifted property included in the decedent's estate (such as IRC
§§2036, 2037, or 2038 property) has been sold and reinvested
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in something else prior to the decedent's death. For estate tax
purposes, the original property is deemed included in the
decedent's estate. But ifit has been sold, can the donee file
an amended income tax return and claim the date of death
value as the adjusted basis? See Humphrey's Estate v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5 th Cir), cert. denied, 332 US817
(1947); Rev. Rut. 72-282, 1972-1 CB 306.
Exception re Certain Spousal Joint Tenancies
(1) The current rules re estate taxation ofjoint tenancy interests
provide that one-half of a spousal joint tenancy asset is
included in the deceased spouse's estate under IRC §2040,
which results in the deceased spouse's one-half of the asset
having its basis adjusted under IRC §1014 and the surviving
spouse's one-half of the asset being left with its historic cost
basis.
(2) Prior to 1982 (pursuant to TRA '1981), the portion of a
spousal joint tenancy asset included in the deceased spouse's
estate was determined with reference to the deceased spouse's
relative contribution to the acquisition of the asset (the so-
called "tracing of contribution" test). Accordingly, before
1982 as little as 0% or as much as 100% of a spousal joint
tenancy asset might have been included in the deceased
spouse's estate under IRC §2040 (and have its basis adjusted
in IRC §1014).
(3) Several cases have now held that the TRA '1981
amendments to IRC §2040(b)(2) did not repeal the effective
date of IRC §2040(b)(1), the net impact of which is to still
apply the tracing ofcontribution rules to spousaljoint tenancy
assets acquired before 1977. See Gallenstein v. U.S., 975
F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992); Patten v. U.S., 116 F3d 1029 (4th
Cir., 1997); Anderson v. U.S., 78 AFTR 2d 96-6557 (DC
MD 1996), and Hahn v. U.S., 110 T.C. 14 (1998). The IRS
does not agree with the holdings in these cases.
Exception re Community Property Interests
(1) The survivor's one-half interest in community property, as
well as the decedent's one-half interest in such property, gets
new basis (equal to the fair market value ofsuch assets) at the
decedent's death. IRC §1014(b)(6).
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4. Special Basis Transitional Dates Under IRC §1014
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(3)
It is thus essential to ascertain whether or not the decedent
and his or her spouse ever lived in one of the community
property states (i.e., Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin),
and if so, if community property was thereby created (and
subsequently preserved) --- even ifthe client resided in a non-
community property state at death.
Some states now allow community property to be held in
joint tenancy, and it is unclear whether the joint tenancy or
community property rules will apply to such arrangements.
See Estate ofWayne-Chi Young, 110 T.C. No. 24, Doc. 98-
14934 (1998).
c. Death after 12-31-47
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
a.
b.
d.
e.
Death after 12-31-51
IRC §1014 applies to property transferred to a revocable trust. Treas.
Reg. §1.1014-2(a)(3).
Death after 10-21-42 but before 12-31-47
Basis of surviving spouse's share of community property was the
greater of its adjusted basis or its estate tax value.
The surviving spouse's one-half share of community property
assumes the same basis as the decedent's share.
Death between 1-1-51 and 12-31-53
The survivor's interest in a joint and survivor annuity received a basis
adjustment if the decedent's interest was includable in his/her gross
estate.
Death after 12-31-53
All property acquired from a decedent by reason ofdeath receives a
stepped-up basis.
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f. Death after 8-26-37
The decedent's stock or securities in a foreign corporation which is a
foreign personal holding company receives a basis which is the lower
ofthe fair market value at date ofdeath or the decedent's basis.
Other Basis Issues
a. Appraisal
The applicable date for determining fair market value is "as of' the
decedent's date of death, unless alternate valuation date is elected
under IRC 2032. The appropriate values will appear ofthe Form 706.
b. When no Form 706 is Required
Successors to the decedent's property are entitled to new basis even
if no estate tax was due by reason of the decedent's death. The
fiduciary should obtain an appraisal or other proofto support the new
cost basis even ifno Form 706 is required (i.e., because the decedent's
gross estate totals less than the estate tax exemption-equivalent).
c. Impact on Depreciation, Depletion, etc.
Be mindful of the need to recompute future depreciation, depletion,
and amortization relative to assets (or that portion of an asset)
included in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
Such assets will get a new basis and date of acquisition after the
decedent's death, which may also result in a new life and method of
depreciation as to such asset (or portion of an asset). Consider
electing cost depletion where appropriate.
d. Elective Partnership Basis Adjustments
A partnership (or other entity taxed as a partnership, such as an LLC)
may elect to adjust the inside basis of its assets to reflect the outside
basis adjustment occurring by reason ofa partner's death. IRC §754
e. Appreciated Undistributed Devises Due Decedent
The death of a beneficiary due undistributed appreciated assets as
beneficiary of another estate mayor may· not result in such
undistributed assets having their basis adjusted, depending upon
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which authority you believe. Compare Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company v. U.S., 410 F.2d 77 (1969) and Connecticut National Bank
v. U.S., 937 F.2d 90 (1991),
Certain Joint Spousal Trusts
Post-Death Capital Gains and Losses
(1) All capital gains or losses that occur after death are long-term
capital gains or losses ifthe property sold was included in the
gross estate of the decedent, regardless of the length of the
post-death holding period. IRe §1223(11).
It has been suggested that husband and wife can create a single trust
with their collective assets (called a "joint spousal trust"), wherein the
first to die has a general power ofappointment, with the result that all
of the their collective assets will have their basis adjusted to fair
market value upon the death of the first spouse to die. This author
does not believe such technique works. See 30 University ofMiami
School of Law, Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning
(1996), ~206.
Such long-term treatment may be valuable where a gain
occurs, inasmuch as long-term capital gains have historically
been afforded favorable tax treatment.
Such long-term treatment may be unfavorable where a loss
occurs, inasmuch as long-term capital losses in excess of
offsetting capital gains can only be utilized to offset ordinary
income to the extent of $3,000 per year.
It is common to have post-death capital losses. For example,
imagine a decedent owning only a home appraised at
$100,000 which is sold 1-2 months after date of death for a
net of $92,000 after commissions and other selling expenses
of $8,000. The $8,000 of selling expenses, which will be
taken on the income tax return (after all, there is no estate tax
return due to deduct such expenses on), cause an $8,000 long-
term capital loss on the seller's income tax return.
(2)
(3)
(4)
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III REVOCABLE TRUSTS VS. PROBATE ESTATES
A. Lifetime Income Tax Consequences
Logically a revocable living trust which is a grantor-type trust, fully taxable to it's
grantor during the grantor's lifetime, should be disregarded for all income tax
purposes during the grantor's lifetime. Unfortunately, this not always the case, and
inconsistent income tax treatment results:
1. S Corporation Stock
A revocable living trust is a an eligible shareholder for the purpose ofholding
title to stock in an S corporation during the grantor's lifetime. IRC
§1361(c)(2)(A)(i).
2. Section 1244 Stock
Shareholders otherwise entitled to ordinary loss treatment upon the sale of
their stock in a qualifying corporation will lose this benefit if such stock is
transferred to a trust. IRC §1244(d)(4).
3. Public Utility Stock
The former tax-free dividend reinvest provision which allowed owners of
qualified public utility stock to elect to reinvest dividends on a tax-free basis
is available to the grantor ofa revocable trust who is deemed to own the trust
owing such stock for income tax purposes.
B. Effect of Grantor's Death
1. A revocable living trust typically allows the grantor, but no one else, to
revoke it and thus becomes irrevocable at the grantor's death.
2. The income, deductions and credits attributable to such a grantor-type trust
prior to the grantor's death will be reflected on the deceased grantor's final
Form 1040.
3. A revocable living trust becomes a different taxpayer after the grantor dies.
Rev. Rul. 57-51, 1957-1 C.B. 171. It must obtain a new taxpayer
identification number and start filing Form 1041 trust income tax returns
under such new number on income earned after the grantor's death.
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4. If a grantor-type revocable living trust was not exempt from filing trust
income tax returns or obtaining a taxpayer identification number during the
grantor's lifetime, then such trust should file a final grantor-type trust income
tax return under its old taxpayer identification number relating to items of
income, deductions, and credits attributable to such trust for the period
ending on the grantor's date of death.
r C. Post-Mortem Income Tax Differences
1. Separate Taxpaying Entities
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Unless the provisions of TRA '97's new IRC §646 are elected to treat the
revocable trust as a part of the probate estate, the revocable living trust
becomes a separate taxpaying entity after the grantor's death, thus providing
an added run up the tax bracket ladder (i.e., on the estate's return as well as
the trust's tax return) and the advantage ofseparate exemptions ($600 for the
estate and either $100 or $300 for the trust). IRC §§1(e) and 642(b).
Loss Recognition in Related Party Transactions
After TRA '97, an estate is still allowed to recognize some losses for income
tax purposes (i.e., losses resulting from the funding ofa pecuniary gift), but
losses in other taxable transactions between an estate or trust and its
beneficiaries are not allowed to be recognized for tax purposes. IRC
§267(b)(5).
Fiscal Year Tax Reporting
An estate is allowed to choose a fiscal year for income tax reporting
purposes, but a revocable living trust must utilize a calendar year for
reporting its income after the grantor's death. IRC §645(a).
Gain on Sale ofDepreciable Property
Taxable transactions between a trust and its beneficiary will result in all gain
being ordinary income, but gain in taxable transactions between an estate and
its beneficiary will result in ordinary income only to the extent of the
recapture amount. IRC §1239.
Throwback Rules
Estates are not subject to the throwback rules with respect to accumulated
income from prior tax years, but some domestic trusts and all foreign trust are
still (post-TRA '97) subject to throwback rules. IRC §§665-669.
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Quarterly Estimated Tax Payments
Estates and (since TAMRA) revocable trusts are not required to make
estimated income tax payments during their first two taxable years. IRC
§6654(k). However, estates have less flexibility than trusts inasmuch as
trusts can elect to have estimated income tax payments deemed distributed
to the beneficiary in any year, but estates can only do so in their last year.
IRC §643(g).
Charitable Set Aside Deduction
Estates having a charitable residuary beneficiary can deduct amounts which
are set aside for ultimate distribution to charity. IRC §642(c). Post 1969-Act
trusts are not entitled to the IRC §642(c) deduction, which makes it difficult
for trusts to avoid income tax on capital gains realized unless a current year
distribution of such gains can be made to charity.
Charitable Deduction ifHave Unrelated Business Income
Estates have a potentially unlimited charitable income tax deduction. IRC
§642(c). But trusts having unrelated business income that is contributed to
charity are subject to the percentage limitations on deductibility applicable
to individuals. IRC §681(a).
Passive Activity Loss Limitations
An estate (but not a trust) in its first two taxable years after death may deduct
up to $25,000 oflosses with respect to rental real estate against other income
ifthe decedent was an active participant with respect to such real estate at the
time ofdeath. IRC §469(i)(4).
Low Income Housing Project Investments
An estate (but not a trust) is exempt from the passive loss limitations for its
first two taxable years with respect to qualified low income housing project
investments acquired before 1987 in which the decedent was a qualified
investor at the time of death. IRC §469(i)(6)(b).
Ability to Hold S Corporation Stock
An estate qualifies to hold to hold S corporation stock for a reasonable period
oftime, but a revocable trust can continue as an S corporation shareholder for
only two years after the grantor's death. IRC §§1361(b)(1)(B) and
1361(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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14.
Discharge From Personal Liability
The executor (or personal representative) and a trustee may have personal
liability for a decedent's income and gift tax returns, but only an "executor"
(as specially defined in IRC §6905(b), which does not include a trustee) is
entitled to a written discharge for personal liability for such taxes. IRC
§§267(b)(5) and 6905.
Medical Expenses Paid Within One Year ofDeath
Medical expenses ofthe decedent paid out ofthe estate within one year after
date of death may be deducted if so elected. IRC §§213(c); 642(g).
Apparently the decedent's revocable trust is not accorded similar treatment.
Amortization ofReforestation Expenses
Estates qualify for IRC §194 amortization ofreforestation expenditures, but
trusts do not.
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LIFETIME GIFTS
Eric A. Manterfield
Krieg DeVault Alexander & Capehart
Indianapolis, Indiana
This paper will address several questions which are important to those ofyour single
clients who own more than $1 million and those ofyour married clients who together own more
than $2 million. Why should a lifetime gift program be considered? What assets might be given
away? How much should be given away? How can the Internal Revenue Service be bound by
your client's valuation of the gift?
A. WHY SHOULD YOUR CLIENT CONSIDER A LIFETIME GIFT PROGRAM?
Many clients are reluctant to make lifetime gifts. "I may need that money later." "My
children are scoundrels." "My children may get a divorce." "My grandchildren are just babies."
"Ifyou had lived through the Depression, you would not make gifts either." "I may get sick."
The reasons not to make lifetime gifts are legion. So why, indeed, should a client make
gifts before death?
1. Is traditional estate plannine enoueh? I am convinced that there is a level below
which "traditional estate planning" is adequate. If you represent a single person with less than $1
million or a married couple with less than $2 million in assets, a traditional estate plan (with a
G - 1
credit trust created at the death of the first spouse) may shelter all the assets from tax due to the
increasing applicable credit amount under Section 201 O(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended (hereafter, the "Code").
Depending on the years in which each spouse dies, this traditional estate plan for a
married couple can shelter somewhere between $1.3 million (if both spouses were to die in 1999)
and $2 million (ifboth spouses were to die in 2006 or later).
If ownership of their life insurance were also given to their children or to the trustee ofan
irrevocable life insurance trust, the amount which can be protected by this traditional estate plan
can grow to larger amounts.
The converse of this belief is equally true. Ifyour married clients today own more than
$2 million and have done only "traditional" estate planning, significant avoidable estate tax will
be paid at the death of the surviving spouse.
2. What ifyour clients already own more than $2 million? What if the value of their
assets continues to appreciate? They already own more than can be protected by a traditional
estate plan and they have no present plan to die, of course. Today's tax problem is only growing
worse over time, as the value of their estates continues to grow.
The good news for this couple comes from the numerous strategies which exist to shelter
even more than $2 million from estate tax. These strategies include (among other things) grantor
retained income trusts (GRATs and GRUTs), charitable lead trusts (CLATs and CLUTs),
charitable remainder trusts, qualified personal residence trusts, sales to freeze estate values and
more. Lifetime gifts can play an important role in this program.
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3. "But I already have a will!" A significant problem is presented by the client's
protestation that "I already have a will." No matter that it was prepared years ago, that the client
never understood what it said even when it was signed and that the value of his or her assets has
appreciated dramatically in the years since. "I already have a will" leads too many of our clients
to believe that no more needs to be done and that no more could be done anyway.
One of our great challenges as advisors and counselors is to convince clients that more
needs to be done and that more can be done. The old estate plan they created five (or more) years
ago may be totally inadequate in view of increased asset values, new planning strategies and
altered family situations.
If both the husband and wife were to die this year with their existing assets and their
existing estate plan, what would happen? How much tax would be due? Where would the cash
come from to pay the tax? How much will their children inherit and when will they receive it?
Who will run the family business? It is likely that most of our clients could not answer these
questions.
Our clients' natural tendencies to put off estate planning is compounded by the fact that
most of our significant clients have multiple advisors. There are accountants, lawyers, financial
planners, insurance professionals, bank loan officers and so forth all giving advice.
The success of your efforts at updating your clients' estate plan may depend on your
seeking input from these other advisors, perhaps before you present planning ideas to your
clients. If the advisors narrow down the planning strategies in advance, you can together present
a coordinated planes) to the clients.
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"But I already have a will." Do you know what it says? "No." Do you know what will
happen when you die with that will? "No." Don't you think we shouldjind out? "Well, so long
as it doesn't cost me anything to find out!"
4. You should do this work for your most si&nificant clients. It should be relatively
simple for you and your clients' other advisors to look at a client's current financial statement
and their current wills and trust agreement, so that you can tell them what, indeed, would happen
were they to die with their existing estate plan. My experience is that most clients are not at all
happy with these results, particularly if their estate plan was prepared some years ago.
You should be willing to invest a modest amount of (no charge) time to gauge the
adequacy of your best clients' current estate plans. If you truly are a counselor to these clients,
you owe it to them to make this effort.
If, as a result of this inquiry (coordinated with the other advisors), a significant client
determines that an update of his or her estate plan is needed, your reward (both in a fee and, more
importantly, as a counselor to these significant clients) for this initial (no charge) time will be
bountiful.
5. The tax on future appreciation. The full range of sophisticated estate planning
options (GRATs, CLATs and so forth) is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the
general objective of many of these techniques is simply stated: give assets away now before they
appreciate even further.
G-4
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
I
.I
J
r
r
r
r,
r
r
f
r
r
r
j
r
r
r
r
,..
1
r
,.
I
r
r,
Indeed, your clients will be in the 55% estate tax bracket for those assets which are in
excess of $3 million. Because your clients are not dying today, that essentially means that the
Internal Revenue Service stands ready (indeed, eager!) to take 55% of all the future appreciation
which occurs after today.
Your client who works 70 hour weeks at the family business is really a junior partner to
the IRS, which will take 55% of the growth from now on! How hard should your client work
under those circumstances?
A major tax planning strategy, therefore, is to make lifetime gifts which will not only
reduce the assets subject to tax, but which will shift some ofthis future appreciation to the next
generation. If the subsequent growth increases the value of assets already owned by the children
and grandchildren (or trusts for their benefit), that growth will not later be taxed when your
clients die.
B. WHAT ASSETS MIGHT BE GIVEN AWAY?
The primary goal of a lifetime gift program is not only to reduce the value ofyour client's
net worth for tax purposes, but also to shift future appreciation to the next generation. Therefore,
the strategy is to give away those assets which your client reasonably believes will appreciate
most rapidly over the balance ofhis or her lifetime.
If your client gives away assets which later depreciate in value, you have not helped the
cause of tax reduction. Those depreciating assets could have been held until death and given
away at their then lower value.
G-5
If your client gives away assets which later grow in value, that subsequent appreciation in
value will not later be subject to the 55% estate tax when your clients die. The children and
grandchildren will receive 100% of this subsequent growth, rather than only 45%.
It is certainly true that the subsequent growth will, in all likelihood, be subject to capital
gains tax if and when the appreciating assets are later sold. But would your client's children
rather pay 20% capital gains tax (payable later and only if the asset is sold) or 55% estate tax
(payable within nine months of the death of the second parent whether or not the asset is sold)?
That is usually an easy choice for most people.
There are several considerations when your clients consider which assets to give away:
1. Cash gifts. For most of our clients, cash gifts are the preferred alternative. Cash is
easy! Everyone wants to receive cash! So why not give cash? There are several reasons to
consider gifts of other assets:
• cash will appreciate in the hands of the donee only if it is invested. It certainly
would not have appreciated in the hands of the donor (if held as invested cash and
not given away). Therefore, a lifetime gift of cash fails to satisfy the strategy of
giving away those assets most likely to appreciate in the hands of the client;
• many clients do not have that much cash. Frequently, assets must be sold to raise
the cash to be given away, resulting in the payment of capital gains taxes by your
clients; and
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• cash gifts are "dollar for dollar gifts." Your client's net worth goes down by $1
and the donee's net worth goes up by $1. There is no leverage. Your client
should give away more than 100 cents on the dollar if that is possible
2. Gifts of marketable securities. Some clients will make lifetime gifts ofmarketable
securities because they want to shift the future growth in value of those securities to their
children. Recall that your client's cost basis will pass to the donees. Code Section 1015.
While lifetime gifts of marketable securities will satisfy the goal of shifting appreciation
to the children, there is no discount in the valuation of the stocks which are given away. That is,
the value is easily determined from the stock market.
Once again, these are "dollar for dollar gifts." Your client's net worth goes down by the
value of the securities and the donee's net worth increases by the same amount. While your
client does shift future appreciation to the children or grandchildren, there is no leverage in how
much is given away.
3. Gifts of non-marketable securities. Many of our clients are the owners of
successful family businesses. These businesses may be organized in any number of ways: C or S
corporations; general, limited, family, or limited liability limited partnerships; limited liability
companies; sole proprietorships; or otherwise.
The value of the enterprise may have increased dramatically over time and your client
may reasonably believe that these trends will continue in the future. Indeed, there may be an
organized family business succession plan (with potential new owners identified and trained),
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along with a plan to transfer control and ownership to these new owners over time or when your
clients die. If there is not such an organized business succession plan, there should be!
If your client were to make lifetime gifts of small equity positions in the family business,
the value of the gifts should be entitled to lack ofmarketability and minority interest discounts.
There is a two step valuation: (i) the business as a whole is appraised as a going concern with no
discount; and (ii) discounts are then applied to determine the tax value of the small interests
which are given away.
These discounts can increase the amount your client can give away. If the appraisers
determine that a 33% discount can be taken, for example, your client can make a gift of an equity
position in his or her company which appears to have a value of$15,000, but which really has a
gift tax value of only $10,000 because of the discount. A 33% discount enables you to increase
the amount which can be given away by 50%.
For those of our clients who wish to retain control of the family business even after
making lifetime gifts (perhaps all of them!), the gift might be of preferred stock (in a C
corporation), non-voting stock (in an S corporation), limited partnership interests (in a family
partnership) or non-managing interests (in an LLC). Your client can give away value, but can
keep control.
Lifetime gifts of equity interests in a family business produce at least four benefits:
• the future growth in value of the asset which is given away will escape estate tax
when your client later dies;
• your clients' children will have an equity "stake" in the success of the enterprise;
G - 8
G-9
4. Gifts of fractional interests in real estate or tangible assets. Similar valuation
discounts are available in the case of lifetime gifts of real estate (farm ground, horse farms,
commercial real estate and so forth) and of tangible personal property (works of art, horses,
valuable motor vehicles, significant antiques and the like).
Suppose your client owns commercial real estate with a present value of $1 million. It is
appreciating in value over time. If no lifetime gift is made by this client, the full date of death
value of the real estate will be subject to estate tax. There will be no valuation discounts. All the
appreciation which hereafter occurs will also be taxed.
If that client had, instead, made a lifetime gift of an undivided 1.3% interest in this real
estate to each of his four children, tax savings are possible. Each gift appears to have a value of
$13,333. Ifa 25% discount were taken to reflect a lack ofmarketability (what can you do with
an undivided 1.3% interest in a building?), the tax value of the gift is only $10,000.
Your client can give away fractional interests to his four children having an undiscounted
value ofmore than $53,300, while he is treated as having given away only $40,000 for gift tax
purposes. Ifhis wife also made similar gifts, another $53,300 can be given away.
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your client can give away more than 100 cents on the dollar because of the
discounts; and
the business can be structured so your client can give away value, while
maintaining full control of the enterprise.
The result of these gifts is an ownership of the commercial real estate which is divided
among the four children (2.6% each), the mother (44.8%) and the father (44.8%). No one has
control.
There are these benefits of the lifetime gifts:
• the value of the lifetime gifts might be reduced by 25% to reflect a lack of
marketability, thereby increasing the amount which can be given away;
• the later growth in value of what is given away will not later be taxed when your
clients die; and
• the estate tax value of the interests retained by your clients can also be discounted
to reflect the fact that their retained interests are also not marketable.
These same strategies can be employed by your clients who own significant collections of
art, antiques, horses and motor vehicles. You not only discount the value of what is given away,
but you can also discount the value of what is retained.
C. HOW MUCH SHOULD BE GIVEN AWAY?
It is difficult to encourage some clients to make lifetime gifts. If you have successfully
shown your significant clients the benefits of a lifetime gift program, however, there are three
levels of lifetime gifts and benefits of each:
1. $10,000 annual gifts. Gifts of a present interest which do not exceed $10,000 per
donee per year will escape estate tax under Code Section 2503(b) and will use up no part ofyour
client's applicable credit amount otherwise available under Code Section 2505. Gifts of a future
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interest (an irrevocable trust, for example, which will benefit children or grandchildren only years
into the future) can be converted into gifts of a present interest with use of a Crummey Power.
For those ofyour clients who regularly make annual gifts of$10,000 to their children and
grandchildren, you should remind them that this is a "use it or lose it" tax provision. If this client
were to die during a year in which no annual gift had yet been made (she was waiting to pass out
the checks at Christmas, for example), the ability to shelter those dollars from tax is lost.
It is better to make these annual exclusion gifts as early as possible each year. If your
client were to die later during the year, the gift already will have been made. Some clients pass
out checks at Christmas or at Hannukkah which are dated January 1 of the following year. The
children and grandchild carefully hold those checks and then cash them on the first business day
of the year.
2. Give away the applicable credit amount now. Remember that one goal of a
lifetime gift program is to shift future appreciation to the children and grandchildren. The more
that your client gives away now, the more appreciation that is passed to subsequent generations.
If your client only makes $10,000 annual gifts, it is difficult to make a meaningful
reduction in the value ofyour client's net worth (even with valuation discounts). The later
appreciation in value of these small gifts will also provide little comfort to your client, who sees
the value ofhis or her retained assets continue to grow. Even after making these annual gifts, the
client's net worth continues to increase.
Therefore, there is benefit from making larger gifts. Why should this client retain the
applicable credit amount until death? While the usefulness of this tax free amount is growing as
G-ll
it increases from $650,000 to $1 million, the even faster appreciation in the value of your client's
net worth diminishes the usefulness of the credit.
Those clients who today own significant assets might consider giving away more than
$10,000 per donee per year. Gifts in excess ofthis level, ofcourse, will "use up" some (or all) of
the client's applicable credit amount. However, no gift tax will be paid so long as the gift
remains below that level.
That means each client can this year give away as much as $650,000 plus $10,000 per
donee. Remember that the $10,000 annual exclusion is measured on a per donee basis, while the
$650,000 applicable credit amount is a one time benefit allowed the donor (who can divide it up
among as many donees as the client wishes). As the applicable credit amount increases over the
next several years, this client can continue to make gifts in excess of the $10,000 level.
A married couple today can give away up to $1.3 million without having to pay any gift
tax. Indeed, this same couple will be able to give away $2 million by 2006, when the applicable
credit amount is fully phased in.
a. Valuation discounts can be used to increase dramatically the amount which can be
given away within these limits. Suppose your clients own a family business with a present value
of $1 0 million. They have four children.
If the valuation report supports a 33% discount for lifetime gifts ofa minority interest in
the family business which is non-marketable, your clients together could give away $2.1 million
in value without having to pay any gift tax. That is, a gift of 19.5% of the business to their
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children has a proportionate value of$1,950,000; however, a 33% discount reduces the gift tax
value to only $1,298,700.
In addition, your clients can each give to each of their four children another $10,000 (after
discount). Once again, the 33% discount enables your clients to give away stock which has a
proportionate value of $15,000, but which has an after discount gift tax value of only $10,000.
Four gifts of$15,000 to each of their four children from each ofyour clients removes another
$120,000 in value from their net worth, even though these gifts of non-marketable minority
interests have a gift tax value of only $80,000.
Your client could have a buy-sell agreement to keep the business in the family even if one
of the children were later to go through a divorce or bankruptcy.
These combined gifts (annual exclusion gifts and gifts of both applicable credit amounts)
will remove over 20% ofthe value of the business from the clients' taxable estates. As the
business continues to appreciate over the balance of your clients' lifetimes, more than 20% of
that subsequent growth will escape taxation when your clients later die.
b. "Delayed" gifts to the children can increase even further the amount which can be
given away without having to pay any gift tax. If assets are placed into a grantor retained annuity
trust (a GRAT) or a charitable lead annuity trust (a CLAT), a present value analysis can reduce
significantly the value of the gift.
The amount of the gift is only the present value of the children's right to receive these
assets years into the future and only after an annuity has been. paid in the meantime to either the
G-13
clients themselves (in a GRAT) or to charity (in a CLAT). This present value depends on how
long the children must wait to receive the gift and how high the annuity rate is in the meantime.
Gifts to a GRAT or a CLAT can receive two discounts: (i) the first discount reflects the
fact that your clients are funding the trust with only a minority position in the family business
which has no market for resale; and (ii) the second discount reflects the reality that the child
receives nothing today, but must wait years to receive the gift.
Suppose your clients (age 55) put non-voting stock of their S corporation into a grantor
retained annuity trust which will pay them a 7% annuity for 10 years, after which the remaining
trust assets will be distributed to their children? The present value of the children's right to
receive these assets ten years from now is worth only 53% of the value of what is put into the
trust today (assuming the 7520 rate is 7%).
Your clients could put $3,700,000 worth of non-voting stock into this trust. The gift tax
value ofthat stock, after a 33% lack ofmarketability and minority interest discounts, is only
$2,464,200. Because the children have to wait ten years to get it (with a 7% annuity being paid
to your clients in the meantime), the amount ofthe gift is only 53% ofthat value or $1,306,000.
A minority interest and lack ofmarketability discount ofmore than 33%, a longer term for the
GRAT or a higher annuity rate will reduce the value of the gift even more.
Your clients will receive a number of benefits from this lifetime gift:
• 37% ofthe company is now owned by a trust for the next generation, which
means that 37% of the future growth in value of the company will escape estate
taxation when your clients later die (assuming they outlive the term ofthe
GRAT);
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the gift tax value of what they have given away is only the amount of their
combined applicable credit amounts even though they are reducing their net worth
by almost three times that amount. Now that's leverage!
your clients' retention of the voting shares means they will maintain control of the
company even after the gift;
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• a 7% annual annuity on the discounted value of the non-voting stock held in the
GRAT is only a 4.7% annuity on the undiscounted value of the stock. That is, the
7% annuity (based on the gift tax value of the shares put in the trust [or
$2,464,200 in this example]) is only 4.7% of the real value of what is put in the
trust ($3.7 million in this example);
• the compensation paid to your clients from the business might be reduced during
the ten year term of the GRAT, so that the company can distribute its earnings in
the form of dividends. Your clients will receive 63% ofthose dividends because
they have retained that much of the stock; the GRAT will receive 37% of the
dividends, out of which your clients will then receive the fixed annuity;
• at the expiration of the ten year term of the GRAT, the trust will terminate and the
shares held in the trust will be distributed tax free to the children (including ten
years of appreciation). However, the children will receive only non-voting shares.
Your clients will retain the voting shares and can exercise those votes to
determine whether to continue the dividend program; and
• Your clients may, in addition, make annual gifts of up to $10,000 (after discount)
per donee per year.
While a full discussion of the tax savings potential of "delayed" gifts through the use of
GRATs and CLATs is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important that we as advisors
understand how our clients can increase dramatically the amount which they can give away
without exceeding the amount of the applicable credit amount.
There are several goals of a lifetime gift program that consumes the applicable credit amount:
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1. shift appreciation to the next generation, so the more your clients give away, the more
appreciation is moved;
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2. give away more than 100 cents on the dollar, by taking minority interest and lack of
marketability discounts and discounts for the present value of gifts which will be
completed only years into the future;
3. give an incentive to the children (through ownership of an equity position) to help the
family business succeed;
4. leave your clients in control of their family business; and
5. pay no dollars to the Internal Revenue Service today.
All these goals can be achieved.
3. Even larger gifts. Some (although not many) clients may be willing to make lifetime
gifts of even larger amounts, thereby causing the payment of gift tax. Why would anyone do
such a thing?
There may be at least two reasons to do so:
Shift even more appreciation. The more that is given away, the more appreciation that
can be shifted to the next generation. While the example given earlier showed how
clients could put up to 37% ofthe value of their $10 million business into a ten year
GRAT, they still were left with 63% of all the subsequent appreciation being taxed when
they later died. If they had given away more than $3.7 million dollars, even more future
appreciation could have been shifted to the children, although gift tax will have to be
paid; and
G -16
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Do not pay tax on the tax itself. If gift tax is paid by your client, the amount of the gift
tax paid will be included in your client's gross estate under Code Section 2035(b) when
he or she later dies only if the client dies within three years of paying the gift tax. If the
client lives more than three years after paying the gift tax, then the gift tax itself is not
subject to estate tax. The "exclusive" nature of the gift tax system is in contrast to the
"inclusive" nature of the estate tax system, in which an estate pays estate tax on the
dollars which are actually used to pay the estate tax itself.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to convince clients that they are better off by "pre-paying" any tax!
D. HOW CAN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE BE BOUND BY YOUR
CLIENT'S VALUATION?
Gifts in excess of the $10,000 annual exclusion provided for gifts of a present interest by
Code Section 2503(b) are required to be reported on a gift tax return (Form 709). Gifts of a
present interest which have a value of less than $10,000 per donee do not need to be reported on
Form 709.
1. The old rules. If a gift tax return was filed and if gift tax was paid, the statute of
limitations for an examination of the return would have expired three years from the due date of
the gift tax return or three years from the date on which the gift tax was paid, whichever was
later. Code Section 2504(c). If the statute had run, the value of the gift was the amount reported
on Form 709, so long as gin tax was paid
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Rev. Rul. 70-398, 1979-2 CB 339 mandated the use of the applicable credit amount to
lifetime gifts which were in excess of the $10,000 per donee exclusion. The donor could not
"hold back" the applicable credit amount for later use and elect to pay gift tax now, so as to start
the statute of limitations running under Code Section 2504(c). In addition, the donor's use ofhis
or her applicable credit amount was not a "payment" for purposes of Code Section 2504(c). Rev.
Rul. 84-11, 1984-1 CB 201.
If no gift tax was paid (because the gifts were under $10,000 per donee or because the
gifts were collectively less than the donor's applicable credit amount), the value of the gift could
later be redetermined when the donor died. Rev. RuI84-11, 1984-1 CB 201.
2. How estates were harmed by the IRS position. The Internal Revenue Service took
the position that Code Section 2504(c) prevented it from revaluing gifts (so long as gift tax was
paid) for gift tax purposes only. It did not prevent the IRS from revaluing those lifetime gifts for
purposes of calculating the "adjusted taxable gifts" for purposes of the estate tax calculation,
when no gift tax was paid when the gift tax return was filed.
The effect of this recalculation of the decedent's lifetime adjusted taxable gifts was to
move into higher estate tax brackets those assets which were held until your client's death,
thereby increasing the amount ofestate tax payable. For estates which were already in the 55%
estate tax bracket, this adjustment was not of great significance; however, the "mid-size" estate
frequently found itself with a significantly increased estate tax burden as a result of this
adjustment in the value of the decedent's lifetime gifts.
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This position was initially upheld in the Estate of Smith, 94 TC 872 (1990), acq. 1990-2
CB 1; and was subsequently reaffirmed in the Estates ofPrince, TCM 1991-208; Levin, 986 F.2d
91 (4th Cir. 1993); Evanson, 30 F.3rd 960 (8th Cir. 1994); and Stalcup, 792 F. Supp. 714 (DC
Okla. 1991).
An example of the results of the Service's ability to revalue gifts when the donor later
died was given by Edward Kessel and Kathleen A. Stepenson in the January, 1998 issue ofEstate
Planning:
Example lA
Adjusted Taxable Gifts (1990 return)
Tentative Taxable Estate 1997
Taxabler
r
r
r
Estate Tax
Less: Section 2010 Credit
Section 2011 Credit
TaxonATG
Net estate tax
Example IB
$192,800
18,000
--±
$345,000
210,800
$300,000
700,000
$1,000,000
$135,000
$192,800
18,000
--±
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Adjusted Taxable Gifts (1990 return)
Audit Adjustment to ATG
Tentative Taxable Estate 1997
Taxable
Estate Tax
Less: Section 2010 Credit
Section 2011 Credit
TaxonATG
Net estate tax
Estate Tax Before Audit Adjustment
Tax Caused by Adjustment
$448,300
210,800
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$300,000
250,000
700,000
$1,250,000
$237,500
135,000
$102,500
Our clients who made lifetime gifts of hard to value assets (real estate, closely held
business interests and the like) were left in the uncomfortable position ofknowing the IRS could
later revalue those gifts at death, no matter how many years later that might be.
The only way to enforce the three year statute of limitations was to make such a large gift
that the applicable credit amount was used up and gift tax was actually paid on gifts in excess of
that amount. Because few clients were ever willing to pay gift tax, the Internal Revenue Service
essentially had no statute of limitations on the revaluation of gifts for estate tax purposes.
3. How the law was chaol:ed. This problem was solved by the Tax Reform Act of
1997, as later revised by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.
Code Section 2504(c) was amended to drop the requirement that gift tax had to be paid
before the valuation on the gift tax return would become final and binding on even the IRS.
Section 2001(f) was added to the estate tax provisions to add the same prohibitions on the
revaluation of adjusted taxable gifts in the calculation of the estate tax when the donor later died.
The Service is subject to the three year statute of limitations whether or not gift tax is paid.
Smith and its progeny have been legislatively overruled.
This reliefcomes at a cost. however. Code Section 6501 (c)(9) was enacted to provide
that the gift tax statute of limitations does not begin to run on a gift unless it is disclosed on a gift
tax return "in a manner adequate to apprise the [IRS] of the nature" of the gift.
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Code Section 6501(c) extends the "unlimited" statute of limitations to all unreported and
inadequately disclosed lifetime gifts. The Service can now seek the payment of additional gift
tax, along with interest and penalties, in those situations. See also Prop. Regs. 301.6501(c)-
1(f)(l).
These new rules apply to all gifts made after August 5, 1997: Prop. Regs. 20,2001-1(b);
25.2504-2(b); and 301.6501(c)-I(f). Gifts made before that date are still subject to the old rules,
so the Service may still revalue those post 1976 adjusted taxable gifts (unless gift tax was paid)
when those clients later die. Prop. Regs. 20.2001-1(a) and 25.2504-2(a).
4. "Adeguate" disclosure to the IRS. The Service issued proposed regulations on
December 22, 1998, which appear in the Federal Register, Volume 63, Number 245. These
proposed regulations detail the rules which must be followed before the gift has been "adequately
disclosed," so as to start the statute of limitations running.
Prop. Reg. Section 301.6501(c)-(f)(2) provides that the gift tax return must have a
"complete and accurate description of the transaction." It lists the following items which must be
disclosed:
1. A description of the property given and any consideration received by the donor;
2. The identity of the donor and the donee and the relationship between them;
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3.
4.
5.
6.
A "detailed description" of the valuation method used to determine the value shown on
the gift tax return, including a description of any discounts taken.
If the gift is of an interest in a non-marketable security, the description must set
forth a complete:
"description of any discount claimed in valuing the entity, including a statement
regarding the fair market value of 100 percent of the entity (determined without
regard to any discounts in valuing the entity or any assets owned by the entity), the
pro rata portion of the entity subject to the transfer, and the fair market value of
the transferred interest as reported on the return."
The existing rules which apply to the disclosure of Chapter 14 gifts are made
applicable to all gifts, so the donor must also supply the business' balance sheets and
statements of net earnings, operating results and dividends paid for each of the five years
immediately before the gift. Regs. 301.6501 (c)-1 (e)(2)(iii).
The tax identification number of the trust (ifthe transfer is to a trust), along with "a brief
description of the terms of the trust;"
Any restrictions on the transferred asset which were considered when the property was
valued for gift tax purposes; and
A statement of all facts regarding the transaction
"that reasonably may be expected to apprise the Internal Revenue Service of the
nature of any potential controversy concerning the gift tax treatment of the
transfer, or in lieu of this statement, a concise description of the legal issues
presented by the facts. In addition, a statement describing any position taken that
is contrary to any temporary or final Treasury regulations or revenue rulings."
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Although not mentioned in the Proposed Regulations, your client should also check the
box on the top of Schedule A ofForm 709 if the value of any item on the gift tax return
"reflect[s] any valuation discount." Ifyour client fails to check this box, he or she runs the risk
that there has not been "adequate disclosure" even if the other items are provided.
5. Will the information be available? What should your client do ifhe or she cannot
get the required information, particularly as it relates to financial information from a family
business? While the Regulations requiring detailed financial information for purposes of
Chapter 14 gifts merely state that the taxpayer "should" provide this information, recall that the
purpose is to start the statute of limitations running on the valuation of the gift.
Ifyour client cannot obtain the financial information, I suggest that the gift tax disclosure
give a full explanation of the steps which were taken to obtain it. If the taxpayer is in control of
the family business, a statement that the information is not available will probably not be
convincing. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer is not in control of the business and if the gift is
ofan insignificant interest in the business, the company's refusal to provide otherwise
confidential financial information may be more persuasive. But has there been "adequate
disclosure" for purposes of Code Section 6504?
6. How does "adequate disclosure" help our clients? If your client's Form 709
follows these rules and there is, in fact, adequate disclosure to the IRS, the gift tax statute of
limitations will expire three years after the filing of the return IF, within that three year period:
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1. the IRS does not contest the value;
2. the IRS specifies the value and the taxpayer does not timely contest that value;
3. a court determines the value; or
4. there is a settlement agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS.
If at least one of those things has occurred, the Service cannot later challenge the value, either for
gift or for estate tax purposes. Prop. Regs. 20.2001-1(c).
These new rules prevent the IRS from raising issues about valuation. The Proposed
Regulations state that the Service may still make adjustments to prior gifts if the adjustment has
nothing to do with valuation.
Examples might include
1. the qualification of gifts for the $10,000 annual exclusion because of the use (or
misuse) of a Crummey power;
2. the question of whether excessive compensation paid a child is really a gift;
3. the question of whether a business transfer was made in the ordinary course of
business (for full and adequate consideration) or was made with a donative intent
(for less than full and adequate consideration);
4. the component of a sale which is later determined to be a gift;
5. the entrepreneur who provides services after retirement (for less than full and
adequate consideration) to a business now owned by the children; or
6. the children's use of real or personal property with inadequate rent being paid.
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E. LIFETIME GIFT PLANNING UNDER THE NEW RULES.
It seems clear that a gift tax return must be filed for every gift made by our clients if we
expect the statute of limitations to run in three years. Failure to file a gift tax return with
"adequate disclosure" will permit the Service to revalue the gift for estate tax purposes when
your client later dies, no matter how many years after the gift that may be.
Clients should file a Form 709 even for gifts ornon-marketable assets which thev
reasonably believe have a value ofless than $10.000 per donee.
Suppose a client makes a gift of non-voting stock in the family business and obtains an
appraisal report both to value the business and to justify minority interest and lack of
marketability discounts. This client may give each child an interest in his or her business which
has a value of$15,000 before discount and only $10,000 after discount.
That client may reasonably wonder about the need to file a gift tax return for this
transaction. Nevertheless, the statute oflimitations will not begin to run unless a Form 709 is
filed and there is adequate disclosure to the IRS. If the Service does not question the valuation
reported on the return within three years, it cannot later do so; if no return is filed, on the other
hand, the Service is free to question the value at any time.
There may be some benefit in having a client make small gifts now, which are adequately
disclosed on a gift tax return. If the Service does not question the value of these gifts (either
because of the small size of the gift or because of inadequate IRS staffing or both), its ability to
do so will expire in three years. If your client then makes larger lifetime gifts, you may argue
that the Service's "approval" of the earlier gifts prevents it from questioning the same valuation
methodology when it is used with the later, larger gifts.
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1. How will the IRS find unreported eifts? Obviously, lawyers and accountants must
advise their clients to obey the law and to report gifts to the IRS as required by the law. A client
cannot justify not filing a return on the theory that "they'll never know about it."
In addition, it is reasonable to expect the Service to become even more diligent in the
examination of estate tax returns when our clients later die. If a business owner dies with less
than all of the business reported on Form 706, do not be surprised if the Service wonders where
the rest of it went!
We can and must advise our clients to file gift tax returns for all gifts (even those below
$10,000) if there is a gift of non-marketable securities or other hard to value assets. Even though
these regulations are merely proposed, it is a foolish taxpayer who will refuse to follow them.
2. Why would a client not made full disclosure? In circumstances where valuation
discounts have been taken, it is critically important to justify them. Are these discounts bogus?
Ifnot, then why hide it? Indeed, if your father were to give you non-voting stock in his family
business, would you really think it was worth 100 cents on the dollar? Of course not. These
discounts are legitimate, but you client should be prepared to defend them.
Even in situations where your client is taking an aggressive position (with respect to
valuation issues or otherwise), it is frequently better to disclose all the facts now and have battle
with the Service at a time when your client can participate. If your client fails to disclose the
transaction (or to make "adequate disclosure" under the proposed regulations), the lawyer and
accountant may easily end up having to do battle with the IRS only after the death ofyour client.
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3. Iryou know there will be a fi.:ht with the Service. why put it off until after your
client's death? You will not have the active assistance ofyour client on factual issues under
those circumstances and you may also need to explain to the client's family why this battle is
even going on. "My father would never have gone through with this transaction if he had known
he would have to fight the IRS!" Even if you have written evidence in your files that your client
assumed these risks, why have the fight later when the client is dead?
F. CONCLUSIONS
Many of our clients today own more assets than can be sheltered by "traditional" estate
plans. A credit trust plan can shelter $2 million at best for a married couple. As the value of our
clients' assets continues to appreciate, the tax bite will grow only worse. Indeed, the 55% tax on
all future appreciation is a significant obstacle to overcome.
We should advise our clients of the benefits of a lifetime gift program. Give away assets
now which the client reasonably believes will appreciate in the future. The more that your clients
give away, the more appreciation that can be shifted to future generations.
Encourage your clients to permit you to see where they are today. If your most significant
client were to die this year with his or her present estate plan and today' s assets, how much tax
would be due? Where will the children get cash to pay that much tax? Will 6166 really work
under some realistic cash flow scenarios? Who will inherit the remaining assets and at what
ages? Who will end up running the family business?
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If your client is not happy with those answers, you have some work to do. A lifetime gift
program may play an important part in the general update of that client's personal estate plan and
family business succession plan.
Eric A. Manterfield
July 11,1999
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Professional Ethics and Tax Tactics
John T. Bondurant and James W. Turner, Jr.
These dealings may be broken down into three main categories:
All professionals are governed by ethical rules in representing their clients. Each practice
area has distinctive features that give rise to unique ethical considerations. One such feature in
the estate planning and administration area is dealings with governmental tax authorities,
especially the Internal Revenue Service.
Tax return preparation and related advice.1.
r
r
r
r
r
r
This discussion will touch on each of these areas, with particular emphasis on
representation of taxpayer clients in connection with federal estate and gift tax return audits,
since the elimination/reduction of inheritance taxes in Kentucky and elsewhere has considerably
reduced controversies between estates and state tax representatives.
r
r
r
2.
3.
Representation in connection with tax return audits.
Tax planning and implementation.
r
r
r
r
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Attached to this outline are three resource items:
1. "Guidelines to Tax Practice Second" by Frederic G. Corneel, which appeared in
43 Tax Lawyer 297 (1990) (Annex A).
2. "Standards of Tax Practice Statement 1999-1" dealing with IRS computational
errors, which was prepared by the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of
Taxation of the American Bar Association and will at some time be published in the Section's
Newsletter (Annex B).
3. Six scenarios that represent the types of ethical questions that are encountered in
estate planning and administration (Annex C).
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
Frederic G. Corneel*
The Tax Lawyer Vol. 43, No.2 (Winter 1990)
In 1978, the ABA Tax Section Committee on Standards of Tax Practice
published suggested Guidelines for Tax Practice for consideration by fIrms en-
gaged in civil tax practice. J According to advices received at the time, scores
of fIrms did indeed adopt the 1978 Guidelines, often with changes that evidenced
thoughtful reflection.
That was more than a decade ago. Since then we have had a flood of tax
shelters, and although that has now receded, it has left behind the large number
of new penalties and compliance provisions which affect all tax practice, whether
or not related to tax shelters. Malpractice claims arising out of tax work, which
were virtually unheard of before the Seventies, have become an everyday oc-
currence. The growing complexity of the tax law with its pressure for ever more
specialization, the increase in the fees charged for tax advice, and the growth
in the size of the fIrms, all contribute to the "depersonalization" of the practice
and thereby increase the need for a conscious effort to maintain ethical profes-
sional standards.
Therefore, a year or two ago, the author came to believe that it was time for
a Guidelines for Tax Practice Second. They evolved over a period of time at
various tax institutes. 2 Most recently, they were examined by the Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice, and the following reflects the comments of a good
number of its members. 3
These guidelines are in no sense offIcial; indeed, it would be a mistake to try
to develop offIcial guidelines. Guidelines should suit the condition and circum-
stances of the firm that adopts them. They should be straightforward, without
the sanctimony and hypocrisy which is all too common in efforts of this kind.
They should reflect what others may reasonably expect of us; and, just as im-
portant, what we need to do to feel good about ourselves. A large national firm
with offIces in many cities should have different guidelines than a small criminal
tax law boutique.
Indeed, the precise resolution of a particular question is often less important
·Frederic G. Comeel (A.A., Little Rock Junior College, 1941; L.L.B.• Columbia Law School,
1948) is a partner with Sullivan & Worcester, Boston, Massachusetts.
IGuidelinesjor Tax Practiu, 31 TAX LAWYER SSI (1978).
2Southern Tax Lawyer Institute, Fall 1987; Bentley Tax Institute, January 1988; Annual Virginia
Conference on Federal Taxation, June 1988.
)The Committee under the chairmanship of Thomas G. Bost. Los Angeles, Cal., reviewed drafts
of these Guidelines Second and members Michael C. Durst, Chicago, Ill.; Paul J. Sax, San Francisco,
Cal.; Mark G. Ancel, Los Angeles, Cal.; David E. Watts, New York, N.Y.; Gersham Goldstein,
Portland, Or.; Terrence G. Perris, Cleveland, Ohio; Bernard Wolfman, Cambridge, Mass.; and
many others, both members and nonmembers of the Committee, contributed helpful suggestions.
The Committee took no official action, however, with respect to this version of the Guidelines and
the responsibility is entirely the author's.
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SECfION OF TAXATION
than that the question was noted and considered. To illustrate, the earlier Guide-
lines suggested that if the Service makes a mathematical mistake in favor of our
client, for example, by under'itating a bill based upon an agreed settlement, that
we should ask the client's permission to inform the Service. Subsequently,
Professor Wolfman called our attention to an informal opinion of the ABA
Committee on Ethics that indicated an ethical obligation to call "scrivener's
errors" to the attention of the other side without consulting the client, since
consultation with the client, and the client's order not to disclose, might cause
the lawyer to become involved in improper conduct.4
Therefore, an earlier draft of Guidelines Second stated that the norm should
be correction without consultation. I was moved to accept that position not so
much by the ABA Opinion as by reflection on a frequently repeated personal
experience: When, by mistake, '1 give the cashier two bills that are stuck together.
they return my extra bill without asking the store owner. She is right to assume
that she was hired to act as a decent register clerk; we, as lawyers. have a right
to assume that we have been hired to act as decent lawyers. Another Boston
firm. after carefully considering the matter. disagreed. I have found the new
practice quick and easy and intend to adhere to it. But what matters is that both
firms gave the question thought.5
Some are concerned that the adoption of guidelines may make the defense of
a malpractice claim against the firm more difficult. I do not know of any evidence
to support this fear;6 in any event, adoption and adherence to appropriate guide-
lines should substantially reduce the risk of actions or failures to act that are
likely to give rise to such claims.
I suggest that tax firms or tax departments circulate these guidelines to their
members with a view to discussing the changes that might best serve their
particular needs. As revised, the guidelines should then be adopted and given
to every new lawyer who joins the firm. In addition. every year or two a lawyer
in the firm might be asked to update the authorities cited and recommend changes
in light of new developments and experience.
As law firms grow in size and turnover in tax department personnel quickens.
the guidelines can play an increasingly important role in maintaining professional
standards. As before, the author would appreciate hearing of firms' adoption.
revision and practical experience with the guidelines.
Frederic G. Corneel
4ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility; Infonnal Op. 1518 (1986).
5Guidelines Second now waffles on this point. See infra note 44.
61t is true that in spite of the expressed intent of their authors, rules of professional responsibility
adopted by bar associations and courts have been taken by many courts as also setting forth standards
on which clients can rely in dealing with lawyers. But unlike the official disciplinary rules, the
guidelines, when adopted by a particular lawyer or f1rnl, are not intended to set forth norms of
general application on which malpractice liability might be based. Indeed, as pointed out earlier in
this introduction, the guidelines are expected to vary from finn to finn.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 43, No.2
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACfICE SECOND
GUIDELINES TO THE TAX PRACTICE OF _
(name of finn)
I. INTRODUCTION
All lawyers are subject to the rules of professional ethics, requiring them to
work competently and carefully for their clients, free from any prohibited conflict
of interest and preserving their clients' confidences. These rules apply equally
to the tax lawyer. Nevertheless, each field of practice has its own special problems
which necessitate approaches specifically suited to that field.
As a result of the "self-assessment" tax system, clients must apply tax law
to their own conduct. Uncertainties created by the complexities of the law, doubts
as to .its fairness, widespread publicity about the exploitation of loopholes, and
low audit coverage which, unlike any other lottery. skew the odds of the tax
lottery in favor of the client, all tend to make the average person think of a tax
lawyer not so much as an expert in the law, but as an expert in what the client
might get away with on the client's return.
This attitude on the part of many clients increases the need for us to adhere
to the highest ethical standards in our tax practice and to make it clear to our
clients that this finn insists on such adherence. Obviously, we try to do all we
can to help our clients achieve their business and personal goals at the lowest
tax cost, by perfonning our work with an understanding for their needs, com-
petently, efficiently, and with dedication, imagination, and intelligence. But we
work for tax reduction only to the extent we can do so ethically. In the long run
that standard is likely to work best for most of our clients; in any event, it is
essential to this finn's practice and that of each lawyer who participates in our
practice.
Questions of professional responsibility should not be resolved merely on the
basis of individual conscience, but on the basis of rules applicable to the entire
office. With this in mind, we are publishing and circulating to every attorney
in the finn guidelines to our tax practice, with the exception of criminal tax
practice and tax litigation in the courts, as these involve. other considerations.
Familiarity with these gui4elines and adherence to them should assist us in
continuing the kind of practice we can enjoy and of which we can be proud.
The finn expects each attorney involved in tax matters to adhere to these guide-
lines, accepting them not as technical rules of law to be avoided by the clever
exercise of lawyerly skills, but rather as a guide to a satisfying professional life
and to the building of a professional environment in which we can be comfortable
in the knowledge that others in the finn bring to bear the same standards.
While the guidelines seek to reflect applicable legal authorities, they are not
intended as a text of the rules governing the legal obligation of our clients to
the Internal Revenue Service or of the legal obligations of lawyers either to the
Service or to clients.
II. OUR RELATIONSHIP TO OUR CLIENTS
The word "client" comes from the same root as the word "incline," that is,
"lean." The client leans on us for support to clarify the impact of taxes on the
Ttv: lAwyer. Vol. 43. No.2
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client's affairs; to reduce the tax burden within the limits of the law; to strike
the right balance between the quality of our work and the cost to the client; and
to be a stalwart defender of the client's interests in struggles with the Service.
We should do our best to justify the client's confidence, but the client does
not control the ethical and legal standards by which we practice our profession.
We are responsible for ou~ actions and unethical or illegal conduct can never be
justified on the basis of client pressure.
Similar considerations bear on the quality of our work. There is a clear re-
lationship between the quality of our work and the time devoted to it. Just as
clearly, there is a relationship between the time devoted to work and its cost.
The client is the one who has the final word on fees and may seek to limit the
scope of our work either for reasons of economy or because of time pressures.
We, however, are the ones who must be satisfied with the quality of our work.
Where the client does not authorize the expenditure of time necessary for a fully
researched and carefully considered conclusion, we should make a conscious
choice among the alternatives:
We may decline to do the work; or
We may undertake it, knowing that we will not be adequately compensated;
or
We may limit the scope of our work in accordance with the limitations placed
upon us.
The last alternative is generally the least desirable. Inadequate work on small
jobs is likely to breed a general carelessness. Further, the last alternative is not
always available. Except for emergencies, we should refuse to represent a client
in matters before a court or in dealings wi~h the Service or other third parties
unless we are satisfied that we can provide quality representation. Where the
last alternative is available, as in advice to a client, we should make sure that
the client understands the risks resulting from our limited work. For our own
protection as well as that of the client, such warning should usually be in writing.7
Nor is the client necessarily our friend forever. Tax planning and tax reporting
are complex and, although we try to do our best, mistakes and disappointments
are bound to occur and malpractice claims have become common. Our best
defense against such claims is doing a first class job, providing clear warnings
of potential costs and risks, keeping the client fully and currently informed of
the development of the case, and maintaining a complete record.8
'MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.2(c) (1984), permits limiting the scope of the
lawyer's work after consultation with the client. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNOucr
Rule 1.1 comment (1984), under the subtitle Thoroughness and Preparation, noting that the nature
of the individual case partly determines the scope of the lawyer's work.
IFor articles discussing legal malpractice and providing suggestions on how to avoid such a charge.
see Burrell, Legal Malpractice of the TtU Attorney. 34 TAX EXEC. 259 (1982); Mossner. ugal
Malpractice-How to Avoid It. MICH. BJ. 244 (1984); Phillips. Attorneys' Personal Liabilities in
TtU Counselling. 54 WIS. B. BULL. 30 (1981); Portuondo, Abusive TtU Shelters, ugal Malpractice,
and Revised Formal Ethics Opinion 346: Does Revised 346 Enable Third Party Investors to Recover
From TtU Attorneys Who Violate Its Standards? 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 220 (1986); Comment.
Legal Liability of the Professional Tax Practitioner. 26 EMORY L.I. 403 (1977); O'Malley. How to
TtU lAwyer, Vol. 43, No.2
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
To accommodate both the need to warn the client of potential risks and at the
same time preserve the confidentiality of our communications, we may confine
the record of warnings to our own files or mark communications that go to the
client "privileged and confidential." In particular, we should be careful not to
disseminate such writings to non-privileged recipients, such as accountants or
investment bankers.
Ill. OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT
Our relationship with the Service, state, or local tax department should be
professional and courteous. We, however, should avoid extending any kind of
personal favor that might be interpreted as an effort to obtain improper favorable
treatment. Furthennore, it is a violation of Internal Revenue Service rules to
imply to our clients that we are in a position to obtain special treatment.9 At
times our relationship is clearly adversarial; but we are adversaries in a contest
in which we observe the rules, a contest that is not a personal one between us
and the government representatives.
Particularly where the client is under a legal obligation to disclose facts, as
in connection with a tax return or in responding to questions on audit, we may
be under pressure to compromise either our obligation to keep infonnation re-
ceived in connection with the representation of a client confidential, or our
obligation to be truthful to the tax collector. 10 The following discussion suggests
ways of dealing with this problem in specific situations. The basic rule which
applies throughout is simple: we will not voluntarily disclose confidential in-
fonnation unless so authorized by the client and we will not lie to the Service. II
We will do our best to resolve any conflict between these two principles, and
if we cannot do so, we will resign.
Our obligation to the government includes an obligation to "the system." In
addition to representing our clients, we should also seek to contribute to im-
provement of the tax laws and their administration. If in connection with such.
Avoid Legal Malpractice Suits, 33 NAC. LAw. 13 (1987): Routh, Liabilities ofTax Preparers: An
Overview, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 479 (1984); Tinsley & Pease, Guidelines for Protecting the Tax
Practitioner from Criminal Liability, 40 TAX'N. Acer. 94 (1988).
9"freas. Cir. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 1O.5I(c) (1988); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT
Rule 8.4(e) (1984) (declaring such action to be a professional misconduct).
IOMODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1984), generally prohibits unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information relating to the client. A number of ethics opinions also prohibit
disclosure to the tax authorities of information as to tax derelictions by non-clients unless such
disclosure is legally mandated or authorized by the client. See Ala. Op. 8389, ABA/BNA Lawyer's
Manual on Professional Conduct [hereinafter ABA/BNA] 801:1056-57; Ariz. Opt 82-13, ABAIBNA
801:1313; N.Y. City Op. 81-100,801:6331; N.C. Op. 374, ABA/BNA 801:6617-18.
"Lying to the Internal Revenue Service is not only unethical but illegal. See Treas. Cir. 230, 31
C.F.R. § 1O.5I(b) (1988), which includes in "disreputable conduct" for which a practitioner may
be disbarred from practice before the Service "giving false or misleading information, or participating
in any way in giving false or misleading information. . . [whether in testimony, a return or otherwise]
knowing such information to be false or misleading." See also I.R.C. § 6701 (aiding and abetting)
& I.R.C. § 7206(2) (aiding or assisting in false return); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (person making
a false statement to government agency is guilty of felony).
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effort we take a position because it will be helpful to our clients, we should
make it clear that we are acting in a representative capacity.12
Law review articles are another area where we should be careful to advance
positions we believe will be of general benefit, rather than merely helpful to
individual clients. In taking positions we must be careful, however, not to harm
our clients through the use of confidential information. Further, our advocacy
of policies and positions may have an impact on our subsequent ability to rep-
resent clients effectively in particular matters. 13
While these guidelines are intended to assure our adherence to ethical principles
arising in our practice as representatives of taxpayers, it is important to the
preservation and functioning of "the system" that government employees also
adhere to ethical standards. When we observe departures from such standards
by government employees, we should work for correction as individuals, as a
firm and through our bar associations.
IV. ADVICE CONCERNING TAX REPORTING
A. Tax Return Preparation and Advice
The tax return is the principal focus for a tax lawyer's struggles with ethical
issues. This is true whether the issue arises in connection with return preparation
or in planning a transaction which must eventually be reflected on a return.
Indeed, giving advice on the reporting of a major item on a return may make
the lawyer an "income tax preparer" for purposes of the applicable penalty
regulations, even though the lawyer does not actually participate in making the
entries on the return. 14 Even when our work does not fall within the statutory
definition of "return preparation." for instance, when the transaction is pro-
spective or the advice does not relate to a major item, the ethical considerations
are largely the same. Therefore, most of the following discussion is applicable
to advice concerning tax reporting whether or not we act as return preparers.
,B. Taxpayers and Return Preparers
1. Return preparation is a two-party effort, involving the client and the return
preparer. Each has responsibilities to bring to the task: knowledge of the relevant
law comes from the return preparer; the relevant facts come from the client. A
failure by either may occasion problems for both.
2. The preparation of returns is not the practice of law, although it may be
part of such practice if performed by a la\\ryer. 15 Being a return preparer in a
12MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDt:cr 3.9 (1984).
IJObviously a lawyer will have a hard time being a spokesperson for a particular law or view of
the law if he has previously ....Tinen in opposition to it.
'4I.R.C. § 770I(a)(36) as supplemented by Regs. § 301.7701-15(b)(2) defines who is an income
tax return preparer.
ISGraves, Anorney Client Privilege in Preparation of Income Tax Returns: What El'ery Preparer
Should Know, 42 TAX LAWYER 577,613-17 (1989).
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
particular case may hamper us in other aspects of our role as lawyer. Information
given in connection with return preparation may not be privileged. 16 Therefore,
at the outset of the engagement, we should consider the relationship between
our responsibility as return preparer and our role as lawyer, and consider dis-
cussing with the client any problems that we can foresee which may arise during
the course of the representation.
a. We may advise a client even though his return may run the risk of incurring
a penalty. As return preparers, however, we will seek to avoid participation in
a return likely to subject us to penalties. 17
b. If, subsequent to our preparation of a return, it comes to our attention that
there was a clear and material error on the return, we may wish to withdraw
from the representation unless the error is corrected, although the client may not
be under a legal obligation to make a correction. IS We are obliged not to mislead
the Service, and by continuing under the circumstances we may do so. 19 Indeed,
we may from time to time be asked to assist in the defense of a client who has
filed a fraudulent return. If we should ever learn, however, that a client asked
us to be return preparers of a fraudulent return, we would immediately terminate
all further representation.20
c. In return preparation, the tension between the quality service we insist on
providing and the client's desire to minimize costs is particularly strong. We
should not hesitate to point out to the client less expensive return preparation
alternatives than we are willing to provide.
16See United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1986); Graves. supra note 15; see
generally, Spahn, Making and Breaking the Attorney-Client Privilege. 35 PRAC. LAW. 61 (1989)
(summarizing principles of attomey-client privilege and offering suggestions for its creation and
maintenance). See also Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner. 93 T.C. 521 (1990).
where use of house counsel's affidavit was held to waive the privilege.
I7For negligence penalties applicable to return preparers, see I.R.C. § 6694. as amended by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-239. 103 Stat. 2106; see also generally
but relating to the law prior to its 1989 amendment, Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774; Rev. Ruls.
80-262 through 80-266 issued in connection therewith; Arzoo. Preparer Penalties and Compliance,
18 TAX ADVISER 36 (1987); Thomas, The Negligent Return Preparer: Avoiding Section 6694(a), 63
TAXES 831 (1985); Buchholz & Paley. Minimizing Your Exposure to Tax Preparer Liability: A
Checklist Approach, 18 PRAC. Acer. 75 (1987). In 1986, the Treasury proposed an amendment to
Circular 230 under which imposition of § 6661 substantial underpayment penalties on the client
would be taken as evidence of improper practice by the adviser. The ABA and AICPA opposed this
proposal. See AlCPA Comments on Circular 230. 18 TAX ADVISER 275 (1987). But see Wolfman.
Circular 230,36 TAX NOTES 832 (Feb. 23, 1987); Johnson. "True and Correct" Standards/or Tax
Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (June 19, 1989).
IISee infra parts IV.E. and V.B. (more detailed discussion of the impact of the discovery of error
on a return on our relationship with the client).
19Any withdrawal from representation must be handled in such a way as not to disclose confidences
or unduly prejudice the client. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, FormalOp. 314 (1965); AICPA
Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.7 (rev. 1988); See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 comment (1984).
zoMODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(I)-(3); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 comment (1983). ("A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in
conduct the lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudu-
lent. ").
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C. Diligence
We owe it to our clients and ourselves to be diligent in the preparation of
returns. This duty includes making reasonable efforts to obtain all relevant in-
fonnation from the client, reviewing last year's income tax return for any changes,
obtaining confinnation as to the client's record keeping procedures (where they
are relevant to the tax result), considering the tax position of other related
taxpayers (to the extent known to us), and researching any doubtful questions
of law.
As return preparers, we are not under any obligation to audit our client's
records; but if infonnation given to us raises questions in our minds, we should
ask them and not proceed further unless we are reasonably satisfied.21
D. Valuation
A difficult factual issue frequently arising in the preparation of returns is the
value of property transferred. Most tax practitioners are not appraisers and should
generally let others make the valuation. It is entirely proper, however, to assist
the appraiser in preparing the report. Indeed, we should use our lawyering skills
to ensure that the report is sensible and will withstand scrutiny, because thereby
we serve both the system and our clients.
The Code now imposes various special penalties for overvaluation and un-
dervaluation of property and also requires the services of a qualified appraiser
in certain situations. We must advise the client of these rules so that the client
can be aware of the risks involved. Further, while there is nothing wrong in
either the appraiser or the preparer giving the client the benefit of the doubt
where the value is uncertain, any valuation involved in a return that we prepare
must be responsibly done, make sense,' be well-reasoned, and be internally
consistent.22
Even though we may be well-qualified to make an infonned judgment as to
a particular property, we should nevertheless consider whether our representation
of the client as advocate before the Service may not undercut our effectiveness.
as an impartial appraiser. 23
E. Conformity to Law
1. A tax return involves the application of law to facts. Where the law is
clear, we follow the law.24
21AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.3 (rev. 1988). This same approach
also applies to relying on forms K-I, brokers' statements and similar third party information.
USee I.R.C. § 6662(e)-(g) (valuation penalties); see also I.R.C. § 6664(c) (requiring, inter alia,
a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser for relief from penalty). For the requirements of a
qualified appraiser, see Regs. § 1.170A-13(c)(5). These regulations refer to other provisions of law
under which appraisers may be subject to the aiding and abetting penalty an4 also may be subject
to proceedings conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury for a determination to have their appraisals
disregarded. .
2JSee MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 3.7(1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(A) & DR 5-IOI(B) (1980) (lawyer being a witness and advocate in the
same proceeding),
2
4See generally AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.1 (rev. 1988); ABA
Tax Lawyer. Vol. 43, No.2
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2. It is appropriate to assist the client in structuring a transaction and reporting
it on the return in the way least likely to be subject to audit, provided we do
not mislead the Service. However:
a. We will not participate in the preparation of a return containing a clear
error or frivolous position merely to have "a bone to throw" to the agent on
audit in the hope that the error will not be discovered, or because the client
cannot afford or wants to postpone a current tax payment.
(i) We should remind the client of the exposure to penalties, interest, future
audit procedures, and other potentially adverse consequences that may flow from
overreaching in tax matters.'
b. We will not participate in the preparation of a return where the client fails
to answer a question on the return in order to save taxes. 25
c. When it is appropriate to use estimates on a return. we may indicate that
it is an estimate, and, in any event, we will not do so in a manner likely to
imply greater accuracy than in fact exists.26 For instance, if we believe an amount
is about $2000, we should write "$2000" or "$2000 (est'd)." We should not
write "$1984.76."
3. When the application of the law to the facts is not clear, there are frequently
many choices, all within pennitted limits, relating both to the position to ~e
taken and the nature of the disclosure on the return. Positions and disclosures
range from the entirely safe and certain to be accepted by the Service, to ag-
gressive positions, which may result in a lesser tax burden, but involve the risk
of challenge by the Service, to interest not being deductible, and of possible
civil penalties in addition to the accounting, legal and administrative costs in-
volved in resolving a tax controversy. Within the limits indicated below, it is
up to the client to make the choice; it is up·to us to explain the potential benefits
and hazards.
4. There have been ongoing discussion and controversy about the degree of
assurance the taxpayer and the taxpayer's advisor must have in the correctness
of the return. These discussions should not obscure our general rule: returns
should be prepared carefully and should be believed to be correct. This basic
rule by itself does not provide.the answer to the problems that arise when the
law. is not clear or where the client intentionally and with full advice decides to
test the limits of the pennissible. Even then, our general commitment to "good
returns" provides the background against which the specific situation will be
considered. In any case, no matter how urgent the client's needs, we will not
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Fonnal Op. 352 (1985) (lawyer's advice in regard
to a tax return should be governed by good faith and the realistic possibility for success should the
matter be litigated).
25See AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.2 (rev. 1988) (discussing answers
to questions on returns). Our commitment to answering a question depends. of course, on our
conviction that the Service is legally authorized to ask the question. At times. rather than completing
a fonn, we may attach a statement which provides all relevant infonnation but in a manner more
helpful to the client than the official fonn.
26See AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.4 (rev. 1988).
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participate in a return that falls below either the standards of Circular 230 or the
rules set forth in applicable ABA Opinions of Ethics,27
a. When a client decides to take an aggressive position, we should usually
explain the risks to make sure that the client is aware of what is involved. We
should make a record of our warning and of the technical support for the client's
position to protect this firm against possible claims from the client or the Service.
We should, however, make such record in a manner that preserves the confi-
dentiality of our communications. 28
b. The general view of tax return professionals is that the applicable rules of
professional ethics that bar assistance to a client engaged in "violation of law"
are intended solely to prohibit participation in criminal conduct. With respect to
client conduct that may lead to certain lesser civil penalties-such as a penalty
under section 6662 (which now includes the substantial underpayment penalty
of old section 6661)-the professional's obligation is merely to warn the client. 29
Nevertheless, it would be highly unusual for this finn to participate in conduct
certain to lead to civil tax penalties; indeed we will generally not participate
when a civil penalty to the taxpayer would more likely than not result if the
return were audited and all of the facts were presented to a court. Further, we
will not serve as return preparers if it appears more likely than not that we would
be subject to any preparers' penalty if all the facts were known to the Service.30
c. Both as a matter of statutory law and as a matter of the common law of
taxation, the risk of penalties resulting from aggressive positions may generally
be reduced by riders or explanatory statements attached to the return.3 \ No matter
27The principal current opinion is ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics. Formal Op. 314 (1965),
as modified by ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Formal Op. 352 (1985).
Opinion 85-352 is reproduced in 39 TAX LAWYER 613 (1988). The same volume also contains an
explanation of the background, Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352,39
TAX LAWYER 613 (1988).
28See supra last paragraph in part U.
29See Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027 (1987).
3O'fhe Il'ITERNAL REVENUE AUDIT MANUAL, Part IV, 4297.9(7)(f) (1987), instructs agents to consi4er
imposition of preparer penalties whenever considering substantial underpayment or valuation pen-
alties. The House Committee Report on the 1989 Civil Penalty Legislation states, however, as part
of its Administrative Recommendations to the Service, in section c.3, to instruct its employees not
to threaten imposition of preparer penalties during the course of an examination, Appeals conference,
or other proceeding.
The preparer penalty provisions in I.R.C. § 6694, as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, now follow the ethical guidelines for lawyers
and accountants proposed by the ABA and the AICPA. If an understatement of tax liability on a
return is due to a position of which the return preparer knew or should have known that it did not
have a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits and such position was not disclosed or
was frivolous, the preparer is subject to penalty "unless it is shown that there is reasonable cause
for the understatement and such person acted in good faith." For a discussion and matrix of the
negligence penalty provisions for taxpayers and return preparers resulting from the 1989 revisions,
see Banoff, Determining Valid Legal Authority in Advising Clients. Rendering Opinions. Preparing
Tax Returns, 68 TAXES 40 (1990).
31Substantial understatement penalties under I.R.C. § 6662(d) may be reduced by the amount
attributable to "any item with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment
are adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return." For relevant authority
prior to the penalty provision amendments made by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Tax Lawyer. Vol. 43, No.2
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACfICE SECOND
how complete the disclosure, however, we must in good faith believe that the
taxpayer's position is not frivolous. 32
F. Prior Years' Returns
If we discover an error in a prior year's return that is not barred by the statute
of limitations, whether or not of our own creation, we must advise the client of
the error.33 We should explain that present law does not mandate the filing of
an amended return, but that a tax that is owed is a debt that should be paid and,
therefore, in general an amended return should be filed to correct any clear and
material errors.34
1. Although there is no legal obligation to file an amended return, the impli-
cations of an uncorrected error on future years' returns must be considered. An
uncorrected error having an effect on future returns cannot knowingly be carried
forward.
2. If correction gives rise to risk of penalty, we must describe the risk and
explore ways of paying the tax due that will minimize exposure to the penalty.
In any situation involving potential fraud charges, however, we should carefully
explain to the taxpayer the benefits and hazards of the various options available,
including any constitutional right not to cooperate with the Service. A lawyer
who does not have criminal tax practice experience should consult with one who
has such experience.
a. When a clear and material error was made on a return prepared by this
firm or in an audit in which we acted as the client's representative, we should
explain to the client our own interest in an appropriate correction, and suggest
that if the client wants advice not colored by such interest, the client should
consult another adviser. Indeed, we may be required to insist that the client
consult another advisor, where our own interest is sufficiently disparate from
that of the client.
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, see I.R.C. § 666l(b){2) {l9861: Rev. Proc. 86-27, 1986-1
C.B. 562; Rev. Proc. 87-48, 1989-2 C.B. 645; Rev. Proc. 8837, 1988-2 C.B. 560.
32"fhe AICPA and the ABA fonnerly did not suggest the explanatory riders were ethically required,
although they might be prudent. See AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, No. I
[.02d] (rev. 1988); ABA Camm. on Professional EthiCS, Fonnal Op. 314 (l965). More recently,
these organizations have agreed that where a position has less chance of success than the "realistic
possibility of success" standard, it may nevertheless be taken on a return if adequately disclosed
and not frivolous. See A1CPA Comments on Circular 230, 18 TAX ADVISER 275 (1987). With respect
to return items not involving tax shelters, disclosure may avoid the substantial underpayment penalty.
See I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2){B)(ii); Rev. Proc. 86-22, 1986-1 C.B. 562; Rev. Proc. 87-48, 1987-2 C.B.
645; Rev. Proc. 88-37, 1988-2 C.B. 560. As a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, disclosure that satisfies § 6662(d)(2){B)(ii) would also protect the preparer against penalty
unless the position was frivolous. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3).
3331 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1988). For planning correction of erroneous transactions, see infra note 49
and supporting text.
~See generally Ronan, Do Clients Have a Duty to File Amended Tax Returns? 33 PRAc. LAW.
25 (l987); AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.6 (rev. 1988). See also Harris,
On Requiring the Corr~ction ofError Under the Federal Tax lAw, 42 TAX LAWYER 515 (1989). A
failure to correct a clear and material error in a refund claim before the refund is paid appears
particularly serious.
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b. When we were preparers of a return that we subsequently learned ·contains
a clear and material error,35 and the client decides not to amend the return, we
should consider whether the circumstances are such that we should no longer
represent the client either in tax matters in general or, specifically, in any audit
of the return. 36
c. As already stated, if we should ever learn that a client asked us to assist
in the preparation of a fraudulent return, we would immediately terminate all
further representation. 37
3. If a client has failed to file returns for prior years and pay the taxes due,
he is under a clear legal obligation to do so and usually the best advice is to
report and pay. Nevertheless, this involves the same balancing of benefits and
risks as described under part IV.E.l. with respect to erroneous returns.
4. When we must respond to an independent auditor's Jetter and know of a
clear error on a prior year's return that is not barred by the period of limitations,
we must carefully consider whether this is a "contingent liability" to be disclosed
by the client to the auditors. In that connection, it is relevant whether we believe
it more likely than not that the claim will be asserted by the Service. Nevertheless,
we must be certain that, by our silence. we do not mislead the auditors as to
our client's situation, particularly since our client's refusal to correct a return
containing a clear and substantial error may have a bearing on the auditor's
reliance on the client's statements generally.38
V. AUDIT REPRESENTATION
A. Nature ofProceedi/l8
1. A tax audit is the first step and often also the last step in a potentially
adversarial legal proceeding.
The following recommendations address audits when either the taxpayer has
the burden of proof or when the Service may reasonably infer that we do not
know the taxpayer's position to be clearly wrong. Obviously, when the audit is
tending toward the direction of fraud charges, the client is entitled to take a
position of "prove it" toward the Service and our role becomes pretty much
that of an advocate in an adversar1al proceeding.
2. Some lawyers handle audits on a superficial basis, in the hope that with
only a little effort they can convince the agent to drop whatever questions the
agent may have raised. Our firm's general approach is to persuade the client to
JSThe term "c1ear and material error" does not include a position that was appropriate under the
law in effect at the time of filing the return nor one that does not have a significant effect on the
tax liability. See AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. I (rev. 1988). See a/so
l.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) which precludes substantial underpayment penalty for any underpayment
due to "the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial authority for
such treatment." (emphasis added).
~See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics. Formal Op. 314 (1965).
J7See supra note 20 and supporting text.
J8See general/y Fuld. The Statement ofPolicy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors Requests
for Information, 31 Bus. LAw. 1709 (1976) (the impact on the attorney-client privilege by clients'
responses to auditors requests).
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authorize us to do a thorough and first class job. While at times the result may
be an unnecessary expenditure of time and money, far more often a thorough
preparation of the client's case will pennit an earlier tennination of the audit
and a settlement of the controversy on tenns favorable to the client. Superficial
work, on the other hand, frequently leads to inconsistencies, as facts and legal
theories developed in later stages of a proceeding do not coincide with earlier
communications to the Service. Such inconsistencies undennine the lawyer's
credibility and persuasiveness, thereby reducing the client's prospects for suc-
cess.
Where the matter is small or the client's funds are limited, it may make sense
to do less than a "full court press." Within the limits of our professional
responsibility, the decision is the client's. 39
3. The Service representatives will have substantial knowledge and experience,
while the client may not be aware of all the legal aspects of his particular situation.
Unlike lawyers who are usually barred from having contact with the opposing
party except through the opposing party's lawyer, Service agents are not similarly
restricted. 4o Clients, however, need and are entitled to the same protection as
in other proceedings when the other side possesses legal expertise that they lack.
While a lawyer or other representative need not be present at all stages of an
audit, we should at the outset seek to review with the client the legal aspects of
the audit, particularly any weak spots in the client's situation.
4. Frequently we can do a better job representing a client at an appeals
conference if the client is not present. When we believe this to be the case,
we should point this out to the client, leaving the final decision to the c1ient.41
5. Both we and the client should cooperate with the Service, where this
can be done without harm to the client's situation. We must remember,
however, that it is not the Service but the courts that have the last word in
determining what information-including information relating to third par-
ties-the Service has a right to obtain from the client. In a particular case,
there is nothing wrong with politely informing an agent that a summons will
be required or that the propriety of a summons that has been issued will be
tested in court.
6. Taxpayers have a right to periodically eliminate from their files papers no
longer needed under applicable record keeping requirements, including memo-
randa and drafts regarding tax planning. Once an audit has started, however,
any destruction of potentially relevant documents is improper.42
J9See supra part II. (discussing the impact of costs on the work undertaken by attorneys).
40See I.R.C. § 7520Ib)(2) (giving taxpayers the right to consult with an attorney or other authorized
representative, but this right must be specifically requested).
'''The Service requires a summons to compel attendance by the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 7520(c).
42Record retention requirements are set out in § 6001and in Guide to Record Retention Requirements
in the Code of Federal Regulations. NAT'L ARCHIVES AND REC. AD. (rev. 1986). MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) comment (1984), bar advising the destruction or concealment
of evidence once a controversy has started or can be foreseen. See also I.R.C. § 7203 (punishes
the willful failure to maintain required records as a misdemeanor); I.R.C. § 7206(5) (classifies as
fraud the willful withholding or destruction of certain documents); I.R.C. § 7210 (deals with the
failure to obey a summons).
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B. TruthfuLness in Dealings with the Service
. 1. We must at all times be truthful with the Service and use our best efforts
to ensure that the client is also truthful.
a. To preserve our reputation for integrity and reliability we must, in com-
munications to the Service, be clear as to the source of any facts we assert.
"The corporation made all relevant elections on a timely basis" is a legitimate
statement if we know it to be a fact. If we do not know it, we should say, "We
are informed by John Jones, Treasurer of the corporation, that it made all relevant
elections on a timely basis. "43
b. When we become aware of a clear and material error on the client's return,
we should generally urge the client to permit disclosure, particularly when the
proceeding involves the general correctness of the return rather than focusing
on a specific issue. See part IV.E. above. (For instance, we should do so if we
find during the course of an audit that a deduction was taken for a particular
expenditure that was clearly non-deductible). Also, any mathematical mistakes
whether made by ourselves, the client, or the Service, should be disclosed to
the Service.44
c. If, in an appropriate case, the client refuses to make the necessary correction
or disclosure, in general, we should withdraw from further representation; the
need to withdraw is particularly strong when we were the preparers of what is
now known to be an erroneous return or when we may otherwise be understood
by the Service to have participated in a misrepresentation by the client.
(i) Withdrawal from the engagement must be carefully undertaken so as to
balance the desire or obligation to withdraw against the requirements that
confidences not be disclosed and the client's interest not be otherwise prej-
udiced.
(ii) It may be helpful to remind the client that, during the course of an
audit, it is customary for the auditing agent to ask whether the taxpayer or
taxpayer's representative is aware of any matters requiring adjustment. If
there is an undisclosed problem, and we have decided to continue represen-
tation in spite of the client's refusal to authorize disclosure, we must provide
a truthful answer.
2. Difficult questions occasionally arise whether, in order to avoid misleading
the Service, the lawyer should disclose information not known to the Service.
•3MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL. CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1984) (". . . an assertion purporting'
to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, ... may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the
assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of reasonably diligent inquiry. ").
44ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1518 (1986), counsels
disclosure of a "scrivener's error" to the opponent without consultation with the client, since raising
the issue of disclosure with the client might involve the lawyer in fraud if the client refuses to
authorize disclosure. But see Chicago Bar Ass'n Prof. Resp. Com., Op. 864, in ABA/BNA, LAw-
YER'·S MANVAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Vol. 4, No. 20, 345 (1988). In a particular case, it may
be preferable first to consult with the client and urge disclosure.
Tax lAwyer. Vol. 43, No.2
H - 16
GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
Generally, in an audit, as in other adversarial proceedings, our obligation to tell
the truth does not require disclosure of all relevant facts and law.4S
a. Excepting only the situations referred to in part V.B.l.b. above, we are
under no legal or ethical obligation to volunteer to the Service infonnation adverse
to the client or to urge the client to do so. Nevertheless, in our dealings with
the Service, we can often serve our client most effectively by frank recognition
of the problems with our client's case and then explaining why, in spite of these
problems, our client should prevail.
b. There is no obligation to call the attention of the Service to apparent legal
or factual inconsistencies in a settlement that was arrived at fairly. A settlement
is an agreement between the taxpayer and the Service relating to "the bottom
line, " and inconsistencies with facts or rules of law not agreed to are irrelevant.46
Nor must the settlement agreement be followed in future years unless it specif-
ically so provides.47
VI. TAX PLANNING
A. Complexities of Tax Law
Tax law has grown to the point where no one can possibly know all of the
rules and approaches to various business and personal planning problems. Re-
search, continuing education, the use of checklists, and consultation with others
are all essential to prevent hann to our clients and malpractice exposure to the
finn. We should not hesitate to suggest to the client consultation with experts
outside our office whenever that appears in the client's best interest.
B. The Interest of Clients and Others .
In tax planning we seek to assist our clients, within the limits of the law, to
achieve their personal and economic objectives at the least tax cost.
1. We are likely to do our best planning if before turning to the legal tech-
nicalities, we seek to obtain a clear understanding of the "big picture"-for
example, the overall strategic planning goals of the client-with which the tax
plan should be consistent. . .
2. Frequently a fonn of transaction chosen by our client will have tax con-
sequences for those with whom he is transacting business. Examples are situations
4SMODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.l(b) (l984), requires disclosure by the lawyer
when "necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6" (which protects confidential infonnation except to prevent crimes likely to
result in death or serious bodily hann or to protect the lawyer's interest). MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 comment (l984), Slates: "A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing
with others on the client's behalf, but generally has no affmnative duty to infonn an opposing party
of relevant facts ...
46See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (l965). See also Corneel, Ethical
Guidelines/or Twc Practice, 28 TAX L. REv. 1,21-22 (1972). There is no obligation on taxpayer's
counsel to educate the Service as to the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the Tax Court refused
to set aside a settlement where the Service lost approximately $700,000 due to the ignorance of its
counsl:l. See Stamm International Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315 (1988).
47See AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No.5 (rev. 1988).
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where our client is borrowing or lending money, buying or selling a business,
acting as franchisor or franchisee, etc. While as a matter of professional ethics
our responsibility to non-clients may be limited to recommending representation
by counsel, we should generally consider the tax consequences for all concerned,
so that the client can make an informed choice that takes into account the resulting
tax benefits and burdens of all.
3. We must remember that in addition to the client who pays us, others may
rely on our advice. Examples are investors in a partnership promoted by our
client; both husband and wife for whom we are preparing estate plans, even
though only one will pay for our services; employees of a corporate client who
rely on our advice as to the tax consequences of a compensation plan; and many
more. In appropriate cases, we should recommend that they consult with another
counselor adviser. In all events, any written advice to clients should be worded
so that it wiIl not confuse or mislead non-clients who are likely to rely on it.
C. Plans Must Be Conditioned on Compliance with Tax Law
A tax plan should not be suggested without taking into consideration how the
transaction should be reported and what the consequences of an audit of the
return are likely to be. We will not suggest and we should counsel against plans
that are bound to fail if all of the facts become known to the Service. We wiIl
not participate in transactions entirely lacking in economic substance and intended
solely to conceal or mislead.
I. It is unethical to assist the client in the preparation of evidence designed
to mislead the Service, such as a bill to a corporate client that includes, without
disclosing, the cost of personal services to the owner of the corporation.48 On
the other hand, it is entirely proper to advise clients on the best ways of docu-
menting legitimate positions.
2. At times the client in ignorance of the tax law has taken steps resulting in
adverse tax consequences or has failed to take steps to prevent such consequences.
It is not unethical to make every effort to correct this result, provided that this
can be done without destruction of existing documents, backdating of new doc-
uments or other steps intended to mislead the Service as to what in fact hap-
pened.49
D. Borderline Plans
We should remember that our objective in tax planning is to produce a good
tax plan, a plan that works. A plan that is not sustained on audit or by litigation
was not a good plan, no matter how brilliantly conceived, unless the client
desired to consummate the transaction despite the possibility or probability of
4SABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Infonnafbp. 1517 (1988). superseding
Infonnal Op. 1494 (1982). requires disclosure on the corporate bill both of the personal services
(without necessarily disclosing their nature) and the amount of the bill applicable to them.
49Banoff, Unwinding or Rescinding A Transaction: Good Tax Planning or Tax Fraud? 62 TAXES
942 (1984).
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
adverse tax consequences. The decision whether to riskthe adverse consequences
of borderline plans should be the client's, based upon our advice.
Clients are less well-infonned than we are as to whether a proposed plan
involves ethical but risky "skating on thin ice" or whether it involves "walking
on water," that is, a breach oflaw. We must make the difference clear to them,
and explain that being on the right side of this line is vital to our working with
them on their tax plans. Lawyers' lectures to clients on morality are likely to
be resented and useless, but clients can understand that we do not want to
jeopardize continuing to make our living in our accustomed way. Further, it is
often helpful to tell clients that if they do something clearly wrong, they can
never thereafter be comfortable, that they will always be hostage to all who
know or may come to know of their breach of law.
1. It would be unusual for us to suggest or recommend a plan which in our
view would more likely than not result in negligence or similar penalties to the
client if all the facts became known to the Service. Indeed, in planning, our
standards are likely to be higher than in planning returns, since there will usually
be opportunities in planning to reduce the risk of challenge.
2. Clients contemplating proceeding with a highly aggressive tax plan should
make certain in advance that their tax return preparer will be willing to sign the
return.
3. Sometimes we are blinded by our own brightness. If we have devised what
we consider to be a particularly clever tax plan, we should remember the maxim.
"If it is too good to be true, it isn't," and view each aspect and the overall plan
through the eyes of an ambitious Service agent, detennined to collect as much
as possible. Finally, we should ask another experienced tax practitioner to review
our plan and opinion carefully, both as to .the technical details and as to the
overall concept.
E. Tax Shelter Plans
We will not assist in the offering of a tax shelter program in which the tax
benefits are important to the success of the investment unless it is substantially
more likely than not that the material tax benefits will, in fact, be available to
the investors. The degree of assurance we require as to the availability of the
tax benefits depends upon the importance of the tax benefits to the success of
the investment. so .
1. We should decline to participate in a tax opinion on a shelter program
unless this finn also handles the balance of the legal work or has confidence in
the other counsel involved and)1as adequate opportunity to explore any matters
considered potentially troublesome. Familiarity with all of the facts is vital to
such an opinion.
50ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 346 (rev. 1982). and 31
C.F.R. § 10.33 (1988), set forth ethical guidance for tax shelter opinions. Although they authorize
"negative opinions," this finn will not undertake representation in such offerings.
Tax Lawyer. Vol. 43, No.2
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F. Following Up
A perfectly good tax plan m:lY be spoiled in its implementation: there may
be a failure to execute the proper documents, to make a timely filing. of notices
or elections, or to pay the amount necessary to avoid a gift or a dividend. We
should make every effort to have our engagement in a tax planning matter also
cover the implementation.
The desirability of assuring proper implementation of a plan that we helped
create is very different from assuming any obligation to advise with respect to
future changes in the law that may have a bearing on plans we have devised or
on the repetition in future years of acts that we have previously approved. Most
clients understand that nothing is less constant than the tax law and that what is
right today may be wrong tomorrow. But it is a truth worth repeating both to
our clients and ourselves.
VII. ASSURING AN ETHICAL TAX PRACTICE
A. Like charity, the maintenance of professional standards begins at home.
We expect all who work here to comply fully with all aspects of Federal,
state, and local tax law in meeting their personal tax obligations. 51
B. We can help maintain ethical standards by wide discussion among all
tax specialists of any ethical questions arising in our practice and of any court
decisions, rulings, ABA opinions, AICPA statements or other developments
having a bearing on professional standards in taxpractice. Doubtful questions
should not be resolved without such discussion based upon careful research.
C. The foregoing guidelines must be applied to all of our clients, without
reference to their monetary importance to 'the firm. We must recognize, how-
ever, that our financial interest in a matter may affect our judgment as to
whether a contemplated course is proper. Accordingly, if we have doubts as
to the propriety of a particular action and the matter is material from the
firm's point of view-either by risking the loss of an important client or by
exposing the firm to the charge that it engaged in misconduct-it is imperative
to have a full and complete discussion of the matter with one or more un-
involved partners in the firm. In some cases, it may be advisable to obtain
the opinion of outside counsel.
D. We want everyone working here to feel comfortable with the standards
observed in our tax practice. Suggestions for improvement are always wel-
come. If anyone has any questions concerning the propriety of any action or
plan, involving either that person or someone else in the firm, those questions
should be promptly discussed-first, with the individual involved and then
with any partner or partners in whose judgment the individual reposes con-
fidence. Remember, the ultimate responsibility for your own conduct is solely
your own.
E." There is now a growing and ever-changing body of law, regulations,
SIThis is also a condition for practice before the Service. 31 C.F.R. § 1O.5I(d) (985).
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GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE SECOND
opinions, court decisions, and literature bearing on the conduct of a tax practice.
,Therefore, research is essential to the proper resolution of problems that may
arise. The authorities cited are intended to facilitate the beginning of such re-
search.52
S2'Jbe ~st current general text on the subject is B. WOLFMAN & 1. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
FEDERAL TAX PRAC11CE (2d ed. 1985) . The ethical requirements for practice before the Treasury
Department are set forth in 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3, 10.4. Circular 230 should be carefully reviewed
because it specifies all kinds of disreputable conduct that may result in disciplinary action by the
Treasury even though not directly related to dealings with the Service. Id. at § 10.51. See ge1lt!rally
Shapiro, Professional Responsibility in tilt! Eyes ofthe IRS, 17 TAX ~DVISER 136 (1986). The recently
revised AICPA Statements on Responsibility in Tax Practice offer the best detailed discussion on
the points they cover. Needless to say, tax lawyers are lawyers and the state law disciplinary rules
apply. t~ the conduct of tax practice. For bar association opinions bearing on the conduct of tax
practice, see ABA/BNA. LAWYER's MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988), and more generally
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw ON LAWYERS (now in preparation).
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ANNEXB
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
STATEMENT 1999-1
American Bar Association
Section of Taxation
Committee on Standards of Tax Practice
(Unofficial guidance)
Issue Presented
This Statement addresses the issue of counsel's responsibilities upon discovering a
computational error made by the Internal Revenue Service in the client's favor that is unrelated to
any affirmative representation or omission of either the client or counsel.
The issue arises in a number of contexts. A computational error may surface either
before or after the client has determined the correct tax calculation. A computational error may
involve a tribunal, as in the settlement or decision in a docketed tax case. Documents filed by
the parties with the court may carry the error, as in a stipulated decision document filed in Tax
Court, or may not, as in general stipulations for dismissal filed in District Court. Computational
errors by the Internal Revenue Service may create a reduced deficiency, but can also result in an
erroneous refund being received by the client.
Applicable Rules
Rule 1.6(a) of the ABA Model Rules prevents a lawyer from revealing confidential
information relating to representation of a client, unless the client consents to disclosure after
consultation or there is implied authorization to disclose in order to carry out the representation.
Rule 4. lea) prevents a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact
to a third person. Rule 4. l(b) prevents a lawyer from knowingly failing to disclose a material
H-23
fact to a third person, but only where disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent act
by the client and then only if disclosure is not prohibited by Rule 1.6.
Rule 1.2(d) prevents a lawyer from knowingly counseling a client to engage in, or assist a
client in, conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. In this regard, Rule 8.4(c) proscribes conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Under Rule 3.3(a), a lawyer may not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to
a tribunal or fail to disclose to a tribunal a material fact necessary to avoid assisting a client in a
fraudulent act. These duties to a tribunal continue through the conclusion of the proceedings and
~pecifically apply even if compliance requires a lawyer to disclose a confidence otherwise
protected under Rule 1.6.
Rules 1.4(a) and (b) require a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter and to explain the matter to the client, to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions.
Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if called upon to act in
violation of the rules of professional conduct. Under Rule 1.16(b), a lawyer may (but need not)
withdraw if withdrawal is without material adverse effect on the client, or if the client (i) persists
in action involving the lawyer's service that counsel believes to be fraudulent or (ii) persists in
pursuing an objective that counsel considers repugnant or imprudent.
H-24
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An error in calculating the correct tax liability can be computational, such as an
arithmetic mistake, or clerical, such as a typographical mistake. Computational errors can also
be conceptual, such as where the calculation depends on the application or interpretation of a
particular Code section. The computational error need not relate to the tax liability, but can
occur with respect to penalties or interest. Courts generally have not been reluctant to correct
clerical errors. See Holland v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433 (1992); In re Cat!, 96-2
U.S.T.C., par. 50,422 (E.D. Wash. 1996). An arithmetic error, rather than a conceptual error, can
be corrected by the Internal Revenue Service without the need for a statutory notice of
deficiency. I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) and (g)(2). An arithmetic error generally is not subject to
dispute. This is not necessarily the case with conceptual errors, where the courts are more
reluctant to permit correction. In Stamm International Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315
(1988), for example, the Tax Court refused to allow the Internal Revenue Service to withdraw a
stipulated settlement upon discovering its unilateral mistake of not considering the application of
a Code provision in calculating the settlement amount. The Tax Court held that silence by the
taxpayer's counsel, although misleading, was not the equivalent of a misrepresentation in that
case.
Two local bar association opinions have held that a computational error in a client's favor
constituted a client confidence under the applicable state professional rules of conduct and thus
counsel was not permitted to disclose. Chicago Bar Ass'n Op. 86-4; Dallas Bar Ass'n Op. (8-23-
89) (apparently involving a tribunal.)
The ABA has opined that a lawyer may not deliberately or affirmatively mislead the IRS
in settlement negotiations, either by affirmative misstatements or by silence and may not permit
H-25
the client to mislead, while at the same time noting that a lawyer need not disclose weaknesses in
a client's case even if an unjust result occurs. Formal Opinion 314 (April 27, 1965). This
Opinion is also explicit that the Internal Revenue Service is not a tribunal.
In United States v. McRee, 7 F.3d 976 (11th Cir. 1993), a taxpayer was convicted for
converting government property by cashing an erroneously issued refund check, even though the
taxpayer did nothing to induce issuance of the refund.
ABA Informal Opinion 86-1518 (Feb. 9, 1986) determined that counsel had a duty to
disclose an inadvertently omitted provision from a contract when presented for signature because
the omission involved merely a scrivener's error. The ABA assumed for purposes of discussion
that the scrivener's error was a client confidence and reasoned that counsel had implied authority
to disclose under Model Rule 1.6 because the parties had already reached a meeting of the minds.
The Informal Opinion did not address counsel's duty if the client wished to exploit the error.
Discussion
When counsel learns that the Internal Revenue Service has made a computational error of
tax, penalty or interest in the client's favor, the information gained is a client confidence under
Rule 1.6(a), which generally may not be disclosed without the client's consent, unless otherwise
provided in the Model Rules or by other law. Confidentiality applies to all information obtained
about the client relating to the representation and not just communications from the client. But
Model Rule 8.4(c) provides that a lawyer may not engage in conduct that is dishonest.
H-26
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The lawyer's ethical obligations will depend on the circumstances; thus, this Statement
recognizes that different conclusions should be reached in different factual situations. There is
nonetheless a common theme. A client should not profit from a clear unilateral arithmetic or
clerical error made by the Internal Revenue Service, and a lawyer may not knowingly assist the
client in doing so. This is not the case, however, if the computational error is conceptual, such
that a reasonable dispute still exists concerning the calculation.
Docketed Case
If the parties in a docketed case are required to document the amount of the client's tax
liability or overpayment, such as in a decision document filed in Tax Court or in a judgment
entered on a counterclaim in U. S. District Court or the U. S. Court of Federal Claims, counsel
must disclose an error to the court. Model Rule 3.3(a)(1). Because counsel knows that the
deficiency is understated, or refund overstated, counsel cannot file a document with the Court
that contains an incorrect deficiency or overpayment without making a false statement to a
tribunal. Disclosure of the error may be made in this situation without the consent of, or
consultation with, the client. Rule 3.3(b) specifically requires disclosure notwithstanding that the
error is a client confidence under Rule 1.6.
Where the parties need not document the amount of the tax liability or refund, as is
generally the case in the U.S. District Courts or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the dismissal
document generally does not contain the false statement of material fact. Nonetheless, under
Model Rule 3.3, counsel owes a greater duty to a tribunal than is owed to an opposing party, and
H-27
the rules of conduct should not vary depending on the particular forum. Disclosure is required,
and may be made without consulting the client.
Settlement ofNon-Docketed Case
A lawyer must disclose a clear arithmetic or clerical calculation error (but not a
conceptual error) the amount of which is not de minimis to the Internal Revenue Service, if there
exists express or implied authority from the client to make the disclosure. Whether implied
authority exists is a question of fact. Implied authority will generally exist where the terms of a
settlement have been reached and the Internal Revenue Service then commits a unilateral
arithmetic or clerical error in the computation of the tax, penalty or interest owed or refund due.
Implied authority generally will not exist if the calculation error is conceptual; that is, for
example, it depends on the application or interpretation of a Code section for which a reasonable
dispute could exist.
In refund situations, the cashing of an erroneous refund check can constitute a criminal
violation for converting government property. A lawyer who knows that a miscalculation will
result in an erroneous refund cannot become an instrumentality in creating the erroneous refund.
However, the potential crime is a client confidence that generally cannot be disclosed, unless
express or implied authority to do so exists.
Therefore, in non-docketed cases involving refunds or deficiencies, if the client refuses to
consent where there is no implied authorization, counsel must withdraw from the engagement
because the failure to act would constitute a violation of Rule 8A(c) and Rule 1.2(d). See Rule
1.16(a). Counsel need not withdraw if express consent is withheld and the error is conceptual.
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These principles can be illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1: After the terms of a settlement in a non-docketed case have been reached,
the Internal Revenue Service in calculating the deficiency inadvertently misplaces a decimal
point so that the recomputed deficiency is reflected as $25,189.01, instead of$251,890.10. This
error is entirely clerical. Implied authority to disclose ordinarily would exist, absent an
extraordinary circumstance such as the client's prior express direction to the contrary. Therefore
counsel must disclose and need not consult with the client. See Example 3. If implied authority
to disclose does not exist and express consent is withheld by the client, counsel must withdraw.
Where the case is docketed, disclosure is required irrespective of the client's express or implied
consent.
Example 2: As part of the terms of a settlement reached with the Internal Revenue
Service Office of Appeals, the client is entitled to claim a $100,000 deduction, which was
originally reflected on Schedule C of his federal income tax return. Counsel believes that this
deduction is more likely attributable to a passive activity, but the issue was not raised at Appeals
and the Internal Revenue Service computation treated the deduction as non-passive. The
taxpayer would not currently benefit from the deduction if it was related to a passive activity.
This error is conceptual, as the application of Section 469 to the settlement computation is highly
factual and is subject to some reasonable dispute. Counsel may not disclose this error without
express consent from the client. Implied authority to consent does not exist because the issue
was not addressed in the settlement negotiations and there was no meeting of the minds on the
point. The result does not change where the failure to consider Section 469 resulted in a refund
or if the case was docketed.
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Example 3: The client agrees to settle a non-docketed tax case after the client calculates
the deficiency to be approximately $150,000. Counsel later receives the Internal Revenue
Service recomputation reflecting a deficiency of only $125,000 and leams that the difference
resulted from a multiplication error. Because this error is entirely arithmetical, as to which there
can be no reasonable dispute, counsel must disclose the error. Implied authority to disclose
exists because the client agreed to settle knowing that the revised deficiency would be
approximately $150,000. If the multiplication error resulted in a revised deficiency of $149,900,
disclosure would not be necessary because the error is de minimis.
Example 4: In Example 3, assume the client accepted the settlement terms in principle,
subject to the Internal Revenue Service recomputation, but estimated a $100,000 revised
deficiency. Upon receiving the Internal Revenue Service recomputation, the client and counsel
learn that the Internal Revenue Service erroneously determined the deficiency to be $125,000
and the correct revised deficiency was actually $150,000. Implied authority does not exist here
because the correct amount is not consistent with the client's stated expectation. This is so
notwithstanding that the IRS computational error is entirely arithmetic. Under these
circumstances, the lawyer may not disclose the error to the Internal Revenue Service absent
express consent from the client. If the client refuses to consent, the lawyer must withdraw.
CONCLUSION
A lawyer must disclose a clear arithmetic or clerical error in the client's favor in a case
docketed in court. In a non-docketed case, a lawyer must disclose a clear unilateral arithmetic or
clerical error if there exists express or implied consent. If the client refuses express consent
where there is no implied authorization, counsel must withdraw.
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This Standard of Tax Practice Statement is issued for the guidance of tax practitioners. It
was prepared by the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section ofTaxation of the
American Bar Association. The Statement was reviewed before issuance by the Council of the
Section of Taxation. The Statement has not been approved by the Section or by the American
Bar Association and should not be construed as policy of those entities. The ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has indicated that it has no objection to the
issuance of the Statement. The Reporter for this Statement was Donald P. Lan, Jr. of Dallas,
Texas. The Chair of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice was Leslie S. Shapiro of
Washington, D.C., the Vice Chair was Linda Galler of Hempstead, NewYork, and the Chair of
its Subcommittee on Standards of Tax Practice Statements was Charles Pulaski of Phoenix,
Arizona.
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ANNEXC
Sue Smith, the mother ofyour good friend and client, Bob Smith, dies leaving an estate of
$2.5 million in equal shares to Bob and his brothers, Bill and John. Bob is named as executor
and retains you to represent him. Among other things you arrange for an appraiser to value
the contents of the family residence. The day before the appraisal is to take place, Bob
informs you that he and his brothers and their wives have gone through the house and
removed a substantial number ofpersonal items, including jewelry and silver, which they have
. divided among themselves. None of these items are specifically referred to in the will.
Should you
a. Arrange with Bob to have these items made available to the appraiser and included
in the appraisal?
b. Confirm with Bob that the items taken are of relatively minor value and advise him
that they need not be included in the appraisal?
c. Advise Bob that technically they should be included in the estate and leave it up to him
as to whether they should be included in the appraisal?
Fred Fox has recently inherited a vacation home from his mother that he wants to give to his
children, their spouses and his grandchildren as annual present interest exclusion gifts. To
facilitate this (and perhaps obtain some valuation discounts) you advise Fred to transfer the
home to an LLC and then give units in the LLC. When you mention to Fred that in order to
use his and his wife's $20,000 annual exclusions it will be necessary for them to file gift tax
returns and agree to split the gifts, he asks if there is any way by which this could be avoided
Should you tell Fred that he can transfer an interest in the property to his wife, who can in
turn transfer that interest to the LLC in return for units that she can transfer to the intended
donees?
Since Kentucky no longer requires that safe deposit boxes be inventoried, you do not become
aware until after the federal estate tax return (prepared by your office) has been filed that the
box contained $100,000 of bearer tax-exempt bonds in an envelope labeled "Property of
Pamela," a lady friend of the widower decedent who did not have access to the box. Under
the tax payment clause in the decedent's Will, any estate and inheritance taxes on these bonds
will be paid out of the residuary estate, which is left to the decedent's two children.
What advice do you give to the executor (one of the children)?
The decedent owned a substantial number of shares in a closely held corporation. As the
attorney for the executor, a daughter who also owns a significant number of shares in the
corporation, you obtain a qualified appraisal of the shares of$I,500 per share, both at the
date of death and as of six months thereafter. Seven months after death, the corporation's
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shareholders receive an unsolicited offer for all of the stock at $5,000 per share, which the
shareholders accept a month later.
a. At what value do you report the stock on the estate's federal estate tax return?
b. Do you disclose on the return the sale of the stock for $5,000 per share?
c. Would it make any difference if the offer were the result of "discussions" that had
commenced prior to the decedent's death?
d. Ifthe offer/acceptance had not occurred until after the estate tax return had been filed,
but before it was audited, would you mention the disposition to the IRS attorney?
e. Ifthe offer did not occur until after the IRS attorney had proposed to settle for $2,000
per share, would you mention it to the IRS attorney or settle quickly?
With your assistance, Joe Jones establishes an irrevocable trust and transfers $1,300,000 of
assets to it, intending for him and Mrs. Jones to agree to split their gifts so as to use both of
their applicable credit amounts and GST exemptions. In the middle of the night it suddenly
occurs to you that, since Mrs. Jones is a potential distributee of the trust, she cannot
effectively consent to split the gifts.
What, if anything, can you do to avoid Mr. Jones having to pay a substantial amount ofgift
tax?
You and an IRS attorney are negotiating the resolution of her audit of your client's federal
estate tax return and you have tentatively agreed on a disposition of all of the issues. You
have calculated the approximate deficiency and have obtained authority from your client to
settle on the basis of your computation. When the IRS attorney sends you her computation
of the resulting deficiency, you quickly notice that she has made a mathematical error that has
resulted in a substantial understatement of the deficiency.
Do you
f Inform the IRS attorney of the error;
g. Ask the client ifyou may tell the IRS attorney about the error; or
h. Accept the attorney's calculation.
Would your response be different if the error were in the application of the tax law to the
agreed facts?
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Would your response be different if the error were in a factual matter that did not originate
with you or your client (such as the valuation of a listed security)?
What obligation, if any, do you have if the IRS representative proposes to settle a disputed
estate tax situation for a fixed dollar amount, based on a calculation that she provides you that
reflects a misunderstanding ofthe applicable facts or a misapplication ofthe law to the facts?
What is your obligation to the IRS representative ifyou realize that the statute oflimitations
for the issuance of a notice of deficiency will expire before you are expected to respond to
a proposed settlement offer?
NOTE: Some of the above scenarios are derived from a questionnaire prepared by Frederic G.
Corneel for the ALI-ABA Course of Study "Sophisticated Estate Planning Techniques," September 9,
1994, in Boston.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the point of view of the Plaintiff in a will contest case, the essence of the matter is
to convince a jury that it should reject the challenged will. Counsel for the Plaintiffs in such an
endeavor will normally rely on one or more of the following themes: (a) the testator did not
really know what he/she was doing in making out the will; (b) the testator was talked into the
will by a domineering and controlling personality, i.e. the undue influencer, who must be
portrayed as a bad person, selfish, aggrandizing and ruthless; (c) the testator could not have truly
intended to sign such a mean-spirited and unfair document and must, therefore, have been
laboring under a delusion; and (d) much more rarely, the will is a forgery and the testator did not,
in fact, sign it. This paper therefore addresses the question of how Plaintiffs counsel can foster
or advance one or more of the foregoing points, and also addresses how different strategies may
be utilized to achieve the goals of the Plaintiff in such litigation.
II. CHOICE OF PARTIES
A. Which Defendants to Sue. Until 1992, the Plaintiff had little choice in who
should be named as a party defendant in a will contest case. KRS 394.260 required that
"...all necessary parties should be brought before the court by the Plaintiff'. That phrase
had been uniformly determined by the courts of Kentucky to refer to all beneficiaries,
e.g., Security Trust Company vs. Swope, Ky., 118 S.W.2d 200 (1938); McComas v. Hull,
Ky., 118 S.W.2d 540 (1938); Russell vs. Grumbley's Executor, 160 S.W.2d 321 (1942).
However, in West vs. Goldstein, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 379 (1992), the Supreme Court in a 4-
3 decision by Justice Leibson, departed from the previous rule. In Goldstein, Plaintiffs
had elected, presumably for strategic reasons, not to join as parties defendant to the
action, two elderly ladies who were the recipients of relatively small specific bequests
1- 1
under the will which Plaintiffs contested. The Plaintiffs' main strategy was to make out
the Defendant as a greedy and controlling presence in the testatrix's life. Apparently they
felt that joining the two elderly specific legatees would tend to dilute that strategy.
Defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the absence of necessary parties; the trial
court overruled. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and held, pursuant to the then
existing precedent, that the omission of the specific legatees as defendants was fatally
defective. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and readmitted the Circuit Court judgment, holding that, at least in the circumstances
presented in Goldstein, the specific legatees were not necessary parties. In dissent,
Justice Lambert commented:
"By omitting certain parties, the contestant can, in effect, permit the jury to
rewrite the will invalidating those bequests which it deems inappropriate, safe in
the kriowledge that proper bequests have been or will be satisfied."
Following Goldstein, it was unclear exactly how far this logic would be extended.
However, in Kesler vs. Shehan, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 254 (1996), the Supreme Court seemed
to offer some clarification. One of the issues in Kesler was whether an appeal was
defective when some ofthe parties adversely affected by the judgment were not named as
parties to the appeal. In holding the appeal defective, the Court noted the rule in
Goldstein did not apply because the omitted parties were residuary beneficiaries rather
than specific legatees and because there was no waiver of rights as against the omitted
legatees. It would therefore appear that the rule in Goldstein will likely only apply where
the omitted beneficiaries are recipients of specific bequests and where the Plaintiff
affirmatively waives all claims against those beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the rule does
clearly give a Plaintiff a leg up, in that as favorable parties such as charities, elderly
1-2
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people, small children, grandchildren or close friends who receive only specific bequests
under a challenged document will not have to be sued. This clearly enables the Plaintiff
the Plaintiff feels are the most attractive targets.
to focus the case (and the subject of the jury's inquiry) solely on the party or parties thatr
r B. Which Plaintiffs Should Be Named. Unlike the parties named as beneficiaries in
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a challenged will, the parties who elect to file suit are not required to be an all inclusive
class. That is, anyone or more of the persons aggrieved by the action of a District Court
in admitting to probate an allegedly defective will has the right to sue individually. See
Security Trust Company, supra (holding that the trial court committed no error in failing
to require the contestants to join all other heirs of the testator as parties). However, as a
practical matter, it is seldom advantageous for a family unit not to speak as one mind on
the issue of contesting the will. That is, it is hard to think of circumstances in which it is
more advantageous for fewer than all of the aggrieved parties to participate in the
litigation. Indeed where fewer than all of the potential will contestants are parties, some
interesting questions arise in the context of potential settlement of the case. Will a
Defendant be willing to settle with some of the heirs while other potential contestants
remain in the wings? If a Defendant insists upon a release from persons who are not
parties to the suit, can the Plaintiffs obtain such releases, or will they necessarily dilute
the available pool of settlement money if they do so? If that problem can be overcome,
what happens if, in fact, other contestants do bring another suit?
r
r
r
\ A.
III. PLEADING STRATEGY
Grounds to Set Aside the Will. Obviously, the pleader will ordinarily set forth
r
r,
as many grounds to challenge the will as the limits of Rule 11 will permit. There is
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seldom any advantage in failing to include any potential ground if there is reasonable
basis for it to be pleaded. In this regard two matters deserve note. The great bulk of will
contest cases are pleaded on the basis of both lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence. Even when one or the other of those grounds appears somewhat weak, it is
usually advantageous to assert both grounds, as a relatively small amount of evidence is
then required to submit both grounds to the jury. The rule, as frequently noted, is that
where there is some evidence of undue influence and some evidence of lack of capacity,
the quantum of proof sufficient to take the case to the jury is less than would be the case
for either grounds standing alone. See Burke vs. Burke, Ky. App., 801 S.W.2d 691
(1990). The second matter is the provision of Civil Rule 9.02 which requires averments
of fraud or mistake to be pleased with particularity as to the circumstances constituting
same. It is a frequent defense ploy to attempt to compel the Plaintiff to specifically aver
the acts of undue influence. Since undue influence, as the cases noted below reflect, is
seldom practiced in the open, to require the Plaintiff to plead it with particularlity can be
burdensome if not impossible. A recitation of the colorable badges of undue influence
which the pleader reasonably believes to exist should suffice.
B. Joinder of Inter Vivos Claims. Frequently the party benefited by a challenged
will has also benefited from inter vivos transactions with the decedent. These may
include outright gifts during the testator's lifetime, the creation of joint survivorship
interests, or questionable transactions made by the wrongdoer while holding a power of
attorney for the deceased. The issue frequently raised is whether causes of action
challenging these transactions may be joined with the will contest case, and perhaps more
significantly, if they can be simultaneously tried with the issues of the will contest.
1-4
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Again, until the Goldstein case it was not at all clear that the Plaintiff could join the inter
vivos claims or try them simultaneously with will contest claims. However, Goldstein,
supra, relying on KRS 24A.120 and CR 18.02, dealing with dependent claims, held that
the trial court properly conducted a combined trial covering all of such issues between the
parties. And from a strategic point ofview, it is almost always to the Plaintiffs benefit to
include all of the claims against the Defendant that one might have. In the normal undue
influence case, Plaintiff desires to paint a picture of the wrongdoer which portrays
him/her as a pervasively self-aggrandizing person. The more questionable or suspicious
transactions that one can point to, the greater the odds of prevailing on the entire case.
Another aspect of the Goldstein decision which is significant is its approval of submitting
for decision in the Circuit Court action, the validity or invalidity of other wills which
were not presented to the District Court. A defensive strategy where numerous
testamentary documents have been executed is to simply fall back to each earlier
document in time in which the Defendant still may participate as a beneficiary. If it is
desired to attack all of those documents, it is much easier to do so in one trial than to have
a series of trials each over the respective prior documents. Under Goldstein, Circuit
Courts now clearly have jurisdiction to entertain a contest of prior wills which were not
acted on by the District Court.
IV. DISCOVERY STRATEGY
A. Timing and Method of Discovery. There is no one set formula for the timing,
nature and sequence of discovery. That is a matter which depends on the individual case
and upon the individual preference of counsel. It is believed, however, that in most cases
it makes more sense to obtain financial and medical records in advance of depositions as
1-5
those materials may furnish the grounds for important lines of inquiry. However, there
are certainly circumstances under which a quick deposition of the adverse party may be
desirable to lock in certain testimony before Defendant's counsel has full knowledge of
the circumstances.
B. Production of Financial Records. In undue influence cases, the Defendant is
almost always involved to some degree in handling money before the testator's death. To
the extent that one can demonstrate inappropriate, inadequately documented,
unauthorized or otherwise suspicious transactions, the case is enhanced. However, it is
not unusual for the Defendant to have discarded those records as he/she is usually in
possession of them at the time of testator's death. Thus, relatively expensive and slow
recovery ofmicrofilm records from banks may be necessary.
C. Production of Medical Records. If the testator had been hospitalized or
regularly saw a physician, it is essential to obtain those records in advance of any medical
depositions. It may also be necessary to obtain such records if one seeks to utilizes the
services of an expert witness on the subject of the testator's mental state at the time of the
will. These records would include not only hospital but private physician records, and a
review of such documents is essential in any case in which the testator's mental state is at
Issue.
v. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES
With today's emphasis on mediation and alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, it is
appropriate for Plaintiffs counsel to consider settlement in virtually every case. Obviously, as a
general rule, only cases where the parties are significantly at odds should be taken to trial.
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However, the reasons underlying the desirability of settlement in will cases is even stronger than
in other types of legal actions, e.g. damage suits. In an action for money damages, the jury is
entitled to fix the elements of damages, frequently compromises between the Plaintiffs demand
and the Defendant's plea for exoneration occur. That is not possible in a will contest case. The
instructions submitted to the jury by the court allow only for the jury to find for or against the
challenged will. The Plaintiff will win everything or will take nothing. Settlement thus holds
benefits for everyone. However, before entering into mediation or other efforts to settle the case
it is obviously important for counsel to evaluate the case as accurately as possible. Attorneys not
familiar with this type of litigation frequently undervalue will cases. Defense counsel may
believe that there is no solid evidence in support of the claims made, that juries are
fundamentally conservative, that the Plaintiff - usually family members - were insufficiently
attentive to the deceased or that they may be easily portrayed as undeserving or greedy.
Obviously it is the job of Plaintiffs counsel to dispel those notions if possible and if not, then to
point out the extent of the Defendant's exposure. Plaintiffs counsel and defense counsel may
somewhat more frequently be able to agree in an evaluation of a case of testamentary incapacity
but may have great difficulty in evaluating claims of undue influence. Defendants will simply
assert that there is no proof of undue influence, that the attorney who wrote the will and
witnesses to the instrument adequately sustain that it was the voluntary act of the testator and
generally that the Plaintiffs case is all smoke and mirrors. On the other hand, Plaintiffs have an
exceedingly powerful weapon in their arsenal- the concept of "badges of undue influence". The
concept has been around for a long time. The case most frequently cited is Belcher vs.
Somerville, Ky. 413 S.W.2d 620 (1967). However, the principal has been restated and
1-7
reaffinned as lately as the 1990 case of Burke vs. Burke, supra. In general, the badges of undue
influence are said to be:
1. A physically weak, mentally impaired testator;
2. An unreasonable will;
3. A lately developed close relationship between the testator and the principal
beneficiary
4. Participation by the beneficiary in the preparation ofthe will;
5. Possession ofthe will by the beneficiary after it is written;
6. Efforts by the beneficiary to restrict contacts between the testator and the natural
objects ofhis/her bounty; and
7. Absolute control of testator's business affairs.
These factors - each of which is merely a circumstance - essentially enables Plaintiffs
counsel to make out a case of undue influence based purely upon circumstantial evidence. In
fact, it is frequently stated in the law that merely the circumstance of an unnatural disposition
when coupled with slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence is sufficient to take the
case to the jury. See Williams vs. Vollman, Ky. App. 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987) and cases cited
therein. Logically, one can conclude that a Defendant may be objectively innocent of
overreaching and yet found culpable given the right set of circumstances. While that may be
true, it does not lessen the legal exposure of the Defendant and for purposes of settlement,
exposure is the crucial point which Plaintiffs counsel will want to hammer on. Again, exposure
can mean the Defendant loses everything, unlike other civil cases where the issue of the degree
of exposure may be the heart of the dispute. To sum up, for purposes of settlement, Plaintiffs
counsel will want to stress two questions:
(a) How will Defendant's conduct appear to the jury? and
1-8
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(b) Do the circumstances of the challenged will pass the "smell test"?
Of course, Plaintiffs counsel must also be aware that each of the circumstances cited
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may have a reasonable explanation. Counsel must also take into account the recent case of Bye
vs. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998) in which the Supreme Court restated at length many
of the traditional principles applicable to undue influence and testanlentary incapacity cases.
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Bye does not really cover any new ground or make any new law, but definitely reiterates the
burdens which the Plaintiff in such a case must bear. Plaintiffs counsel will need to be ready to
fend off the Defendant's attempt to extend Bye and to rely upon it in the settlement process.
r VI. EVIDENCE ISSUES
training or education..." Expert testimony in will contest cases usually involves medical
identical rules and other forms of civil action. Under Kentucky Rules of Evidence,
experts, disputed document experts, accountants or attorney experts.
issue..." and if the witness is "...qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
Use of Experts. The use of expert witnesses in will contests is subject to theA.
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
Section 702, an expert witness's testimony is admissible if the expert's "specializedr
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1. Medical Experts. Use of medical testimony in will contest cases IS
common. However, most medical experts are treating physicians who have actual
knowledge of the testator's condition. Unless the issue of incapacity is clear-cut,
most treating physicians are reluctant to opine as to testator's testamentary
capacity on a given date unless they actually saw the testator on that date.
Therefore, medical experts, generally psychiatrists or neurologists, are frequently
r, utilized to offer an opinion based upon the other medical evidence admissible in
r 1-9
the case as to whether testator possessed testamentary capacity on the date of the
will. To avoid the "ultimate fact" rule, the testimony to be elicited frequently
addresses sub-elements of testamentary capacity, i.e., whether the testator in the
opinion of the expert possessed sufficient mind to know the natural objects of
his/her bounty, the nature and extent of his/her bounty, and was able to formulate
a fixed plan to dispose of the estate. Obviously, the strength of a medical expert's
testimony is no greater than the medical records and other facts upon which the
opinion is based. However, in most cases a medical expert's opinion is well
received by a jury.
2. Disputed Document Experts. If forgery or the substitution of pages in a
will is at issue, a disputed document examiner may be not merely desirable but
necessary to make Plaintiffs case.
3. Accounting Experts. In cases in which undue influence is demonstrated
among other ways, by evidence of the amount of control of the testator's business
affairs, or if there are·a large number of apparently unauthorized or inappropriate
transactions, it is not uncommon to utilize the services of a CPA to schedule all of
the transactions and testify regarding his/her findings. Such an expert can also be
helpful if tracing of funds is necessary as is sometimes required if the wrongdoer
has attempted, consciously or subconsciously, to launder the funds removed from
the decedent's estate prior to death.
4. Legal Experts. A legal expert may be called to clarify for the jury the
process of executing the will and the scrivener's duties with respect thereto. This
evidence is sometimes objected to as irrelevant and most trial courts will not
1- 10
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pennit Plaintiffs counsel to get into the area of whether the scrivener met the
standard of practice in connection with the preparation of the contested will.
However, under the authority ofKesler vs. Shehan, supra, it is clearly appropriate
for such evidence to be used to rebut testimony offered by the scrivener of the
will that he/she was careful about ascertaining whether the will was the product of
undue influence.
B. Proving Lack of Testamentary Capacity. In order to prove testamentary
capacity it is not necessary to adduce evidence from either the testator's treating
physician or physicians or from an expert medical witness. Rather, lay persons who have
had an opportunity to observe the testator's conduct may give opinions as to testator's
mental capacity. This has been the rule in Kentucky since at least the case of Murphy's
Executor vs. Murphy, 142 S.W. 1018 (1912). The view is also consistent with the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence, Section 701, which pennits opinion testimony by lay
witnesses which are rationally based on the witness' perceptions and are helpful for a
clear understanding of the matter in controversy. Therefore, Plaintiffs counsel will need
to investigate, locate and discover individuals who have some foundation or background
of knowledge about the testator and who are willing to express their opinion that based
on their perceptions that the testator did not have the requisite elements of testamentary
capacity. On the other hand, expert opinion alone unsupported by either medical records
or supporting testimony of factual witnesses is insufficient to sustain the Plaintiffs
burden of proof. Fischer vs. Heckennan, Ky., App. 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989). A further
difficulty for the Plaintiff in sustaining a case of testamentary incapacity is the so-called
"lucid interval" rule. Restated in the recent Bye decision, supra, the lucid interval rule
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holds that a generalized or non-specific dementia or condition of mental impairment is
not of itself sufficient to demonstrate that testator lacked testamentary capacity if the
testator had lucid intervals, i.e., periods of time in which the mental impairments abated
and testator could interact, think, reason and speak relatively normally. Anyone with
exposure to individuals suffering from dementia, senility or related neurological deficits
is aware that mental acuity is not a static thing, but frequently varies significantly from
day to day and even from hour to hour. The Plaintiff will frequently have difficulty
finding witnesses, lay or expert, who have knowledge of the testator's precise mental
state at the time of execution of a will. The issue normally devolves to an inquiry as to
whether the testator ever had lucid intervals after a given point in time which, to assist the
Plaintiffs case, must be answered in the negative. Other than testimony of witnesses,
other frequently employed techniques to demonstrate lack of capacity involve medical
records, particularly hospital or nursing home records, which reflect disorientation,
confusion, forgetfulness, dementia or conduct or activities inconsistent with normal
mental functioning, i.e. aggressive behavior, wandering, inability to perform simple
mental tasks, etc. Nurses' notes and observations from medical charts are frequently full
of these sorts of episodes which can be most helpful to the Plaintiffs case.
C. Proof of Undue Influence. As discussed above, proof of undue influence is
normally based upon evidence tending to establish the presence of one or more of the
badges of undue influence. Another aspect of undue influence which is usually found is
the existence of a confidential, i.e. fiduciary or quasi fiduciary, relationship between the
Defendant and the testator. Undue influence is never presumed, however, no matter how
strong the relationship between the parties, as the Bye case has re-emphasized. However,
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the reliance, dependence and vulnerability components of the relationship are strong
evidence, if coupled with other aspects of overreaching. As the cases recite, undue
influence is a species of fraud and is rarely practiced in daylight; e.g. see McKinney vs.
Montgomery, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 719 (1952). Furthermore, each component relied upon to
establish the undue influence may well be insufficient standing alone; however, it is the
effect of all the circumstances taken together which show the undue influence. Walls vs.
Walls, Ky. 99 S.W. 969 (1907). Other aspects or components of proof of undue
influence are discussed in Section V above.
D. Declarations of the Deceased. It is uniformly held that direct declarations of the
deceased, whether offered by interested parties or not, are admissible in a will contest in
order to demonstrate the relationship between the parties, the susceptibility of the
decedent to undue influence, the testator's state of mind, and possible other relevant
issues. Hall vs. Childress, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 398 (1967); Welch's Administrator vs.
Clifton, Ky., 1725 S.W.2d 221 (1943). However, those authorities hold that such
declarations while admissible, are not themselves direct evidence of undue influence.
Hence, a case cannot be pitched solely upon the statement that for example the testator
said, "Momma made me write that will". However, such testimony would be admissible
for the purpose of showing susceptibility to undue influence and, in one Kentucky case,
the testimony that the testator had made a will to "keep down the hell at home" was held
admissible; Powell vs. Powell's Administrator, Ky., 78 S.W.2d 152.
E. Testimony by Counsel for Defendants. A rather interesting problem which
occurs with amazing frequency is where the scrivener of the will represents the
Defendant executor in the probate proceeding in District Court, and also represents the
1-13
Defendant in the will contest action in the Circuit Court. Thus, the attorney, who is
clearly a material witness, is also actively defending the Circuit Court action. This would
appear to be a violation of Rule 3.7(a) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct,
which requires that a lawyer not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to
be a necessary witness. While the Rule states several exceptions, none would appear to
be applicable. Nevertheless, many attorneys rely on Adams vs. Flora, 445 S.W.2d 420
(1969), as grounds to remain in the role of attorney for the Defendant in the will contest
case. The Adams case has not been overruled and whether its holding has been abrogated
by the above cited disciplinary rule is yet to be determined by the Supreme Court. That
point aside, however, counsel for Plaintiff will also need to consider the practical aspect
of the situation. Is it better to make a motion to disqualify Defendant's counselor is it
more advantageous to Plaintiffs case to put the adversary in the unseemly position of
being crossed-examined during a trial at which defense counsel is serving as an active
advocate? That is a decision which, in consultation with the client, will need to be made
on a case by case basis.
F. Evidence Post-dating the Contested Will. As a general and broadly stated rule,
evidence of events or circumstances which occur after the date of the challenged will is
not relevant. However, this rule must be taken in context of the nature of the case. For
purposes of testamentary capacity, clearly the testator's condition at a remote time after
the will was executed has no bearing on the condition at the time of the will. However,
some cases have permitted medical evidence of circumstances within a brief time after
the execution of the will, i.e. days or weeks, as likely indicating mental condition as of
the date of the will. The point is buttressed if the medical expert is able or willing to state
1- 14
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that the condition could not have changed to any great degree in the interim. In an undue
influence case, however, there is somewhat more latitude and a greater probability of
admission of evidence occurring after the date of the wilL This is because one must
differentiate between direct evidence of undue influence on one hand and circumstances
on the other hand, some of which occur after the date of the will, which nonetheless may
indicate that undue influence existed at the time of the will's making. For example, at
least two of the commonly stated badges of undue influence clearly imply conduct or
actions after the date of the will - possession of the will by the undue influencer and
keeping the testator in seclusion. At least one foreign case has held that evidence of a
spouse's indifference to the testator's welfare and her disposition to exercise undue
influence (which occurred more than two years after the will was admissible). See Neill
vs. Brackette, Mass., 135 N.E. 690 (1922). Therefore, the Rule might be able to be stated
as follows: the undue influence must affect the will and therefore must have occurred on
or before its making, but the evidence that undue influence was exercised may be based
upon circumstances which exist or occur after the date of the will's making.
VII. CONCLUSION
It can reasonably be argued that will contest litigation is just like any other fonn of
litigation and is or should be the province of litigators as opposed to probate or estate attorneys.
However, it is submitted that a stronger case can be made that the specific substantive and
procedural rules applicable to will contests are quite different from garden variety criminal or
civil cases; and that this type of litigation should be considered more appropriately as a facet of
probate and estate law. It is clear that strategies for success in such litigation are relatively
unique, given the great weight placed on circumstantial evidence, the nuances of family
1- 15
relationships, the winner-take-all-nature of such cases and the extraordinary emotional context in
which many of these cases take place. For some light reading on the subject, consider "In the
Presence of Enemies ", a novel by William J. Coughlin (St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1993).
Although it slightly gives away the story, you might find it interesting to know that the young
probate lawyer was victorious over the old, grizzled trial lawyer.
1- 16
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CONTESTED ESTATES: Preserving the Will Against Attack
I. OVERVIEW
Husband widowed after 53 years of marriage in February 1985, moved from Ohio to Pike
County in June 1985, and decided to remarry several weeks later to woman he had not
known previously. Remarried on July 20; executed new will on July 27 leaving
everything to her; died August 17. Two children challenged new will on grounds of
undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity; conflicting evidence concerning
whether testator began drinking heavily and was incapacitated by grief after fIrst wife's
death. Jury found "the document probated was not the will of' the decedent. Widow
appealed that there was a "complete lack" of evidence of either undue influence or
incapacity. Court of Appeals affIrmed, although acknowledging that "we are not
unmindful of the possibility that the jury invalidated this will simply because it seemed
unfair."
Court candidly notes "A survey of the law on this subject yields a series of
contradictory statements and policies. On the one hand courts stoutly proclaim the
policy of carrying out the wishes of the deceased, even if they are arbitrary or
unfair.... The testator must have suffIcient mind to know his property, the objects of his
bounty and his duties to them ... ; but he is perfectly free to ignore the latter if he is
otherwise of sound mind. 'Every man possessing the requisite mental powers may
dispose of his property by will in any way he may desire, and a jury will not be permitted
to overthrow it, and to make a will for him to accord with their ideas of justice and
propriety.' ... There must be some specifIc evidence of circumstances from which it can
be reasonably inferred that undue influence was in fact exercised.... To justify setting
aside a will the influence exercised must be such that it 'obtains dominion over the mind
of the testator to such an extent as to destroy his free agency in the disposal of his estate,
and constrains him to do that which he would not have done if left to the free exercise of
his judgment.' ...
"After issuing these stern admonitions, however, the law reverses itself
somewhat to lower the contestant's burden of proof when allegations of undue
influence are coupled with an unequal or unnatural disposition, allegations of
mental incapacity, or both•... '[W]hen slight evidence of the exercise of undue
influence and the lack of mental capacity is coupled with evidence of an unequal or
unnatural disposition, it is enough to take the case to the jury.''' (Citations omitted.)
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989) (reversing dismissal of will
contest)
Decedent suffered heart attack and stroke on February 7, 1986, and executed will during
hospital stay on February 14, 1986. He died on April 8, 1986, leaving none of $1 million
J - 1
estate to his two surviving relatives, who challenged will based on lack of mental
capacity and undue influence by one or more of the beneficiaries. After trial court
granted summary judgment to beneficiaries, Court of Appeals reversed on both grounds.
As to lack of capacity, Court ruled that expert testimony should have been
permitted to address effects of medical developments on testator's capacity because those
effects "are beyond the pale of common knowledge." Moreover, Court held that there
was a genuine issue of fact about capacity presented by lay testimony.
• Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987) (reversing dismissal of will
contest)
Testator died at 91 on February 19, 1985. Both testator's wife and one daughter had died
in May 1984, and testator had never been told. Appellant, a granddaughter, challenged
the will prepared four or five months before testator's death by her cousin, a grandson, on
grounds of lack of mental capacity and undue influence. The will disinherited the
testator's only living child and all of his grandchildren except one, to whom the testator
left his house and an adjoining lot to the grandson. After trial court granted"directed
verdict to grandson on grounds that there was no evidence of probative value of mental
incapacity or undue influence, Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that there was
evidence of undue influence.
B. After:
• Bye v. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998) (will contest unsuccessful)
Elderly testator's wife dies in March 1989, and he hires appellant as housekeeper in May
1989. In July 1989, accompanied by appellant, testator executes new will leaving her
entire estate except for $100. In July 1990, testator is adjudged partially disabled, and a
limited guardian is appointed for him. In September 1990, he is admitted to hospital and
diagnosed suffering from Alzheimer's disease. Thereafter, petition filed with
Breckinridge District Court seeking to allow testator to marry appellant. At May 1991
hearing, testator testifies that he was misled about petition, he does not want to marry
appellant, and he is afraid of her. Court denies petition, and appellant is terminated as
housekeeper. In October 1991, testator executes new will, leaving estate to second
cousin and brother-in-law. Testator dies in August 1992, and appellant challenges
October 1991 will. Jury unanimously decides against appellant, and Supreme Court
affirms despite 1990 adjudication of partial disability.
"'Kentucky is committed to the doctrine of testatorial absolutism.' ... The practical effect
of this doctrine is that the privilege of the citizens of the Commonwealth to draft wills to
dispose of their property is zealously guarded by the courts and will not be disturbed
based on remote or speculative evidence....
"Given this Court's consistent attitude toward the virtually absolute right of the citizens
J-2
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of the Commonwealth to make wills, it would be incongruous for us now to announce a
new rule of law which restricted these rights which we have held in such high regard for
so long. While the clear policy of the Commonwealth is that our citizens who are
no longer able to fully care for themselves must be protected from the various
societal predators, we will restrict their testamentary rights only when it is
absolutely necessary and even then only to the degree required to defend their
interests."
• See also Wallace v. Scott, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 439 (1992) (will contest
unsuccessful)
Widow involved in litigation beginning in 1955 with her two children after she paid half
of the purchase price but was made only one-third owner under the deed. Upon
resolution of that litigation, she stated "That's the last they'll ever get off me." Shortly
afterwards, man began working on the farm, and ten years later he moved into the house
with her. In 1973, widow prepared will, and prepared codicil in 1975, leaving life estate
to man, with remainder to Methodist Home. After she died in 1988, two children
challenged will based upon lack of mental capacity and exercise of undue influence.
Trial court granted summary judgment and Court of Appeals affirmed (even after
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991».
Court noted "appellants were unable to discover any evidence of sufficient
probative value to demonstrate even the slightest indication of lack of mental capacity."
Court emphasized that "The burden of proof is on contestants ... to overcome the
presumption of capacity by substantial evidence." Likewise, reviewing the "badges" of
. undue influence enumerated in Golladay v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904 (1955), court
again noted that "the burden of proof is on appellants to establish undue influence with
evidence of substance," and found no basis for such a finding.
II. SUMMARY OF WILL CONTEST PROCEDURES
A. Requirements For Making a Will:
"To validly execute a will, a testator must: (1) know the natural objects of her bounty; (2) know
her obligations to them; (3) know the character and value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her
estate according to her own fixed purpose." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 455.
B. Procedure For Contesting a Will:
In circuit court, within two years of district court's probate action; must name all
beneficiaries who are "necessary parties"; may restrain further distributions.
KRS 394.240(1): "Any person aggrieved by the action of the district court in admitting a will to
record or rejecting it may bring an original action in the circuit court of the same county to
contest the action of the district court. Such action shall be brought within two (2) years after the
J-3
decision of the district court."
• A person. is "aggrieved" so as to create standing only if the will deprives the person of some
benefit the person would otherwise receive, such as by intestacy or under a previous will.
Wells v. Salyers, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 392 (1970); Egbert v. Egbert, Ky., 217 S.W. 365 (1920).
• Although Kentucky law formerly required that all beneficiaries must be named as parties in a
will contest, that is no longer required under KRS 394.260. West v. Goldstein, Ky., 830
S.W.2d 379 (1992) (contestant must only name a beneficiary who is a "necessary party"
within meaning of CR 19.01).
• Statute further provides that "The parties may, in the same action, or in a separate action if
the validity of the will is not in issue, seek construction, interpretation or reformation of a
will." West v. Goldstein, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1992) (unlike previous statutory
framework, a will contest suit is "no longer strictly limited to whether the particular
instrument probated or rejected in the district court is the will of the testator").
Cf. Mullins v. First American Bank, Ky. App., 781 S.W.2d 527, 528 (1989)
(upholding circuit court decision that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on validity of
codicil neither admitted nor rejected by district court; "it should be clear that the
statutes, read together, require (1) that all proceedings for the admission to
probate of a will or codicil be commenced in the district court; (2) that the district
court must either admit or reject the instrument; and (3) that the district court
retains jurisdiction over the matter until such time as a will contest, or adversary
proceeding, is commenced in the circuit court."
• Pursuant to KRS 394.240, contestant should lodge notice of the action "in the office of the
county clerk of the county in which the will was admitted to probate or rejected," but failure
to do so will not justify dismissal, Justice v. Conn, Ky. App., 724 S.W.2d 227 (1987),
discussed in West v. Goldstein, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 379,381 (1992).
C. Restraining Further Distributions
KRS 394.250: "An action filed in the circuit court, pursuant to KRS 394.240, shall not, unless
taken within twelve (12) months from the entry of the district court's order, prevent the
appointment of an administrator or executor by the district court or the settlement, distribution,
and division of the decedent's estate. The circuit court in which proceedings are pending may
make an order restraining the further distribution and division of the estate....."
D. Removal of Personal Representative
KRS 395.160: The district court may remove a personal representative for several reasons,
including the personal representative becoming "incapable to discharge the trust." This has been
construed to include mismanagement of the estate. Stafford's Exrs v. Spradlin, Ky., 193 S.W.2d
J-4
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474 (1946). The Circuit Court presumably has this power also, see Mullins v. First American
Bank, Ky. App., 781 S.W.2d 527 (1989) (apparently holding that filing of a will contest action
vests the Circuit Court with jurisdiction over all probate matters related to the proceeding until
the conclusion of the action).
III. GROUNDS FOR CONTESTING A WILL
"Merely being an older person, possessing a failing memory, momentary
forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in
conversation does not render one incapable of validly executing a will.
... 'Every man possessing the requisite mental powers may dispose of
his property by will in any way he may desire, and a jury will not be
permitted to overthrow it, and to make a will for him to accord with their
ideas ofjustice and propriety"" Bye v. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451,
455-56 (1998) (citations omitted).
A. Lack of Capacity
"The inquiry as to capacity is three-fold. First, did the testator know the natural objects of his
bounty, and his obligations to them. Second, could he make a rational survey of his estate.
Third, did he dispose of that estate according to a fixed plan of his own." Fischer v. Heckerman,
Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing Bennett v. Kissinger, 231 S.W.2d 74, 75 (1950).
Bye Raises "Rebuttable" Burden ofProofto Great Heights:
"The burden is placed upon those who seek to overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of
capacity.... The presumption created is a rebuttable one, so that evidence which demonstrates
conclusively that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will
results in nullifying that will." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 456, citing Warnick v. Childers, Ky., 282
S.W.2d 608, 609 (1955); Pfuelb v. Pfuelb, 275 Ky. 588, 122 S.W.2d 128 (1938).
that sounds manageable, but ..•
"In Kentucky there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate
testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest showing
of incapacity." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 455, citing Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738
S.W.2d 849 (1987); Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
"The degree of mental capacity required to make a will is minimal. ... The minimum
level of mental capacity required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a
deed, ... or a contract." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 455, citing Nance v. Veazey, Ky., 312
S.W.2d 350, 354 (1958); Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69 (1965); Warnick v.
Childers, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608 (1955).
J-5
-- Accord, Warren v. Sanders, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1956) ("Testamentary
capacity requires a lower degree of mental capacity than contractual or business
capacity, especially so where the plan of the testamentary disposition in the will
and codicil at hand was so simple and uncomplicated. [Citations omitted.] And
mere weakness of mental power will not prevent a person from making a valid
will.").
and "minimal" really means "minimal"...
"Appellant seeks to have the 1991 will declared invalid as it was executed following the
1990 adjudgment of partial incapacity. While a ruling of total or partial disability
certainly is evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity, it is certainly not dispositive of
the issue. This Court has upheld the rights of those afflicted with a variety of illnesses
to execute valid wills. Tate v. Tate's Ex'r, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 597 (1955) (testator suffered
deafness and retarded speech); Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393, 12 S.W. 762 (1889) (testator
was blind); In re: McDaniel's Will, 25 Ky. 331 (1929) (testator was paralyzed); Bodine
v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706,44 S.W.2d 840 (1932) (testator was an epileptic). We have not
disturbed the testatorial privileges of those who believed in witchcraft ... spiritualism ...
or atheism.... While none of these cases absolutely parallels the instant case, we recite
them here to demonstrate how this Court has always taken the broadest possible view of
who may draft a will no matter what their infirmity." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 456.
especially with application of "lucid interval doctrine"...
Evidence of "lucid interval" may permit probate of will by otherwise incapable testator.
"When a testator is suffering from a mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms of its
effect on the testator's mental competence, it is presumed that the testator was inentally fit
when the will was executed. This is commonly referred to as the lucid interval doctrine."
Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 456 (citations omitted).
"In the present case there is no question that Mr. McQuady suffered
from Alzheimers disease. Accordingly, under the doctrine he is presumed to
have been experiencing a lucid interval during the execution of the will....
Appellant has failed to offer this Court evidence which demonstrates that the
testator did not have a lucid interval during which he executed the 1991 will. In
sum, let it suffice to say that in the instant case a presumption of a lucid interval
of testamentary capacity was appropriate." [d.
B. Undue Influence
What it is:
"Undue influence is a level of persuasion which destroys the testator's free will and replaces it
with the desires of the influencer." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457. "In discerning whether influence
on a given testator is 'undue,' courts must examine both the nature and the extent of the
J-6
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influence.... The essence of this inquiry is whether the testator is exercising her own judgment."
• "First, the influence must be of a type which is inappropriate."
• "Influence from acts of kindness, appeals to feeling, or arguments addressed to the
understanding of the testator are permissible." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457.
- See,~, Sivils v. Bank One. Lexington. N.A., No. 95-CI-4050 (Fayette Cir. Ct.
Fourth Div. June 25, 1999) (granting summary judgment and dismissing will
contest alleging undue influence by Birmingham-Southern College; finding no
evidence supporting any "badges of undue influence" and concluding "All of
these actions are typical of fund-raising efforts by universities when a
contributor has a history of giving to the institution. If the Court were to find
that these actions were undue influence, no university or other charitable
institution could ever send out a fund-raising letter and follow-up thank-you
letters.").
• "Influence from threats, coercion and the like are improper and not permitted by the
law." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457, citing Lucas v. Cannon, 76 Ky. 650 (1878).
• "Second, the influence must be of a level that vitiates the testator's own free will so
that the testator is disposing of her property in a manner that she would otherwise
refuse to do." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457, citing See v. See, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 225 (1956);
Rough v. Johnson, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 376 (1955).
"Undue influence is a subtle thing and can rarely be shown by direct proof. In many instances
the facts and circumstances leading up to the execution of the desired instrument must be relied
upon to establish its existence." Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74 (1965), quoting
McKinney v. Montgomery, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 719 (1952).
When it must have been exercised:
"[Al contestant must also show influence prior to or during the execution of the will.... The
influence must operate upon the testator at the execution of the will. If the influence did not
[a]ffect the testator, then such conduct is irrelevant. Bodine v. Bodine, 241Ky. 706,44 S.W.2d
840 (1932); Walls v. Walls, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 948, 99 S.W. 969 (1907). However, even if the
influence occurred many years prior to the execution of the will, but operates upon the testator at
the time of execution, it is improper and will render the will null and void. Id."
"Badges ofundue influence":
"To determine whether a will reflects the wishes of the testator, the court must examine the
indicia or badges of undue influence." Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457. "Such badges include:
"a physically weak and mentally impaired testator,
J-7
"a will which is unnatural in its provisions,
• "The burden of proof is on appellees, as proponents of the will, to explain the
disposition. Gibson v. Gipson, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 927,929 (1968); and Sutton v.
Combs, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (1976). There is not, however, a per se unnatural
will. Clark v. Johnson, 268 Ky. 591, 105 S.W.2d 576, 580 (1937). Instead, it is a
factual issue which can be explained satisfactorily by proponents. Nunn [v.
Williams, Ky.,] 254 S.W.2d [698,] at 700 [(1953)]." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky.
App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1989).
"a recently developed and comparatively short period of close relationship between the testator
and principal beneficiary,
"participation by the principal beneficiary in the preparation of the will,
"possession of the will by the principal beneficiary after it was reduced to writing,
"efforts by the principal beneficiary to restrict contacts between the testator and the natural
objects of his bounty, and
"absolute control of testator's business affairs." [d. citing Belcher v. Somerville, Ky., 413
S.W.2d 620 (1967); Golladay v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1955).
C. Insufficient Age, Improper Execution or Revocation
KRS 394.020 •• Persons competent to make - What may be disposed of: Any person of
sound mind and eighteen (18) years of age or over may by will dispose of any estate, right, or
interest in real or personal estate that he may be entitled to at his death, which would otherwise
descend to his heirs or pass to his personal representatives, even though he becomes so entitled
after the execution of his will.
KRS 394.040 - Requisites of a valid will: No will is valid unless it is in writing with the name
of the testator subscribed thereto by himself, or by some other person in his presence and by his
direction. If the will is not wholly written by the testator, the subscription shall be made or the
will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two (2) credible witnesses, and in the
presence of each other.
• Proponent of the will must establish due execution of the will. Williams v. Vollman,
Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 850 (1987).
• "If a will (or, in this case, a codicil) appears rational, proof of proper execution
creates a presumption of its legality." Cruse v. Leary, Ky. App., 727 S.W.2d408,
411 (1987), citing Simpson v. Sexton, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 803 (1958).
J-8
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I'
I
I
I
r
r
,.
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
IV. ADDITIONAL PRACTICE ISSUES
A. Burden of Contest May Be Easier If Multiple Grounds for Contesting Will
• "There is authority for the proposition that mere assertion of challenges based upon
both undue influence and lack of capacity makes it easier for contestants to get to the
jury. Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69 (1965); and Gibson [v. Gipson, Ky.,]
426 S.W.2d [927,] at 928 [(1968)]. But the evidence presented must not merely be a
scintilla. It must be of sufficient character, substance, and weight to furnish a firm
foundation for a jury's verdict." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642,
646 (1989).
• "When a contest is pitched on both mental incapacity and undue influence, evidence
that tends to show both need not be as convincing as would be essentialto prove one
or the other alone." Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74 n.l (1965), quoting
Roland v. Eibeck, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 37 (1964).
• "[A]n unequal or unnatural disposition by itself is not enough to show undue
influence, but when coupled with slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence
... it is sufficient to take the case to the jury." Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738
S.W.2d 849, 851 (1987), quoting Bennett v. Bennett, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 580, 582
(1970).
• "[W]here there is gross inequality in the disposition of the estate among the natural
objects of testator's bounty, or where the will is unnatural, such facts, when
unexplained and when corroborated by even slight evidence of want of testamentary
capacity, or of undue influence, are sufficient to take the case to the jury." Pardue v.
Pardue, Ky., 227 S.W.2d 403,406 (1950), quoting Allen v. Henderson, Ky., 184
S.W.2d 885, 886 (1945).
B. Lay Witnesses And Expert Testimony
1. Lay testimony
• Declarations of the testator are generally admissible. Atherton v. Goslin, Ky., 239
S.W. 771 (1922). The Dead Man's Statute, KRS 421.210(2), does not apply to will
contest cases, so the parties may freely testify about their relations, conversations and
transactions with the testator. Gay v. Gay, Ky., 215 S.W.2d 92 (1948).
• Opinion testimony about capacity from lay witnesses is admissible so long as
opinions are based on facts which themselves are both admissible and sufficient to
support finding of capacity or incapacity. See Hendren v. Brown, Ky., 364 S.W.2d
329, 332 (1962) ("opinion testimony as to the mental capacity of [the testator] is
J-9
admissible to the extent it is based upon observable conditions"); Warren v. Sanders,
Ky., 287 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1956) ("Opinions of witnesses are insufficient to take a
will contest case to the jury, unless the facts upon which the opinions are based tend
to establish lack of mental capacity.") (citation omitted).
• A wide range of proof involving the testator's background and relations with the
parties is allowed in undue influence cases. Welch's Administrator v. Clifton, Ky.,
172 S.W.2d 221 (1943).
2. Expert testimony
• Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989) (testator suffered heart
attack and stroke on February 7, 1986, and executed will during hospital stay on
February 14, 1986. He died on April 8, 1986, leaving none of $1 million estate to his
two surviving relatives, who challenged will based on lack of mental capacity and
undue influence by one or more of the beneficiaries. Court of Appeals ruled that
expert testimony should have been permitted to address effects of medical
developments onlestator's capacity because those effects "are beyond the pale of
common knowledge").
V. SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
From West v. Goldstein, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 379 (1992) (Westerfield, Jeff. Cir. Ct.), which are drawn from
2 J. S. Palmore & R. W. Eades, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, § 50.01-.03, at 393-95 (4th ed. 1989).
Instruction No.1: For purposes of these instructions:
1) A person has testamentary capacity in making a will if at the time of its execution
she has such mental capacity as to enable her to know the natural objects of her bounty,
her obligation to them, the character and value of her estate, and to dispose of it
according to a fixed purpose of her own.
2) Undue influence is any influence obtained over the mind of the deceased to such
an extent as to destroy her free agency and lead her to do against her will what she would
otherwise refuse to do, whether exerted at one time or another, directly or indirectly, if it
so operated upon her mind at the time she signed the paper. [But any reasonable
influence resulting from acts of kindness or from appeals to the feeling or understanding,
and not destroying free agency, is not undue influence.]
Interrogatory No.1:
Do you believe from the evidence that Pretty Polly lacked testamentary capacity at the
time she executed the Will dated July 18, 1999 or that she was induced by undue
influence exerted upon her by Snidely Whiplash to sign the Will? YESINO __
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Mary Ruth BYE, Appellant,-v.-
Sylvia Ann MATrINGLY, Successor Ad.
ministratrIx Cum, Testa~ento Annexo,
of the Estate of William Louis McQua.
dy, Richard Keith Mcquady, an~ Acra-
cia G. Beavin, Appellees. -
No. 97-8C-20S-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Sept. 8, 1998.
Testator's fonner housekeeper brought
action against executor of testator's estate
and beneficiaries, challenging validity of will
on grounds of undue influence and .lack of
testamentary capacity. The Breckinridge Cir-
cuit Court, Ronnie C. Dortch, J., upheld will.
Fonner housekeeper appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 1996 WL 531751, affirmed. After
granting discretionary review, the Supreme
Court, StePl1ens, C.J., held that: (1) pursuant
to presumption arising under lucid interval
doctrine, testator had requisite testamentary
capacity; (2) will was not result of undue
influence; and (3) any error resulting from
permitting judge for same circuit to testify as
rebuttal character witness for attorney, after
fonner housekeeper sought to discredit will
by discrediting attorney as c;Irafter, was
hannless.
Affirmed.
Wintersheimer, J., concurred in the re-
sult. -- .
1. Wills e=>52(3)
Pursuant to presumption arising under
lUcid interval doctrine, testator who suffered
from Alzheimer's disease and had been ad-
jUdged partially disabled had requisite testa-
mentary capacity at time he executed con-
tested will, given failure of party challenging
will's validity to show that testator did not
have lucid period at will execution.
2. Wills e=>52(l)
There is a strong presumption in favor
of a testator possessing adequate testamen-
tary capacity which can only be rebutted by
the strongest showing of incapacity.
3. Wills e=>53(2)
Testamentary capacity is only relevant
at the time of execution of a will.
4. Wills e=>21 -
Any order purporting tp render a person
per se unable to dispose of property by will is
void ab initio, as such a ruling on test.amenta.
ry capacity would be prema~.
5. Wills e=>53<'l)
Kentucky is committed to the doctrine of
testatorial absolutism, whose practical effect
is that the privilege of ci~Ds to draft wills
to dispose- of their property'is zealously
guarded by the courts and will not be dis·
turbed based on remote or speculative evi-
dence.
6. Wills ~31
Degree of mental capacity required to
make a will is minimal.
7. Wi~ls e=>31
Minimum level of mental capacity re-
quired to make a will is less than that neces-
sary to make a deed or a contract.
8. ;Wills e=>50
To validly execute a will, a testator must
(1) know the natural objects of her bounty,
(2) know her obligations to them, (3) know
the character and value of her estate, and (4)
dispose of her estate according to her own
fixed purpose.
9. Wills e=>31, 32, 47
Merely being an older person, possess-
ing a failing memory, momentary forgetful-
ness, weakness of mental powers or lack of
strict coherence in conversation does not ren-
der one incapable of validly executing a will
10. Wills e=>316.2
Every man possessing the requisite
mental powers may dispose of his property
by will in any way he may desire, and a jury
will not be pennitted to overthrow it, and to
make a will for him to accord with their ideas
of justice and propriety.
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11. Wills e=>24
While a ruling of total or partial disabili-
ty is evidence of a lack of testamentary ca-
pacity, it is not dispositive of the issue.
12. Wills e=>52(3)
Under "lucid interval doctrine," when a
testator is suffering from a mental .illness
which ebbs and flows in terms of its effect on
the testator's mental competence, it is pre-
sumedthat the testator was mentally fit
when the will was executed.
See publication Words and p~
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions,
13. Wills e=>52(l)
Burden is placed upon those who seek to
overturn a will to demonstrate the lack of
testamentary capacity.
14. Wills e=>52(3)
Presumption of testamentary 'capacity
created under· lucid interval doctrine is a
rebuttable one, so that evidence which· dem-
onstrates conclusively that the testator
lacked testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of the will results in nullifying
that will.
15. Wills e=>156, 158
Testator's will was not result of undue
influence; although testator suffered from
partial disability when will was executed and
beneficiary, as testator's limited conservator
and guardian, had complete control of testa-
tor's affairs, no other indicia of undue influ-
ence existed
16. Wills e=>155.1
"Undue influence" is a level of persua-
sion which destroys the testator's free will
and replaces it with the desires of the influ-
encer.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions.
17. Wills e=>155.2·
In discerning whether influence .on a
given testator is "undue," courts must exam-
ine both the nature and the extent of the
influence.
J - 12
18. Wills e=>155.2, 155.4
To be ''undue'' influence, influence on
testator must be of a type which is inappro-
priate; influence from acts of kindness, ap-
peals to feeling, or arguments addressed to
the understanding of the testator are permis-
sible.
19. Wills e=>155.3
Influence on testator from threats, coer-
cion and the like are improper and not per-
mitted by the law.
20. Wills e=>159
To be "undue" influence on testator, in-
fluence must be of a level that vitiates the
testator's own free will so that the testator is
disposing of her property in a manner that
she would otherwise refuse to do.
21. Wills e=>155.1
:Essence of undue influence inquiry is
whether the testator is exercising her own
judgment.
22. Wills e=>155.1
In addition to demonstratiDg that undue
influence was exercised upon ·the testator, a
contestant asserting undue influence must
also show influence occurring prior to or
during the execution of the will; undue influ-
ence exercised after the execution of the will
has no bearing whatsoever upon whether the
testator disposed of her property according
to her own wishes.
23. Wills ¢::>159
To support undue influence claim, influ-
ence must operate upon the testator at the
execution of the will; if the influence did not
affect the testator, then such conduct is irrel-
evant.
24. Wills ¢::>159
Even if undue influence occurred many
years prior to the execution of the will, but
operates upon the testator at the time of
execution, it is improper and will render the
will null and void.
25. Wills ¢::>155.1, 156
To determine whether a will reflects the
wishes of the testator, the court must exam-
ine the indicia or badges of undue influence,
including a physically weak and mentally im-
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paired testator, a will which is unnatural in
its provisions, a recently developed and com-
paratively short period of close relationship
between the testator and principal beneficia-
ry, participation by the principal beneficiary
in the preparation of the will, possession of
the will by the principal beneficiary after ;it
was reduced to writing, efforts by the princi-
pal beneficiary to restrict contacts Qatween
the testator and the natural objects of his
bounty, and absolute control of testator's
business affairs.
26. Wills e=:>163(l)
When a contestant seeks to claim that
undue influence was employed upon a testa-
tor, the burden is upon the contestant to
demonstrate the existence and effect of the
influence.
27. Wills e=:>163(l)
Merely demonstrating that the opportu-
nity to exert undue influence existed is not
sufficient to sustain the burden of proving
that such influence was exerted,
28. Wills e=:>156
When undue influence and a mentally
impaired testator are b9th alleged and the
mental impairment of the testator:. is proven,
the level of undue influence which must be
shown is less than would nonnally be re-
quired since the testator is in a weakened
state.
29. Wills e=:>163(2)
No presumption of undue influence
arises from a bequest by a testator who has a
confidential relationship with the beneficiary.
30. Wills e=:>163(2)
When a testator has a confidential rela-
tj.onship with one who receives a benefit un-
der a will, such a transaction should be exam-
ined and placed into evidence before the jury,
but no presumption of wrongdoing is created.
31. Guardian and Ward e=:>69
Contract between a guardian and ward
creates a presumption against the transac-
tion which must be rebutted by the guardian
with clear and convincing evidence.
Ky. 453
32. Wills e=:>393.1
Supreme Court is particularly disin-
clined to set aside a jury's decision in which
it has found a will to be valid.
33. Wills e=:>163(4)
Presumption of undue influence arising
from grossly unreasonable will in which prin-
cipal beneficiary actively participated in will's
execution did not apply to will in which bene-
~ciary's participation was merely, to drive
testator to and from lawyer's offices.
34. Wills e=:>163(4)
In those instances in which a will is
grossly unreaSonable and the principal bene-
ficiary actively participated in its execution, a
presumption of undue influence arises.
35. Wills e=:>163(4)
If the will contestant can offer evidence
that will is grossly unreasonable and princi-
pal beneficiary actively participated in its
et'ecution, then the burden of persuasion on
undue influence claim shifts to the propo-
nents of· the will, bt~.t it does not relieve the
contestants of the continuing burden of
proof,
36. Wills e=:>400
Atly error resulting from pennitting
judge for same circuit to testify as rebuttal
character witness for attorney, after will con-
testant sought to discredit will by discredit-
ing attorney as drafter, was harmless, given
that judge was subpoenaed by will propo-
nents, and thus his testimony was pennissi-
ble under ethical rules, and testimony was
relatively brief and limited in scope. Sup.Ct.
Rules, Rule 4.300, Code of Jud.Conduct, Can-
on 2, subd. B.
O. Grant Bruton, Louisville, Kentucky, for
appellant.
Kenton R. Smith, Steven R. Crebessa,
Brandenburg, Kentucky, for appellees.
STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
The testator, William Louis McQuady, and
Alberta Beavin McQuady were married for
forty-five years prior to Ms. McQuady's
death on March 23, 1989. In October of
1988, the McQuadys executed identical wills
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which left the surviving spouse in possession
of the entire estate. In the event that there
was no surviving spouse, all realty was to
pass to Richard Keith McQuady, a second
cousin once removed to William McQuady,
and all personalty was to pass to Samuel
Thomas Beavin, brother of Alberta Beavin
McQuady. Accordingly, on Ms. McQuady's
death, the .entire estate passed to Mr.
McQuady.
Following his wife's death, Mr. McQuady
retained Mary Ruth Bye, appellant in this
matter, to act as his housekeeper. Mr.
McQuady was unable to. see and required
assistan~ to pvercome this disability. Dur-
ing their marriage, Ms. McQuady had per-
formed all tasks related to maintaining the
household and Ms. Bye Was to perform theSe
tasks as part of her duties. Ms. Bye as-
sumed her position as housekeeper in May of
1989.
On July 17,1989, Mr. McQuady, accompa-
nied by Ms. Bye, visited Herbert O'Reilly of
Hardinsburg who' had drafted the 1988 wills
the McQuadys had executed. Mr~ McQuady
executed a new will that left his entire estate,
save a hundred dollar bequest to Sl Mary of
the Woods Church, to Ms. Bye.
Subsequent to the execution of the 1989
will, Ms. Bye arranged for a garage to be
constructed on Mr. McQuady's property.
Following completion of the garage Mr.
McQuady's car was never actually stored in
the garage. However, at trial Ms. Bye testi-
fied that her car was periodically parked
inside the garage. The relevance of this
event was that it sparked concern in MJ:.
Beavin and Mr. Richard McQuady with re-
gard to the use of Mr. William McQuady's
money by Ms. Bye. The construction of the
garage concerned Mr. Beavin and Richard
McQuady as the McQuadys had lived in a
fnIgal fashion during their forty-five year
relationship and Mr. McQuady possessed an
older automobile which had never been ga-
raged in the pasl
On May 18, 1990, the petition of Mr. Beav-
in and Mr. Richard McQuady to appoint a
guardian/conservator for William McQuady
was heard. As a result of that hearing the
Breckinridge District Court appointed Mr.
Beavin as a Limited Conservator and Limit-
ed Guardian for Mr. McQuady. Following
the hearing, Mr. McQuady's health declined
and he was admitted to the hospital on Sep-
tember 21, 1990. Mr. McQuady was diag-
nosed as suffering from Alzheimer's disease.
It should be noted that the effects of Al-
zheimer's disease can be accentuated by poor
health and/or poor treatmenl
After Mr. McQuady was diagnosed with
Alzheimer's disease, a petition seeking to
permit Mr. McQuady to marry Ms. Bye was
ffied with the Breckinridge District Courl
On May 17, 1991, a heari;ng was held in
Breckinridge District Court to determine
whether the petition of William McQuady to
marry Ms. Bye should be granted. At that
hearing Mr. McQuady testified that although
he had signed the petition, he was misled in
regard to the nature of the documenl Mr.
McQuady stated that he was ~ld by the Byes
not to worry about it and jlist sign il The
document was prepared ·by Ellen Bye,
daughter of appellanl
During the course of this hearing, Mr.
McQuady emphatically stated that he did not
want to get marrie.d to Ms. Bye. He also
stated that he was afraid of Ms. Bye. The
court denied the petition to marry. Ms.
Bye's services as housekeeper were subse-
quently terminated.
Five months after the hearing on the peti-
tion to marry, Mr. McQuady executed a new
will. The net effect of the will executed
October 29, 1991, was to re-enact the will he
had executed in 1988, in effect leaving his
personalty to Mr. Beavin and his realty to
Mr. Richard McQuady. The ·1991 will was
drafted by Alton Cannon and ~as executed in
his office. Richard McQuady drove William
McQuady to Mr. Cannon's Law Offices, but
Richard McQuady never participated in any
discussion or activities regarding the will.
William McQuady and Mr. Cannon. privately
discussed the will that Mr. McQuady desired.
Whe~ the will was. actually executed Mr.
Cannon, Mrs. Sheila Cannon and William
McQuady were the only three persons pres-
enl
On August 7, 1992, William McQuady died.
Mr. Beavin was appointed executor of
McQuady's estate. Appellant then brought
J - 14
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I'
I
I
I
[8-10] To validly execute a will, a testa-
tor must: (1) know the natural objects of her
bounty; (2) know her obligations to them;
(3) know the character and value of her
estate; and (4) dispose of her estate accord-
ing to her own fixed purpose. Adams v.
Calia, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 661 (1968); Waggener
v. General Ass'n ofBaptists, Ky., 306 S.W.2d
271 (1957); Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801
[2-4] In Kentucky there is a strong pre-
sumption in fa,vor of a testator possessing
adequate testamentary capacity. This pre-
sumption can only be rebutted by the
strongest showing of incapacity.' Williams
v.VoUman, Ky.App'J 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987);
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky .App., 700 S.W.2d
415, 416 (1985). Testamentary capacity is
only relevant at the time of execution of a
will. New v. Croomer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918
(1955). Thus any" order purporting to ren-
der a person per se .unable to dispose of
property by will is void "ab initio, as such a
roling on testamentary capacity would be
premature. This is not to say that such an
order is irrelevant, but rather it is not dis-
positive of the issue of testamentary capaci-
ty.
[5-7] "Kentucky is committed to the doc-
trine of testatQrial absolutism." J. Merritt, 1
Ky.Prac.-Probate Practice & ~ure,
§ 367 (Merritt 2d ed. West 1984). See New
v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955);
Jaclcson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98
S.W.2d 505 (1937). The practical effect of
this doctrine is that the privilege of theciti,
zens of the Commonwealth to draft wills to
dispose of their property is zealously guard~
ed by the courts and will not be disturbed
based on remote or speculative evidence.
American National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Penner, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 751 (1969). ~he
degree of mental capacity required to make a
will is minimal. Nance v. Veazey, Ky., 312
S.W.2d 350, 354 (1958). The minimum level
of mental capacity required to make a will is
less than that necessary to make a deed,
Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69
(1965), or a contract. Warnick v. Childers,
Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608 (1955).
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the instant action, challenging the validity of the judgment.
the 1991 will on grounds of undue influence such roling.
and lack of testamentary capacity. Mr.
Beavin died on October 5, 1993 and Sylvia
Mattingly, Mr. Beavin's daughter, was ap-
pointed by the Breckinridge Circuit Court to
serve as a party-defendant in place of Mr.
Beavin in his capacity as executor.
Following a five day trial, a jury returned
a unanimous verdict for appellees. During
the course of the trial Judge Samuel Mon-
arch, a sitting judge on the Breckinridge
Circuit Court, was called by appellees to
testify as a witness. Judge Monarch had not
been listed by appellees on their witness list.
Judge Monarch testified as to the honeSty
and veracity of his former partner in legal
practice, Alton Cannon. Appellants appealed
the verdict to the Court of Appeals. A divid-
ed panel upheld the trial court. Bye v. Mat-
tingly, Ky.App., 97-eA-I874-MR (Sept. 20,
1996). This Court granted discretionary re-
view. We now affirm the Court of Appeals.
There are several issues which the parties
have brought before this Court. First,
whether a partial disability judgment against
an individual removes that person's testa-
mentary capacity. Second, whether a partial
disability judgment creates a presumption
that a testator lacks testamentary capacity.
Third, whether a. fiduciary relationship be-
tween a limited conservator/guardian and his
ward creates a burden on the limited conser-
vator/guardian to demonstrate the non-exis-
tence of undue influence. Fourth, whether it
is proper for a circuit judge who sits in the
same court as the instant trial to testify as a
character witness. We shall respond to each
of these issues in turn.
I. JUDGMENT OF DISABIUTY PURSU-
ANT TO KRS 387.500 ET SEQ. AND
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.
[1] On July 9, 1990, pursuant to KRS
387.500 et seq., William McQuady was ad-
judged partially disabled in the Breckinridge
District Court. Appellants urge this Court
to role that the effect of such judgment was
to remove McQuady's capacity to draft a will
or in the alternative that a presumption
against testamentary capacity was created by
Ky. 455
We decline to make either
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S.W.2d 691 (1990); Fischer v. Heckerma:n,
Ky.App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989). Merely be-
ing an older person, possessing a failing
memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness
of mental powers or lack or'strict coherence
in conversation does not render one incapa-
ble of validly' executing a will. Wa.rd tI.
Norton, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 193 (1964). "Every
man possessing the requisite mental powers
may dispose of his property by will in any
way he may desire, and a jury will not be
permitted to overthrow it, and to make a will
for him to accord with their ideas of justice
and propriety." Burke v. Burke, Ky.App.,
801 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1991) (citing Cecil's
Ex'rs. v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198, 195 S.W. 837,
846 (1917».
[ll] In the instant case Mr. McQuady
executed wills in 1988, 1989 and 1991. Ap-
pellant seeks to have the 1991 will declared
invalid as it was executed following the 1990
adjudgment of partial incaPacity. While a
ruling of total or partial disability certainly is
evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity, it
is certainly not dispositive of the issue. This
Court has upheld the rights of those aftlicted
with a variety of illnesses to execute· vlllid
wills. Tate 11. Tate's Ex'r, Ky., 275 S.W.2d
597 (1955) (testator suffered deafness and
retarded speech); Bush 'V. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393,
12 S.W. 762 (1889) (testator was bOOd); In
re: McDaniel's Will, 25 Ky. 331 (1829) (tes-
tator was paralyzed); Bodine v. Bodine, 241
Ky. 706, 44 S.W.2d 840 (1932)(testator was an
epileptic). We have not disturbed the testa-
torial privileges of those who believed in
witchcraft 1, spiritualism Z or atheism.•
While none of these cases absolutely parallels
the instant case, we recite them here to
demonstrate how this Court has always tak-
en the broadest possible view of who may
execute a will no matter what their infirmity.
[12] When a testator is suffering from a
mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms
of its effect on the testator's mental compe-
tence, it is presumed that the testator was
mentally fit when the will was executed.
I. Schildnecht v. Rompfs Exx. 9 Ky.Law Rep.
120.4 S.W. 235 (1887)
2. Compton v. Smith, 286 Ky. 179, 150 S.W.2d
657 (1941).
This is commonly referred to as the lucid
interval doctrine. Warnick 11. Childers, Ky.,
282 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1955); Pfuelb 11. Pfuelb,
275 Ky. 588, 122 S.W.2d 128 (1938). See In
re Weir's Will, 39 Ky. 434 (1840); Watts v.
Bullock, 11 Ky. 252 (1822). Alzheimer's is a
disease that is variable in its effect on a
person over time. It is precisely this type of
illness with which the lucid interval doctrine
was designed to deal. By employing this
doctrine, citizens of the Commonwealth who
suffer from a debilitating mental condition
are still able to dispose of their property.
[13, 14] The lucid interval doctrine is only
implicated when there .is evidence that a
testator is suffering from a mental illness;
otherwise the normal presumption in favor of
testamentary capacity is operating. The
burden is placed upon those who seek to
overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of
capacity. Warnick; 282 S.W.2d at 609;
Pfuelb, 275 Ky. at 588, 122 S.W.2d at 128.
The presumption created is a rebuttable one,
so that evidence which demonstrates conclu-
sively that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the
will results in nullifying that will.
In the present case there is no question
that Mr. McQuady suffered from Alzheimers
disease. However, under the doctrine he is
presumed to have been experiencing a lucid
interval during the execution of the will.
The wisdom of this doctrine is demonstrated
by Mr. McQuady's testimony during the
hearing on the petition for marriage in
Breckinridge District court. During that
hearing Mr. McQuady was very lucid and
demonstrated a complete grasp of the cir-
cumstances in which he found himself. Ap-
pellant has failed to offer this Court evidence
which demonstrates that the testator did not
have a lucid interval during which he execut-
ed the 1991 will. In sum, let it suffice to say .
that in the instant case a presumption of a
lucid interval of testamentary capacity was
appropriate.
3. Woodruffs Ex', v. Woodruff, 233 Ky. 744. 26
S.W.2d 751 (1930).
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Given this Court's consistent attitude to-
ward the virtually absolute right of the citi-
zens of the Commonwealth to make wills, it
would be incongruous for us now to announce
a new rule .of law which restricted these
rights which we have held in such high re-
gard for so long. While the clear poliey of
the Commonwealth is that our citizens who
are no longer able to fully care for them-
selves must be protected from the various
societal predators, we will restrict their tes-
tamentary rights only when it is absolutely
necessary and even then only to the degree
required to defend their interests.
II. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND
THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE,
INFLUENCE.
[15-21] Undue influence is a level of per-
suasion which destroys the testator's free will
and replaces it with the desires of the influ-
encer. Nunn v. WiUiams, Ky., 254 S.W.2d
698, 700 (1953); WiUiams v. YoUman, Ky.
App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 850 (1987). In dis-
cerning whether influence on a given testator
is "undue", courts must exarillne both the
nature and the eXtent of the influence.
First, the influence must be of a; type which
is inappropriate. Influence from acts of
kindness, appeals to feeling, or arguments
addressed to the understanding of the testa-
tor are permissible. Nunn, 254 S.W.2d at
700; Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky.App., 772
S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989). Influence from
threats, coercion and the like are improper
and not permitted by the law.. Lucas v.
Cannon, 76 Ky. 650 (1878). Second, the
influence must be of a level that vitiates the
testator's own free will so that the testator is
disposing of her property in a manner that
she would otherwise refuse to do. See v. See,
Ky., 293 S.W.2d 225 (1956); Rough v. John-
son, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 376 (1955). The es-
sence of this inquiry is whether the testator
is exercising her own judgment. Mayhew v.
Mayhew, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 72 (1959); Copley
v. Croft, Ky., 312 S.W.2d 899 (1958).
[22-24] In addition to demonstrating that
undue influence was exercised upon the tes-
tator, a contestant must also show influence
prior to or during the execution of the will.
Undue influence exercised after the execu-
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tion of the will has no bearing whatsoever
upon whether the testator disposed of her
property according to her own wishes. Ben-
nett v. Bennett, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 580 (1970);
Wallace v. Scott. Ky.App., 844 S.W.2d 439
(1992); Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky.App.,772
S.W.2d 642 (1989). The influence must oper-
ate upon the testator at the execution of the
will. If the influence did not affect the testa-
tor, then such conduct is irrelevanl Bodine
v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706, 44 S.W.2d 840 (1932);
Walls v. WaUs, 30 Ky.Law Rep. 948, 99 S:W.
969 (1907). However, even if the influence
OCCUlTed many years prior to the execution
of the will, but operates upon the testator at
the time of execution, it is improper and will
render the will null and void. Id.
[25] To determine whether a will reflects
the wishes of the, testator, the court must
examine the indicia or badges of undue influ-
ence. Such badges include a physically weak
and mentally impaired testator, a will which
is unnatural in its provisions, a recently c:Ie-
veloped and comparatively short period of
close relationship between the testator and
principal beneficiary, participation by the
principal beneficiary in the preparation of the
will, possession of the will by the principal
beneficiary after it was reduced to writing,
efforts by the principal beneficiary to restrict
contacts between the testator and the natural
objects of his bounty, and absolute control of
testator's business affairs. Belcher v. Som-
erviUe, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 620 (1967); Golladay
v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1955).
Applying these badges to the 1991 will, it
is clear that no undue influence was presenl
Given the fact that a partial disability order
was in place when the will was executed,
there is no question that the testator was
physically and mentally·weak. Similarly,
since a disability order was in place, Mr.
Beavin had complete control of the testator's
business affairs. However, none of the other
badges are present with respect to the 1991
vrill. .
[26-28] When a contestant seeks to claim
that undue influence was employed upon a
testator, the burden is upon the contestant to
demonstrate the existence and effect of the
influence. Nunn v. WiUiams, Ky., 254
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S.W.2d 698, 700 (1953). Merely demonstrat-
ing that the opportunity to exert such influ-
ence is not sufficient to sustain the burden of
proof. Id. When undue influence and a men-
tally impaired testator are both alleged and
the mental impairment. of the testator is
proven, the level of undue influence which
must be shown is less than would nonnally
be required since the testator is in a weak-
ened state. Creason 11. Creason, Ky., 392
S.W.2d 69 (1965); Sloan 11. Sloan, 303 Ky.
180,197 S.W.2d 77, 80 (1946).
[29,30] In Kentucky no presumption of
undue influence m::ises from. a bequest by a
testator who has a confidential relationship
with the beneficiary. Palmer 11. Richardson,
311 Ky. 190, 197, 223 S.W.2d 745, 749-50
(1949); McAtee v. McAtee, 297 Ky. 865, 874,
181 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1944); Kiefer's Ez'r v.
Deibel, 292 Ky. 318, 166 S.W.2d 430, 433-34
(1942); 1 Ky. Prae.-Probate Practice & Pr0-
cedure, § 555 <Merritt 2d ed.l984). There is
no question when a testator who has a confi-
dential relationship with one who· receives a
benefit under a will, such a transaction
should certainly be examined and placed into
evidence before the jury, but no presumption
of wrongdoing is created. In fact, it is not
uncommon or inappropriate for a testator to
make such a bequest to one who has provid-
ed comfort and support to the testator. Eck-
en's Ex'x 11. Abbey, 283 Ky. 449, 141 S.W.2d
863 (1940); Karr 11. Karr's Ex'r, 283 Ky. 355,
141 S.W.2d 279 (1940).
[31] We wish to no~ that in making this
ruling we are not disturbing the well-settled
rule that a contraetbetween a guardian and
ward does indeed create a presumption
against the transaction which must be rebut-
ted by the guardian with clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Meade· 11. Fullerton's Adm~
266 Ky. 34, 98 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1936). The
distinction between a bequest in a will and a
transaction between two parties is that a will
gift does not invol~e conflicting interests.
However, in a transaction, the parties are
placed in an adversarial relationship in which
each party is attempting to maximize his or
her own benefit without regard to the other.
Accordingly, all contracts between a ward
and guardian are due a much higher level of
scrutiny and thus the presumption against
them is created.
[32] Accordingly, since no presumption
against the validity of the 1991 will exists,
the burden was on the appellant to show that
the 1991 will was procured through undue
influence. A jury unanimously found that
the 1991 will was not procured by undue
influence. Nothing appellant has offered this
Court even comes close to rising to the level
necessary to set the jury's verdict aside.
This Court is particularly disinclined to set
aside a jury's decision in which it has found a
will to be valid. Rodgers 11. Cheshire, Ky.,
421 S.W.2d 599 (1967). .
Appellant's argument, based on the idea
that because the testator had been adjudi-
cated as mentally intinn, he was more sus-
ceptible to undue influence, is indeed an in-
teresting one. However, for some reason
appellant urges this Court not to eJ(.amine
the 1989 will, procured under suspicious cir-
cumstances (under which she.benefitted) but
rather only apply its undue influence analy-
sis to the 1991 will. We decline her invita-
tioll to do so. If testator was in a mentally
feeble condition in July of 1990, then it is
certainly possible-in fact likely-that he
was in a similar condition one year earlier
when he willed his entire estate to appellant.
We find appellant's argument unpersuasive.
However, as we find no undue influence in
the execution of the 1991 Will, we have no
occasion to fully review the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the 1989 will.
[33-35] There is a presumption which
has some potential application to the instant
ease. In those instances in which a will is
grossly unreasonable and the principal bene-
ficiary actively participated in its execution, a
presumption of undue influence arises. Hol-
lon's Ex'r v. Graham., Ky., 280 S.W.2d 544
(1955); Gay v. Gay, 308 Ky. 539, 215 S.W.2d
92 (1948). If the contestant can offer evi-
dence of such activities, then the burden of
persuasion shifts to the proponents of the
will, but it does not relieve the contestants of
the continuing burden of proof. Gay, 308
Ky. at 539, 215 S.W.2d at 92; Kiefer'S Ex'r 11.
Deibet 292 Ky. 318, 166 S.W.2d 430 (1942).
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The executions of the 1989 and 1991 wills
are virtually identical in their facts. In 1989,
Ms. Bye drove the testator to a lawyer and
Ms. Bye was not privy to the drafting nor
execution of the will. Following the execu-
tion ritual, Ms. Bye drove the testator home.
In 1991, the same circumstance was repeated
with Mr. Beavin driving testator to and from
the lawyer's offices. Under neither of these
circumstances can we say that Ms. Bye nor
Mr. Beavin actively participated in the execu-
tion of the respective wills. Accordingly, this
presumption does not apply in the instant
case.
III. APPEARANCE OF SITTING CIR-
CUIT JUDGE AS A WITNESS AT
TRIAL IN HIS OWN COURTHOUSE.
[36] During the course of the trial, appel-
lant sought to discredit the 1991 will by
discrediting its drafter, Alton Cannon. Ap-
pellant now complains that she was unfairly
surprised when appellees were permitted to
call Circuit Judge Samuel Monarch, who sits
in the Breckinridge Circuit Court where this
case was tried, as a character witness to
rebut appellant's attacks on Mr. Cannon.
Appellant asserts, inter alia, that it was im-
proper for Judge Monarch to be permitted to
testify as a witness in the very courthouse in
which he was then sitting as a Circuit Judge.
Appellant further complains that he had pre-
sided over the same panel of veniremen and
at least two of the jurors had been jurors in a
previous trial which Judge Monarch had con-
ducted. It should be noted that Judge Mon-
arch recused himself from participating in
the instant case due to his previous relation-
ship with Alton Cannon.
Obviously it is preferable that a sitting
jurist never be called upon to testify in a
trial, particularly within the jurisdiction over
which he presides and very particularly in
front of a panel of veniremen over which he
originally presided. While this Court· does
not agree with appellant's characterization of
appellees conduct as the "ultimate Home
Cookin'" ploy, we are in gen~ agreement
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that this was a very unfortunate situation
which should be avoided whenever possible.
However, we find singularly uncompelling
appellant's argument that she was "blind-
sided" by Judge Monarch's surprise appear-
ance, particularly after she placed Mr. Can-
non's crec:hbility in issue in the first place.
As the trial record clearly reflects, appel-
lant decided to attempt to denigrate Mr.
Cannon's reputation in an attempt to cast the
execution of the 1991 will into doubl This
was a perfectly permissible trial strategy.
However, appellant cannot now speak out of
the other side of her mouth and say that she
had no idea that a character witness might
be called to rebut her assaull Appellees are
under no obligation to warn appellant of their
possible response to" appellant's every con-
ceivable course of action. -
Under Canon 2(b) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, codified at- SCR 4.300, a "judge
should not . .. testify voluntarily as a charac-
ter witness." Judge Monarch was .served
with a subpoena by appellees. Accordingly,
he did not testify voluntarily within the
meaning of Canon 2(b). Since Judge Mon-
arch's testimony was permissible, given its
relative brevity and limited scope, anY'error
which may have occurred was', certainly
harmless.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is at-
finned...
COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE,
LAMBERT and STUMBO, JJ., concur.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., con~urs in result
only.
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